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Re: [EM] MAM vs Schulze

MS
Markus Schulze
Sun, Oct 9, 2016 8:01 AM

Hallo,

MAM doesn't disregard a defeat unnecessarily or without
obvious, compelling justification.

It is not a characteristic property of MAM that it "doesn't
disregard a defeat unnecessarily or without obvious,
compelling justification". Many methods can be described in
this manner: MAM, Schulze, River, MinMax, Kemeny-Young, etc..

Markus Schulze

Hallo, > MAM doesn't disregard a defeat unnecessarily or without > obvious, compelling justification. It is not a characteristic property of MAM that it "doesn't disregard a defeat unnecessarily or without obvious, compelling justification". Many methods can be described in this manner: MAM, Schulze, River, MinMax, Kemeny-Young, etc.. Markus Schulze
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Sun, Oct 9, 2016 6:32 PM

(Replying farther down)

On Oct 9, 2016 1:02 AM, "Markus Schulze" markus.schulze@alumni.tu-berlin.de
wrote:

Hallo,

MAM doesn't disregard a defeat unnecessarily or without
obvious, compelling justification.

It is not a characteristic property of MAM that it "doesn't

disregard a defeat unnecessarily or without obvious,
compelling justification". Many methods can be described in
this manner: MAM, Schulze, River, MinMax, Kemeny-Young, etc..

(endquote)

Yes, I suppose that anything could be called " obvious, compelling
justification ". So that wording of mine was unhelpful.

My comparison was intended for pure pairwise-count methods that choose a
winner based on pairwise defeats.

Sometimes there's a cycle, and therefore no immediately obvious winner. To
declare a winner amounts to disregarding hir defeat(s).

We want to disregard as few defeats as possible. Plainly, if it's necessary
to disregard one of the defeats in a cycle, then it should be the weakest
one.

When CSSD starts dropping defeats, the weakest defeat in the current
Schwartz set, a stronger defeat that makes it the weakest, might, itself,
be similarly contradicted, overruled & nullified.

If a defeat is nullified, overruled, contradicted, by being the weakest in
a cycle with stronger un-nullified defeats, then is it really necessary to
drop a defeat that it cyclically contradicts?

That's a big flaw in CSSD's justification.

And it's why, when MAM & Schulze choose differently, the MAM winner is
usually publicly preferred to the Schulze winner.

MAM:

A defeat is affirmed if it isn't the weakest defeat in a cycle whose other
defeats are affirmed.

(end of definition)

There's no mention of an order of operations.

We don't drop, invalidate or disqualify a defeat because it's cyclically
contradicted by defeats that, themselves, are cyclically contradicted by
qualified, valid stronger defeats.

No, there's no circularity there, just recursion.

If we want to disregard a defeat only if necessary, only if it's overruled
by being weakest in a cycle with un-overruled defeats, then MAM is the one
& only method that achieves that (because that's literally what MAM's
definition says).

If the need to disregard a defeat is due to its being cyclically
contradicted by stronger defeats that can't be thus disregarded, then MAM
is the only method that doesn't unnecessarily disregard defeats.

Therefore it's no surprise that the MAM winner is usually publicly
preferred to the Schulze winner.

Michael Ossipoff e

Markus Schulze


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

(Replying farther down) On Oct 9, 2016 1:02 AM, "Markus Schulze" <markus.schulze@alumni.tu-berlin.de> wrote: > > Hallo, > > > > MAM doesn't disregard a defeat unnecessarily or without > > obvious, compelling justification. > > It is not a characteristic property of MAM that it "doesn't > > disregard a defeat unnecessarily or without obvious, > compelling justification". Many methods can be described in > this manner: MAM, Schulze, River, MinMax, Kemeny-Young, etc.. (endquote) Yes, I suppose that anything could be called " obvious, compelling justification ". So that wording of mine was unhelpful. My comparison was intended for pure pairwise-count methods that choose a winner based on pairwise defeats. Sometimes there's a cycle, and therefore no immediately obvious winner. To declare a winner amounts to disregarding hir defeat(s). We want to disregard as few defeats as possible. Plainly, if it's necessary to disregard one of the defeats in a cycle, then it should be the weakest one. When CSSD starts dropping defeats, the weakest defeat in the current Schwartz set, a stronger defeat that _makes_ it the weakest, might, itself, be similarly contradicted, overruled & nullified. If a defeat is nullified, overruled, contradicted, by being the weakest in a cycle with stronger un-nullified defeats, then is it really necessary to drop a defeat that it cyclically contradicts? That's a big flaw in CSSD's justification. And it's why, when MAM & Schulze choose differently, the MAM winner is usually publicly preferred to the Schulze winner. MAM: A defeat is affirmed if it isn't the weakest defeat in a cycle whose other defeats are affirmed. (end of definition) There's no mention of an order of operations. We don't drop, invalidate or disqualify a defeat because it's cyclically contradicted by defeats that, themselves, are cyclically contradicted by qualified, valid stronger defeats. No, there's no circularity there, just recursion. If we want to disregard a defeat only if necessary, only if it's overruled by being weakest in a cycle with un-overruled defeats, then MAM is the one & only method that achieves that (because that's literally what MAM's definition says). If the need to disregard a defeat is due to its being cyclically contradicted by stronger defeats that can't be thus disregarded, then MAM is the only method that doesn't unnecessarily disregard defeats. Therefore it's no surprise that the MAM winner is usually publicly preferred to the Schulze winner. Michael Ossipoff e > Markus Schulze > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
JL
Juho Laatu
Sun, Oct 9, 2016 7:56 PM

On 09 Oct 2016, at 21:32, Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com wrote:
We want to disregard as few defeats as possible. Plainly, if it's necessary to disregard one of the defeats in a cycle, then it should be the weakest one.

