Re: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
I recently made a meme relevant to this topic:
https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/
Just like IIA and Cloneproofness and so many other criteria failed by many
Condorcet methods, Participation only matters in elections when there is
not a Condorcet Winner (CW), which means it only creates an actionable
strategy when someone can predict that a given election will not have a CW.
I tend to prefer cardinal methods because of the increased expressivity and
reduced cognitive load on the voter, but the more I think about Condorcet
methods, the more impenetrable they seem. It just comes down to explaining
it to voters and legal viability. That's why I like "elect the candidate
who is preferred over the most others" as a method (i.e. Ranked Robin (i.e.
Copeland)).
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election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote:
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Today's Topics:
1. Question to the Condorcetists (Closed Limelike Curves)
2. Re: Question to the Condorcetists (Michael Ossipoff)
Message: 1
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 10:36:40 -0800
From: Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com
To: election-methods@electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
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Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable
to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
Germany.
With V voters, the number of individual pairwiwe-preference-votes that need
to be counted in order to test for Participation-failure is proportional to
V^4. I don't know how fast the fastest computers are, but might that be
computationally feasible?
On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 2:43 PM Sass sass@equal.vote wrote:
I recently made a meme relevant to this topic:
https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/
Just like IIA and Cloneproofness and so many other criteria failed by many
Condorcet methods, Participation only matters in elections when there is
not a Condorcet Winner (CW), which means it only creates an actionable
strategy when someone can predict that a given election will not have a CW.
I tend to prefer cardinal methods because of the increased expressivity
and reduced cognitive load on the voter, but the more I think about
Condorcet methods, the more impenetrable they seem. It just comes down to
explaining it to voters and legal viability. That's why I like "elect the
candidate who is preferred over the most others" as a method (i.e. Ranked
Robin (i.e. Copeland)).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 1:03 PM <
election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote:
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Today's Topics:
1. Question to the Condorcetists (Closed Limelike Curves)
2. Re: Question to the Condorcetists (Michael Ossipoff)
Message: 1
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 10:36:40 -0800
From: Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com
To: election-methods@electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
Message-ID:
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UXH6V3CYg@mail.gmail.com>
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Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
vulnerable
to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
Germany.
Well, with each voter, one at a time, individually-considered as not
showing up, all that’s needed is to decrement the pairwise vote-totals that
s/he’d added to.
Much less votecounting than what would be needed if it were necessary to
keep repeating the whole exhaustive pairwise count, as I’d previously
assumed.
So surely the Participation-check would be computationally-feasible.
On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 18:09 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
With V voters, the number of individual pairwiwe-preference-votes that
need to be counted in order to test for Participation-failure is
proportional to V^4. I don't know how fast the fastest computers are, but
might that be computationally feasible?
On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 2:43 PM Sass sass@equal.vote wrote:
I recently made a meme relevant to this topic:
https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/
Just like IIA and Cloneproofness and so many other criteria failed by
many Condorcet methods, Participation only matters in elections when there
is not a Condorcet Winner (CW), which means it only creates an actionable
strategy when someone can predict that a given election will not have a CW.
I tend to prefer cardinal methods because of the increased expressivity
and reduced cognitive load on the voter, but the more I think about
Condorcet methods, the more impenetrable they seem. It just comes down to
explaining it to voters and legal viability. That's why I like "elect the
candidate who is preferred over the most others" as a method (i.e. Ranked
Robin (i.e. Copeland)).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 1:03 PM <
election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote:
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Today's Topics:
1. Question to the Condorcetists (Closed Limelike Curves)
2. Re: Question to the Condorcetists (Michael Ossipoff)
Message: 1
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 10:36:40 -0800
From: Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com
To: election-methods@electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
Message-ID:
<CA+euzPi2VRg_Z_4C32zCE+t=gu4OXAjoffs=_sch=
UXH6V3CYg@mail.gmail.com>
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Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
vulnerable
to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
Germany.
