CL
Closed Limelike Curves
Wed, Feb 28, 2024 6:36 PM
Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable
to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
Germany.
Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable
to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
Germany.
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Wed, Feb 28, 2024 7:32 PM
It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
participation-failure, a pass.
I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
irrelevant to strategy.
But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows that
single-winner elections aren’t perfect. …making a good argument for
PR…monotonic PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany feels
no need to compromise participation.
We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the world’s
countries for about a century.
But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck in
the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to
democracy.
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable
to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
Germany.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
participation-failure, a pass.
I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
irrelevant to strategy.
But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows that
single-winner elections aren’t perfect. …making a good argument for
PR…*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany feels
no need to compromise participation.
We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the world’s
countries for about a century.
But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck in
the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to
democracy.
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
> have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable
> to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
> Germany.
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
CL
Closed Limelike Curves
Thu, Feb 29, 2024 4:57 AM
It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on , and
courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone voting
rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for Begich's
campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate Republican
plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme Court, without
being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes his case look
even stronger.
On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of a
judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop caring about
all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain participation
failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska Republicans that
Begich lost because he got *too many votes. *
One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
the opposite of what you ask it to).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
participation-failure, a pass.
I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
irrelevant to strategy.
But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
that single-winner elections aren’t perfect. …making a good argument for
PR…monotonic PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany feels
no need to compromise participation.
We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
world’s countries for about a century.
But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck in
the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to
democracy.
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable
to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
Germany.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
>
> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>
I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on , and
courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone voting
rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for Begich's
campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate Republican
plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme Court, without
being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes his case look
even stronger.
On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of a
judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop caring about
all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain participation
failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska Republicans that
Begich lost because *he got* *too many votes. *
One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
the opposite of what you ask it to).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>
> It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
> Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
> participation-failure, a pass.
>
> I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
> incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
> the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
> improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
> irrelevant to strategy.
>
> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
> that single-winner elections aren’t perfect. …making a good argument for
> PR…*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>
> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany feels
> no need to compromise participation.
>
> We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
> world’s countries for about a century.
>
> But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck in
> the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to
> democracy.
>
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
>> have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable
>> to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
>> Germany.
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
CL
Closed Limelike Curves
Thu, Feb 29, 2024 5:07 AM
Always electing the voted CW brings strategy improvement, & the
unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably irrelevant to
strategy.
I lean towards agreeing, which is why I brought this up. Condorcet and
participation conflict with each other in theory, but such pathologies seem
likely to be rare in practice. OTOH, "We promise we'll only occasionally
violate your basic constitutional rights" strikes me as an argument that
wouldn't hold up in court. Some alternative criterion that gets us "99% of
the way to Condorcet," so it behaves like Condorcet except in the rare
cases where it conflicts with participation (or maybe just
mono-add-top/remove-bottom).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 8:57 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on , and
courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone voting
rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for Begich's
campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate Republican
plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme Court, without
being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes his case look
even stronger.
On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of a
judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop caring about
all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain participation
failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska Republicans that
Begich lost because he got *too many votes. *
One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
the opposite of what you ask it to).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
participation-failure, a pass.
I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
irrelevant to strategy.
But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
that single-winner elections aren’t perfect. …making a good argument for
PR…monotonic PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany feels
no need to compromise participation.
We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
world’s countries for about a century.
But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck in
the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to
democracy.
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
methods have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
vulnerable to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
seen in Germany.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
>
> Always electing the voted CW brings strategy improvement, & the
> unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably irrelevant to
> strategy.
I lean towards agreeing, which is why I brought this up. Condorcet and
participation conflict with each other in theory, but such pathologies seem
likely to be rare in practice. OTOH, "We promise we'll only *occasionally*
violate your basic constitutional rights" strikes me as an argument that
wouldn't hold up in court. Some alternative criterion that gets us "99% of
the way to Condorcet," so it behaves like Condorcet except in the rare
cases where it conflicts with participation (or maybe just
mono-add-top/remove-bottom).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 8:57 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>
> I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on , and
> courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone voting
> rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
> challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
> possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
> monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
>
> The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for Begich's
> campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate Republican
> plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme Court, without
> being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes his case look
> even stronger.
>
> On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of a
> judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop caring about
> all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain participation
> failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska Republicans that
> Begich lost because *he got* *too many votes. *
>
> One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
> should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
> failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
> the opposite of what you ask it to).
>
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>
>> It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
>> Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
>> participation-failure, a pass.
>>
>> I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
>> incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
>> the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
>> improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
>> irrelevant to strategy.
