It is very difficult (if not impossible)  to modify IRV without causing it to lose some criterion compliance that a lot of its supporters like.  This is part of the case that it is in its way a good method, certainly compared to STAR. 49 A 24 B 27 C>B| Here, with the C>B voters extending their approval to B, the winner in this suggested "approval-enhanced" method is B. But plain IRV meets Later-no-Harm, which a lot of people like. In this example if the 24 B voters change to B>C (even without approving C) then the winner would change from B to C, breaking LNHarm. 49 A 24 B>C 27 C>B| Now the new IRV winner is C and C  also now pairwise beats both the other candidates. I am sure that a more complicated example could be found that demonstrates that it also fails Later-no-Help, so maybe Toby was right in calling this a "kludge" after all. Chris Benham > [EM] Approval-enhanced IRV (take 2) > > *C.Benham*cbenham at adam.com.au > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Approval-enhanced%20IRV%20%28take%202%29&In-Reply-To=%3C9fed1bfa-1ee8-cb6c-8e85-e394d3eb898f%40adam.com.au%3E> > /Mon Aug 21 09:36:20 PDT 2023/ > > * > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > This is I think more appealing and streamlined than my earlier > version. *Voter strictly rank from the top however many candidates > they wish. Also they can mark one candidate as the highest ranked > candidate they approve. Default approval is only for the top-ranked > candidate. Determine the IRV winner. On ballots that approve the IRV > winner, approval for any candidate or candidates ranked below the IRV > winner is withdrawn. Elect the pairwise winner between the (thus > modified) approval winner and the IRV winner.* This works fine in the > same way as the earlier version in the example given to talk about > Minimal Defense and Chicken Dilemma. It is more Condorcet efficient > than normal IRV, and meets (or comes close enough to meeting) > appropriately modified versions of the LNHs and Minimal Defense and > Chicken Dilemma. 49 A  (sincere might be A>B) 24 B   (sincere might be > B>C) 27 C>B If the C voters B>A preference is strong they can by > approving B avoid regret for not Compromising. Then the final pairwise > comparison will be between B and A and B will win. Chris Benham