It's not hard to figure out whether many pass/fail criteria apply to
certain scenarios. The results alone should always show whether it's
possible. From there, you can theory-craft the types of ballots that need
to be removed. Then you check if sufficiently many ballots exist in the
election to be changed/removed.
For example, I went through the results of the 2018 San Francisco Mayoral
election looking for a monotonicity failure in the frontrunners, so I made
a preference matrix and compared it to the RCV results. What I actually
found were signs of a monotonicity failure among middling candidates
because the CW of those middle three candidates was eliminated first. I
calculated how many voters needed to lower their preference for that
middling CW in order to help them. I then realized that it was more votes
than the number of top-choice votes that candidate received in their final
round, which means that there wasn't actually a monotonicity failure. Upon
more investigation into the ballots, I discovered that most of the
preferences for that candidate were actually second choices that were all
blocked by first choices for an ideologically-aligned frontrunner. (This
was a really cool result and realization that when monotonicity failures
occur in RCV, they will almost always be among the top candidates.)
The point is that I didn't need to analyze every individual ballot. I
started with the results and worked in the other direction. A similar
approach can be used with Participation.
On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 7:16 PM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
Well, with each voter, one at a time, individually-considered as not
showing up, all that’s needed is to decrement the pairwise vote-totals that
s/he’d added to.
Much less votecounting than what would be needed if it were necessary to
keep repeating the whole exhaustive pairwise count, as I’d previously
assumed.
So surely the Participation-check would be computationally-feasible.
On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 18:09 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
With V voters, the number of individual pairwiwe-preference-votes that
need to be counted in order to test for Participation-failure is
proportional to V^4. I don't know how fast the fastest computers are, but
might that be computationally feasible?
On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 2:43 PM Sass sass@equal.vote wrote:
I recently made a meme relevant to this topic:
https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/
Just like IIA and Cloneproofness and so many other criteria failed by
many Condorcet methods, Participation only matters in elections when there
is not a Condorcet Winner (CW), which means it only creates an actionable
strategy when someone can predict that a given election will not have a CW.
I tend to prefer cardinal methods because of the increased expressivity
and reduced cognitive load on the voter, but the more I think about
Condorcet methods, the more impenetrable they seem. It just comes down to
explaining it to voters and legal viability. That's why I like "elect the
candidate who is preferred over the most others" as a method (i.e. Ranked
Robin (i.e. Copeland)).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 1:03 PM <
election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote:
Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
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Today's Topics:
1. Question to the Condorcetists (Closed Limelike Curves)
2. Re: Question to the Condorcetists (Michael Ossipoff)
Message: 1
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 10:36:40 -0800
From: Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com
To: election-methods@electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
Message-ID:
<CA+euzPi2VRg_Z_4C32zCE+t=gu4OXAjoffs=_sch=
UXH6V3CYg@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
methods
have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
vulnerable
to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
Germany.
The point is that I didn't need to analyze every individual ballot. I
started with the results and worked in the other direction. A similar
approach can be used with Participation.
Yes, but a complete thorough check for Participation-violation would take
about a million times less time than the original exhaustive pairwise-count
would require.
On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 7:16 PM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.comindividually-considered
as not showing up, all that’s needed is to decrement the pairwise
vote-totals that s/he’d added to.
Much less votecounting than what would be needed if it were necessary to
keep repeating the whole exhaustive pairwise count, as I’d previously
assumed.
So surely the Participation-check would be computationally-feasible.
On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 18:09 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
With V voters, the number of individual pairwiwe-preference-votes that
need to be counted in order to test for Participation-failure is
proportional to V^4. I don't know how fast the fastest computers are, but
might that be computationally feasible?
On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 2:43 PM Sass sass@equal.vote wrote:
I recently made a meme relevant to this topic:
https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/
Just like IIA and Cloneproofness and so many other criteria failed by
many Condorcet methods, Participation only matters in elections when there
is not a Condorcet Winner (CW), which means it only creates an actionable
strategy when someone can predict that a given election will not have a CW.
