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GOLD voting: the most practical PR proposal?

JQ
Jameson Quinn
Mon, Jul 3, 2017 5:14 PM

I sent essentially the same message as below, with a different subject,
earlier today, to the same two lists. I'm re-sending it now because on
second thought it should be in its own separate thread. The only changes
between the below and the earlier message, besides the subject line, are:

  • I've fixed the copy of the webpage at the end to reflect the latest
    adjustments.
  • I mention precinct-summability as an advantage of GOLD.

I designed GOLD voting
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting
specifically for situations like BC, and I put the finishing touches on the
system in response to my simulation results based on the BC outcome. So I
think that GOLD is basically the ideal proposal for BC, as well as being
uniquely well-suited as a reform in the US context.

(Note: at the end of this email, I'll paste the current version of the
electorama page)

What's good about GOLD? I think the starting point for asking that question
is first to establish what voters (and, insofar as they're not in conflict
with voters, politicians) are looking for from a voting system.

And that brings us to the mydemocracy.ca poll. That poll had some serious
flaws: it tended to pose its questions in the form of "A or B" false
dilemmas, rather than just asking "How important is A? How important is B?"
In fact, the entire poll can be seen as a strategy by the Liberals to
deep-six election reform. Nevertheless, the poll is, as far as I know,
unequalled for its sample size in probing the electoral values of an
English-speaking population accustomed to FPTP.

So, what did it find? What do Canadians think their electoral system should
be like?

  • It should lead to a greater diversity of views in Parliament (65%
    agree, 13% disagree; and 70% want power to be spread over more than just
    one party).
  • However, it should not lead to too many small parties (59% agree, 41%
    disagree).
  • Ballots should remain relatively simple (59% agree, 41% disagree).
  • MPs should be more accountable to their constituents than to their
    party (77% agree, 23% disagree).
  • The poll did not ask whether voters believe that the “constituents”
    mentioned above must be defined by geographic area (riding). However, when
    asked to pick the important values from a list of various possibilities,
    “governments with strong representation from every region” was picked by
    49%, and “MPs who focus primarily on the interests of their local
    community” by 42%.

These results were spun by Trudeau and the Liberals as “mixed”, and he
reneged on his promise to support and implement PR. But there is nothing
“mixed” about it. There’s a clear mandate for reforming the voting system,
and it’s possible to design a voting system that fulfills all of the above
values.

GOLD is one possible outcome of such a design process. Furthermore, having
gone through this process, I think that many of the decisions involved in
GOLD's design are clearly the right ones. I'm certainly not saying that
every detail of GOLD as it's currently written up on electorama is beyond
debate, but I do think that the basic skeleton of the idea — in particular,
optional delegation and localized ballots — are pretty well-justified.

I'm posting this message to both electionscience@googlegroups.com and
election-methods@lists.electorama.com. On these lists, we like to talk
about theoretical aspects of voting methods. Give us a good debate about
Phragmen vs Ebert or about Sainte-Laguë vs D'Hondt, and we're happy. But I
actually think that, when it comes to proportional methods, these debates
are secondary. Between FPTP and PR, there's a yawning chasm; between
Sainte-Laguë and D'Hondt, or between the honest outcomes of proportional
range voting and of Bucklin transferable voting (to give arbitrary
examples) the difference is in almost all cases a small handful of seats or
fewer.

So the important questions aren't the details of the proportionality
formula, but rather practical matters like ballot design.

As far as I can tell, the PR options generally considered for a case like
BC are dual-vote MMP; multimember-district STV; or open list. All of these
are decent systems. But none of them comes close to matching GOLD at
fulfilling the values above.

  • Delegation and localized ballots allow GOLD to give much simpler
    ballots than STV.
  • The fact that voters have the option to vote out-of-district and/or
    not to delegate means that voters have much greater power and politicians
    have much more accountability than MMP or open list.
  • Pre-eliminating all but the "top two" (occasionally one or three) in
    each district provides an incentive against party fragmentation. This is
    better than STV, and transfers let it naturally avoid the wasted votes of
    similar mechanisms that can be added to MMP or open list.
  • One important advantage of GOLD is that it only changes the FPTP
    outcome insofar as it has to to achieve proportionality. This makes it
    much, much less of a threat to incumbent politicians, especially insofar as
    those politicians won "fair and square" under FPTP. (That is, without
    relying on natural or artificial gerrymandering, negative campaigning, or
    other pathologies of FPTP.)
  • In the US context, compatibility with current federal law is an
    additional advantage of GOLD.
  • GOLD is also precinct-summable, unlike STV or many other "advanced"
    proposals.

...

So I think GOLD is the gold standard. But is that just because I'm the one
who designed it? The burden of proof is on me to show that it's not. In
order to meet that burden, I'm interested in having as broad a dialogue as
possible about practical PR reform proposals. Does anybody here think that
MMP, STV, or open list is a better proposal (that is, given similar
investments in activism, more likely to catch on and spread) than GOLD? Are
there other new proposals that offer as many advantages as GOLD does?

Jameson

ps. Here's the current GOLD webpage from Electorama:

Geographic Open List/Delegated voting (GOLD voting) is a proportional
voting method for electing legislators to a multi-seat body. Its main
advantages are: simple ballots, minimal wasted votes, and "do no harm"
(that is, it doesn't change FPTP outcomes unless they're non-proportional).

It assumes the voters have been divided up into one equal-population riding
(aka district or constituency) per seat being elected and that each
candidate has publicly declared their preference order for the other
candidates ("if I don't win, then I want the votes I hold to go to her,
then him, then him, etc."). Precisely one representative per area
(district, riding, or constituency) will win.

Here are the rules. Items in italics are mere explanations or
justifications; the rules themselves are only the non-italic portions.

Voters make two different choices in each race:

  1. Choose a candidate.
    • The ballot lists the candidates running locally, with their parties
      and their first three transfer preferences (explained below).
    • Voters may write in candidates from further away.
  2. Choose a transfer method for when your first choice is no longer in
    the running. There are 2 basic options:
    • Open list: Trust the voters of your chosen candidate’s party.
  • If your first choice is no longer in the running, your vote is
    transferred to the remaining candidates from your chosen party, in
    proportion to the number of direct votes they got.
    • This is the default if you vote for a local, non-independent
      candidate.
    • If every voter chose this option, this would be like an “open
      list” voting method; that is, seats would be divided proportionally by
      party, and go to the highest vote-getters within the party.
    • If you choose this option, your vote will never be transferred out
      of the party. Since independent candidates are considered to each be in a
      party by themselves, voters for those candidates should only choose this
      option if they do not want their vote to be transferred.
  • Delegated: Trust the candidate (that is, the pre-declared
    preferences of your chosen candidate.)
  • Each candidate must publicly pre-declare ordered preferences between
    the other candidates. If the candidate is no longer in the running, these
    votes will go to the highest remaining candidate on their pre-declared
    preference list.
    • This is the default if you vote for a non-local and/or independent
      candidate.
    • If a voter mistakenly marks both transfer methods, the default
      applies (as if they had chosen neither).

