UK electoral systems "post mortem" discussion on radio
A few weeks back, I heard on the radio a reasonable discussion about the
chances of electoral reform in the UK. It sounded like one of the
panellists in the discussion knew of the various ("complicated") PR
systems more than the average person.
In any case, only glancing mentions were made about other electoral
systems. The panellist knew the target audience. I think this is
understandable given that the target audience really want good results,
not a "technical" system.
Anyway, the link for the broadcast in question is below.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p02q9wgx
It starts around 2h08m at lasts just over 25 minutes with musical
breaks. It ends with a brief discussion about maybe having politicians
being homeless people!
There's under 40 hours to listen to it as of writing this.
Sorry for the late notice for this. I've been meaning to send this much
much earlier. However, it was more difficult to track down than I
thought (I was searching wrong radio station until today!) plus I had
other things to attend to. Better late than never...?
Thanks,
Gervase.
On 06/09/2015 10:47 PM, Gervase Lam wrote:
A few weeks back, I heard on the radio a reasonable discussion about the
chances of electoral reform in the UK. It sounded like one of the
panellists in the discussion knew of the various ("complicated") PR
systems more than the average person.
In any case, only glancing mentions were made about other electoral
systems. The panellist knew the target audience. I think this is
understandable given that the target audience really want good results,
not a "technical" system.
That raises the question of what the best "simple" PR method one can get
is. There's probably a trade-off between conceptual simplicity and
fairness too, and what's simple depends on the audience.
I suppose the simplest amortized fair (so to speak) PR voting method is
random favorite with single-member districts, but it wouldn't be
accepted because in the constituencies where the plurality winner didn't
win, the voters would loudly complain. They want fairness throughout,
not only on a large scale.
Next simplest would probably be party list PR, but then you have to make
parties an official part of the system. Multiwinner candidate methods
can be more fair without parties, but they're complex and get more
complex still if you want them to gracefully degrade when there are few
seats. (Multiwinner SNTV can kinda work, but you get stronger parties
anyway because of the need to coordinate strategy, and it definitely
doesn't degrade gracefully.)
Good Morning, Gervase
Did you happen to notice the report of the election in Frome, UK:
Frome has elected a government of Independents. The article describes
the ongoing process of eliminating political parties from city
government. It also mentions other communities in the UK that are
taking similar steps.
It's worth noting that these efforts are taking place in a country with
multiple parties. Many people think additional parties or proportional
representation will cure our political malaise. That does not seem to
be the case.
My only quibble with the movement in Frome is the means by which they
select their candidates. If anyone reads the article and would like to
discuss the selection of candidates, I'll be happy to participate.
Fred Gohlke
An interesting development, but still a travesty of voter (mis)representation.
These councillors were all elected by FPTP (simple plurality) or MM-FPTP (multiple plurality) from a weird mixtures of wards: 3
wards with 3 councillors; 3 wards with 2 councillors; 2 wards with 1 councillor each. As a result large numbers of those who voted
in these elections are not represented on the Town Council.
It may be a poke in the eye for party politics, but it doesn't do much for democratic representation of voters. Of course, the
Independents for Frome group might be supporters of the campaign to change the voting system for local government in England. Had a
fair voting system been in place the IfF group would not have won all 17 seats on this council given the voting patterns in the 2015
elections.
Full results here: http://www.frometowncouncil.gov.uk/elections-2015/
James Gilmour
Edinburgh, Scotland
-----Original Message-----
From: Election-Methods [mailto:election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Fred Gohlke
Sent: 11 June 2015 15:19
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] UK electoral systems "post mortem" discussion on radio
Good Morning, Gervase
Did you happen to notice the report of the election in Frome, UK:
Frome has elected a government of Independents. The article describes the ongoing process of eliminating political parties from
city
government. It also mentions other communities in the UK that are taking similar steps.
It's worth noting that these efforts are taking place in a country with multiple parties. Many people think additional parties or
proportional representation will cure our political malaise. That does not seem to be the case.
My only quibble with the movement in Frome is the means by which they select their candidates. If anyone reads the article and
would like to discuss the selection of candidates, I'll be happy to participate.
Fred Gohlke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.
https://www.avast.com/antivirus
Thank you, James
I particularly appreciate your link to the election results.
