If, using voted rankings, Sequential-Pairwise’s comparison-order is determined by giving, to the candidates with higher top-count score, a later position in the comparison-order, so that voters don’t know what the comparison-order will be… … …& if voters’ knowledge of eachother’s preferences is no better than it is now in political-elections… … …Does that Sequential-Pairwise election have an offensive strategy with gain-expectation comparable to what it would have in MinMax, RP & CSSD? …And, if so, is there a defensive strategy to thwart or deter that offensive strategy? …That seems of interest because Sequential-Pairwise is so much less computationally-demanding than the other pairwise-count methods. If, using voted rankings, Sequential-Pairwise’s comparison-order is determined by giving, to the candidates with higher top-count score, a later position in the comparison-order, so that voters don’t know what the comparison-order will be… … …& if voters’ knowledge of eachother’s preferences is no better than it is now in political-elections… … …Does that Sequential-Pairwise election have an offensive strategy with gain-expectation comparable to what it would have in MinMax, RP & CSSD? …And, if so, is there a defensive strategy to thwart or deter that offensive strategy? …That seems of interest because Sequential-Pairwise is so much less computationally-demanding than the other pairwise-count methods.

So called BTR-IRV, "Bottom Two Runoff IRV" goes along those lines. You probably remember "Benham" that runs IRV elimination until there remains a candidate undefeated by any of the other remaining candidates. This reminds me of basing the Sequential Pairwise Elimination agenda order on Top preferences ... by using those preferences to "de-clone" the Borda agenda order: The agenda order is given by SB(X), the Sum over all ballots B of the first place votes of the candidates ranked above X on B. The larger SB(X), the later X is (on average) in the rankings, and the rearlier X is in the elimination agenda. On Wed, Sep 20, 2023, 4:56 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > If, using voted rankings, Sequential-Pairwise’s comparison-order is > determined by giving, to the candidates with higher top-count score, a > later position in the comparison-order, so that voters don’t know what the > comparison-order will be… > > … > > …& if voters’ knowledge of eachother’s preferences is no better than it is > now in political-elections… > > … > > …Does that Sequential-Pairwise election have an offensive strategy with > gain-expectation comparable to what it would have in MinMax, RP & CSSD? > > > > …And, if so, is there a defensive strategy to thwart or deter that > offensive strategy? > > > > …That seems of interest because Sequential-Pairwise is so much less > computationally-demanding than the other pairwise-count methods. > > If, using voted rankings, Sequential-Pairwise’s comparison-order is > determined by giving, to the candidates with higher top-count score, a > later position in the comparison-order, so that voters don’t know what the > comparison-order will be… > > … > > …& if voters’ knowledge of eachother’s preferences is no better than it is > now in political-elections… > > … > > …Does that Sequential-Pairwise election have an offensive strategy with > gain-expectation comparable to what it would have in MinMax, RP & CSSD? > > > > …And, if so, is there a defensive strategy to thwart or deter that > offensive strategy? > > > > …That seems of interest because Sequential-Pairwise is so much less > computationally-demanding than the other pairwise-count methods. > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >

Yes, that fancier Sequential Pairwise ordering method would make it harder for a strategist to guess anything about the comparison-order…when, instead of the candidate’s top-count, it uses the sum of the top-counts of those above him on each ballot. An extra layer of unpredictability for a would-be strategist. The vulnerability of the simplest-defined procedure would have to be weighed against what polls & focus-groups say about people’s requirement for definition-simplicity & brevity. Undeniably the more multi-layered & unpredictable ordering procedure is more strategy-proof & better. Strategy-evaluation for Condorcet-complying pairwise-count methods has proven to be complicated & more difficult than one would expect. But it now seems for sure that there are such methods that are sufficiently offensive-strategy-proof or well-protected from offensive-strategy. It’s only a question of how many & which ones. The Condorcet-IRV-Runoff hybrids hold promise, with merit to always be balanced with what is heard in polls & focus groups about definition-brevity. So I’m sure that I’ll propose & recommend good Condorcet versions (even if I don’t yet know which ones & how many) over IRV. …but I’ll nonetheless include IRV among the methods that I offer, because it’s better than a lot of people believe. …though its merit & workability strongly depend on the electorate & the candidate-lineup. I.e. Because it isn’t Condorcet-complying, it’s necessary that the electorate aren’t timid lesser-evil giveaway voters. But an electorate that has just enacted IRV in a referendum didn’t do so because they want to rank Lesser-Evil over their favorite. They enacted it because they want to rank sincerely, to express & fully help their favorite. Let’s support Oregon’s IRV (RCV) referendum next year! Though IRV doesn’t meet the Condorcet Criterion, it meets Mutual-Majority: IRV always elects the candidate of the largest faction of the Mutual-Majority. …The favorite candidate of the Mutual-Majority. IRV didn’t “fail” in Burlington & Alaska. It did what it’s supposed to do. We don’t yet have a big Condorcet organization, or referenda, initiatives or strong lobbying for it, but let’s support the already ongoing enactment efforts for IRV, now named RCV. On Wed, Sep 20, 2023 at 18:24 Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> wrote: > So called BTR-IRV, "Bottom Two Runoff IRV" goes along those lines. > > You probably remember "Benham" that runs IRV elimination until there > remains a candidate undefeated by any of the other remaining candidates. > > This reminds me of basing the Sequential Pairwise Elimination agenda order > on Top preferences ... by using those preferences to "de-clone" the Borda > agenda order: > > The agenda order is given by SB(X), the Sum over all ballots B of the > first place votes of the candidates ranked above X on B. > > The larger SB(X), the later X is (on average) in the rankings, and the > rearlier X is in the elimination agenda. > > > > On Wed, Sep 20, 2023, 4:56 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> If, using voted rankings, Sequential-Pairwise’s comparison-order is >> determined by giving, to the candidates with higher top-count score, a >> later position in the comparison-order, so that voters don’t know what the >> comparison-order will be… >> >> … >> >> …& if voters’ knowledge of eachother’s preferences is no better than it >> is now in political-elections… >> >> … >> >> …Does that Sequential-Pairwise election have an offensive strategy with >> gain-expectation comparable to what it would have in MinMax, RP & CSSD? >> >> >> >> …And, if so, is there a defensive strategy to thwart or deter that >> offensive strategy? >> >> >> >> …That seems of interest because Sequential-Pairwise is so much less >> computationally-demanding than the other pairwise-count methods. >> >> If, using voted rankings, Sequential-Pairwise’s comparison-order is >> determined by giving, to the candidates with higher top-count score, a >> later position in the comparison-order, so that voters don’t know what the >> comparison-order will be… >> >> … >> >> …& if voters’ knowledge of eachother’s preferences is no better than it >> is now in political-elections… >> >> … >> >> …Does that Sequential-Pairwise election have an offensive strategy with >> gain-expectation comparable to what it would have in MinMax, RP & CSSD? >> >> >> >> …And, if so, is there a defensive strategy to thwart or deter that >> offensive strategy? >> >> >> >> …That seems of interest because Sequential-Pairwise is so much less >> computationally-demanding than the other pairwise-count methods. >> > ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >

Hi everyone, Oh Michael...where do I begin? Your apparent move to the dark side makes me sad. I realize that this intro may sound condescending, but I truly don't mean it that way. I deeply respect your opinion. YOU were the one who taught me about "center squeeze" in 1995 or so, and made me rethink AV/PV/IRV/RCV (or whatever the name of the week is). I just think you're incorrect about FairVote. More inline below..... On Wed, Sep 20, 2023 at 10:32 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > Yes, that fancier Sequential Pairwise ordering method would make it harder > for a strategist to guess anything about the comparison-order…when, instead > of the candidate’s top-count, it uses the sum of the top-counts of those > above him on each ballot. > > An extra layer of unpredictability for a would-be strategist. > > The vulnerability of the simplest-defined procedure would have to be > weighed against what polls & focus-groups say about people’s requirement > for definition-simplicity & brevity. > RCV is already poorly understood. When I moved to San Francisco in 2011, I expected to grudgingly like voting in RCV elections, and I expected to enjoy ranking my choices What I found instead was that very few people here understand how votes are counted, and many folks in my lefty political tribe here take great pride in their ignorance of math and the inner workings of their electoral system, trusting that the powers-that-be will count things correctly. As "exhibit A", I will point to the recent clown show in Alameda County (i.e. just a few miles east of me, on the other side of a puddle known as the "San Francisco Bay"): https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Alameda-County-admits-tallying-error-in-17682520.php It would seem that they had been counting RCV elections wrong for DECADES, and only noticed the problem in 2022. Simplicity and precinct summability matters. Undeniably the more multi-layered & unpredictable ordering procedure is > more strategy-proof & better. > > Strategy-evaluation for Condorcet-complying pairwise-count methods has > proven to be complicated & more difficult than one would expect. > This I will agree with. That is why I've hopped on the approval voting bandwagon for single-winner reform. I've been (more-or-less) aligned with FairVote when it comes to multi-winner reform, since the many of the problems with STV dissipate as the number of seats being selected for rises. For example, using STV to proportionally select members of a 5-seat board helps ensure diverse representation. I'm not aware of anyplace in the SF Bay Area that is doing that, though. What they do is divide the land inside the city/county/whatever into districts, and then performs single-winner elections in each district. It's horrific. But it now seems for sure that there are such methods that are sufficiently > offensive-strategy-proof or well-protected from offensive-strategy. It’s > only a question of how many & which ones. > > The Condorcet-IRV-Runoff hybrids hold promise, with merit to always be > balanced with what is heard in polls & focus groups about > definition-brevity. > > So I’m sure that I’ll propose & recommend good Condorcet versions (even if > I don’t yet know which ones & how many) over IRV. > > …but I’ll nonetheless include IRV among the methods that I offer, because > it’s better than a lot of people believe. …though its merit & workability > strongly depend on the electorate & the candidate-lineup. > > I.e. Because it isn’t Condorcet-complying, it’s necessary that the > electorate aren’t timid lesser-evil giveaway voters. > Back in 2018, I was heavily involved in lefty politics. The mayor (Ed Lee) dropped dead while grocery shopping at a Safeway that I had been to many times. He wasn't 500 years old; and he seemed in good health. It was truly a surprise to everyone, Suddenly, we had nearly a dozen local politicians with almost no name recognition competing to be the next mayor: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_San_Francisco_mayoral_special_election The good news: the Condorcet winner (London Breed) won the election. The bad news: it was a close election, almost exclusively centered on identity politics (though YIMBY vs NIMBY also played a factor). There were three well-funded candidates (Breed: who was "the establishment" candidate, born and raised in the Fillmore, which USED TO BE an affordable neighborhood in SF, and she would become our first Black woman serving as mayor), Mark Leno (who would have become our first openly gay mayor), and Jane Kim (who promised to be our first Korean-American mayor). Having only lived here since 2011, I still considered myself new(-ish) to the political scene. I asked a friend (who I met in a lefty political org here in SF) who I should vote for. He said "None of them. They're all corrupt. Breed's funded by Conway." I didn't know who George Conway was at the time, but that didn't matter. I was looking for a mainstream(-ish) candidate to put SOMEWHERE in my ranking, so that I could evaluate the niche candidates relative to my mainstream anchor. I pressed him: "if someone was holding a gun to your head, and you had to choose between Breed, Kim, or Leno, who would you choose?". He refused to answer, despite how hard I pressed on the issue. The polls leading up to the election were spotty and difficult to decipher. Most of the news coverage was about the Breed/Leno/Kim food fight. Breed had served as mayor for a day or two after Ed Lee died, but there was a political food fight over her running for mayor after getting to be the incumbent, so she was removed as mayor. I think that helped her, since (at least for me) it made her a bit more sympathetic candidate, and given that the rules said she should be mayor (as previous President of the Board of Supervisors). Many SF voters get high and mighty about "rule of law", and yet, the law was changed just as soon as a Black woman took office. My point: I'm guessing that my activist friend was one of the dreaded "bullet voters" that FairVote misinforms people about. I find FairVote a flawed organization, and I specifically think that founder/leader Rob Richie to be a deeply unethical (perhaps even Machiavellian) political player. Approval voting finds consensus candidates in a way that I think the electorate can understand. "Mark all of the candidates you approve of, and the candidate with the highest approval rating wins" I suspect that approval voting is better at rooting out corruption than RCV, and I have some more anecdotal evidence to back me up. St. Louis switched their mayoral elections to approval top-two. The primary election selects the two candidates with the highest approval rating, and the general election decides between the last two. All eyes in the electoral reform community were on St. Louis, and St. Louis also elected their first Black woman to be their mayor: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_St._Louis_mayoral_election If you've never been to St. Louis, I'll break it down for you. The north part of town is the flood plain at the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers. It's