That question was recently asked. Condorcet has many versions, & there’s no agreement on that matter. So Condorcet doesn’t have any enactment-projects, or even an organization. Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few candidates, in the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its particularly great unfamiliarity. Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn’t too-vote an evil. How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in various nonpolitical votes. Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a voting-system reform. That’s happened for RCV. …or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened for RCV. But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, in the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for the pursuit of an initiative. Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such as: MinMax(wv) CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA). Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles. Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don’t like & don’t wish to beat the CW via burial. That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of initiative-enactment. Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to approve (only) the proposal(s) that they’d support in an initiative.

A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to learn why it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing mention of this episode, so this research would probably involve traveling to Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives, county election records and the public library. On the other hand, this part of Michigan is a beautiful place to visit. Any takers? --Bob Richard ------ Original Message ------ >From "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com> To "EM list" <election-methods@electorama.com> Date 1/10/2024 11:34:57 AM Subject [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals? >That question was recently asked. > >Condorcet has many versions, & there’s no agreement on that matter. > >So Condorcet doesn’t have any enactment-projects, or even an >organization. > >Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few >candidates, in the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. >Hence its particularly great unfamiliarity. > >Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure >our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn’t >too-vote an evil. > >How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in >various nonpolitical votes. > >Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a >voting-system reform. That’s happened for RCV. > >…or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened >for RCV. > >But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, >in the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, >for the pursuit of an initiative. > >Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such >as: > >MinMax(wv) >CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA). > >Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles. > >Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the >defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don’t like & don’t >wish to beat the CW via burial. > >That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to >find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of >initiative-enactment. > >Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that >focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked >to approve (only) the proposal(s) that they’d support in an initiative. > > > > > > >

On 2024-01-10 21:07, Bob Richard [lists] wrote: > A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of > Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to learn > why it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing > mention of this episode, so this research would probably involve > traveling to Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives, > county election records and the public library. On the other hand, this > part of Michigan is a beautiful place to visit. Any takers? In addition, regarding Condorcet methods in actual use, Schulze has been used by a bunch of organizations, and in referenda in a Spanish city. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method#Usage My impression is that Schulze got its relatively popularity by first being adopted by technology-conscious organizations like Debian and Wikimedia, and then filtering down from there. Nanson has also been used by the University of Adelaide and the University of Melbourne. University elections aren't the same thing as public ones and the circumstances do differ, but perhaps figuring out why they were repealed there would give at least some idea? (Then again, perhaps not; see my confused surprise at the reasoning the UBC Alma Mater Society gave for abandoning Ranked Pairs.) -km

Nanson has precedent, but it doesn’t have the simplicity of some of the other Condorcet-compliant methods. …& how does Nanson do by freedom from need for defensive-strategy (against offensive-strategy)? Achieving the best strategy-free-ness is the goal of Condorcet. On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 12:08 Bob Richard [lists] < lists001@robertjrichard.com> wrote: > A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of > Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to learn why > it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing mention of > this episode, so this research would probably involve traveling to > Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives, county election > records and the public library. On the other hand, this part of Michigan is > a beautiful place to visit. Any takers? > > --Bob Richard > > ------ Original Message ------ > From "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com> > To "EM list" <election-methods@electorama.com> > Date 1/10/2024 11:34:57 AM > Subject [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals? > > That question was recently asked. > > Condorcet has many versions, & there’s no agreement on that matter. > > So Condorcet doesn’t have any enactment-projects, or even an organization. > > Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few candidates, > in the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its > particularly great unfamiliarity. > > Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure > our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn’t too-vote an > evil. > > How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in > various nonpolitical votes. > > Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a > voting-system reform. That’s happened for RCV. > > …or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened > for RCV. > > But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, in > the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for the > pursuit of an initiative. > > Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such as: > > MinMax(wv) > CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA). > > Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles. > > Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the > defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don’t like & don’t wish > to beat the CW via burial. > > That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to > find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of > initiative-enactment. > > Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that > focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to > approve (only) the proposal(s) that they’d support in an initiative. > > > > > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >

On 1/10/24 5:07 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > On 2024-01-10 21:07, Bob Richard [lists] wrote: >> A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of >> Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to >> learn why it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a >> passing mention of this episode, so this research would probably >> involve traveling to Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper >> archives, county election records and the public library. On the >> other hand, this part of Michigan is a beautiful place to visit. Any >> takers? > > In addition, regarding Condorcet methods in actual use, Schulze has > been used by a bunch of organizations, and in referenda in a Spanish > city. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method#Usage > > My impression is that Schulze got its relatively popularity by first > being adopted by technology-conscious organizations like Debian and > Wikimedia, and then filtering down from there. > > > Nanson has also been used by the University of Adelaide and the > University of Melbourne. University elections aren't the same thing as > public ones and the circumstances do differ, but perhaps figuring out > why they were repealed there would give at least some idea? > > (Then again, perhaps not; see my confused surprise at the reasoning > the UBC Alma Mater Society gave for abandoning Ranked Pairs.) > > -km The CIVS voting system is routinely used (and has been for years) by a variety of organizations to decide leadership questions: especially open-source organizations and universities. Randomly grabbing a few recent ones: The Linux Foundation OpenStack Bytecode Alliance Kubeflow Lubuntu SUNY Fredonia College of William and Mary Of course, it gets used for many other less consequential decisions, with more than 35,000 polls run so far. The default rule CIVS uses is Minimax but it also supports Schulze and other methods. -- Andrew

Michael, I see you like Condorcet//Approval(implicit). What about Condorcet//Median Ratings? On Thu, Jan 11, 2024, 09:07 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > Nanson has precedent, but it doesn’t have the simplicity of some of the > other Condorcet-compliant methods. > > …& how does Nanson do by freedom from need for defensive-strategy (against > offensive-strategy)? > > Achieving the best strategy-free-ness is the goal of Condorcet. > > On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 12:08 Bob Richard [lists] < > lists001@robertjrichard.com> wrote: > >> A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of >> Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to learn why >> it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing mention of >> this episode, so this research would probably involve traveling to >> Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives, county election >> records and the public library. On the other hand, this part of Michigan is >> a beautiful place to visit. Any takers? >> >> --Bob Richard >> >> ------ Original Message ------ >> From "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com> >> To "EM list" <election-methods@electorama.com> >> Date 1/10/2024 11:34:57 AM >> Subject [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals? >> >> That question was recently asked. >> >> Condorcet has many versions, & there’s no agreement on that matter. >> >> So Condorcet doesn’t have any enactment-projects, or even an organization. >> >> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few candidates, >> in the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its >> particularly great unfamiliarity. >> >> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure >> our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn’t too-vote an >> evil. >> >> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in >> various nonpolitical votes. >> >> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a >> voting-system reform. That’s happened for RCV. >> >> …or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened >> for RCV. >> >> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, in >> the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for the >> pursuit of an initiative. >> >> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such as: >> >> MinMax(wv) >> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA). >> >> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles. >> >> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the >> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don’t like & don’t wish >> to beat the CW via burial. >> >> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to >> find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of >> initiative-enactment. >> >> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that >> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to >> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they’d support in an initiative. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >

I’d have to understand it better. I’ll study it. If Median-Ratings is like Majority-Judgment, its need for a special tiebreaker complicates it. Simplicity is important for a 1st Condorcet proposal. When you described it, I assumed that it was Majority-Judgment—but now I’ll take a closer look. So, till then… On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:05 Ted Stern <dodecatheon@gmail.com> wrote: > Michael, > > I see you like Condorcet//Approval(implicit). > > What about Condorcet//Median Ratings? > > On Thu, Jan 11, 2024, 09:07 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Nanson has precedent, but it doesn’t have the simplicity of some of the >> other Condorcet-compliant methods. >> >> …& how does Nanson do by freedom from need for defensive-strategy >> (against offensive-strategy)? >> >> Achieving the best strategy-free-ness is the goal of Condorcet. >> >> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 12:08 Bob Richard [lists] < >> lists001@robertjrichard.com> wrote: >> >>> A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of >>> Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to learn why >>> it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing mention of >>> this episode, so this research would probably involve traveling to >>> Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives, county election >>> records and the public library. On the other hand, this part of Michigan is >>> a beautiful place to visit. Any takers? >>> >>> --Bob Richard >>> >>> ------ Original Message ------ >>> From "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com> >>> To "EM list" <election-methods@electorama.com> >>> Date 1/10/2024 11:34:57 AM >>> Subject [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals? >>> >>> That question was recently asked. >>> >>> Condorcet has many versions, & there’s no agreement on that matter. >>> >>> So Condorcet doesn’t have any enactment-projects, or even an >>> organization. >>> >>> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few candidates, >>> in the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its >>> particularly great unfamiliarity. >>> >>> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure >>> our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn’t too-vote an >>> evil. >>> >>> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in >>> various nonpolitical votes. >>> >>> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a >>> voting-system reform. That’s happened for RCV. >>> >>> …or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened >>> for RCV. >>> >>> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, >>> in the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for >>> the pursuit of an initiative. >>> >>> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such >>> as: >>> >>> MinMax(wv) >>> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA). >>> >>> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles. >>> >>> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the >>> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don’t like & don’t wish >>> to beat the CW via burial. >>> >>> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to >>> find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of >>> initiative-enactment. >>> >>> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that >>> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to >>> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they’d support in an initiative. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >>> info >>> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >

Median Rating is just ER-Bucklin with gaps allowed. On Thu, Jan 11, 2024, 15:11 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > I’d have to understand it better. I’ll study it. > > If Median-Ratings is like Majority-Judgment, its need for a special > tiebreaker complicates it. Simplicity is important for a 1st Condorcet > proposal. > > When you described it, I assumed that it was Majority-Judgment—but now > I’ll take a closer look. > > So, till then… > > On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:05 Ted Stern <dodecatheon@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Michael, >> >> I see you like Condorcet//Approval(implicit). >> >> What about Condorcet//Median Ratings? >> >> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024, 09:07 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Nanson has precedent, but it doesn’t have the simplicity of some of the >>> other Condorcet-compliant methods. >>> >>> …& how does Nanson do by freedom from need for defensive-strategy >>> (against offensive-strategy)? >>> >>> Achieving the best strategy-free-ness is the goal of Condorcet. >>> >>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 12:08 Bob Richard [lists] < >>> lists001@robertjrichard.com> wrote: >>> >>>> A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of >>>> Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to learn why >>>> it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing mention of >>>> this episode, so this research would probably involve traveling to >>>> Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives, county election >>>> records and the public library. On the other hand, this part of Michigan is >>>> a beautiful place to visit. Any takers? >>>> >>>> --Bob Richard >>>> >>>> ------ Original Message ------ >>>> From "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com> >>>> To "EM list" <election-methods@electorama.com> >>>> Date 1/10/2024 11:34:57 AM >>>> Subject [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals? >>>> >>>> That question was recently asked. >>>> >>>> Condorcet has many versions, & there’s no agreement on that matter. >>>> >>>> So Condorcet doesn’t have any enactment-projects, or even an >>>> organization. >>>> >>>> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few >>>> candidates, in the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence >>>> its particularly great unfamiliarity. >>>> >>>> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure >>>> our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn’t too-vote an >>>> evil. >>>> >>>> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in >>>> various nonpolitical votes. >>>> >>>> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a >>>> voting-system reform. That’s happened for RCV. >>>> >>>> …or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened >>>> for RCV. >>>> >>>> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, >>>> in the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for >>>> the pursuit of an initiative. >>>> >>>> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such >>>> as: >>>> >>>> MinMax(wv) >>>> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA). >>>> >>>> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles. >>>> >>>> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the >>>> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don’t like & don’t wish >>>> to beat the CW via burial. >>>> >>>> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to >>>> find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of >>>> initiative-enactment. >>>> >>>> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that >>>> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to >>>> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they’d support in an initiative. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ---- >>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >>>> info >>>> >>> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >>> info >>> >>