The basic vote-counting process has 5 steps (based on Single Transferrable
Voting):

  1. Tally votes
    • Each ballot counts as 1 point for the chosen candidate.
  2. Eliminate candidates without enough support in their riding
    • The top candidate in each riding, counting local votes only, is
      never eliminated.
    • The second candidate in each riding, counting local votes only, is
      eliminated only if their local votes are fewer than half those of the top.
    • Others are eliminated by default, surviving only if their local
      votes are more than half those of the top AND their total direct votes
      (including non-local write-ins) are more than those of the top local
      candidate. (For this rule, "top" is counted by local votes only,
      but "those
      of" includes non-local votes.)
    • This makes sure that no riding is badly mis-represented just
      because a given party "deserves" more winners.
    • It also helps discourage voters from splintering into small
      single-issue parties. If a party can’t pass this threshold in even one
      riding, it won’t get seats. But those votes can still be transferred, so
      those voters can still be represented by a relatively
      sympathetic candidate
      from a slightly larger party.
  3. Find winners and transfer leftovers.
    • If V is the total number of valid (non-exhausted) votes, and S is
      the number of unfilled seats, then a “quota” is defined as
      Q=V/(S+1). This
      ensures that each full “quota” of voters will get a seat, with less than
      one “quota” of vote left unrepresented even though they still
      have a valid
      preference.
    • Any candidate with a full quota of votes at any time is elected. If
      their winning vote total is W>Q, then the leftover fraction
      (W-Q)/W of all
      of their votes is transferred.
    • Whenever a candidate wins, all other candidates from their riding
      are eliminated.
  4. Eliminate the candidate who's furthest behind in their riding and
    transfer votes
    • If a candidate's current full tally is 1000 votes (including local
      votes, direct write-ins, and transferred votes), and the top
      full tally of
      any remaining candidate in their riding is 2000, then they are
      1000 behind
      in their riding.
    • This rule means that the last remaining candidate in a riding is
      not eligible for elimination.
    • See above for the transfer methods a voter can choose.
  5. If there are still seats to fill, repeat from step 3.

Once all winners are chosen, each winning party is responsible for
assigning each district they did not win to be "additional territory" of
one of their winning representatives. Representatives are responsible to
all citizens from their own district, and also to hear petitions from their
"additional territory". That means that if you are in the minority in your
district, you will still have a sympathetic representative to petition.
Proportional or semiproportional?[edit
http://wiki.electorama.com/w/index.php?title=Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting&action=edit&section=1
]

GOLD voting is proportional in a two-party context. If there are more than
two parties, though, it is only semiproportional; smaller parties without a
clear regional character may get less than their proportional share. But if
that happens, their votes will not be ignored; they will have a say on
which of the larger parties gets more seats, and even on which candidates
from that allied larger party win. Thus, a smaller party will be able to
promote their issues by favoring those candidates who prioritize those
issues. Also, if there are two competing party coalitions, with all voters
choosing one of the alliances and all candidates preferring same-coalition
candidates over opposite-coalition ones, then GOLD will be fully
proportional between the two coalitions.

Note that other proportional voting methods sometimes are used with extra
rules designed to stop fringe parties from winning seats. For instance, in
the German mixed-member "proportional" method, a party that gets less than
5% or 2 direct seats does not get a proportional allotment of seats. Thus,
technically speaking, even the German system is really only
semiproportional, not truly proportional.
Advantages[edit
http://wiki.electorama.com/w/index.php?title=Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting&action=edit&section=2
]

The advantages of this method are as follows. First, the advantages common
to all proportional representation methods:

  • Equality: partisan gerrymandering is impossible, and each party gets
    its fair share of seats.
  • Representation: Almost all voters are truly represented; even if you
    are a minority in your district, your vote helps elect a candidate of a
    party you sympathize with.

This method also keeps all the strong points of the current voting system.
(The current system is horrible in general, but it still has its strong
points.)

  • Simplicity: you just choose one candidate, and the ballot is short.
  • Accountability: voters, not parties, choose who is elected.
  • Unity: discourages splinter parties, because candidates without a
    strong local base of support are eliminated up-front.
  • Geography: Everyone has a representative who lives relatively close to
    them.

Similar methods[edit
http://wiki.electorama.com/w/index.php?title=Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting&action=edit&section=3
]

OL/D voting
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Open_List/Delegated_(OL/D)_voting:
basically the same, but without the constraint of one candidate per riding,
and with a slightly weaker elimination rule.

Proportional 3RD voting
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Proportional_3RD_voting: a similar
system, for a nonpartisan context without ridings.