I tend to prefer cardinal methods because of the increased expressivity
and reduced cognitive load on the voter, but the more I think about
Condorcet methods, the more impenetrable they seem. It just comes down to
explaining it to voters and legal viability. That's why I like "elect the
candidate who is preferred over the most others" as a method (i.e. Ranked
Robin (i.e. Copeland)).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 1:03 PM <
election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote:
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Today's Topics:
1. Question to the Condorcetists (Closed Limelike Curves)
2. Re: Question to the Condorcetists (Michael Ossipoff)
Message: 1
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 10:36:40 -0800
From: Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com
To: election-methods@electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
Message-ID:
<CA+euzPi2VRg_Z_4C32zCE+t=gu4OXAjoffs=_sch=
UXH6V3CYg@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
methods
have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
vulnerable
to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen
in
Germany.
Oops !! I was treated the number of voters as if it were the number of
candidates.
Actually a complete thorough Participation-violation-check would take half
as long as the initial Condorcet exhaustive pairwise-count.
…about 57 billion individual pairwise-votes to count, vs 114 billion.
…for 300 million voters & 20 candidates.
I doubt that either would be a problem for a modern computer.
On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 23:21 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
The point is that I didn't need to analyze every individual ballot. I
started with the results and worked in the other direction. A similar
approach can be used with Participation.
Yes, but a complete thorough check for Participation-violation would take
about a million times less time than the original exhaustive pairwise-count
would require.
On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 7:16 PM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.comindividually-considered
as not showing up, all that’s needed is to decrement the pairwise
vote-totals that s/he’d added to.
Much less votecounting than what would be needed if it were necessary to
keep repeating the whole exhaustive pairwise count, as I’d previously
assumed.
So surely the Participation-check would be computationally-feasible.
On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 18:09 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
With V voters, the number of individual pairwiwe-preference-votes that
need to be counted in order to test for Participation-failure is
proportional to V^4. I don't know how fast the fastest computers are, but
might that be computationally feasible?
On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 2:43 PM Sass sass@equal.vote wrote:
I recently made a meme relevant to this topic:
https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/
Just like IIA and Cloneproofness and so many other criteria failed by
many Condorcet methods, Participation only matters in elections when there
is not a Condorcet Winner (CW), which means it only creates an actionable
strategy when someone can predict that a given election will not have a CW.
I tend to prefer cardinal methods because of the increased
expressivity and reduced cognitive load on the voter, but the more I think
about Condorcet methods, the more impenetrable they seem. It just comes
down to explaining it to voters and legal viability. That's why I like
"elect the candidate who is preferred over the most others" as a method
(i.e. Ranked Robin (i.e. Copeland)).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 1:03 PM <
election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote:
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Today's Topics:
1. Question to the Condorcetists (Closed Limelike Curves)
2. Re: Question to the Condorcetists (Michael Ossipoff)
Message: 1
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 10:36:40 -0800
From: Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com
To: election-methods@electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
Message-ID:
<CA+euzPi2VRg_Z_4C32zCE+t=gu4OXAjoffs=_sch=
UXH6V3CYg@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
methods
have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
vulnerable
to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen
in
Germany.
So people don't all have to click on the link for the "meme": "You fail participation because you ignore relevant ballot data. I fail participation because I have a strong honesty incentive. We are not the same."
It's not particularly useful. It needs backing up mathematically.
And as has been said previously regarding Copeland, if there isn't a Condorcet winner, it's probably because there's a three-way cycle, so it's primary tie-breaking method doesn't work.
Toby
On Thursday, 29 February 2024 at 19:43:32 GMT, Sass sass@equal.vote wrote:
I recently made a meme relevant to this topic:https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/
Just like IIA and Cloneproofness and so many other criteria failed by many Condorcet methods, Participation only matters in elections when there is not a Condorcet Winner (CW), which means it only creates an actionable strategy when someone can predict that a given election will not have a CW.