Okay, then it has a reasonably brief definition, & is based on something with precedent. I recently thought that ER-Bucklin was promising, & advocated it here, but then noticed a strategy-problem. It was my impression then that gaps wouldn’t solve the problem. Delaying a vote bestowal to Z can protect against helping Z beat someone, Y, whom you like better before Y gets your vote…but it can also prevent you from helping Z, in time, against someone worse. So I gave-up on Bucklin. On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:39 Ted Stern <dodecatheon@gmail.com> wrote: > Median Rating is just ER-Bucklin with gaps allowed. > > On Thu, Jan 11, 2024, 15:11 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> I’d have to understand it better. I’ll study it. >> >> If Median-Ratings is like Majority-Judgment, its need for a special >> tiebreaker complicates it. Simplicity is important for a 1st Condorcet >> proposal. >> >> When you described it, I assumed that it was Majority-Judgment—but now >> I’ll take a closer look. >> >> So, till then… >> >> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:05 Ted Stern <dodecatheon@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Michael, >>> >>> I see you like Condorcet//Approval(implicit). >>> >>> What about Condorcet//Median Ratings? >>> >>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024, 09:07 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Nanson has precedent, but it doesn’t have the simplicity of some of the >>>> other Condorcet-compliant methods. >>>> >>>> …& how does Nanson do by freedom from need for defensive-strategy >>>> (against offensive-strategy)? >>>> >>>> Achieving the best strategy-free-ness is the goal of Condorcet. >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 12:08 Bob Richard [lists] < >>>> lists001@robertjrichard.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of >>>>> Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to learn why >>>>> it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing mention of >>>>> this episode, so this research would probably involve traveling to >>>>> Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives, county election >>>>> records and the public library. On the other hand, this part of Michigan is >>>>> a beautiful place to visit. Any takers? >>>>> >>>>> --Bob Richard >>>>> >>>>> ------ Original Message ------ >>>>> From "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com> >>>>> To "EM list" <election-methods@electorama.com> >>>>> Date 1/10/2024 11:34:57 AM >>>>> Subject [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals? >>>>> >>>>> That question was recently asked. >>>>> >>>>> Condorcet has many versions, & there’s no agreement on that matter. >>>>> >>>>> So Condorcet doesn’t have any enactment-projects, or even an >>>>> organization. >>>>> >>>>> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few >>>>> candidates, in the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence >>>>> its particularly great unfamiliarity. >>>>> >>>>> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully >>>>> reassure our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn’t >>>>> too-vote an evil. >>>>> >>>>> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in >>>>> various nonpolitical votes. >>>>> >>>>> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a >>>>> voting-system reform. That’s happened for RCV. >>>>> >>>>> …or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise >>>>> happened for RCV. >>>>> >>>>> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, >>>>> in the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for >>>>> the pursuit of an initiative. >>>>> >>>>> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such >>>>> as: >>>>> >>>>> MinMax(wv) >>>>> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA). >>>>> >>>>> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles. >>>>> >>>>> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the >>>>> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don’t like & don’t wish >>>>> to beat the CW via burial. >>>>> >>>>> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, >>>>> to find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of >>>>> initiative-enactment. >>>>> >>>>> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that >>>>> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to >>>>> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they’d support in an initiative. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ---- >>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for >>>>> list info >>>>> >>>> ---- >>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list >>>> info >>>> >>>