I understand the point you are making, and, perhaps oddly, agree that
the Frome event "doesn't do much for democratic representation of
voters". However, the "poke in the eye for party politics" should not
be ignored. I suspect the difference in our views is that I see
proportionality as an internal quality, not an external one.
When proportionality is seen as an external quality, it is
confrontational; it sets the proportions at odds with each other. It
does nothing for the democratic representation of voters because it
empowers a relatively radical portion of the electorate at the expense
of the common-interest oriented portion of the electorate.
Seeing proportionality as an internal quality allows us to choose
representatives that represent the entire community rather than a subset
of it. None but the most radical of us are wholly conservative or
wholly liberal. We lean in one direction or another, but we also have
preferences that don't square with our basic orientation and the
intensity of these preferences ebb and flow with circumstance and time.
At present, we lack the means to seek out and elect those who have the
particular blend of qualities needed to address and resolve the issues
that are of current concern.
Dr. Jane Mansbridge, a recent past-president of the American Political
Science Association, has provided the rationale for a more democratic
political process. In A "selection model" of political representation,
Mansbridge wrote:
"As a general rule, the higher the probability that
the objectives of principal and agent may be aligned,
the more efficient it is for the principal to invest
resources ex ante, in selecting the required type,
rather than ex post, in monitoring and sanctioning. If
these objectives are well aligned, citizens will be
better served by a constituent-representative
relationship based primarily on selection than by one
based primarily on monitoring and sanctions. From a
normative perspective, the selection model also tends to
focus the attention of both citizens and representatives
on the common interest."[1]
Dr. Mansbridge's keynote address to the Austrian Political Science
Association, December 10, 2004, Vienna, Austria, entitled " The Fallacy
of Tightening the Reins" [2] is also worthy of note.
Fred Gohlke
[1]
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=5548&type=WPN
[2] http://www.oezp.at/pdfs/2005-3-02.pdf
On 09 Jun 2015, at 23:47, Gervase Lam gervase@madasafish.com wrote:
A few weeks back, I heard on the radio a reasonable discussion about the
chances of electoral reform in the UK. It sounded like one of the
panellists in the discussion knew of the various ("complicated") PR
systems more than the average person.
In any case, only glancing mentions were made about other electoral
systems. The panellist knew the target audience. I think this is
understandable given that the target audience really want good results,
not a "technical" system.
The Scottish system was used as an example. It is a natural candidate since people often do not want any "foreign" systems but something more familiar and something they can trust. In addition to this kind of ranked / STV style systems there are also other kind of PR systems, like party list based systems. Although most systems are more complicated than the FPTP, I think they are simple enough since they seem to work in many countries. A proportional system can work well even if regular voters do not know the details of the counting process well enough to explain how the system works. For them it is enough to understand how to vote, and to have some general trust in the fairness on the system.
In the broadcast they discussed whether a reform is possible or not. If people want a reform, the reform might come because of good experiences in some parts of the country (Scotland), in some other elections (local, EU), or if voters are active enough and form a movement with wide support. Although the incumbent parties are likely to oppose any changes to the system, there is a tipping point somewhere. The voters can change things if there is strong and wide enough interest.
I find PR natural because I'm so used to it. But it is obvious that also many FPTP countries have been great (and democratic) success stories. UKIP and green ideas will find their way to the programs of the largest parties if there is a risk that they will lose their dominant position otherwise. It may be disappointing though if you never get a representative in some areas even if you would vote for the same mid size party all your life. Maybe PR gives voters a more concrete voice in this sense. But it is up to the UK voters to decide whether they want to continue with the FPTP tradition (with "rough median guidance") or with PR (with "fair number of representatives for all").
PR countries can have stable governments even if they are usually coalition governments. One just has to build the political system in a slightly different way.
Juho
Anyway, the link for the broadcast in question is below.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p02q9wgx
It starts around 2h08m at lasts just over 25 minutes with musical
breaks. It ends with a brief discussion about maybe having politicians
being homeless people!
There's under 40 hours to listen to it as of writing this.
Sorry for the late notice for this. I've been meaning to send this much
much earlier. However, it was more difficult to track down than I
thought (I was searching wrong radio station until today!) plus I had
other things to attend to. Better late than never...?
Thanks,
Gervase.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 06/12/2015 11:30 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 09 Jun 2015, at 23:47, Gervase Lam gervase@madasafish.com
wrote:
A few weeks back, I heard on the radio a reasonable discussion
about the chances of electoral reform in the UK. It sounded like
one of the panellists in the discussion knew of the various
("complicated") PR systems more than the average person.