where the poor people live, and many of them are Black. South of Interstate 44 (which replaced "Route 66") is where one finds the rich people, where many houses were built for slaveowners (back in the day). The St. Louis area has long been the fulcrum of race relations in this country. For example, many folks know about the predominantly Black suburb Ferguson in the flight path of STL, also known as "Lombard". Famous Nazi sympathizer and aviator Charles Lindbergh flew the "Spirit of St. Louis" when he made his first solo transcontinental flight in 1927. As an outsider who has mainly been through St. Louis (many times), and who has only stayed overnight in St. Louis a few nights, I only have a superficial understanding of the place. But I watched the Wikipedia articles about the election with an eagle eye. It would seem that Lewis Cass (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lewis_E._Reed>) was the sore loser, and it appeared he was starting to lead an anti-approval campaign in St. Louis. However, Reed (and a couple of his cronies on the Board of Aldermen) were caught on video accepting bribes from undercover FBI agents. They're in prison now. I don't know much about Tishaura Jones, but all outside evidence suggests she's a good-government type who is cleaning up the politics of St. Louis. I'm hopeful she gets re-elected in 2025, and that FairVote doesn't try to get approval voting replaced with RCV with the help of useful idiots that will take money in exchange for supporting the "correct" policies. But an electorate that has just enacted IRV in a referendum didn’t do so > because they want to rank Lesser-Evil over their favorite. They enacted it > because they want to rank sincerely, to express & fully help their favorite. > > Let’s support Oregon’s IRV (RCV) referendum next year! > > Though IRV doesn’t meet the Condorcet Criterion, it meets Mutual-Majority: > > IRV always elects the candidate of the largest faction of the > Mutual-Majority. …The favorite candidate of the Mutual-Majority. > > IRV didn’t “fail” in Burlington & Alaska. It did what it’s supposed to do. > RCV elected the extreme candidates, rather than the compromise. Sometimes, it elects the "good guy/gal" candidate (like Mary Peltola), but sometimes, it elects an incompetent candidate (like Bob Kiss), and it seems quite likely to me that Alaska will elect an extreme right-wing Republican candidate when Peltola runs for reelection in 2024. Approval (and probably STAR) will elect candidates toward the center of public opinion, but RCV gets random when elections get close: https://electowiki.org/wiki/Yee_diagram Under approval and STAR, those of us who think of ourselves as "left-wing" are not as likely to get lucky every so often and get a minority candidate like Mary Peltola (who sadly wasn't quite able to appeal to the median voter in Alaska, it seems), but we're also not playing Russian roulette and potentially getting a right-wing reactionary that could be funded by foreign adversaries. I've heard (from someone, I can't remember who) that one can see Russia from Alaska. :-) > We don’t yet have a big Condorcet organization, or referenda, initiatives > or strong lobbying for it, but let’s support the already ongoing enactment > efforts for IRV, now named RCV. > Let's not. FairVote isn't that big (only $4.5MM/year in annual revenue, based on my cursory investigation). The Center for Election Science pulls in over $1MM/year, and is looking for new executive director (or "CEO" as they say: https://electionscience.org/about/careers-and-board/ ), and I'm optimistic that they may just hire someone who is more sympathetic to Condorcet consistency than the prior executive director. The Equal Vote Coaltion is a small scrappy startup, but seems to be using their money better than the prior two orgs (and seems far more amenable and adaptable to Internet feedback than either of the larger orgs). Having helped a small-ish non-profit ($10MM/year in 2010 when I joined) become a larger organization ($60MM/year to $70MM/year or so these days, I think), I've learned not to get too enamored of (or intimidated by) "big non-profits". If Rob Richie can prove that he's not unethical, and come to the table with the rest of the electoral reform community, and debate openly and honestly, then maybe I'd consider teaming up with them. Perhaps the FairVote Board can fire Richie, since he promised effective steps toward proportional representation, and hasn't achieved that after three decades. He's only burned bridges and salted the earth for effective reform efforts through backroom dealing (e.g. what FairVote did in Seattle in 2022). As of right now, there's someone with the username "RRichie" that doesn't disclose their clear conflict-of-interest on English Wikipedia, but often makes very pro-RCV arguments (and pro-FairVote marketing) under that name: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:Contributions/RRichie Rob > > On Wed, Sep 20, 2023 at 18:24 Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> So called BTR-IRV, "Bottom Two Runoff IRV" goes along those lines. >> >> You probably remember "Benham" that runs IRV elimination until there >> remains a candidate undefeated by any of the other remaining candidates. >> >> This reminds me of basing the Sequential Pairwise Elimination agenda >> order on Top preferences ... by using those preferences to "de-clone" the >> Borda agenda order: >> >> The agenda order is given by SB(X), the Sum over all ballots B of the >> first place votes of the candidates ranked above X on B. >> >> The larger SB(X), the later X is (on average) in the rankings, and the >> rearlier X is in the elimination agenda. >> >> >> >> On Wed, Sep 20, 2023, 4:56 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> If, using voted rankings, Sequential-Pairwise’s comparison-order is >>> determined by giving, to the candidates with higher top-count score, a >>> later position in the comparison-order, so that voters don’t know what the >>> comparison-order will be… >>> >>> … >>> >>> …& if voters’ knowledge of eachother’s preferences is no better than it >>> is now in political-elections… >>> >>> … >>> >>> …Does that Sequential-Pairwise election have an offensive strategy with >>> gain-expectation comparable to what it would have in MinMax, RP & CSSD? >>> >>> >>> >>> …And, if so, is there a defensive strategy to thwart or deter that >>> offensive strategy? >>> >>> >>> >>> …That seems of interest because Sequential-Pairwise is so much less >>> computationally-demanding than the other pairwise-count methods. >>> >>> If, using voted rankings, Sequential-Pairwise’s comparison-order is >>> determined by giving, to the candidates with higher top-count score, a >>> later position in the comparison-order, so that voters don’t know what the >>> comparison-order will be… >>> >>> … >>> >>> …& if voters’ knowledge of eachother’s preferences is no better than it >>> is now in political-elections… >>> >>> … >>> >>> …Does that Sequential-Pairwise election have an offensive strategy with >>> gain-expectation comparable to what it would have in MinMax, RP & CSSD? >>> >>> >>> >>> …And, if so, is there a defensive strategy to thwart or deter that >>> offensive strategy? >>> >>> >>> >>> …That seems of interest because Sequential-Pairwise is so much less >>> computationally-demanding than the other pairwise-count methods. >>> >> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >>> info >>> >> ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >

Rob, > RCV is already poorly understood. When I moved to San Francisco in 2011, I expected to grudgingly like voting in RCV elections, and I expected to enjoy ranking my choices What I found instead was that very few people here understand how votes are counted, and many folks in my lefty political tribe here take great pride in their ignorance of math and the inner workings of their electoral system, trusting that the powers-that-be will count things correctly. This claim isn't substantiated by any of the extensive polling on the subject. 85% <https://www.alaskansforbetterelections.com/polling-shows-alaskan-voters-understand-ranked-choice-voting/> of Alaska voters reported that it was "simple" after its first use, as did at least 93% <http://readme.readmedia.com/RANK-THE-VOTE-NYC-RELEASES-EDISON-RESEARCH-EXIT-POLL-ON-THE-ELECTION/17989282?utm_source=newswire&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=media_pr_emails> of NYC voters in every racial group. A 2013 survey found that 89% <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1002/naticivirevi.106.1.0025?seq=2> of voters in California cities using IRV find it "easy." > As "exhibit A", I will point to the recent clown show in Alameda County Oh, come on. You can't possibly be suggesting that human administrative error is equivalent to an inherent failure of an electoral system. Even administrators of FPTP elections, as was recently the case in DeKalb County, GA, make mistakes. <https://www.ajc.com/politics/miscount-in-dekalb-caused-by-voting-computer-programming-errors/Z5WPVW5UKVBRTMN4TUZGZW2LLM/> > RCV elected the extreme candidates, rather than the compromise You're seizing on outliers. All but three <https://democracysos.substack.com/p/alaska-election-results-show-why> of the nearly 400 IRV elections that have been conducted in the US since 2004 have elected the Condorcet winner. MJG On Thu, Sep 21, 2023 at 5:26 PM Rob Lanphier <roblan@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi everyone, > > Oh Michael...where do I begin? Your apparent move to the dark side makes > me sad. I realize that this intro may sound condescending, but I truly > don't mean it that way. I deeply respect your opinion. YOU were the one > who taught me about "center squeeze" in 1995 or so, and made me rethink > AV/PV/IRV/RCV (or whatever the name of the week is). I just think you're > incorrect about FairVote. > > More inline below..... > > On Wed, Sep 20, 2023 at 10:32 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Yes, that fancier Sequential Pairwise ordering method would make it >> harder for a strategist to guess anything about the comparison-order…when, >> instead of the candidate’s top-count, it uses the sum of the top-counts of >> those above him on each ballot. >> >> An extra layer of unpredictability for a would-be strategist. >> >> The vulnerability of the simplest-defined procedure would have to be >> weighed against what polls & focus-groups say about people’s requirement >> for definition-simplicity & brevity. >> > > RCV is already poorly understood. When I moved to San Francisco in 2011, > I expected to grudgingly like voting in RCV elections, and I expected to > enjoy ranking my choices What I found instead was that very few people > here understand how votes are counted, and many folks in my lefty political > tribe here take great pride in their ignorance of math and the inner > workings of their electoral system, trusting that the powers-that-be will > count things correctly. > > As "exhibit A", I will point to the recent clown show in Alameda County > (i.e. just a few miles east of me, on the other side of a puddle known as > the "San Francisco Bay"): > > https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Alameda-County-admits-tallying-error-in-17682520.php > > It would seem that they had been counting RCV elections wrong for DECADES, > and only noticed the problem in 2022. Simplicity and precinct summability > matters. > > Undeniably the more multi-layered & unpredictable ordering procedure is >> more strategy-proof & better. >> >> Strategy-evaluation for Condorcet-complying pairwise-count methods has >> proven to be complicated & more difficult than one would expect. >> > > This I will agree with. That is why I've hopped on the approval voting > bandwagon for single-winner reform. I've been (more-or-less) aligned with > FairVote when it comes to multi-winner reform, since the many of the > problems with STV dissipate as the number of seats being selected for > rises. For example, using STV to proportionally select members of a 5-seat > board helps ensure diverse representation. I'm not aware of anyplace in > the SF Bay Area that is doing that, though. What they do is divide the > land inside the city/county/whatever into districts, and then performs > single-winner elections in each district. It's horrific. > > But it now seems for sure that there are such methods that are >> sufficiently offensive-strategy-proof or well-protected from >> offensive-strategy. It’s only a question of how many & which ones. >> >> The Condorcet-IRV-Runoff hybrids hold promise, with merit to always be >> balanced with what is heard in polls & focus groups about >> definition-brevity. >> >> So I’m sure that I’ll propose & recommend good Condorcet versions (even >> if I don’t yet know which ones & how many) over IRV. >> >> …but I’ll nonetheless include IRV among the methods that I offer, because >> it’s better than a lot of people believe. …though its merit & workability >> strongly depend on the electorate & the candidate-lineup. >> >> I.e. Because it isn’t Condorcet-complying, it’s necessary that the >> electorate aren’t timid lesser-evil giveaway voters. >> > > > Back in 2018, I was heavily involved in lefty politics. The mayor (Ed > Lee) dropped dead while grocery shopping at a Safeway that I had been to > many times. He wasn't 500 years old; and he seemed in good health. It was > truly a surprise to everyone, Suddenly, we had nearly a dozen local > politicians with almost no name recognition competing to be the next mayor: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_San_Francisco_mayoral_special_election > > The good news: the Condorcet winner (London Breed) won the election. The > bad news: it was a close election, almost exclusively centered on identity > politics (though YIMBY vs NIMBY also played a factor). There were three > well-funded candidates (Breed: who was "the establishment" candidate, born > and raised in the Fillmore, which USED TO BE an affordable neighborhood in > SF, and she would become our first Black woman serving as mayor), Mark Leno > (who would have become our first openly gay mayor), and Jane Kim (who > promised to be our first Korean-American mayor). > > Having only lived here since 2011, I still considered myself new(-ish) to > the political scene. I asked a friend (who I met in a lefty political org > here in SF) who I should vote for. He said "None of them. They're all > corrupt. Breed's funded by Conway." I didn't know who George Conway was > at the time, but that didn't matter. I was looking for a mainstream(-ish) > candidate to put SOMEWHERE in my ranking, so that I could evaluate the > niche candidates relative to my mainstream anchor. I pressed him: "if > someone was holding a gun to your head, and you had to choose between > Breed, Kim, or Leno, who would you choose?". He refused to answer, despite > how hard I pressed on the issue. > > The polls leading up to the election were spotty and difficult to > decipher. Most of the news coverage was about the Breed/Leno/Kim food > fight. Breed had served as mayor for a day or two after Ed Lee died, but > there was a political food fight over her running for mayor after getting > to be the incumbent, so she was removed as mayor. I think that helped her, > since (at least for me) it made her a bit more sympathetic candidate, and > given that the rules said she should be mayor (as previous President of the > Board of