>>
>> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
>> that single-winner elections aren’t perfect. …making a good argument for
>> PR…*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>>
>> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany feels
>> no need to compromise participation.
>>
>> We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
>> world’s countries for about a century.
>>
>> But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck in
>> the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to
>> democracy.
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
>>> methods have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>>> vulnerable to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
>>> seen in Germany.
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Thu, Feb 29, 2024 5:15 AM
👍
Michael Ossipoff reacted via Gmail
<https://www.google.com/gmail/about/?utm_source=gmail-in-product&utm_medium=et&utm_campaign=emojireactionemail#app>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Thu, Feb 29, 2024 5:24 AM
👍 Yes , if someone goes into a Condorcet election, & votes X over Y, & hir
vote changes the winner from X to Y, I’d have to agree that due process has
been distinctly violated, & that X’s & that voter’s protection hasn’t been
very equal.
Approval won’t do that, or anything nonsensical like that, such as
Consistency violation.
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 20:57 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on , and
courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone voting
rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for Begich's
campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate Republican
plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme Court, without
being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes his case look
even stronger.
On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of a
judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop caring about
all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain participation
failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska Republicans that
Begich lost because he got *too many votes. *
One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
the opposite of what you ask it to).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
participation-failure, a pass.
I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
irrelevant to strategy.
But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
that single-winner elections aren’t perfect. …making a good argument for
PR…monotonic PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany feels
no need to compromise participation.
We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
world’s countries for about a century.
But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck in
the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to
democracy.
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
methods have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
vulnerable to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
seen in Germany.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
👍 Yes , if someone goes into a Condorcet election, & votes X over Y, & hir
vote changes the winner from X to Y, I’d have to agree that due process has
been distinctly violated, & that X’s & that voter’s protection hasn’t been
very equal.
Approval won’t do that, or anything nonsensical like that, such as
Consistency violation.
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 20:57 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>
> I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on , and
> courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone voting
> rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
> challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
> possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
> monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
>
> The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for Begich's
> campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate Republican
> plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme Court, without
> being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes his case look
> even stronger.
>
> On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of a
> judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop caring about
> all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain participation
> failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska Republicans that
> Begich lost because *he got* *too many votes. *
>
> One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
> should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
> failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
> the opposite of what you ask it to).
>
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>
>> It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
>> Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
>> participation-failure, a pass.
>>
>> I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
>> incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
>> the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
>> improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
>> irrelevant to strategy.
>>
>> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
>> that single-winner elections aren’t perfect. …making a good argument for
>> PR…*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>>
>> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany feels
>> no need to compromise participation.
>>
>> We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
>> world’s countries for about a century.
>>
>> But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck in
>> the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to
>> democracy.
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
>>> methods have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>>> vulnerable to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
>>> seen in Germany.
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Thu, Feb 29, 2024 5:29 AM
Rename nonmonotonicity “Opposite Response”. It seems to me that I’ve heard
it called that.
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 21:24 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
👍 Yes , if someone goes into a Condorcet election, & votes X over Y, &
hir vote changes the winner from X to Y, I’d have to agree that due process
has been distinctly violated, & that X’s & that voter’s protection hasn’t
been very equal.
Approval won’t do that, or anything nonsensical like that, such as
Consistency violation.
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 20:57 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on , and
courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone voting
rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for Begich's
campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate Republican
plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme Court, without
being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes his case look
even stronger.
On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of a
judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop caring about
all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain participation
failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska Republicans that
Begich lost because he got *too many votes. *
One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
the opposite of what you ask it to).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
participation-failure, a pass.
I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
irrelevant to strategy.
But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
that single-winner elections aren’t perfect. …making a good argument for
PR…monotonic PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany
feels no need to compromise participation.
We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
world’s countries for about a century.
But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck in
the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to
democracy.
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
methods have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
vulnerable to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
seen in Germany.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
Rename nonmonotonicity “Opposite Response”. It seems to me that I’ve heard
it called that.
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 21:24 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>
> 👍 Yes , if someone goes into a Condorcet election, & votes X over Y, &
> hir vote changes the winner from X to Y, I’d have to agree that due process
> has been distinctly violated, & that X’s & that voter’s protection hasn’t
> been very equal.
>
> Approval won’t do that, or anything nonsensical like that, such as
> Consistency violation.
>
>
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 20:57 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>
>> I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on , and
>> courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone voting
>> rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
>> challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
>> possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
>> monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
>>
>> The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for Begich's
>> campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate Republican
>> plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme Court, without
>> being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes his case look
>> even stronger.