In any case, only glancing mentions were made about other
electoral systems. The panellist knew the target audience. I
think this is understandable given that the target audience really
want good results, not a "technical" system.
The Scottish system was used as an example. It is a natural candidate
since people often do not want any "foreign" systems but something
more familiar and something they can trust. In addition to this kind
of ranked / STV style systems there are also other kind of PR
systems, like party list based systems. Although most systems are
more complicated than the FPTP, I think they are simple enough since
they seem to work in many countries. A proportional system can work
well even if regular voters do not know the details of the counting
process well enough to explain how the system works. For them it is
enough to understand how to vote, and to have some general trust in
the fairness on the system.
In the broadcast they discussed whether a reform is possible or not.
If people want a reform, the reform might come because of good
experiences in some parts of the country (Scotland), in some other
elections (local, EU), or if voters are active enough and form a
movement with wide support. Although the incumbent parties are likely
to oppose any changes to the system, there is a tipping point
somewhere. The voters can change things if there is strong and wide
enough interest.
Systems of government seem in general to be very stable in the sense
that they don't often change. If the voting method is biased in the
sense that some group gets elected more often than in an ideal method,
then naturally this group will prefer the status quo, and they will also
have the power to keep the status quo in place.
To what extent the voters can vote themselves another system depends,
then, on the fidelity of the method itself. If the method is grossly
unresponsive, then it will take a lot of push to do so. (If the system
is too unresponsive, then there will eventually be a revolution, but not
even Plurality systems are that unresponsive.)
So you could have systems that are unfair or unresponsive enough that
they're not very democratic, yet are responsive enough that the
discontent never builds up enough that there's a call to change the
system. In that case, election reform will be very hard, even if it's
what the voters want; the systems won't allow them to express the
desire. At any given time, other issues might be more important, even
though fixing the system itself could make it much easier to handle all
of the direct issues later.
From a selection point of view, a system only has to be a combination
of good enough and resilient enough to ward off changes. The better it
is, the less inherent resilience it needs because the voters would
sincerely prefer the system to remain in place; and the more inherently
resilient it is, the less good it needs to be (because it can withstand
greater pressure to change).
To some extent, one could say that democratic systems in general require
that the people accept the order. Where people are not used to the
representative system or where it starts to break down, sometimes the
people decide to vote themselves out of democracy and into more
authoritarian rule.
It would be interesting to have a meta-system where one can in theory
reach every system (or every system can be tried at least once), and
where every system can do anything it likes as long as it doesn't alter
those rules. Bu doing that in practice would be very hard.
Representative systems do somewhat attempt to emulate it: you may run on
any program, and if elected with a majority, you can do anything as long
as you don't fiddle with the rules themselves (something which often
requires supermajority or referenda). Yet it isn't perfect: the voting
system may be inaccurate and the voters usually have to choose between
policy bundles rather than policies in themselves.
On 06/12/2015 10:47 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Thank you, James
I particularly appreciate your link to the election results.
I understand the point you are making, and, perhaps oddly, agree that
the Frome event "doesn't do much for democratic representation of
voters". However, the "poke in the eye for party politics" should not
be ignored. I suspect the difference in our views is that I see
proportionality as an internal quality, not an external one.
Ideally, proportionality would be internal. If it were, we could use
single-winner methods to elect a large group of centrists, and each
centrist would be internally proportional, being rather more like a
judge than an advocate for his position. Each centrist would be able to
consider all sides of an issue, weighing the different sides as the
people would, and then come to a conclusion.
However, there are two problems. First, there's a matter of skill in
itself. Being a balanced judge-representative requires considerable
ability on part of the representative - moreso the fewer representatives
there are on the council. They'd have to both be balanced, and to retain
that balance in the face of corruption by power.
Second, election methods provide their own selection pressure. Plurality
selects the largest sufficiently cohesive group (the representative with
a plurality). IRV usually chooses from the strongest wing (the strongest
individuals of the collectively strongest group by Plurality metrics); a
similar logic holds for DAC and DSC.
To put it more briefly: the election method chooses the candidates that
are electable according to a combination of its logic and the wishes of
the people (possibly with imperfect information). Both must be up to the
task in order to elect judge-representatives by ordinary means (that is,
by using an election method as it would be used in an ordinary
presidential or parliamentary system).