I sent essentially the same message as below, with a different subject, earlier today, to the same two lists. I'm re-sending it now because on second thought it should be in its own separate thread. The only changes between the below and the earlier message, besides the subject line, are: - I've fixed the copy of the webpage at the end to reflect the latest adjustments. - I mention precinct-summability as an advantage of GOLD. ----- I designed GOLD voting <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting> specifically for situations like BC, and I put the finishing touches on the system in response to my simulation results based on the BC outcome. So I think that GOLD is basically the ideal proposal for BC, as well as being uniquely well-suited as a reform in the US context. (Note: at the end of this email, I'll paste the current version of the electorama page) What's good about GOLD? I think the starting point for asking that question is first to establish what voters (and, insofar as they're not in conflict with voters, politicians) are looking for from a voting system. And that brings us to the mydemocracy.ca poll. That poll had some serious flaws: it tended to pose its questions in the form of "A or B" false dilemmas, rather than just asking "How important is A? How important is B?" In fact, the entire poll can be seen as a strategy by the Liberals to deep-six election reform. Nevertheless, the poll is, as far as I know, unequalled for its sample size in probing the electoral values of an English-speaking population accustomed to FPTP. So, what did it find? What do Canadians think their electoral system should be like? - It should lead to a greater diversity of views in Parliament (65% agree, 13% disagree; and 70% want power to be spread over more than just one party). - However, it should not lead to too many small parties (59% agree, 41% disagree). - Ballots should remain relatively simple (59% agree, 41% disagree). - MPs should be more accountable to their constituents than to their party (77% agree, 23% disagree). - The poll did not ask whether voters believe that the “constituents” mentioned above must be defined by geographic area (riding). However, when asked to pick the important values from a list of various possibilities, “governments with strong representation from every region” was picked by 49%, and “MPs who focus primarily on the interests of their local community” by 42%. These results were spun by Trudeau and the Liberals as “mixed”, and he reneged on his promise to support and implement PR. But there is nothing “mixed” about it. There’s a clear mandate for reforming the voting system, and it’s possible to design a voting system that fulfills all of the above values. GOLD is one possible outcome of such a design process. Furthermore, having gone through this process, I think that many of the decisions involved in GOLD's design are clearly the right ones. I'm certainly not saying that every detail of GOLD as it's currently written up on electorama is beyond debate, but I do think that the basic skeleton of the idea — in particular, optional delegation and localized ballots — are pretty well-justified. I'm posting this message to both electionscience@googlegroups.com and election-methods@lists.electorama.com. On these lists, we like to talk about theoretical aspects of voting methods. Give us a good debate about Phragmen vs Ebert or about Sainte-Laguë vs D'Hondt, and we're happy. But I actually think that, when it comes to proportional methods, these debates are secondary. Between FPTP and PR, there's a yawning chasm; between Sainte-Laguë and D'Hondt, or between the honest outcomes of proportional range voting and of Bucklin transferable voting (to give arbitrary examples) the difference is in almost all cases a small handful of seats or fewer. So the important questions aren't the details of the proportionality formula, but rather practical matters like ballot design. As far as I can tell, the PR options generally considered for a case like BC are dual-vote MMP; multimember-district STV; or open list. All of these are decent systems. But none of them comes close to matching GOLD at fulfilling the values above. - Delegation and localized ballots allow GOLD to give much simpler ballots than STV. - The fact that voters have the option to vote out-of-district and/or not to delegate means that voters have much greater power and politicians have much more accountability than MMP or open list. - Pre-eliminating all but the "top two" (occasionally one or three) in each district provides an incentive against party fragmentation. This is better than STV, and transfers let it naturally avoid the wasted votes of similar mechanisms that can be added to MMP or open list. - One important advantage of GOLD is that it only changes the FPTP outcome insofar as it has to to achieve proportionality. This makes it much, much less of a threat to incumbent politicians, especially insofar as those politicians won "fair and square" under FPTP. (That is, without relying on natural or artificial gerrymandering, negative campaigning, or other pathologies of FPTP.) - In the US context, compatibility with current federal law is an additional advantage of GOLD. - GOLD is also precinct-summable, unlike STV or many other "advanced" proposals. ... So I think GOLD is the gold standard. But is that just because I'm the one who designed it? The burden of proof is on me to show that it's not. In order to meet that burden, I'm interested in having as broad a dialogue as possible about practical PR reform proposals. Does anybody here think that MMP, STV, or open list is a better proposal (that is, given similar investments in activism, more likely to catch on and spread) than GOLD? Are there other new proposals that offer as many advantages as GOLD does? Jameson ps. Here's the current GOLD webpage from Electorama: Geographic Open List/Delegated voting (GOLD voting) is a proportional voting method for electing legislators to a multi-seat body. Its main advantages are: simple ballots, minimal wasted votes, and "do no harm" (that is, it doesn't change FPTP outcomes unless they're non-proportional). It assumes the voters have been divided up into one equal-population riding (aka district or constituency) per seat being elected and that each candidate has publicly declared their preference order for the other candidates ("if I don't win, then I want the votes I hold to go to her, then him, then him, etc."). Precisely one representative per area (district, riding, or constituency) will win. Here are the rules. Items in italics are mere explanations or justifications; the rules themselves are only the non-italic portions. Voters make two different choices in each race: 1. *Choose a candidate*. - The ballot lists the candidates running locally, with their parties and their first three transfer preferences (explained below). - Voters may write in candidates from further away. 2. *Choose a transfer method* for when your first choice is no longer in the running. There are 2 basic options: - *Open list*: Trust the *voters* of your chosen candidate’s party. - If your first choice is no longer in the running, your vote is transferred to the remaining candidates from your chosen party, in proportion to the number of direct votes they got. - This is the default if you vote for a local, non-independent candidate. - *If every voter chose this option, this would be like an “open list” voting method; that is, seats would be divided proportionally by party, and go to the highest vote-getters within the party.* - *If you choose this option, your vote will never be transferred out of the party. Since independent candidates are considered to each be in a party by themselves, voters for those candidates should only choose this option if they do not want their vote to be transferred.* - *Delegated*: Trust the *candidate* (that is, the pre-declared preferences of your chosen candidate.) - Each candidate must publicly pre-declare ordered preferences between the other candidates. If the candidate is no longer in the running, these votes will go to the highest remaining candidate on their pre-declared preference list. - *This is the default if you vote for a non-local and/or independent candidate.* - *If a voter mistakenly marks both transfer methods, the default applies (as if they had chosen neither).* The basic vote-counting process has 5 steps (based on Single Transferrable Voting): 1. Tally votes - Each ballot counts as 1 point for the chosen candidate. 2. Eliminate candidates without enough support in their riding - The top candidate in each riding, counting local votes only, is never eliminated. - The second candidate in each riding, counting local votes only, is eliminated only if their local votes are fewer than half those of the top. - Others are eliminated by default, surviving only if their local votes are more than half those of the top AND their total direct votes (including non-local write-ins) are more than those of the top local candidate. (For this rule, "top" is counted by local votes only, but "those of" includes non-local votes.) - *This makes sure that no riding is badly mis-represented just because a given party "deserves" more winners.* - *It also helps discourage voters from splintering into small single-issue parties. If a party can’t pass this threshold in even one riding, it won’t get seats. But those votes can still be transferred, so those voters can still be represented by a relatively sympathetic candidate from a slightly larger party.* 3. Find winners and transfer leftovers. - If V is the total number of valid (non-exhausted) votes, and S is the number of unfilled seats, then a “quota” is defined as Q=V/(S+1). This ensures that each full “quota” of voters will get a seat, with less than one “quota” of vote left unrepresented even though they still have a valid preference. - Any candidate with a full quota of votes at any time is elected. If their winning vote total is W>Q, then the leftover fraction (W-Q)/W of all of their votes is transferred. - Whenever a candidate wins, all other candidates from their riding are eliminated. 4. Eliminate the candidate who's furthest behind in their riding and transfer votes - *If a candidate's current full tally is 1000 votes (including local votes, direct write-ins, and transferred votes), and the top full tally of any remaining candidate in their riding is 2000, then they are 1000 behind in their riding.* - *This rule means that the last remaining candidate in a riding is not eligible for elimination.* - See above for the transfer methods a voter can choose. 5. If there are still seats to fill, repeat from step 3. Once all winners are chosen, each winning party is responsible for assigning each district they did not win to be "additional territory" of one of their winning representatives. Representatives are responsible to all citizens from their own district, and also to hear petitions from their "additional territory". That means that if you are in the minority in your district, you will still have a sympathetic representative to petition. Proportional or semiproportional?[edit <http://wiki.electorama.com/w/index.php?title=Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting&action=edit&section=1> ] GOLD voting is proportional in a two-party context. If there are more than two parties, though, it is only semiproportional; smaller parties without a clear regional character may get less than their proportional share. But if that happens, their votes will not be ignored; they will have a say on which of the larger parties gets more seats, and even on which candidates from that allied larger party win. Thus, a smaller party will be able to promote their issues by favoring those candidates who prioritize those issues. Also, if there are two competing party coalitions, with all voters choosing one of the alliances and all candidates preferring same-coalition candidates over opposite-coalition ones, then GOLD will be fully proportional between the two coalitions. Note that other proportional voting methods sometimes are used with extra rules designed to stop fringe parties from winning seats. For instance, in the German mixed-member "proportional" method, a party that gets less than 5% or 2 direct seats does not get a proportional allotment of seats. Thus, technically speaking, even the German system is really only semiproportional, not truly proportional. Advantages[edit <http://wiki.electorama.com/w/index.php?title=Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting&action=edit&section=2> ] The advantages of this method are as follows. First, the advantages common to all proportional representation methods: - Equality: partisan gerrymandering is impossible, and each party gets its fair share of seats. - Representation: Almost all voters are truly represented; even if you are a minority in your district, your vote helps elect a candidate of a party you sympathize with. This method also keeps all the strong points of the current voting system. (The current system is horrible in general, but it still has its strong points.) - Simplicity: you just choose one candidate, and the ballot is short. - Accountability: voters, not parties, choose who is elected. - Unity: discourages splinter parties, because candidates without a strong local base of support are eliminated up-front. - Geography: Everyone has a representative who lives relatively close to them. Similar methods[edit <http://wiki.electorama.com/w/index.php?title=Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting&action=edit&section=3> ] OL/D voting <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Open_List/Delegated_(OL/D)_voting>: basically the same, but without the constraint of one candidate per riding, and with a slightly weaker elimination rule. Proportional 3RD voting <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Proportional_3RD_voting>: a similar system, for a nonpartisan context without ridings.
TP
Toby Pereira
Tue, Jul 11, 2017 5:39 PM

