I’d said: >* When I used the example of MDDA & MDDAsc, to illustrate that it's better to* >* equal-top-rank your strong top-set, rather than choosing among them by* >* ranking them in order of preference--That wasn't intended as criticism of* >* MDDA & MDDAsc.* > >* The fact of it being better to equal-rank the set that is important to you* >* instead of choosing among them is true with other rank methods too.* > >* In particular, it's true of Condorcet & Bucklin. It would be true of IRV* >* too, if IRV allowed equal-ranking.* *Robert replied:* if IRV allowed equal-ranking, who of the equal-ranked 2nd choice are promoted to the 1st choice (because that's the only choice that gets counted in IRV) when the 1st choice is eliminated? [endquote] All of them, of course. But I’m not advocating IRV with equal-top-ranking. As Kevin pointed our some years ago, IRV with equal-top-ranking still fails FBC. I don’t propose it or advocate it. >* I don't have proof that it's, in principle, a* property of _all_ >* ranking-methods, but I don't know of an exception.* lemme see, you're claiming that, without an exception that you know of, in any ranked method it is an advisable strategy to equally rank all candidates that you "sorta like"? [endquote] No. I’m saying that I don’t know of a rank method in which it wouldn’t be best to top-rank all of your strong top-set. Your strong top-set is more than “sorta like”. You said: you think voters that [who] are free to unequally rank them (but not to have to score them) would prefer to follow your tactical advise in their particular circumstances that you have no idea of? [endquote] I didn’t say anything about what voters would prefer to do. But I’ve been emphasizing thoughout that a lot of voting-reform advocates want rankings, insist on rankings. I’ve also been repeating that some overcompromisers & rival parties would do better with rankings than with Approval. Some overcompromisers need FBC, so that they won’t feel a need to rank Compromsie over Favorite. I’ve observed people voting more honestly with Score than with Approval, which is why I also strongly advocate Score. I’ve also noticed better honesty in ranked polls. I’m just saying that, when voting in a rank method that allows equal-top-ranking, if you want to maximize the probability of electing from your strong top-set, then top-rank them all. As I said, I don’t guarantee that there are no exceptions. It’s just that I don’t know of one. You said: you can discern that a voter's best political interest would be served by that? [endquote] Yes. You said: and then you think it's little burden to the RCV voter to actually grok that decision in the voting booth: "Lessee, I really like Andy over Bob, but I can live with either and since Michael Ossipoff recommends equally-ranking the top set, I'll rank Bob equal to Andy, just to make sure that this will more effectively defeat Curtis whom I don't want elected?" [endquote] Correct, if Andy & Bob are in your strong top-set, and Curtis is in your strong bottom-set. By the definition of the strong top & bottom sets, the important thing is which set the winner comes from. Choosing _between_ your strong top & bottom sets is incomparably more important than choosing within your strong top-set. So, in a rank method, top-rank Andy & Bob. In Approval, approve Andy & Bob. You said: you think a voter would prefer that to simply ranking Andy > Bob > Curtis? [endquote] If I believed that to always be so, then I’d only advocate Approval. I recognize and admit that many people want or would need ranking in order of preference. I’m merely saying that it’s more advisable to top-rank your top-set. That’s one reason why I say that, as a voting-system reform, Approval is good enough. …except that there’s a psychological need for rankings, partly to avoid the voting-errors of overcompromisers & rival parties, which is why I’d include Bucklin, MDDA, & MDDAsc in a complete voting-system. …along with Approval & Score. You said: the main reason we want to use other systems than Plurality is to reduce the burden of tactical voting on voters and let them express their political interest with little worry about shooting themselves in the foot and voter regret. tactical voting is not pleasant. [endquote] Agreed. By “tactical voting” I mean voting according to alleged predictive information. I claim that voting in Approval doesn’t need predictive information. Voting in Approval needn’t be tactical. We disagree on that, and I guess that’s an impasse. Top-ranking your top-set isn’t tactical voting. You said: and another reason is to reduce the effect of voting *strategy* by campaigns or interest groups trying to swing elections by persuading a quantity of voters to vote a certain way. [quote] Not so much Internet, but corporate mass-media. TV & radio “news” & commentary, including NPR. But yes, a good voting system, one that meets FBC, frees voters from the supposed lesser-of-2-evils problem that the media would otherwise impose on them. But,if we could get a better voting-system, if we could get honest verifiable vote-counting, then we’d surely be able to get honest, open, participatory & agenda-free media too. All of those genuine-democracy requirements would be present in Utopia. You said: i don't see how this advice is attractive to regular voters, who want to be heard, who don't want surprizes because of irregularities. [endquote] Top-voting your strong top-set is the best way to avoid an unpleasant surprise. You said: why would they be motivated to do that? why would they be motivated to even try to remember such advice and its detail? [quote] What detail? Top-vote your strong top-set. ------------------------------------------- By the way, yes I was a bit unfair to Ranked-Pairs(wv) (…of which MAM is the best refinement). Among the methods that look only at pairwise-defeat-strength. RP(wv) is the ideal best. Its protection of ranked candidates against unranked ones is unequalled, because the defeat of a CWs requires burial, and burial is (hopefully) deterred by wv’s penalty for failed burial. It’s just that RV doesn’t meet FBC, and has chicken dilemma, without offering any easy, convenient and reliable way to avoid it. Besides, that burial-deterrence is somewhat iffy, because, if the CWs is in your strong bottom-set, you aren’t really deterred from trying burial against hir. ….and hence the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco. MDDA & MDDAsc meet FBC, & provide a convenient, easy & reliable way to avoid chicken-dilemma. If you’re going to propose a rank-balloting method (with the acceptance-problem that all rank-balloting methods have), then propose one that meets FBC & doesn’t have a chicken-dilemma problem. By avoiding chicken-dilemma problem, and keeping FBC, you’re getting the full promise of rank-balloting. When you propose a voting system for Burlington, I’d suggest a multi-method proposal: Approval Score Bucklin MDDA MDDAsc Offer those to an initiative-proposal committee. Talk about them with members of the public, in conversations, polls, and focus-groups. Don’t underestimate the benefit from Approval & Score. Score is just Approval, with the option for fractional approval, for greater sincerity, to soften the results of overcompromisers’ & rival parties’ possibly-mistaken strategic voting. Approval & Score have much better chance of acceptance by the public, compared to any ranking-method. Then there’s also the fact that Approval doesn’t require any new balloting-equipment, ballots or software…other than turning-off the provision that detects & rejects “overvotes”. The IRV phenomenon gives an erroneous impression of the public acceptability of ranking-methods. IRV got its popularity only by heavy promotion everywhere, probably achieved by very heavy funding. Money can accomplish almost anything, when it comes to convincing the public. Michael Ossipoff --