See my other thread on Pairwise Median Ratings. I proposed using pairwise as the tie breaker for highest median rating, then fall back to MRscore as a last resort if there is a cycle in the top MR group. In essence, it would be a form of Condorcet//Approval in the set of candidates meeting the threshold (after the original Condorcet failed to find a single CW), with the median rating as the approval. A kind of Approval runoff, if you will. So Condorcet//MR//Condorcet*//MRscore overall. In the other thread, I use Smith instead of Condorcet as the first pass to satisfy immunity from irrelevant ballots (and blank ballots). In any case, this method reverts to Condorcet//implicit Approval if no candidate is ranked by more than 50%. On Thu, Jan 11, 2024, 16:44 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > Okay, then it has a reasonably brief definition, & is based on something > with precedent. > > I recently thought that ER-Bucklin was promising, & advocated it here, but > then noticed a strategy-problem. > > It was my impression then that gaps wouldn’t solve the problem. > > Delaying a vote bestowal to Z can protect against helping Z beat someone, > Y, whom you like better before Y gets your vote…but it can also prevent > you from helping Z, in time, against someone worse. > > So I gave-up on Bucklin. > > On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:39 Ted Stern <dodecatheon@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Median Rating is just ER-Bucklin with gaps allowed. >> >> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024, 15:11 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> I’d have to understand it better. I’ll study it. >>> >>> If Median-Ratings is like Majority-Judgment, its need for a special >>> tiebreaker complicates it. Simplicity is important for a 1st Condorcet >>> proposal. >>> >>> When you described it, I assumed that it was Majority-Judgment—but now >>> I’ll take a closer look. >>> >>> So, till then… >>> >>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:05 Ted Stern <dodecatheon@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Michael, >>>> >>>> I see you like Condorcet//Approval(implicit). >>>> >>>> What about Condorcet//Median Ratings? >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024, 09:07 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Nanson has precedent, but it doesn’t have the simplicity of some of >>>>> the other Condorcet-compliant methods. >>>>> >>>>> …& how does Nanson do by freedom from need for defensive-strategy >>>>> (against offensive-strategy)? >>>>> >>>>> Achieving the best strategy-free-ness is the goal of Condorcet. >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 12:08 Bob Richard [lists] < >>>>> lists001@robertjrichard.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of >>>>>> Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to learn why >>>>>> it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing mention of >>>>>> this episode, so this research would probably involve traveling to >>>>>> Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives, county election >>>>>> records and the public library. On the other hand, this part of Michigan is >>>>>> a beautiful place to visit. Any takers? >>>>>> >>>>>> --Bob Richard >>>>>> >>>>>> ------ Original Message ------ >>>>>> From "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com> >>>>>> To "EM list" <election-methods@electorama.com> >>>>>> Date 1/10/2024 11:34:57 AM >>>>>> Subject [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals? >>>>>> >>>>>> That question was recently asked. >>>>>> >>>>>> Condorcet has many versions, & there’s no agreement on that matter. >>>>>> >>>>>> So Condorcet doesn’t have any enactment-projects, or even an >>>>>> organization. >>>>>> >>>>>> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few >>>>>> candidates, in the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence >>>>>> its particularly great unfamiliarity. >>>>>> >>>>>> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully >>>>>> reassure our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn’t >>>>>> too-vote an evil. >>>>>> >>>>>> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it >>>>>> in various nonpolitical votes. >>>>>> >>>>>> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact >>>>>> a voting-system reform. That’s happened for RCV. >>>>>> >>>>>> …or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise >>>>>> happened for RCV. >>>>>> >>>>>> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, >>>>>> online, in the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment >>>>>> committee, for the pursuit of an initiative. >>>>>> >>>>>> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, >>>>>> such as: >>>>>> >>>>>> MinMax(wv) >>>>>> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA). >>>>>> >>>>>> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles. >>>>>> >>>>>> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the >>>>>> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don’t like & don’t wish >>>>>> to beat the CW via burial. >>>>>> >>>>>> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, >>>>>> to find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of >>>>>> initiative-enactment. >>>>>> >>>>>> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that >>>>>> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to >>>>>> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they’d support in an initiative. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ---- >>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for >>>>>> list info >>>>>> >>>>> ---- >>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for >>>>> list info >>>>> >>>>