I think GOLD looks like it's probably a good method, and it looks like an incremental modification of previous methods you've defined and discussed (such as PAL). A few things though:
You mention that candidates must publicly declare a preference order of the other candidates for when votes are transferred. Although it's not explicitly mentioned, I think under PAL party candidates were compelled to list candidates of their own party above all others. They also had a strict number of layers, so, for example, all candidates from one party would be tied in their rankings rather than a candidate having the ability to give individual ranks to every candidate. Does any of that apply here?
I'm not sure I fully follow the vote tallying section, but I'm assuming it's close enough to STV to make it generally proportional while fitting other criteria you want, such as making sure each elected candidate is popular enough in their own area.
But I do wonder if having precisely one candidate elected per area is going to look that good though. With mixed-member, you get a local candidate anyway without worrying about proportionality, and then the top-up MPs are there to make the result proportional. And with STV, the proportionality comes from having wider areas with several MPs elected.
I presume the philosophy behind this is that it seems most fair to have one MP per constituency, and you don't end up with two different types of MP like in mixed-member. STV gives complex ballots and people won't feel quite so connected to MPs that cover a wider area - it might be that all the MPs in your area happen to come from the other side geographically. But I think some people might be annoyed that their MP is not the most popular candidate in their area, and they might perceive it as their MP being there just to make up the proportional balance. And they will look across at the next area and wonder why they were allowed their most popular candidate and not forced to give them up for some sort of "greater good" (proportional representation). I know you have implemented rules to make sure that the elected candidate is not a "nobody" in their own area, but I don't think it will appease everyone. I think that that is arguably one advantage of mixed-member, in that every area gets the MP most popular with the voters (well, according to the voting method being used).
While I'm here, I might as well throw in another method, which I described here - https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/electionscience/aP7ybKMb1zs/giaYAh6wAwAJ It is a mixed-member method, but it uses approval or score ballots rather than plurality/First Past the Post. I also discuss it in this video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EjeBEBZjm9Y If you don't want to watch that, I think it's still worth going to 2:33 to see the score ballot and 12:10 to see the approval ballot, which I think are both nice and simple for the level of proportional representation you get from them.
Toby

  From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn@gmail.com>

To: electionsciencefoundation electionscience@googlegroups.com; EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Monday, 3 July 2017, 18:15
Subject: [EM] GOLD voting: the most practical PR proposal?

I sent essentially the same message as below, with a different subject, earlier today, to the same two lists. I'm re-sending it now because on second thought it should be in its own separate thread. The only changes between the below and the earlier message, besides the subject line, are:

  • I've fixed the copy of the webpage at the end to reflect the latest adjustments.
  • I mention precinct-summability as an advantage of GOLD. 

I designed GOLD voting specifically for situations like BC, and I put the finishing touches on the system in response to my simulation results based on the BC outcome. So I think that GOLD is basically the ideal proposal for BC, as well as being uniquely well-suited as a reform in the US context.
(Note: at the end of this email, I'll paste the current version of the electorama page)

What's good about GOLD? I think the starting point for asking that question is first to establish what voters (and, insofar as they're not in conflict with voters, politicians) are looking for from a voting system.
And that brings us to the mydemocracy.ca poll. That poll had some serious flaws: it tended to pose its questions in the form of "A or B" false dilemmas, rather than just asking "How important is A? How important is B?" In fact, the entire poll can be seen as a strategy by the Liberals to deep-six election reform. Nevertheless, the poll is, as far as I know, unequalled for its sample size in probing the electoral values of an English-speaking population accustomed to FPTP.
So, what did it find? What do Canadians think their electoral system should be like?

  • It should lead to a greater diversity of views in Parliament (65% agree, 13% disagree; and 70% want power to be spread over more than just one party).

  • However, it should not lead to too many small parties (59% agree, 41% disagree).

  • Ballots should remain relatively simple (59% agree, 41% disagree).

  • MPs should be more accountable to their constituents than to their party (77% agree, 23% disagree).

  • The poll did not ask whether voters believe that the “constituents” mentioned above must be defined by geographic area (riding). However, when asked to pick the important values from a list of various possibilities, “governments with strong representation from every region” was picked by 49%, and “MPs who focus primarily on the interests of their local community” by 42%.
    These results were spun by Trudeau and the Liberals as “mixed”, and he reneged on his promise to support and implement PR. But there is nothing “mixed” about it. There’s a clear mandate for reforming the voting system, and it’s possible to design a voting system that fulfills all of the above values. 
    GOLD is one possible outcome of such a design process. Furthermore, having gone through this process, I think that many of the decisions involved in GOLD's design are clearly the right ones. I'm certainly not saying that every detail of GOLD as it's currently written up on electorama is beyond debate, but I do think that the basic skeleton of the idea — in particular, optional delegation and localized ballots — are pretty well-justified.
    I'm posting this message to both electionscience@googlegroups. com and election-methods@lists. electorama.com. On these lists, we like to talk about theoretical aspects of voting methods. Give us a good debate about Phragmen vs Ebert or about Sainte-Laguë vs D'Hondt, and we're happy. But I actually think that, when it comes to proportional methods, these debates are secondary. Between FPTP and PR, there's a yawning chasm; between Sainte-Laguë and D'Hondt, or between the honest outcomes of proportional range voting and of Bucklin transferable voting (to give arbitrary examples) the difference is in almost all cases a small handful of seats or fewer.
    So the important questions aren't the details of the proportionality formula, but rather practical matters like ballot design.
    As far as I can tell, the PR options generally considered for a case like BC are dual-vote MMP; multimember-district STV; or open list. All of these are decent systems. But none of them comes close to matching GOLD at fulfilling the values above. 