Supervisors). Many SF voters get high and mighty about "rule of > law", and yet, the law was changed just as soon as a Black woman took > office. > > My point: I'm guessing that my activist friend was one of the dreaded > "bullet voters" that FairVote misinforms people about. I find FairVote a > flawed organization, and I specifically think that founder/leader Rob > Richie to be a deeply unethical (perhaps even Machiavellian) political > player. Approval voting finds consensus candidates in a way that I think > the electorate can understand. "Mark all of the candidates you approve of, > and the candidate with the highest approval rating wins" I suspect that > approval voting is better at rooting out corruption than RCV, and I have > some more anecdotal evidence to back me up. > > St. Louis switched their mayoral elections to approval top-two. The > primary election selects the two candidates with the highest approval > rating, and the general election decides between the last two. All eyes > in the electoral reform community were on St. Louis, and St. Louis also > elected their first Black woman to be their mayor: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_St._Louis_mayoral_election > > If you've never been to St. Louis, I'll break it down for you. The north > part of town is the flood plain at the confluence of the Missouri and > Mississippi Rivers. It's where the poor people live, and many of them are > Black. South of Interstate 44 (which replaced "Route 66") is where one > finds the rich people, where many houses were built for slaveowners (back > in the day). The St. Louis area has long been the fulcrum of race > relations in this country. For example, many folks know about the > predominantly Black suburb Ferguson in the flight path of STL, also known > as "Lombard". Famous Nazi sympathizer and aviator Charles Lindbergh flew > the "Spirit of St. Louis" when he made his first solo transcontinental > flight in 1927. > > As an outsider who has mainly been through St. Louis (many times), and who > has only stayed overnight in St. Louis a few nights, I only have a > superficial understanding of the place. But I watched the Wikipedia > articles about the election with an eagle eye. It would seem that Lewis > Cass (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lewis_E._Reed>) was the sore loser, > and it appeared he was starting to lead an anti-approval campaign in St. > Louis. However, Reed (and a couple of his cronies on the Board of > Aldermen) were caught on video accepting bribes from undercover FBI > agents. They're in prison now. > > I don't know much about Tishaura Jones, but all outside evidence suggests > she's a good-government type who is cleaning up the politics of St. Louis. > I'm hopeful she gets re-elected in 2025, and that FairVote doesn't try to > get approval voting replaced with RCV with the help of useful idiots that > will take money in exchange for supporting the "correct" policies. > > But an electorate that has just enacted IRV in a referendum didn’t do so >> because they want to rank Lesser-Evil over their favorite. They enacted it >> because they want to rank sincerely, to express & fully help their favorite. >> >> Let’s support Oregon’s IRV (RCV) referendum next year! >> >> Though IRV doesn’t meet the Condorcet Criterion, it meets Mutual-Majority: >> >> IRV always elects the candidate of the largest faction of the >> Mutual-Majority. …The favorite candidate of the Mutual-Majority. >> >> IRV didn’t “fail” in Burlington & Alaska. It did what it’s supposed to do. >> > > RCV elected the extreme candidates, rather than the compromise. > Sometimes, it elects the "good guy/gal" candidate (like Mary Peltola), but > sometimes, it elects an incompetent candidate (like Bob Kiss), and it seems > quite likely to me that Alaska will elect an extreme right-wing Republican > candidate when Peltola runs for reelection in 2024. Approval (and probably > STAR) will elect candidates toward the center of public opinion, but RCV > gets random when elections get close: > https://electowiki.org/wiki/Yee_diagram > > Under approval and STAR, those of us who think of ourselves as "left-wing" > are not as likely to get lucky every so often and get a minority candidate > like Mary Peltola (who sadly wasn't quite able to appeal to the median > voter in Alaska, it seems), but we're also not playing Russian roulette and > potentially getting a right-wing reactionary that could be funded by > foreign adversaries. I've heard (from someone, I can't remember who) that > one can see Russia from Alaska. :-) > > >> We don’t yet have a big Condorcet organization, or referenda, initiatives >> or strong lobbying for it, but let’s support the already ongoing enactment >> efforts for IRV, now named RCV. >> > > Let's not. FairVote isn't that big (only $4.5MM/year in annual revenue, > based on my cursory investigation). The Center for Election Science pulls > in over $1MM/year, and is looking for new executive director (or "CEO" as > they say: https://electionscience.org/about/careers-and-board/ ), and I'm > optimistic that they may just hire someone who is more sympathetic to > Condorcet consistency than the prior executive director. The Equal Vote > Coaltion is a small scrappy startup, but seems to be using their money > better than the prior two orgs (and seems far more amenable and adaptable > to Internet feedback than either of the larger orgs). Having helped a > small-ish non-profit ($10MM/year in 2010 when I joined) become a larger > organization ($60MM/year to $70MM/year or so these days, I think), I've > learned not to get too enamored of (or intimidated by) "big non-profits". > > If Rob Richie can prove that he's not unethical, and come to the table > with the rest of the electoral reform community, and debate openly and > honestly, then maybe I'd consider teaming up with them. Perhaps the > FairVote Board can fire Richie, since he promised effective steps toward > proportional representation, and hasn't achieved that after three decades. > He's only burned bridges and salted the earth for effective reform efforts > through backroom dealing (e.g. what FairVote did in Seattle in 2022). > > As of right now, there's someone with the username "RRichie" that doesn't > disclose their clear conflict-of-interest on English Wikipedia, but often > makes very pro-RCV arguments (and pro-FairVote marketing) under that name: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:Contributions/RRichie > > Rob > > > >> >> On Wed, Sep 20, 2023 at 18:24 Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> So called BTR-IRV, "Bottom Two Runoff IRV" goes along those lines. >>> >>> You probably remember "Benham" that runs IRV elimination until there >>> remains a candidate undefeated by any of the other remaining candidates. >>> >>> This reminds me of basing the Sequential Pairwise Elimination agenda >>> order on Top preferences ... by using those preferences to "de-clone" the >>> Borda agenda order: >>> >>> The agenda order is given by SB(X), the Sum over all ballots B of the >>> first place votes of the candidates ranked above X on B. >>> >>> The larger SB(X), the later X is (on average) in the rankings, and the >>> rearlier X is in the elimination agenda. >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Sep 20, 2023, 4:56 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> If, using voted rankings, Sequential-Pairwise’s comparison-order is >>>> determined by giving, to the candidates with higher top-count score, a >>>> later position in the comparison-order, so that voters don’t know what the >>>> comparison-order will be… >>>> >>>> … >>>> >>>> …& if voters’ knowledge of eachother’s preferences is no better than it >>>> is now in political-elections… >>>> >>>> … >>>> >>>> …Does that Sequential-Pairwise election have an offensive strategy with >>>> gain-expectation comparable to what it would have in MinMax, RP & CSSD? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> …And, if so, is there a defensive strategy to thwart or deter that >>>> offensive strategy? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> …That seems of interest because Sequential-Pairwise is so much less >>>> computationally-demanding than the other pairwise-count methods. >>>> >>>> If, using voted rankings, Sequential-Pairwise’s comparison-order is >>>> determined by giving, to the candidates with higher top-count score, a >>>> later position in the comparison-order, so that voters don’t know what the >>>> comparison-order will be… >>>> >>>> … >>>> >>>> …& if voters’ knowledge of eachother’s preferences is no better than it >>>> is now in political-elections… >>>> >>>> … >>>> >>>> …Does that Sequential-Pairwise election have an offensive strategy with >>>> gain-expectation comparable to what it would have in MinMax, RP & CSSD? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> …And, if so, is there a defensive strategy to thwart or deter that >>>> offensive strategy? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> …That seems of interest because Sequential-Pairwise is so much less >>>> computationally-demanding than the other pairwise-count methods. >>>> >>> ---- >>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >>>> info >>>> >>> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >

On Wed, Sep 20, 2023, 10:31 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > Yes, that fancier Sequential Pairwise ordering method would make it harder > for a strategist to guess anything about the comparison-order…when, instead > of the candidate’s top-count, it uses the sum of the top-counts of those > above him on each ballot. > By the way this top weighted Borda count is just as efficiently precinct summable as Borda itself: to get respective scores of the candidates multiply the pairwise support matrix on the left by the row vector of top respective counts ... which can be conveniently stored as diagonal elements of the pairwise support matrix whose off diagonal element in the j_th row of the k_th column is the number of ballots on which candidate j outranks candidate k. This summability is a big advantage. There were lots of complaints about the slowness of RCV vote transfers between elimination rounds. > > An extra layer of unpredictability for a would-be strategist. > > The vulnerability of the simplest-defined procedure would have to be > weighed against what polls & focus-groups say about people’s requirement > for definition-simplicity & brevity. > > Undeniably the more multi-layered & unpredictable ordering procedure is > more strategy-proof & better. > > Strategy-evaluation for Condorcet-complying pairwise-count methods has > proven to be complicated & more difficult than one would expect. > > But it now seems for sure that there are such methods that are > sufficiently offensive-strategy-proof or well-protected from > offensive-strategy. It’s only a question of how many & which ones. > > The Condorcet-IRV-Runoff hybrids hold promise, with merit to always be > balanced with what is heard in polls & focus groups about > definition-brevity. > One piece of redundancy I recommend in any Condorcet efficient method definition ... start with words to the effect "If there is no majority Top candidate, elect the candidate that is undefeated in every head to head matchup. And in the extremely rare case that no such ideal candidate exists, elect the candidate closest to this democratic ideal as follows: > > So I’m sure that I’ll propose & recommend good Condorcet versions (even if > I don’t yet know which ones & how many) over IRV. > > …but I’ll nonetheless include IRV among the methods that I offer, because > it’s better than a lot of people believe. …though its merit & workability > strongly depend on the electorate & the candidate-lineup. > > I.e. Because it isn’t Condorcet-complying, it’s necessary that the > electorate aren’t timid lesser-evil giveaway voters. > > But an electorate that has just enacted IRV in a referendum didn’t do so > because they want to rank Lesser-Evil over their favorite. They enacted it > because they want to rank sincerely, to express & fully help their favorite. > > Let’s support Oregon’s IRV (RCV) referendum next year! > > Though IRV doesn’t meet the Condorcet Criterion, it meets Mutual-Majority: > > IRV always elects the candidate of the largest faction of the > Mutual-Majority. …The favorite candidate of the Mutual-Majority. > > IRV didn’t “fail” in Burlington & Alaska. It did what it’s supposed to do. > > We don’t yet have a big Condorcet organization, or referenda, initiatives > or strong lobbying for it, but let’s support the already ongoing enactment > efforts for IRV, now named RCV. > > > On Wed, Sep 20, 2023 at 18:24 Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> So called BTR-IRV, "Bottom Two Runoff IRV" goes along those lines. >> >> You probably remember "Benham" that runs IRV elimination until there >> remains a candidate undefeated by any of the other remaining candidates. >> >> This reminds me of basing the Sequential Pairwise Elimination agenda >> order on Top preferences ... by using those preferences to "de-clone" the >> Borda agenda order: >> >> The agenda order is given by SB(X), the Sum over all ballots B of the >> first place votes of the candidates ranked above X on B. >> >> The larger SB(X), the later X is (on average) in the rankings, and the >> rearlier X is in the elimination agenda. >> >> >> >> On Wed, Sep 20, 2023, 4:56 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> If, using voted rankings, Sequential-Pairwise’s comparison-order is >>> determined by giving, to the candidates with higher top-count score, a >>> later position in the comparison-order, so that voters don’t know what the >>> comparison-order will be… >>> >>> … >>> >>> …& if voters’ knowledge of eachother’s preferences is no better than it >>> is now in political-elections… >>> >>> … >>> >>> …Does that Sequential-Pairwise election have an offensive strategy with >>> gain-expectation comparable to what it would have in MinMax, RP & CSSD? >>> >>> >>> >>> …And, if so, is there a defensive strategy to thwart or deter that >>> offensive strategy? >>> >>> >>> >>> …That seems of interest because Sequential-Pairwise is so much less >>> computationally-demanding than the other pairwise-count methods. >>> >>> If, using voted rankings, Sequential-Pairwise’s comparison-order is >>> determined by giving, to the candidates with higher top-count score, a >>> later position in the comparison-order, so that voters don’t know what the >>> comparison-order will be… >>> >>> … >>> >>> …& if voters’ knowledge of eachother’s preferences is no better than it >>> is now in political-elections… >>> >>> … >>> >>> …Does that Sequential-Pairwise election have an offensive strategy with >>> gain-expectation comparable to what it would have in MinMax, RP & CSSD? >>> >>> >>> >>> …And, if so, is there a defensive strategy to thwart or deter that >>> offensive strategy? >>> >>> >>> >>> …That seems of interest because Sequential-Pairwise is so much less >>> computationally-demanding than the other pairwise-count methods. >>> >> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >>> info >>> >>