I tend to prefer cardinal methods because of the increased expressivity and reduced cognitive load on the voter, but the more I think about Condorcet methods, the more impenetrable they seem. It just comes down to explaining it to voters and legal viability. That's why I like "elect the candidate who is preferred over the most others" as a method (i.e. Ranked Robin (i.e. Copeland)).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 1:03 PM election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com wrote:
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Today's Topics:
1. Question to the Condorcetists (Closed Limelike Curves)
2. Re: Question to the Condorcetists (Michael Ossipoff)
Message: 1
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 10:36:40 -0800
From: Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com
To: election-methods@electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
Message-ID:
CA+euzPi2VRg_Z_4C32zCE+t=gu4OXAjoffs=_sch=UXH6V3CYg@mail.gmail.com
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable
to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
Germany.
Just to add on the Copeland / Ranked Robin thing - given most likely tie (a three-way cycle) and Ranked Robin's next level of tie-breaker (Borda among the tied candidates as far as I understand), Ranked Robin is for the most part Condorcet//Borda. I understand that Copeland was picked by Equal Vote because of its simplicity, but given its reliance on the Borda a tie-breaker, it loses that purity and simplicity as a method. So right now I see Ranked Pairs or River as overall the best Condorcet methods for simplicity and criterion compliance. (I would not be averse to their use on a cardinal ballot.)
Toby
On Friday, 1 March 2024 at 10:02:39 GMT, Toby Pereira tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
So people don't all have to click on the link for the "meme": "You fail participation because you ignore relevant ballot data. I fail participation because I have a strong honesty incentive. We are not the same."
It's not particularly useful. It needs backing up mathematically.
And as has been said previously regarding Copeland, if there isn't a Condorcet winner, it's probably because there's a three-way cycle, so it's primary tie-breaking method doesn't work.
Toby
On Thursday, 29 February 2024 at 19:43:32 GMT, Sass sass@equal.vote wrote:
I recently made a meme relevant to this topic:https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/
Just like IIA and Cloneproofness and so many other criteria failed by many Condorcet methods, Participation only matters in elections when there is not a Condorcet Winner (CW), which means it only creates an actionable strategy when someone can predict that a given election will not have a CW.
I tend to prefer cardinal methods because of the increased expressivity and reduced cognitive load on the voter, but the more I think about Condorcet methods, the more impenetrable they seem. It just comes down to explaining it to voters and legal viability. That's why I like "elect the candidate who is preferred over the most others" as a method (i.e. Ranked Robin (i.e. Copeland)).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 1:03 PM election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com wrote:
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Today's Topics:
1. Question to the Condorcetists (Closed Limelike Curves)
2. Re: Question to the Condorcetists (Michael Ossipoff)
Message: 1
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 10:36:40 -0800
From: Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com
To: election-methods@electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
Message-ID:
CA+euzPi2VRg_Z_4C32zCE+t=gu4OXAjoffs=_sch=UXH6V3CYg@mail.gmail.com
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable
to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
Germany.
And thinking further about the meme: "You fail participation because you ignore relevant ballot data. I fail participation because I have a strong honesty incentive. We are not the same." - a participation failure is an example of the exact opposite happening. You cast an honest ballot, but the election result changes in the wrong direction for you. It's not an accurate claim.
On Friday, 1 March 2024 at 16:18:41 GMT, Toby Pereira <tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
Just to add on the Copeland / Ranked Robin thing - given most likely tie (a three-way cycle) and Ranked Robin's next level of tie-breaker (Borda among the tied candidates as far as I understand), Ranked Robin is for the most part Condorcet//Borda. I understand that Copeland was picked by Equal Vote because of its simplicity, but given its reliance on the Borda a tie-breaker, it loses that purity and simplicity as a method. So right now I see Ranked Pairs or River as overall the best Condorcet methods for simplicity and criterion compliance. (I would not be averse to their use on a cardinal ballot.)