  • Delegation and localized ballots allow GOLD to give much simpler ballots than STV.

  • The fact that voters have the option to vote out-of-district and/or not to delegate means that voters have much greater power and politicians have much more accountability than MMP or open list.

  • Pre-eliminating all but the "top two" (occasionally one or three) in each district provides an incentive against party fragmentation. This is better than STV, and transfers let it naturally avoid the wasted votes of similar mechanisms that can be added to MMP or open list.

  • One important advantage of GOLD is that it only changes the FPTP outcome insofar as it has to to achieve proportionality. This makes it much, much less of a threat to incumbent politicians, especially insofar as those politicians won "fair and square" under FPTP. (That is, without relying on natural or artificial gerrymandering, negative campaigning, or other pathologies of FPTP.)

  • In the US context, compatibility with current federal law is an additional advantage of GOLD.

  • GOLD is also precinct-summable, unlike STV or many other "advanced" proposals.
    ...
    So I think GOLD is the gold standard. But is that just because I'm the one who designed it? The burden of proof is on me to show that it's not. In order to meet that burden, I'm interested in having as broad a dialogue as possible about practical PR reform proposals. Does anybody here think that MMP, STV, or open list is a better proposal (that is, given similar investments in activism, more likely to catch on and spread) than GOLD? Are there other new proposals that offer as many advantages as GOLD does?  
    Jameson
    ps. Here's the current GOLD webpage from Electorama:
    Geographic Open List/Delegated voting (GOLD voting) is a proportional voting method for electing legislators to a multi-seat body. Its main advantages are: simple ballots, minimal wasted votes, and "do no harm" (that is, it doesn't change FPTP outcomes unless they're non-proportional).It assumes the voters have been divided up into one equal-population riding (aka district or constituency) per seat being elected and that each candidate has publicly declared their preference order for the other candidates ("if I don't win, then I want the votes I hold to go to her, then him, then him, etc."). Precisely one representative per area (district, riding, or constituency) will win.Here are the rules. Items in italics are mere explanations or justifications; the rules themselves are only the non-italic portions.Voters make two different choices in each race:

  • Choose a candidate.

    • The ballot lists the candidates running locally, with their parties and their first three transfer preferences (explained below).
    • Voters may write in candidates from further away.
  • Choose a transfer method for when your first choice is no longer in the running. There are 2 basic options:

    • Open list: Trust the voters of your chosen candidate’s party.

        • If your first choice is no longer in the running, your vote is transferred to the remaining candidates from your chosen party, in proportion to the number of direct votes they got.
        • This is the default if you vote for a local, non-independent candidate.
        • If every voter chose this option, this would be like an “open list” voting method; that is, seats would be divided proportionally by party, and go to the highest vote-getters within the party.
        • If you choose this option, your vote will never be transferred out of the party. Since independent candidates are considered to each be in a party by themselves, voters for those candidates should only choose this option if they do not want their vote to be transferred.
    • Delegated: Trust the candidate (that is, the pre-declared preferences of your chosen candidate.)

        • Each candidate must publicly pre-declare ordered preferences between the other candidates. If the candidate is no longer in the running, these votes will go to the highest remaining candidate on their pre-declared preference list.
        • This is the default if you vote for a non-local and/or independent candidate.
        • If a voter mistakenly marks both transfer methods, the default applies (as if they had chosen neither).

The basic vote-counting process has 5 steps (based on Single Transferrable Voting):

  • Tally votes

    • Each ballot counts as 1 point for the chosen candidate.
  • Eliminate candidates without enough support in their riding

    • The top candidate in each riding, counting local votes only, is never eliminated.
    • The second candidate in each riding, counting local votes only, is eliminated only if their local votes are fewer than half those of the top.
    • Others are eliminated by default, surviving only if their local votes are more than half those of the top AND their total direct votes (including non-local write-ins) are more than those of the top local candidate. (For this rule, "top" is counted by local votes only, but "those of" includes non-local votes.)
    • This makes sure that no riding is badly mis-represented just because a given party "deserves" more winners.
    • It also helps discourage voters from splintering into small single-issue parties. If a party can’t pass this threshold in even one riding, it won’t get seats. But those votes can still be transferred, so those voters can still be represented by a relatively sympathetic candidate from a slightly larger party.
  • Find winners and transfer leftovers.

    • If V is the total number of valid (non-exhausted) votes, and S is the number of unfilled seats, then a “quota” is defined as Q=V/(S+1). This ensures that each full “quota” of voters will get a seat, with less than one “quota” of vote left unrepresented even though they still have a valid preference.
    • Any candidate with a full quota of votes at any time is elected. If their winning vote total is W>Q, then the leftover fraction (W-Q)/W of all of their votes is transferred.
    • Whenever a candidate wins, all other candidates from their riding are eliminated.
  • Eliminate the candidate who's furthest behind in their riding and transfer votes

    • If a candidate's current full tally is 1000 votes (including local votes, direct write-ins, and transferred votes), and the top full tally of any remaining candidate in their riding is 2000, then they are 1000 behind in their riding.
    • This rule means that the last remaining candidate in a riding is not eligible for elimination.
    • See above for the transfer methods a voter can choose.
  • If there are still seats to fill, repeat from step 3.
    Once all winners are chosen, each winning party is responsible for assigning each district they did not win to be "additional territory" of one of their winning representatives. Representatives are responsible to all citizens from their own district, and also to hear petitions from their "additional territory". That means that if you are in the minority in your district, you will still have a sympathetic representative to petition.
    Proportional or semiproportional?[edit]
    GOLD voting is proportional in a two-party context. If there are more than two parties, though, it is only semiproportional; smaller parties without a clear regional character may get less than their proportional share. But if that happens, their votes will not be ignored; they will have a say on which of the larger parties gets more seats, and even on which candidates from that allied larger party win. Thus, a smaller party will be able to promote their issues by favoring those candidates who prioritize those issues. Also, if there are two competing party coalitions, with all voters choosing one of the alliances and all candidates preferring same-coalition candidates over opposite-coalition ones, then GOLD will be fully proportional between the two coalitions.Note that other proportional voting methods sometimes are used with extra rules designed to stop fringe parties from winning seats. For instance, in the German mixed-member "proportional" method, a party that gets less than 5% or 2 direct seats does not get a proportional allotment of seats. Thus, technically speaking, even the German system is really only semiproportional, not truly proportional.
    Advantages[edit]
    The advantages of this method are as follows. First, the advantages common to all proportional representation methods:

  • Equality: partisan gerrymandering is impossible, and each party gets its fair share of seats.