Perhaps the advanced systems (Condorcet etc) would be good enough that
you would get internally proportional representatives as above. But I'm
not sure the voters would be able to accurately point out such
representatives to begin with, or would desire that sort of inclusive
centrism. I might be wrong, but if I'm not, then external PR methods
will at least ensure some measure of proportionality; getting internal
proportionality in the sense I mentioned above would then require a more
nonstandard system, not just a change of election methods.
(Note that standard PR methods don't "punish" per se. They simply limit
the influence of those who aren't ranked or rated highly by some subset
of the people. Indirectly, I can see that it would be considered a form
of punishment, but it is not directly a form of punishment the way, say,
impeachment or votes of no confidence are.)
As an example of a nonstandard system, consider a form of election by
lot, where the resulting council then makes use of advisory and
implementation organizations (somewhat like departments) to explore and
implement the policies they think should be implemented. This
nonstandard system is proportional if the council is large enough. Each
particular member of the council might not be a particular good judge,
but wisdom-of-crowds logic might make the council - as a whole - behave
like a good judge. There's little recurring corruption, but there might
be some corruption if the people in general are corrupt; this would take
the shape of "I won the lottery, now I'm going to get as much money I
can before I'm thrown out because I'm surely not going to win twice".
The nonstandard system works to the extent it does because it breaks the
assumptions implied in the question "what voting system do we use?". But
it isn't an election system in itself.
When proportionality is seen as an external quality, it is
confrontational; it sets the proportions at odds with each other. It
does nothing for the democratic representation of voters because it
empowers a relatively radical portion of the electorate at the expense
of the common-interest oriented portion of the electorate.
This, however, might be an artifact of the current systems. Or, rather,
even if we want external proportionality, we can make it a lot less
confrontational with the right methods.
First consider single member districts with Plurality. You either get
the strongest radical (because the candidates with broad support have
their votes split) or you get the lesser of two evils. The strongest
radical might be proportional if each district has a different radical,
but you still get a lot of radicals. The lesser evil might end up not
really representing anybody.
Parties in party list PR are somewhat more balanced: they are subject to
dual pressures. On the one hand, they have to be "radical" (clearly
establish their identities and lean in a particular direction) to draw
members and support. On the other hand, they are pulled towards the
common position by the fact that there are more voters there. Parties in
party list PR might be proportional when compared to other parties; that
is, if party X has double the support of party Y, then twice as many
voters are closer to party X than party Y. However, they might be
unrepresentative within each block: the median party X-voter might be
to the left (or right) of party X's official position, and the same
thing holds for party Y.
But it might be possible to construct a candidate-based election method
(like STV) that elects compromises within each slice. Like the good
single-winner methods, it would pick a candidate with broad support in a
single-winner election; and like the multiwinner methods, it would be
proportional in that each slice of opinion space corresponding to a seat
is given to an equally large share of the people.
My point is that while party list allocates slices to parties fairly, it
doesn't ensure that the party is internally representative, and while
something like STV allocates on a candidate basis in a way that
represents groups well (due to the DPC), its reduction to IRV in the
single-winner case means that it may not find the right compromise in
each particular metaphorical slice. A Condorcet-PR mix could potentially
do both. It's only unfortunate that these systems are hideously complex.
(The slice analogy here might be easier to understand if you think of a
left-right axis as an example. Then, in a three-seat election, the first
slice corresponds to the leftmost 33% of the voters, the second
corresponds to the center 33%, and the rightmost corresponds to the
right 33%, at least with Hare. The intuition for Droop is more complex.)
On 18 Jun 2015, at 21:26, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de wrote:
On 06/12/2015 11:30 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 09 Jun 2015, at 23:47, Gervase Lam gervase@madasafish.com
wrote:
A few weeks back, I heard on the radio a reasonable discussion
about the chances of electoral reform in the UK. It sounded like
one of the panellists in the discussion knew of the various
("complicated") PR systems more than the average person.
In any case, only glancing mentions were made about other
electoral systems. The panellist knew the target audience. I
think this is understandable given that the target audience really
want good results, not a "technical" system.
The Scottish system was used as an example. It is a natural candidate
since people often do not want any "foreign" systems but something
more familiar and something they can trust. In addition to this kind
of ranked / STV style systems there are also other kind of PR
systems, like party list based systems. Although most systems are
more complicated than the FPTP, I think they are simple enough since
they seem to work in many countries. A proportional system can work
well even if regular voters do not know the details of the counting
process well enough to explain how the system works. For them it is
enough to understand how to vote, and to have some general trust in
the fairness on the system.