Toby
On Friday, 1 March 2024 at 10:02:39 GMT, Toby Pereira tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
So people don't all have to click on the link for the "meme": "You fail participation because you ignore relevant ballot data. I fail participation because I have a strong honesty incentive. We are not the same."
It's not particularly useful. It needs backing up mathematically.
And as has been said previously regarding Copeland, if there isn't a Condorcet winner, it's probably because there's a three-way cycle, so it's primary tie-breaking method doesn't work.
Toby
On Thursday, 29 February 2024 at 19:43:32 GMT, Sass sass@equal.vote wrote:
I recently made a meme relevant to this topic:https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/
Just like IIA and Cloneproofness and so many other criteria failed by many Condorcet methods, Participation only matters in elections when there is not a Condorcet Winner (CW), which means it only creates an actionable strategy when someone can predict that a given election will not have a CW.
I tend to prefer cardinal methods because of the increased expressivity and reduced cognitive load on the voter, but the more I think about Condorcet methods, the more impenetrable they seem. It just comes down to explaining it to voters and legal viability. That's why I like "elect the candidate who is preferred over the most others" as a method (i.e. Ranked Robin (i.e. Copeland)).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 1:03 PM election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com wrote:
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Today's Topics:
1. Question to the Condorcetists (Closed Limelike Curves)
2. Re: Question to the Condorcetists (Michael Ossipoff)
Message: 1
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 10:36:40 -0800
From: Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com
To: election-methods@electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
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CA+euzPi2VRg_Z_4C32zCE+t=gu4OXAjoffs=_sch=UXH6V3CYg@mail.gmail.com
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Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable
to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
Germany.
I think that should be Smith//Borda.
On Friday, 1 March 2024 at 16:18:41 GMT, Toby Pereira tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Just to add on the Copeland / Ranked Robin thing - given most likely tie (a three-way cycle) and Ranked Robin's next level of tie-breaker (Borda among the tied candidates as far as I understand), Ranked Robin is for the most part Condorcet//Borda. I understand that Copeland was picked by Equal Vote because of its simplicity, but given its reliance on the Borda a tie-breaker, it loses that purity and simplicity as a method. So right now I see Ranked Pairs or River as overall the best Condorcet methods for simplicity and criterion compliance. (I would not be averse to their use on a cardinal ballot.)
Toby
On Friday, 1 March 2024 at 10:02:39 GMT, Toby Pereira tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
So people don't all have to click on the link for the "meme": "You fail participation because you ignore relevant ballot data. I fail participation because I have a strong honesty incentive. We are not the same."
It's not particularly useful. It needs backing up mathematically.
And as has been said previously regarding Copeland, if there isn't a Condorcet winner, it's probably because there's a three-way cycle, so it's primary tie-breaking method doesn't work.
Toby
On Thursday, 29 February 2024 at 19:43:32 GMT, Sass sass@equal.vote wrote:
I recently made a meme relevant to this topic:https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/
Just like IIA and Cloneproofness and so many other criteria failed by many Condorcet methods, Participation only matters in elections when there is not a Condorcet Winner (CW), which means it only creates an actionable strategy when someone can predict that a given election will not have a CW.
I tend to prefer cardinal methods because of the increased expressivity and reduced cognitive load on the voter, but the more I think about Condorcet methods, the more impenetrable they seem. It just comes down to explaining it to voters and legal viability. That's why I like "elect the candidate who is preferred over the most others" as a method (i.e. Ranked Robin (i.e. Copeland)).
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 1:03 PM election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com wrote:
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Today's Topics:
1. Question to the Condorcetists (Closed Limelike Curves)
2. Re: Question to the Condorcetists (Michael Ossipoff)
Message: 1
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 10:36:40 -0800
From: Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com
To: election-methods@electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
Message-ID:
CA+euzPi2VRg_Z_4C32zCE+t=gu4OXAjoffs=_sch=UXH6V3CYg@mail.gmail.com
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable
to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
Germany.