  • Representation: Almost all voters are truly represented; even if you are a minority in your district, your vote helps elect a candidate of a party you sympathize with.
    This method also keeps all the strong points of the current voting system. (The current system is horrible in general, but it still has its strong points.)

  • Simplicity: you just choose one candidate, and the ballot is short.

  • Accountability: voters, not parties, choose who is elected.

  • Unity: discourages splinter parties, because candidates without a strong local base of support are eliminated up-front.

  • Geography: Everyone has a representative who lives relatively close to them.

Similar methods[edit]
OL/D voting: basically the same, but without the constraint of one candidate per riding, and with a slightly weaker elimination rule.Proportional 3RD voting: a similar system, for a nonpartisan context without ridings.----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

I think GOLD looks like it's probably a good method, and it looks like an incremental modification of previous methods you've defined and discussed (such as PAL). A few things though: You mention that candidates must publicly declare a preference order of the other candidates for when votes are transferred. Although it's not explicitly mentioned, I think under PAL party candidates were compelled to list candidates of their own party above all others. They also had a strict number of layers, so, for example, all candidates from one party would be tied in their rankings rather than a candidate having the ability to give individual ranks to every candidate. Does any of that apply here? I'm not sure I fully follow the vote tallying section, but I'm assuming it's close enough to STV to make it generally proportional while fitting other criteria you want, such as making sure each elected candidate is popular enough in their own area. But I do wonder if having precisely one candidate elected per area is going to look that good though. With mixed-member, you get a local candidate anyway without worrying about proportionality, and then the top-up MPs are there to make the result proportional. And with STV, the proportionality comes from having wider areas with several MPs elected. I presume the philosophy behind this is that it seems most fair to have one MP per constituency, and you don't end up with two different types of MP like in mixed-member. STV gives complex ballots and people won't feel quite so connected to MPs that cover a wider area - it might be that all the MPs in your area happen to come from the other side geographically. But I think some people might be annoyed that their MP is not the most popular candidate in their area, and they might perceive it as their MP being there just to make up the proportional balance. And they will look across at the next area and wonder why they were allowed their most popular candidate and not forced to give them up for some sort of "greater good" (proportional representation). I know you have implemented rules to make sure that the elected candidate is not a "nobody" in their own area, but I don't think it will appease everyone. I think that that is arguably one advantage of mixed-member, in that every area gets the MP most popular with the voters (well, according to the voting method being used). While I'm here, I might as well throw in another method, which I described here - https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/electionscience/aP7ybKMb1zs/giaYAh6wAwAJ It is a mixed-member method, but it uses approval or score ballots rather than plurality/First Past the Post. I also discuss it in this video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EjeBEBZjm9Y If you don't want to watch that, I think it's still worth going to 2:33 to see the score ballot and 12:10 to see the approval ballot, which I think are both nice and simple for the level of proportional representation you get from them. Toby From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn@gmail.com> To: electionsciencefoundation <electionscience@googlegroups.com>; EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> Sent: Monday, 3 July 2017, 18:15 Subject: [EM] GOLD voting: the most practical PR proposal? I sent essentially the same message as below, with a different subject, earlier today, to the same two lists. I'm re-sending it now because on second thought it should be in its own separate thread. The only changes between the below and the earlier message, besides the subject line, are: - I've fixed the copy of the webpage at the end to reflect the latest adjustments. - I mention precinct-summability as an advantage of GOLD.  ----- I designed GOLD voting specifically for situations like BC, and I put the finishing touches on the system in response to my simulation results based on the BC outcome. So I think that GOLD is basically the ideal proposal for BC, as well as being uniquely well-suited as a reform in the US context. (Note: at the end of this email, I'll paste the current version of the electorama page) What's good about GOLD? I think the starting point for asking that question is first to establish what voters (and, insofar as they're not in conflict with voters, politicians) are looking for from a voting system. And that brings us to the mydemocracy.ca poll. That poll had some serious flaws: it tended to pose its questions in the form of "A or B" false dilemmas, rather than just asking "How important is A? How important is B?" In fact, the entire poll can be seen as a strategy by the Liberals to deep-six election reform. Nevertheless, the poll is, as far as I know, unequalled for its sample size in probing the electoral values of an English-speaking population accustomed to FPTP. So, what did it find? What do Canadians think their electoral system should be like? - It should lead to a greater diversity of views in Parliament (65% agree, 13% disagree; and 70% want power to be spread over more than just one party). - However, it should not lead to too many small parties (59% agree, 41% disagree). - Ballots should remain relatively simple (59% agree, 41% disagree). - MPs should be more accountable to their constituents than to their party (77% agree, 23% disagree). - The poll did not ask whether voters believe that the “constituents” mentioned above must be defined by geographic area (riding). However, when asked to pick the important values from a list of various possibilities, “governments with strong representation from every region” was picked by 49%, and “MPs who focus primarily on the interests of their local community” by 42%. These results were spun by Trudeau and the Liberals as “mixed”, and he reneged on his promise to support and implement PR. But there is nothing “mixed” about it. There’s a clear mandate for reforming the voting system, and it’s possible to design a voting system that fulfills all of the above values.  GOLD is one possible outcome of such a design process. Furthermore, having gone through this process, I think that many of the decisions involved in GOLD's design are clearly the right ones. I'm certainly not saying that every detail of GOLD as it's currently written up on electorama is beyond debate, but I do think that the basic skeleton of the idea — in particular, optional delegation and localized ballots — are pretty well-justified. I'm posting this message to both electionscience@googlegroups. com and election-methods@lists. electorama.com. On these lists, we like to talk about theoretical aspects of voting methods. Give us a good debate about Phragmen vs Ebert or about Sainte-Laguë vs D'Hondt, and we're happy. But I actually think that, when it comes to proportional methods, these debates are secondary. Between FPTP and PR, there's a yawning chasm; between Sainte-Laguë and D'Hondt, or between the honest outcomes of proportional range voting and of Bucklin transferable voting (to give arbitrary examples) the difference is in almost all cases a small handful of seats or fewer. So the important questions aren't the details of the proportionality formula, but rather practical matters like ballot design. As far as I can tell, the PR options generally considered for a case like BC are dual-vote MMP; multimember-district STV; or open list. All of these are decent systems. But none of them comes close to matching GOLD at fulfilling the values above.  - Delegation and localized ballots allow GOLD to give much simpler ballots than STV. - The fact that voters have the option to vote out-of-district and/or not to delegate means that voters have much greater power and politicians have much more accountability than MMP or open list. - Pre-eliminating all but the "top two" (occasionally one or three) in each district provides an incentive against party fragmentation. This is better than STV, and transfers let it naturally avoid the wasted votes of similar mechanisms that can be added to MMP or open list. - One important advantage of GOLD is that it only changes the FPTP outcome insofar as it has to to achieve proportionality. This makes it much, much less of a threat to incumbent politicians, especially insofar as those politicians won "fair and square" under FPTP. (That is, without relying on natural or artificial gerrymandering, negative campaigning, or other pathologies of FPTP.) - In the US context, compatibility with current federal law is an additional advantage of GOLD. - GOLD is also precinct-summable, unlike STV or many other "advanced" proposals. ... So I think GOLD is the gold standard. But is that just because I'm the one who designed it? The burden of proof is on me to show that it's not. In order to meet that burden, I'm interested in having as broad a dialogue as possible about practical PR reform proposals. Does anybody here think that MMP, STV, or open list is a better proposal (that is, given similar investments in activism, more likely to catch on and spread) than GOLD? Are there other new proposals that offer as many advantages as GOLD does?   