In the broadcast they discussed whether a reform is possible or not.
If people want a reform, the reform might come because of good
experiences in some parts of the country (Scotland), in some other
elections (local, EU), or if voters are active enough and form a
movement with wide support. Although the incumbent parties are likely
to oppose any changes to the system, there is a tipping point
somewhere. The voters can change things if there is strong and wide
enough interest.
Systems of government seem in general to be very stable in the sense that they don't often change. If the voting method is biased in the sense that some group gets elected more often than in an ideal method, then naturally this group will prefer the status quo, and they will also have the power to keep the status quo in place.
Yes. I think elected representatives have good reason not to change the system, since they were elected with the current system, and the new system would probably not elect exactly the same representatives. Even small changes could kick many of the current representatives out.
On the other hand sometimes changes happen. The latest that comes into my mind in Fiji that changed to a classical proportional representation system very recently.
To what extent the voters can vote themselves another system depends, then, on the fidelity of the method itself. If the method is grossly unresponsive, then it will take a lot of push to do so. (If the system is too unresponsive, then there will eventually be a revolution, but not even Plurality systems are that unresponsive.)
Also plurality seems to work. Many leading democracies have that system. Plurality is simple and straight forward, but implements the will of voters in a somewhat less straight forward manner than for example proportional representation.
In these electoral reform matters society can be said to work as a whole rather than just through the elections. For example possible consensus in the media that something is wrong in the system and should be fixed is important. Also some strong individuals play a major role (e.g. if you have a prime minister that has some opinions on the electoral system).
So you could have systems that are unfair or unresponsive enough that they're not very democratic, yet are responsive enough that the discontent never builds up enough that there's a call to change the system. In that case, election reform will be very hard, even if it's what the voters want; the systems won't allow them to express the desire. At any given time, other issues might be more important, even though fixing the system itself could make it much easier to handle all of the direct issues later.
Dictatorships can be seen as countries with problems in democratic representation. That's one end of the scale. Also well working democracies have similar problems of not being able to fix the problems of the system, as already noted. I think the most practical way forward is to build consensus on the direction to take also outside the electoral process, i.e. also in media, by scientists, by individual politicians and by the very basic voters. That's because of the expected reluctancy of the elected representatives to change the system to their disadvantage.
From a selection point of view, a system only has to be a combination of good enough and resilient enough to ward off changes. The better it is, the less inherent resilience it needs because the voters would sincerely prefer the system to remain in place; and the more inherently resilient it is, the less good it needs to be (because it can withstand greater pressure to change).
Yes. A well working society/democracy may rely on the good intentions of the voters and politicians. Educated and civilized citizens are a key asset of a well working democracy. They are the ones that are supposed to make the key decisions (usually indirectly though). It takes time to build this valuable asset. I mean that in order to improve the system as a whole, one needs both good politicians and good voters. Otherwise changes in the mechanics might just not work because the politicians and voters are not ready for them, and can not use them in a constructive enough way.
To some extent, one could say that democratic systems in general require that the people accept the order. Where people are not used to the representative system or where it starts to break down, sometimes the people decide to vote themselves out of democracy and into more authoritarian rule.
Yes, and people accept the order if they believe it is good. In some countries people feel "system = us" and in some societies "system = them". In some societies people even seem to want and support strong, almost dictator level leaders in the hope that they would be strong enough to put the rest of the (no good) politicians, civil servants, businessmen etc. into order.
It would be interesting to have a meta-system where one can in theory reach every system (or every system can be tried at least once), and where every system can do anything it likes as long as it doesn't alter those rules. Bu doing that in practice would be very hard. Representative systems do somewhat attempt to emulate it: you may run on any program, and if elected with a majority, you can do anything as long as you don't fiddle with the rules themselves (something which often requires supermajority or referenda). Yet it isn't perfect: the voting system may be inaccurate and the voters usually have to choose between policy bundles rather than policies in themselves.
It could be practical to test different kind of democratic processes at lower levels like in different towns. Those trials can be then compared to the other areas that still play with the old rules, or with some alternative new rules. There is no major risk of not being able to reverse the process since the individual trials are small. If some approaches seem to work well, then one could make trials also at national level.