On 9/21/23 23:39, Michael Garman wrote: > Rob, > >> RCV is already poorly understood.  When I moved to San Francisco in >> 2011, I expected to grudgingly like voting in RCV elections, and I >> expected to enjoy ranking my choices   What I found instead was that >> very few people here understand how votes are counted, and many folks in >> my lefty political tribe here take great pride in their ignorance of >> math and the inner workings of their electoral system, trusting that the >> powers-that-be will count things correctly. > > This claim isn't substantiated by any of the extensive polling on > the subject. 85% > <https://www.alaskansforbetterelections.com/polling-shows-alaskan-voters-understand-ranked-choice-voting/> of Alaska voters reported that it was "simple" after its first use, as did at least 93% <http://readme.readmedia.com/RANK-THE-VOTE-NYC-RELEASES-EDISON-RESEARCH-EXIT-POLL-ON-THE-ELECTION/17989282?utm_source=newswire&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=media_pr_emails> of NYC voters in every racial group. A 2013 survey found that 89% <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1002/naticivirevi.106.1.0025?seq=2> of voters in California cities using IRV find it "easy." That seems to be more about the ranked ballot format than the method, though. The poll questions from the first link were, lightly paraphrased: "Did you receive instructions on how to fill out your ballot?" "In your opinion, how simple or difficult was it for you to fill out your RCV ballot?" "In the August 16 special election ... did you rank one candidate, two candidates or three candidates?" and a question about primaries. As I understand Rob, his point is about the mechanism itself, so appropriate questions would be more like: "Have you been informed about how the Ranked Choice Voting tally method works?" "In your opinion, how fair is the Ranked Choice Voting tallying method?" Presumably voters would answer questions about the ranked ballot format the same way irrespective of what method was used to count these ranked ballots and determine a winner. -km

Hi Rob— … You wrote: … [quote] Oh Michael...where do I begin? Your apparent move to the dark side makes me sad. I realize that this intro may sound condescending, but I truly don't mean it that way. I deeply respect your opinion. YOU were the one who taught me about "center squeeze" in 1995 or so, and made me rethink AV/PV/IRV/RCV (or whatever the name of the week is). [/quote] … Yes, earlier I was quite critical of RCV (called IRV in those days, before San Francisco insisted on RCV, because “instant” was misleading people to expect an instantaneous count). … I was wrong. … You know that often the relative merits, advantages & disadvantages of single-winner methods aren’t what they at first seem. Never be prematurely sure that someone is wrong about such matters. … But I would like to remind you that I also continue to say that Condorcet, in its best versions, is my favorite, because, always electing the CW, it best gets rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem (LO2E) for any & every kind of voter, thereby accommodating even the most timid LO2E giveaway voter. … As I said, RCV only works & has merit if the voters aren’t timid overcomromising LO2E giveaway voters. … I don’t deny that Condorcet-failure is a disadvantage, but, with a good electorate, it doesn’t matter. I used to say that Approval’s equal-givaway, amounting to an abstention between Favorite & Lesser-Evil, is better than RCV’s favorite-burial…but not if you have an electorate that won’t do the burial !!! … Approval & STAR encourage Mr. Timid to do giveaway. RCV encourages everyone to be frank, honest, ambitious, hopeful !!! … …because, as I said, that won’t be a problem, because an electorate that has enacted RCV didn’t do so because they want & intend to vote a hold-you-nose lesser-evil over their favorite (They can & do do that now, in Plurality). If they enact RCV it’s because they want & intend to sincerely rank the candidates, expressing & fully-supporting their favorite. … …& so THEY WILL DO SO !!! … So don’t worry about LO2E strategy in RCV voting. … Anti-RCVists often say that RCV doesn’t really honor majority. … But, as I’ve been saying, though RCV doesn’t meet the Condorcet Criterion, it meets the Mutual-Majority Criterion (MMC). Let me state an improved & expanded definition of MMC: … MMC: … If there are 1 or more sets of candidates such that a majority of the voters prefer the candidates of that set to everyone outside the set, then the winner should come from such a set. … (Then it goes without saying that, when there’s a Mutual-Majority (defined below) the winner will come from that Mutual-Majority.) … [end of MMC definition] … A majority who all prefer some set of candidates to everyone outside that set, I call an Agreeing-Majority. … A majority who all prefer *the same* set of candidates to everyone outside that set, I call a Mutual-Majority. … (Arguably a weaker definition of a Mutual-Majority would do: A majority who all prefer all of their favorites to everyone outside the set of all their favorites.) … When there are 1 or more Agreeing-Majorities, RCV always elects the candidate of the largest faction of an Agreeing-Majority. … i.e. under those conditions, RCV always elects the favorite of an Agreeing-Majority. … RCV always elects the candidate of the largest faction of the Mutual-Majority. … i.e. RCV always elects the favorite of the Mutual-Majority. … That candidate isn’t an unpopular extremist, but instead has strong genuine majority coalition support, as defined above. … [quote] I just think you're incorrect about FairVote. [/quote] … I didn’t say anything about FairVote. … Whether you like FairVote or not, that has no bearing on the merits of RCV. … FairVote, from the start, has insisted on offering the traditional RCV. We should respect that choice. RCV has about a century of precedent in Australia & Ireland. Proposing a traditional method with long precedent is a valid practical choice, & one that we should respect. … …& that proposal has been enormously successful, & is sweeping this country. Maybe its century of traditional precedent has something to do with its success. … When RCV was initially being adopted, of course there were no computers, & so Condorcet’s complete pairwise-count would be infeasible in a large election. Sure, the Sequential-Pairwise (SP) pairwise-count only needs about twice as much vote-counting as RCV. … (Approval, Score, STAR & RCV all need roughly the same amount of vote-counting (they all vary greatly), & SP needs about twice as much.) … Maybe people didn’t want twice as much vote-counting. Or maybe they were afraid that SP would be rejected because of its Pareto violation (which I consider irrelevant, just like MinMax’s Condorcet-Loser violation). … Then there’s Coombs, which I guess would have about the same amount of vote-counting as RCV. But maybe they didn’t like Coombs because things could get ridiculous, like when I nominate Dracula in the primary, so that we can bury the Democrat under Dracula. … …but of course there are worse things than ridiculous. Maybe we haven’t been fair to Coombs. … As I said, I prefer Condorcet, in its best versions, but it’s RCV that has the activist movement, big well-funded national organization, lobbyists, experienced & active campaign-managers, & big successes all around this country. … …with (I’ve read) on the order of 60 municipalities & 2 states having adopted RCV. … If RCV, & not Condorcet, is succeeding, we Condorcetists have nothing to complain about. When the RCVists were doing the work, we weren’t out there enacting anything. Don’t blame the RCVists for that.. … We should acknowledge, commend & appreciate what the RCV organization has accomplished. … [quote] RCV is already poorly understood. [/quote] … RCV is enormously popular with progressives & progressive organizations & parties, such as the GPUSA, the U.S. Greens. …because they understand that rank-balloting will allow them to express all of their preferences