I almost agree with that but not quite. When picking the winner, the target is not to make the group opinion a linear opinion (where cycles have been broken, and some pairwise defeats disregarded). The idea is rather to accept the fact that group opinions may sometimes be cyclic, and identify a single best winner despite of that. One needs to identify one winner, but there is no need to break cycles of make the group opinion linear.

It is a fact that if there is no Condorcet winner, there is some candidate that would beat the winner in a pairwise comparison. But that's about as far as we need to go in the direction of disregarding defeats.

Some methods may well be based on a philosophy that is based on breaking cycles, but others need not do that. One simple example could be one that resorts to Approval if there is no Condorcet winner. That method quite clearly makes some sense, but doesn't break any cycles, or at least doesn't care about the preference strengths of the cycles, or the pairwise losses of the winner.

Just trying to be very exact on what the single winner methods are supposed to do.
BR, Juho

> On 09 Oct 2016, at 21:32, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > We want to disregard as few defeats as possible. Plainly, if it's necessary to disregard one of the defeats in a cycle, then it should be the weakest one. > I almost agree with that but not quite. When picking the winner, the target is not to make the group opinion a linear opinion (where cycles have been broken, and some pairwise defeats disregarded). The idea is rather to accept the fact that group opinions may sometimes be cyclic, and identify a single best winner despite of that. One needs to identify one winner, but there is no need to break cycles of make the group opinion linear. It is a fact that if there is no Condorcet winner, there is some candidate that would beat the winner in a pairwise comparison. But that's about as far as we need to go in the direction of disregarding defeats. Some methods may well be based on a philosophy that is based on breaking cycles, but others need not do that. One simple example could be one that resorts to Approval if there is no Condorcet winner. That method quite clearly makes some sense, but doesn't break any cycles, or at least doesn't care about the preference strengths of the cycles, or the pairwise losses of the winner. Just trying to be very exact on what the single winner methods are supposed to do. BR, Juho
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Sun, Oct 9, 2016 9:05 PM

If course breaking cycles isn't the only approach to finding the right
winner. But it's the basis of MAM & CSSD, &, in general, the methods that
look only at pairwise defeats, & disregard defeats to make someone
unbeaten..

So I brought it up in connection with the comparison between MAM & Beatpath.

Cycle-breaking methods aren't among my favorite proposals.

3-Slot ICT
Approval
Score
Plain MMPO
Bucklin

Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 9, 2016 12:56 PM, "Juho Laatu" juho.laatu@gmail.com wrote:

On 09 Oct 2016, at 21:32, Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com wrote:

We want to disregard as few defeats as possible. Plainly, if it's
necessary to disregard one of the defeats in a cycle, then it should be the
weakest one.

I almost agree with that but not quite. When picking the winner, the
target is not to make the group opinion a linear opinion (where cycles have
been broken, and some pairwise defeats disregarded). The idea is rather to
accept the fact that group opinions may sometimes be cyclic, and identify a
single best winner despite of that. One needs to identify one winner, but
there is no need to break cycles of make the group opinion linear.

It is a fact that if there is no Condorcet winner, there is some candidate
that would beat the winner in a pairwise comparison. But that's about as
far as we need to go in the direction of disregarding defeats.

Some methods may well be based on a philosophy that is based on breaking
cycles, but others need not do that. One simple example could be one that
resorts to Approval if there is no Condorcet winner. That method quite
clearly makes some sense, but doesn't break any cycles, or at least doesn't
care about the preference strengths of the cycles, or the pairwise losses
of the winner.

Just trying to be very exact on what the single winner methods are
supposed to do.
BR, Juho