Jameson ps. Here's the current GOLD webpage from Electorama: Geographic Open List/Delegated voting (GOLD voting) is a proportional voting method for electing legislators to a multi-seat body. Its main advantages are: simple ballots, minimal wasted votes, and "do no harm" (that is, it doesn't change FPTP outcomes unless they're non-proportional).It assumes the voters have been divided up into one equal-population riding (aka district or constituency) per seat being elected and that each candidate has publicly declared their preference order for the other candidates ("if I don't win, then I want the votes I hold to go to her, then him, then him, etc."). Precisely one representative per area (district, riding, or constituency) will win.Here are the rules. Items in italics are mere explanations or justifications; the rules themselves are only the non-italic portions.Voters make two different choices in each race: - Choose a candidate. - The ballot lists the candidates running locally, with their parties and their first three transfer preferences (explained below). - Voters may write in candidates from further away. - Choose a transfer method for when your first choice is no longer in the running. There are 2 basic options: - Open list: Trust the voters of your chosen candidate’s party. - - - If your first choice is no longer in the running, your vote is transferred to the remaining candidates from your chosen party, in proportion to the number of direct votes they got. - This is the default if you vote for a local, non-independent candidate. - If every voter chose this option, this would be like an “open list” voting method; that is, seats would be divided proportionally by party, and go to the highest vote-getters within the party. - If you choose this option, your vote will never be transferred out of the party. Since independent candidates are considered to each be in a party by themselves, voters for those candidates should only choose this option if they do not want their vote to be transferred. - Delegated: Trust the candidate (that is, the pre-declared preferences of your chosen candidate.) - - - Each candidate must publicly pre-declare ordered preferences between the other candidates. If the candidate is no longer in the running, these votes will go to the highest remaining candidate on their pre-declared preference list. - This is the default if you vote for a non-local and/or independent candidate. - If a voter mistakenly marks both transfer methods, the default applies (as if they had chosen neither). The basic vote-counting process has 5 steps (based on Single Transferrable Voting): - Tally votes - Each ballot counts as 1 point for the chosen candidate. - Eliminate candidates without enough support in their riding - The top candidate in each riding, counting local votes only, is never eliminated. - The second candidate in each riding, counting local votes only, is eliminated only if their local votes are fewer than half those of the top. - Others are eliminated by default, surviving only if their local votes are more than half those of the top AND their total direct votes (including non-local write-ins) are more than those of the top local candidate. (For this rule, "top" is counted by local votes only, but "those of" includes non-local votes.) - This makes sure that no riding is badly mis-represented just because a given party "deserves" more winners. - It also helps discourage voters from splintering into small single-issue parties. If a party can’t pass this threshold in even one riding, it won’t get seats. But those votes can still be transferred, so those voters can still be represented by a relatively sympathetic candidate from a slightly larger party. - Find winners and transfer leftovers. - If V is the total number of valid (non-exhausted) votes, and S is the number of unfilled seats, then a “quota” is defined as Q=V/(S+1). This ensures that each full “quota” of voters will get a seat, with less than one “quota” of vote left unrepresented even though they still have a valid preference. - Any candidate with a full quota of votes at any time is elected. If their winning vote total is W>Q, then the leftover fraction (W-Q)/W of all of their votes is transferred. - Whenever a candidate wins, all other candidates from their riding are eliminated. - Eliminate the candidate who's furthest behind in their riding and transfer votes - If a candidate's current full tally is 1000 votes (including local votes, direct write-ins, and transferred votes), and the top full tally of any remaining candidate in their riding is 2000, then they are 1000 behind in their riding. - This rule means that the last remaining candidate in a riding is not eligible for elimination. - See above for the transfer methods a voter can choose. - If there are still seats to fill, repeat from step 3. Once all winners are chosen, each winning party is responsible for assigning each district they did not win to be "additional territory" of one of their winning representatives. Representatives are responsible to all citizens from their own district, and also to hear petitions from their "additional territory". That means that if you are in the minority in your district, you will still have a sympathetic representative to petition. Proportional or semiproportional?[edit] GOLD voting is proportional in a two-party context. If there are more than two parties, though, it is only semiproportional; smaller parties without a clear regional character may get less than their proportional share. But if that happens, their votes will not be ignored; they will have a say on which of the larger parties gets more seats, and even on which candidates from that allied larger party win. Thus, a smaller party will be able to promote their issues by favoring those candidates who prioritize those issues. Also, if there are two competing party coalitions, with all voters choosing one of the alliances and all candidates preferring same-coalition candidates over opposite-coalition ones, then GOLD will be fully proportional between the two coalitions.Note that other proportional voting methods sometimes are used with extra rules designed to stop fringe parties from winning seats. For instance, in the German mixed-member "proportional" method, a party that gets less than 5% or 2 direct seats does not get a proportional allotment of seats. Thus, technically speaking, even the German system is really only semiproportional, not truly proportional. Advantages[edit] The advantages of this method are as follows. First, the advantages common to all proportional representation methods: - Equality: partisan gerrymandering is impossible, and each party gets its fair share of seats. - Representation: Almost all voters are truly represented; even if you are a minority in your district, your vote helps elect a candidate of a party you sympathize with. This method also keeps all the strong points of the current voting system. (The current system is horrible in general, but it still has its strong points.) - Simplicity: you just choose one candidate, and the ballot is short. - Accountability: voters, not parties, choose who is elected. - Unity: discourages splinter parties, because candidates without a strong local base of support are eliminated up-front. - Geography: Everyone has a representative who lives relatively close to them. Similar methods[edit] OL/D voting: basically the same, but without the constraint of one candidate per riding, and with a slightly weaker elimination rule.Proportional 3RD voting: a similar system, for a nonpartisan context without ridings.---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
JQ
Jameson Quinn
Tue, Jul 11, 2017 6:14 PM

2017-07-11 13:39 GMT-04:00 Toby Pereira tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk:

I think GOLD looks like it's probably a good method, and it looks like an
incremental modification of previous methods you've defined and discussed
(such as PAL).

Yes. I regard GOLD as the culmination of the series of method proposals
that includes PAL and OL/D.

A few things though:

You mention that candidates must publicly declare a preference order of
the other candidates for when votes are transferred. Although it's not
explicitly mentioned, I think under PAL party candidates were compelled to
list candidates of their own party above all others. They also had a strict
number of layers, so, for example, all candidates from one party would be
tied in their rankings rather than a candidate having the ability to give
individual ranks to every candidate. Does any of that apply here?

