LNhelp is a double edged sword. If lower ranked votes cannot help your opponent, they cannot be counted on to help you either. Yet one of the biggest talking point claims of IRV advocates is that it satisfies Reliable Later Help: "If your first place choice is eliminated, then your second place choice will still be there." This is the Later Help promise that converts voters to Instant Runoff Voting. In other words, (according to the promise) unlike other voting methods, IRV makes it safe to always vote your sincere favorite at the top of your ballot ... you don't have to betray your favorite to keep your anti-favorite from winning. One problem with this promise is that it is false; your second place choice may well be eliminated before your first place choice is eliminated. The other problem is its disingenuity: it directly contradicts a lesser (but true) selling point ... namely its satisfaction of Later No Help. IRV advocates want to have it both ways ... they want to be able to say it satisfies both Later No Help and Reliable Later Help, which is impossible. The irony is that voters would rather have Reliable Later Help (the false claim) than Later No Help (the true claim). That's why their salesmen double down on Reliable Later Help, but hardly mention Later No Help (which doesn't even sound that helpful) except in one context: when bashing the Condorcet Criterion. The irony on top of irony is that IRV supporters criticize Condorcet methods for making the correct choice (as much as possible) between Later No Help and Reliable Later Help. In summary, Later No Help and Reliable Later Help are incompatible. Condorcet advocates acknowledge this fact and place themselves 80 percent of the way between LaterNoHelp and ReliableLaterHelp on the spectrum of possibilities. IRV public relations biggest selling point is the false claim that IRV is at the right extreme of the spectrum (100 percent Reliable Later Help), while admitting its 100 percent satisfaction of Later No Help, but without acknowledging this patent contradiction. Like Monk says, "I might be wrong, but I don't think so." -Forest

On 02.06.2022 19:35, Forest Simmons wrote: > LNhelp is a double edged sword. If lower ranked votes cannot help your > opponent, they cannot be counted on to help you either. Yet one of the > biggest talking point claims of IRV advocates is that it satisfies > Reliable Later Help: "If your first place choice is eliminated, then > your second place choice will still be there." LNHarm + LNHelp is just burial immunity. Like Plurality :-) The FBC is what makes it safe to always vote your sincere favorite (co-equal) at top... which is more about compromising. So if the IRV advocates suggest that LNH implies you can vote your sincere favorite top, then they're doubly wrong! In another post, Kevin Venzke mentioned that he found some Condorcet methods to be considerably more susceptible to compromise than others. My impression was that since some Condorcet methods are *almost* FBC compliant, and that it's possible to make them completely FBC compliant at the cost of losing Condorcet compliance (e.g. Minmax and MMPO), Condorcet methods as a whole were pretty close to FBC in some sense, in that they generally aren't susceptible to compromise strategy. James Green-Armytage's results also suggest this, as the Condorcet methods he investigated all had relatively low compromise incentive. But apparently it's not that simple, as Kevin's results indicate! -km

Kristofer, thanks for the further clarifications! It just came to me why IRV's claim of FBC compliance is so ironical: strong FBC is their most vaunted claim and it is false. And though their lesser claim of Later No Help is true, the truth of the lesser claim is at the very heart of why the more vaunted claim is false! On top of that they disparage Condorcet's good faith effort to approach the humble (non-strong) FBC, because it necessarily increases burial risk, a necessity that Condorcet advocates humbly acknowledge, but IRV advocates deny, whether disingenuously or unwittingly. Let's give the vast majority (but not the most crafty and willful minority) of them the benefit of a doubt on that score! -Forest El jue., 2 de jun. de 2022 11:45 a. m., Kristofer Munsterhjelm < km_elmet@t-online.de> escribió: > On 02.06.2022 19:35, Forest Simmons wrote: > > LNhelp is a double edged sword. If lower ranked votes cannot help your > > opponent, they cannot be counted on to help you either. Yet one of the > > biggest talking point claims of IRV advocates is that it satisfies > > Reliable Later Help: "If your first place choice is eliminated, then > > your second place choice will still be there." > > LNHarm + LNHelp is just burial immunity. Like Plurality :-) > > The FBC is what makes it safe to always vote your sincere favorite > (co-equal) at top... which is more about compromising. > > So if the IRV advocates suggest that LNH implies you can vote your > sincere favorite top, then they're doubly wrong! > > In another post, Kevin Venzke mentioned that he found some Condorcet > methods to be considerably more susceptible to compromise than others. > My impression was that since some Condorcet methods are *almost* FBC > compliant, and that it's possible to make them completely FBC compliant > at the cost of losing Condorcet compliance (e.g. Minmax and MMPO), > Condorcet methods as a whole were pretty close to FBC in some sense, in > that they generally aren't susceptible to compromise strategy. James > Green-Armytage's results also suggest this, as the Condorcet methods he > investigated all had relatively low compromise incentive. > > But apparently it's not that simple, as Kevin's results indicate! > > -km >