>>
>> On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of a
>> judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop caring about
>> all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain participation
>> failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska Republicans that
>> Begich lost because *he got* *too many votes. *
>>
>> One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
>> should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
>> failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
>> the opposite of what you ask it to).
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>
>>> It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
>>> Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
>>> participation-failure, a pass.
>>>
>>> I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
>>> incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
>>> the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
>>> improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
>>> irrelevant to strategy.
>>>
>>> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
>>> that single-winner elections aren’t perfect. …making a good argument for
>>> PR…*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>>>
>>> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany
>>> feels no need to compromise participation.
>>>
>>> We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
>>> world’s countries for about a century.
>>>
>>> But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck in
>>> the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to
>>> democracy.
>>>
>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
>>>> methods have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>>>> vulnerable to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
>>>> seen in Germany.
>>>> ----
>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>>> info
>>>>
>>>
KV
Kevin Venzke
Thu, Feb 29, 2024 5:36 AM
Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods have
plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable to
court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in Germany.
No, I don't think Condorcet can be weakened and result in anything interesting.
Participation is just too demanding. I have a calculator where I try to show
most single-winner rank ballot methods of interest:
votingmethods.net/calc
The methods here that satisfy Participation are just FPP, Borda, DAC, DSC, and
I guess "implicit approval." If I could think of more Participation methods
(other than additional Borda variants) I would probably add them.
Kevin
votingmethods.net
Hello,
Feb 28 2024 à 12:37:01 UTC−6, Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> a écrit :
> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods have
> plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable to
> court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in Germany.
No, I don't think Condorcet can be weakened and result in anything interesting.
Participation is just too demanding. I have a calculator where I try to show
most single-winner rank ballot methods of interest:
votingmethods.net/calc
The methods here that satisfy Participation are just FPP, Borda, DAC, DSC, and
I guess "implicit approval." If I could think of more Participation methods
(other than additional Borda variants) I would probably add them.
Kevin
votingmethods.net
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Thu, Feb 29, 2024 5:47 AM
. Some alternative criterion that gets us "99% of the way to Condorcet,"
so it behaves like Condorcet except in the rare cases where it conflicts
with participation (or maybe just mono-add-top/remove-bottom).
There might be better ways, but there’s always the lexicographical way. The
criterion could require that Participation (& other non-opposite-response
criteria) & Consistency be met. …& that the voted CW, when there is one
must be elected when that doesn’t conflict with the above requirements.
A complying method could just repeat that wording, along with a
specification about what to do if there’s no voted CW, & what to do if the
ballot-configuration is such that additional of a new ballot could violate
Participation, or if some division of the electorate into 2 parts could
show a Consistency violation.
Maybe apply Implicit-Approval to the ballots then. (Ranked = approved)
It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on , and
courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone voting
rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for Begich's
campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate Republican
plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme Court, without
being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes his case look
even stronger.
On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of a
judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop caring about
all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain participation
failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska Republicans that
Begich lost because he got *too many votes. *
One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
the opposite of what you ask it to).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
participation-failure, a pass.
I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
irrelevant to strategy.
But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
that single-winner elections aren’t perfect. …making a good argument for
PR…monotonic PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany
feels no need to compromise participation.
We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
world’s countries for about a century.
But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck in
the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to
democracy.
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
methods have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
vulnerable to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
seen in Germany.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 21:07 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
> . Some alternative criterion that gets us "99% of the way to Condorcet,"
>> so it behaves like Condorcet except in the rare cases where it conflicts
>> with participation (or maybe just mono-add-top/remove-bottom).
>
>
There might be better ways, but there’s always the lexicographical way. The
criterion could require that Participation (& other non-opposite-response
criteria) & Consistency be met. …& that the voted CW, when there is one
must be elected when that doesn’t conflict with the above requirements.
A complying method could just repeat that wording, along with a
specification about what to do if there’s no voted CW, & what to do if the
ballot-configuration is such that additional of a new ballot could violate
Participation, or if some division of the electorate into 2 parts could
show a Consistency violation.
Maybe apply Implicit-Approval to the ballots then. (Ranked = approved)
>
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 8:57 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>
>> I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on , and
>> courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone voting
>> rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
>> challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
>> possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
>> monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
>>
>> The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for Begich's
>> campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate Republican
>> plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme Court, without
>> being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes his case look
>> even stronger.
>>
>> On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of a
>> judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop caring about
>> all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain participation
>> failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska Republicans that
>> Begich lost because *he got* *too many votes. *
>>
>> One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
>> should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
>> failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
>> the opposite of what you ask it to).