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

If course breaking cycles isn't the only approach to finding the right winner. But it's the basis of MAM & CSSD, &, in general, the methods that look only at pairwise defeats, & disregard defeats to make someone unbeaten.. So I brought it up in connection with the comparison between MAM & Beatpath. Cycle-breaking methods aren't among my favorite proposals. 3-Slot ICT Approval Score Plain MMPO Bucklin Michael Ossipoff On Oct 9, 2016 12:56 PM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu@gmail.com> wrote: > On 09 Oct 2016, at 21:32, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > > We want to disregard as few defeats as possible. Plainly, if it's > necessary to disregard one of the defeats in a cycle, then it should be the > weakest one. > > I almost agree with that but not quite. When picking the winner, the > target is not to make the group opinion a linear opinion (where cycles have > been broken, and some pairwise defeats disregarded). The idea is rather to > accept the fact that group opinions may sometimes be cyclic, and identify a > single best winner despite of that. One needs to identify one winner, but > there is no need to break cycles of make the group opinion linear. > > It is a fact that if there is no Condorcet winner, there is some candidate > that would beat the winner in a pairwise comparison. But that's about as > far as we need to go in the direction of disregarding defeats. > > Some methods may well be based on a philosophy that is based on breaking > cycles, but others need not do that. One simple example could be one that > resorts to Approval if there is no Condorcet winner. That method quite > clearly makes some sense, but doesn't break any cycles, or at least doesn't > care about the preference strengths of the cycles, or the pairwise losses > of the winner. > > Just trying to be very exact on what the single winner methods are > supposed to do. > BR, Juho > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > >
JL
Juho Laatu
Sun, Oct 9, 2016 9:14 PM

Ok, accepted. :-) Except that some methods like minmax look at pairwise defeats, but do not aim at breaking cycles (and forcing out a linear preference order). :-) Maybe at least all "path based" methods aim at breaking cycles. (All methods of course ignore at least one defeat if there is no Condorcet winner.)

BR, Juho

On 10 Oct 2016, at 00:05, Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com wrote:

If course breaking cycles isn't the only approach to finding the right winner. But it's the basis of MAM & CSSD, &, in general, the methods that look only at pairwise defeats, & disregard defeats to make someone unbeaten..

So I brought it up in connection with the comparison between MAM & Beatpath.

Cycle-breaking methods aren't among my favorite proposals.

3-Slot ICT
Approval
Score
Plain MMPO
Bucklin

Michael Ossipoff

On Oct 9, 2016 12:56 PM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu@gmail.com mailto:juho.laatu@gmail.com> wrote:

On 09 Oct 2016, at 21:32, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com mailto:email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
We want to disregard as few defeats as possible. Plainly, if it's necessary to disregard one of the defeats in a cycle, then it should be the weakest one.

I almost agree with that but not quite. When picking the winner, the target is not to make the group opinion a linear opinion (where cycles have been broken, and some pairwise defeats disregarded). The idea is rather to accept the fact that group opinions may sometimes be cyclic, and identify a single best winner despite of that. One needs to identify one winner, but there is no need to break cycles of make the group opinion linear.

It is a fact that if there is no Condorcet winner, there is some candidate that would beat the winner in a pairwise comparison. But that's about as far as we need to go in the direction of disregarding defeats.

Some methods may well be based on a philosophy that is based on breaking cycles, but others need not do that. One simple example could be one that resorts to Approval if there is no Condorcet winner. That method quite clearly makes some sense, but doesn't break any cycles, or at least doesn't care about the preference strengths of the cycles, or the pairwise losses of the winner.

Just trying to be very exact on what the single winner methods are supposed to do.
BR, Juho


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em http://electorama.com/em for list info

Ok, accepted. :-) Except that some methods like minmax look at pairwise defeats, but do not aim at breaking cycles (and forcing out a linear preference order). :-) Maybe at least all "path based" methods aim at breaking cycles. (All methods of course ignore at least one defeat if there is no Condorcet winner.) BR, Juho > On 10 Oct 2016, at 00:05, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > > If course breaking cycles isn't the only approach to finding the right winner. But it's the basis of MAM & CSSD, &, in general, the methods that look only at pairwise defeats, & disregard defeats to make someone unbeaten.. > > So I brought it up in connection with the comparison between MAM & Beatpath. > > Cycle-breaking methods aren't among my favorite proposals. > > 3-Slot ICT > Approval > Score > Plain MMPO > Bucklin > > Michael Ossipoff > > On Oct 9, 2016 12:56 PM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu@gmail.com <mailto:juho.laatu@gmail.com>> wrote: >> On 09 Oct 2016, at 21:32, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com <mailto:email9648742@gmail.com>> wrote: >> We want to disregard as few defeats as possible. Plainly, if it's necessary to disregard one of the defeats in a cycle, then it should be the weakest one. >> > I almost agree with that but not quite. When picking the winner, the target is not to make the group opinion a linear opinion (where cycles have been broken, and some pairwise defeats disregarded). The idea is rather to accept the fact that group opinions may sometimes be cyclic, and identify a single best winner despite of that. One needs to identify one winner, but there is no need to break cycles of make the group opinion linear. > > It is a fact that if there is no Condorcet winner, there is some candidate that would beat the winner in a pairwise comparison. But that's about as far as we need to go in the direction of disregarding defeats. > > Some methods may well be based on a philosophy that is based on breaking cycles, but others need not do that. One simple example could be one that resorts to Approval if there is no Condorcet winner. That method quite clearly makes some sense, but doesn't break any cycles, or at least doesn't care about the preference strengths of the cycles, or the pairwise losses of the winner. > > Just trying to be very exact on what the single winner methods are supposed to do. > BR, Juho > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em <http://electorama.com/em> for list info >