among the candidates. … …& because they’ve been correctly informed that RCV has genuine strong majority properties, when it coalesces the Mutual-Majority. ..even if they haven’t heard about the details of those properties. … As for RCV’s definition, RCV can be defined very briefly, in one sentence: … Repeatedly eliminate the candidate who tops fewest rankings, till someone tops most of them. … [end of brief RCV definition] … [quote] When I moved to San Francisco in 2011, I expected to grudgingly like voting in RCV elections, and I expected to enjoy ranking my choices What I found instead was that very few people here understand how votes are counted [/quote] … They would if they heard RCV’s brief definition. … [quote] , and many folks in my lefty political tribe here take great pride in their ignorance of math and the inner workings of their electoral system, trusting that the powers-that-be will count things correctly. [/quote] … …& they’re right, when the method is RCV. (…& likewise would be, with a good Condorcet version too.) … [quote] As "exhibit A", I will point to the recent clown show in Alameda County (i.e. just a few miles east of me, on the other side of a puddle known as the "San Francisco Bay"): … https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Alameda-County-admits-tallying-error-in-17682520.php … It would seem that they had been counting RCV elections wrong for DECADES, and only noticed the problem in 2022. Simplicity and precinct summability matters. [/quote] … RCV’s brief definition is simple. RCV is simple, natural & obvious. … There’s a lot of mis-statement about “Precinct-Summability”, & questionable-ness about what “Precinct Summability” is supposed to mean.. … Plurality, Approval & Score: … Candidates’ vote totals are summed in each precinct & sent to a central count-place, where there’s a central tabulation. … STAR: … Same, at first. Then the central counting place determines the two top scorers, & then presumably sends that information to the precincts, which still have the rankings, & the precincts each total the pairwise votes for each of the finalists over the other, & they all send that back to the central location, where the results are summed & the final winner reported. … Condorcet: … Each precinct counts the preference votes for A over B, & for B over A, for each of the N(N-1)/2 pairs {A,B}. …& those totals are sent in to the central location, where the winner is determined according to the rules of whatever Condorcet version is being used. … RCV: … Each precinct counts the top-count score of each candidate, & sends that in to the central location. … The central location totals that count for each candidate, to determine which has lowest top-score, & sends that information back to the precincts. … Each precinct eliminates that candidate from its rankings, & repeats the first line above. … Repeat till the central location finds that one candidate tops most of the rankings. --- Notice something similar about those? Every one of those procedures requires counts at the precincts, & also at the central location, & communication between the two. … How is RCV different? It does such a procedure a number of times. That’s it. That’s the difference. … So it’s questionable regarding what is this “Precinct Summability” that Plurailty, Approval, Score, STAR & Condorcet all have, but RCV allegedly doesn’t have. … The same security measures, precautions & audits can be done with RCV as with any of the other methods whose procedures are described above. … [quote] [quote] Strategy-evaluation for Condorcet-complying pairwise-count methods has proven to be complicated & more difficult than one would expect. [/quote] … This I will agree with. That is why I've hopped on the approval voting bandwagon for single-winner reform. [/quote] … That’s a bit hasty. Undeniably some of the pairwise-count Condorcet-compliant methods thwart &/or deter offensive strategy so well that it won’t be a problem, & the election of the sincere-CW will virtually always be elected. … There’s the argument that there are so many good Condorcet versions that choosing between them is prohibitively problematic, preventing the adoption of any of them. … No, several of the best versions can be offered to a proposal-committee, & it can discuss & evaluate them & then choose a proposal. … …& there are a few obviously simplest proposals, making the choice a lot less complicated & difficult than antii-Condorcetists claim: … MinMax: … Elect the candidate whose greatest defeat is the least. … (…implying the election of an unbeaten candidate when there is one ( as there nearly always is) ). … Condorcet//Approval: … Your ranking is counted as approving everyone you rank. If no one is pairwise-unbeaten, then elect the most approved candidate. … Majority-Defeat Disquaification//Approval (MDDA): … Your ranking is counted as approving everyone you rank. Elect any unbeaten candidate. If there are none, then every majority pairwise-beaten candidate is disqualified, & the un-disqualified candidate with most approvals is elected. … (I’ve added a Condorcet-winner electing clause, because I now feel that Condorcet’s failure-betrayal scenario is so rare & unpredictable as to be irrelevant to strategy.) … Sequential-Pairwise: … Order the candidates in a list such that the ones topping more rankings are listed below the ones topping fewer rankings. … Find the pairwise-winner among the top 2 candidates in the ordering. Then find the pairwise winner between that winner & the next candidate down the list. Condtinue until you’ve found the winner of the then-current winner & the last candidate in the list. S/he wins. ---------- I’d offer those 4 simple pairwise-count versions. … I’d also offer Approval, in case the jurisdiction either couldn’t afford, or didn’t want to spend for, rank-balloting equipment & software. … I’d also offer RCV & STAR, because some proposal-committee members might prefer them. … I’d personally propose & justify the choice of a Pairwise-Count, with RCV as next choice, & of course Approval if rank-balloting is infeasible or rejected. … If there were a ranked vote in the proposal committee, of course my ranking would be: … 1. Some ordering of the above-listed four Pairwise-Count methods … 2. RCV … 3. Approval if ranked-balloting is infeasible or rejected. ----- Yes, I like Approval. Under different conditions, normal conditions, it would be my suggestion, though STAR would then be okay too. … But our voting-conditions are anything but normal. … We always have a sleazy & corrupt POS “lesser”-evil, & a dramatically-horrifying greater-evil. (…& some better candidates who, our media insist, are unwinnable, minor, not-serious, candidates.) … We’re constantly told that the greater evil is the only bad result, & so we have to support the “lesser-evil” against the greater-evil (…& against our favorite). … Always. … It’s always this same discouraging, dismal & hopeless situation. … That isn’t normal. It certainly isn’t natural. … So yes, I’d suggest Approval under normal conditions. But our highly, bizarrely, abnormal & unnatural conditions require special methods to deal with the (allegedly) hard choice between genuinely-wanted outcomes, & odious dismal regrettable & deplorable “lesser” evils. … For these conditions, we need something more powerfully-discriminating: a rank-method, to let everyone vote all their preferences among as many candidates as they want to. …to elicit & count genuine favoriteness immediately. … (…not after several election-cycles, because a lot of harm can be done in 4 years or 8 years.) … It’s like when, in _The Godfather_, Michael says to his attorney: … “No, you’re a peacetime consiglieri, but right now we need a wartime consiglieri.”