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>
>>> It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
>>> Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
>>> participation-failure, a pass.
>>>
>>> I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
>>> incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
>>> the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
>>> improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
>>> irrelevant to strategy.
>>>
>>> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
>>> that single-winner elections aren’t perfect. …making a good argument for
>>> PR…*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>>>
>>> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany
>>> feels no need to compromise participation.
>>>
>>> We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
>>> world’s countries for about a century.
>>>
>>> But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck in
>>> the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to
>>> democracy.
>>>
>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
>>>> methods have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>>>> vulnerable to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
>>>> seen in Germany.
>>>> ----
>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>>> info
>>>>
>>>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Thu, Feb 29, 2024 6:07 AM
I call RP(wv) with that modification “Nonsense-Free RP(wv)”, & propose it
for Germany’s single-winner elections, including the single member district
elections in their Additional-Member proportional topping-up Parliamentary
elections.
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 21:47 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
. Some alternative criterion that gets us "99% of the way to Condorcet,"
so it behaves like Condorcet except in the rare cases where it conflicts
with participation (or maybe just mono-add-top/remove-bottom).
There might be better ways, but there’s always the lexicographical way.
The criterion could require that Participation (& other
non-opposite-response criteria) & Consistency be met. …& that the voted
CW, when there is one must be elected when that doesn’t conflict with the
above requirements.
A complying method could just repeat that wording, along with a
specification about what to do if there’s no voted CW, & what to do if the
ballot-configuration is such that additional of a new ballot could violate
Participation, or if some division of the electorate into 2 parts could
show a Consistency violation.
Maybe apply Implicit-Approval to the ballots then. (Ranked = approved)
It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on , and
courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone voting
rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for
Begich's campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate
Republican plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme
Court, without being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes
his case look even stronger.
On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of a
judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop caring about
all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain participation
failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska Republicans that
Begich lost because he got *too many votes. *
One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
the opposite of what you ask it to).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <
email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
participation-failure, a pass.
I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
irrelevant to strategy.
But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
that single-winner elections aren’t perfect. …making a good argument for
PR…monotonic PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany
feels no need to compromise participation.
We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
world’s countries for about a century.
But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck
in the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on
to democracy.
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
methods have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
vulnerable to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
seen in Germany.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
list info
I call RP(wv) with that modification “Nonsense-Free RP(wv)”, & propose it
for Germany’s single-winner elections, including the single member district
elections in their Additional-Member proportional topping-up Parliamentary
elections.
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 21:47 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 21:07 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> . Some alternative criterion that gets us "99% of the way to Condorcet,"
>>> so it behaves like Condorcet except in the rare cases where it conflicts
>>> with participation (or maybe just mono-add-top/remove-bottom).
>>
>>
> There might be better ways, but there’s always the lexicographical way.
> The criterion could require that Participation (& other
> non-opposite-response criteria) & Consistency be met. …& that the voted
> CW, when there is one must be elected when that doesn’t conflict with the
> above requirements.
>
> A complying method could just repeat that wording, along with a
> specification about what to do if there’s no voted CW, & what to do if the
> ballot-configuration is such that additional of a new ballot could violate
> Participation, or if some division of the electorate into 2 parts could
> show a Consistency violation.
>
> Maybe apply Implicit-Approval to the ballots then. (Ranked = approved)
>
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 8:57 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>>
>>> I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on , and
>>> courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone voting
>>> rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
>>> challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
>>> possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
>>> monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
>>>
>>> The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for
>>> Begich's campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate
>>> Republican plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme
>>> Court, without being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes
>>> his case look even stronger.
>>>
>>> On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of a
>>> judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop caring about
>>> all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain participation
>>> failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska Republicans that
>>> Begich lost because *he got* *too many votes. *
>>>
>>> One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
>>> should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
>>> failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
>>> the opposite of what you ask it to).
>>>
>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>>
>>>> It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
>>>> Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
>>>> participation-failure, a pass.
>>>>
>>>> I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
>>>> incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
>>>> the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
>>>> improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
>>>> irrelevant to strategy.
>>>>
>>>> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
>>>> that single-winner elections aren’t perfect. …making a good argument for
>>>> PR…*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>>>>
>>>> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany
>>>> feels no need to compromise participation.
>>>>
>>>> We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
>>>> world’s countries for about a century.
>>>>
>>>> But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck
>>>> in the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on
>>>> to democracy.
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>> closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
>>>>> methods have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>>>>> vulnerable to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
>>>>> seen in Germany.
>>>>> ----
>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>> list info
>>>>>
>>>>