I'd like to see continuous trials like this. That would make it easier to discuss the benefits and problems of possible national level changes.
Juho
Good Morning, Kristofer
re: "Ideally, proportionality would be internal. If it
were, we could use single-winner methods to elect a
large group of centrists, and each centrist would be
internally proportional, being rather more like a judge
than an advocate for his position. Each centrist would
be able to consider all sides of an issue, weighing the
different sides as the people would, and then come to a
conclusion."
The designation as centrist is valid as long as we recognize that what
is centric under one set of time and circumstances is not necessarily
what will be centric under a different set of time and circumstances.
I'm not sure that it's necessary to characterize the centrists as
judges, except to the extent we all act in accordance with our own judgment.
As you say, such an arrangement would be ideal. To date, we do not have
a process for seeking such people and raising them to public office.
re: First, there's a matter of skill in itself. Being a
balanced judge-representative requires considerable
ability on part of the representative - moreso the fewer
representatives there are on the council. They'd have to
both be balanced, and to retain that balance in the face
of corruption by power.
Organizing a large number of people in a way that lets them select the
best of their number as their representative(s) requires a progressive
selection that constantly narrows the field. Those who advance are
necessarily those with the greatest ability. Whether or not they are
balanced is a subjective issue; they will reflect the biases of those
who selected them.
The corruption by power is limited by several factors:
-
Electees are individuals, not members of a voting bloc. Their
power is limited to their ability to influence other members
of the body to which they were elected. -
Corruption takes time and the selection process repeats.
Given the size of the electorate, repeated selection will not
be common. -
Selection is face-to-face, so there is no need for the immense
amounts of campaign money that corrupts party-based systems.
re: Second, election methods provide their own selection
pressure.
The selection pressure in party-based systems starts long before the
election. Candidates cannot mount a viable campaign without party
sponsorship. They obtain sponsorship by agreeing to support the party.
The party, assured of the loyalty of its candidates, attracts donors
because it can promise that its candidates will support the objectives
of the donors who supply the immense amounts of money the party needs to
sell their candidate to the people. As has always been the case, He Who
Pays The Piper Calls The Tune. Thus, those who supply the money dictate
the laws that burden the people.
re: Plurality selects the largest sufficiently cohesive
group (the representative with a plurality). IRV
usually chooses from the strongest wing (the strongest
individuals of the collectively strongest group by
Plurality metrics); a similar logic holds for DAC and
DSC.
That may be true, but each case assumes a party-based system. When we
learn to organize a community in a way that lets every person in the
community participate in the political process to the full extent of
each individual's desire and ability, regardless of the strength or
inclination of their views, parties can (and should) influence the
process but they will not control it. The "largest sufficiently
cohesive group" will be the people, not a biased subset of the people.
re: I might be wrong, but if I'm not, then external PR
methods will at least ensure some measure of
proportionality ...
I believe you are right. External PR methods do, at least, ensure some
measure of proportionality. The problem is the proportionality is made
up of factions that are necessarily confrontational. There is no
rational attempt to address the issues facing the people. There is no
advocate of the common interest, only multiple advocates of competing
interests.
In this connection, I should note that the political process in Frome is
an extension of this problem. It appears they have formed a new party -
the no-party party - that suffers all the ills of party politics. It is
my hope that the IfF (Independents for Frome) group's democratic ideals
extend to devising a way for every member of the community to
participate in the political process, regardless their of partisan
inclinations.
re: ... getting internal proportionality in the sense I
mentioned above would then require a more nonstandard
system, not just a change of election methods.
and
As an example of a nonstandard system, consider a form
of election by lot ...
Election by lot or sortition suffer because they make no attempt to seek
out and elevate the most competent members of the community. Ability
and integrity are distributed throughout society. We have a duty to
ourselves and our progeny to devise a method, however nonstandard it may
be, that sifts through the entire electorate to seek out those
individuals with the qualities needed to meet contemporary challenges
and raise them to leadership positions.
re: (the confrontational nature of proportionality as an
external quality) "... might be an artifact of the
current systems. Or, rather, even if we want external
proportionality, we can make it a lot less
confrontational with the right methods.
That is probably true, but wouldn't it make more sense to apply our
intellect to curing the disease rather than treating its symptoms?
(I apologize for the delay in preparing and posting this. Private
matters intervened.)
Fred Gohlke