I have been deliberately vague on that point in defining GOLD as a general
idea, because I think that different implementations of GOLD could
reasonably differ on this detail. But when I tried to redraft the Fair
Representation Act
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1nfpFrGNXA8KJHw0Rd6YByyXyx2Gj_awi16apSUr9L0s/edit
to institute GOLD instead of multimember STV
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1AWhaCWxG2TkvsASkbYt6Gf4NihvzCupcJL5cM9Qu9BQ/edit,
I mandated a maximum of 6 rating levels, a minimum of 2 candidates in any
level used, and a rule that no same-party candidate may be rated strictly
below a different-party candidate.

I'm not sure I fully follow the vote tallying section, but I'm assuming
it's close enough to STV to make it generally proportional while fitting
other criteria you want, such as making sure each elected candidate is
popular enough in their own area.

That's the idea, yes.

But I do wonder if having precisely one candidate elected per area is
going to look that good though. With mixed-member, you get a local
candidate anyway without worrying about proportionality, and then the
top-up MPs are there to make the result proportional. And with STV, the
proportionality comes from having wider areas with several MPs elected.

I presume the philosophy behind this is that it seems most fair to have
one MP per constituency, and you don't end up with two different types of
MP like in mixed-member. STV gives complex ballots and people won't feel
quite so connected to MPs that cover a wider area - it might be that all
the MPs in your area happen to come from the other side geographically. But
I think some people might be annoyed that their MP is not the most popular
candidate in their area, and they might perceive it as their MP being there
just to make up the proportional balance. And they will look across at the
next area and wonder why they were allowed their most popular candidate and
not forced to give them up for some sort of "greater good" (proportional
representation). I know you have implemented rules to make sure that the
elected candidate is not a "nobody" in their own area, but I don't think it
will appease everyone. I think that that is arguably one advantage of
mixed-member, in that every area gets the MP most popular with the voters
(well, according to the voting method being used).

These are reasonable concerns. I'd answer them with the following points:

  • As a relatively recent addition to my definition of GOLD, I've
    included a mandate¹ for winning parties to assign each district that they
    didn't win as "additional territory" to one of their winning
    representatives. (Search for "Once all the winners..." in the text below to
    see this requirement.) So, say there was a member of party X who happened
    to be among the plurality of their own district but still got a local
    winner from party Y due to transferred votes. Such a person would still be
    in the "additional territory" of a party-X candidate; in almost all cases,
    one whom their vote had helped elect. So they'd still have a sympathetic
    representative responsible for hearing their petitions.
  • This aspect of GOLD is an advantage in the US context because it makes
    the method compatible with current federal law.
  • It's also an advantage in terms of making the system more acceptable
    to incumbent politicians, because it means that the GOLD outcome will
    differ from the FPTP outcome only insofar as the latter is
    disproportionate, and/or insofar as GOLD motivates or allows different
    behavior from voters (including cross-district voting). In other words: if
    you are an incumbent from a party which has not benefitted from
    gerrymandering, and if you are not unusually unpopular with your
    constituents so that they'll be especially likely to vote out-of-district,
    and if you do not expect the number of seats that go to third parties under
    GOLD to be greater than the gerrymandering disadvantage your party suffered
    under FPTP, then your seat is as safe with GOLD as it was under FPTP. The
    first two criteria there are likely to hold for most incumbents in any
    place that has any chance of passing a PR reform; and the third criterion
    is likely to be close enough to holding that you can reasonably
    de-emphasize it when talking to incumbents.
  • Finally, the "one per district" rule of GOLD helps to justify the
    "pre-elimination" step, which helps discourage excessive party splintering
    (a la Israel). One could still add a pre-elimination or other quota-like
    step in OL/D (that is, GOLD without the one-per-district rule), but it
    would seem more arbitrary. I think that having a mechanism to discourage
    excessive splintering is an important feature of a practical PR method.
    (Note that the corresponding rule for MMP, such as Germany's 5% quota,
    leads inevitably to wasted votes and thus to voters strategically ignoring
    new parties, while in GOLD the votes can still transfer usefully and thus
    smaller parties can still play a productive role and exercise real power
    via their transfer orders even before they are large enough to win any
    seats. I think that's clearly an advantage to GOLD over MMP.)

While I'm here, I might as well throw in another method, which I described
here - https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/electionscience/
aP7ybKMb1zs/giaYAh6wAwAJ It is a mixed-member method, but it uses
approval or score ballots rather than plurality/First Past the Post. I also
discuss it in this video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EjeBEBZjm9Y If
you don't want to watch that, I think it's still worth going to 2:33 to see
the score ballot and 12:10 to see the approval ballot, which I think are
both nice and simple for the level of proportional representation you get
from them.

I like this idea, but I don't want to get this thread off-topic.

Toby


From: Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn@gmail.com
To: electionsciencefoundation electionscience@googlegroups.com; EM <
election-methods@lists.electorama.com>
Sent: Monday, 3 July 2017, 18:15
Subject: [EM] GOLD voting: the most practical PR proposal?

I sent essentially the same message as below, with a different subject,
earlier today, to the same two lists. I'm re-sending it now because on
second thought it should be in its own separate thread. The only changes
between the below and the earlier message, besides the subject line, are:

- I've fixed the copy of the webpage at the end to reflect the latest
adjustments.
- I mention precinct-summability as an advantage of GOLD.

I designed GOLD voting
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting
specifically for situations like BC, and I put the finishing touches on the
system in response to my simulation results based on the BC outcome. So I
think that GOLD is basically the ideal proposal for BC, as well as being
uniquely well-suited as a reform in the US context.

(Note: at the end of this email, I'll paste the current version of the
electorama page)

What's good about GOLD? I think the starting point for asking that
question is first to establish what voters (and, insofar as they're not in
conflict with voters, politicians) are looking for from a voting system.

And that brings us to the mydemocracy.ca poll. That poll had some serious
flaws: it tended to pose its questions in the form of "A or B" false
dilemmas, rather than just asking "How important is A? How important is B?"
In fact, the entire poll can be seen as a strategy by the Liberals to
deep-six election reform. Nevertheless, the poll is, as far as I know,
unequalled for its sample size in probing the electoral values of an
English-speaking population accustomed to FPTP.

So, what did it find? What do Canadians think their electoral system
should be like?

- It should lead to a greater diversity of views in Parliament (65%
agree, 13% disagree; and 70% want power to be spread over more than just
one party).
- However, it should not lead to too many small parties (59% agree,
41% disagree).
- Ballots should remain relatively simple (59% agree, 41% disagree).
- MPs should be more accountable to their constituents than to their
party (77% agree, 23% disagree).
- The poll did not ask whether voters believe that the “constituents”
mentioned above must be defined by geographic area (riding). However, when
asked to pick the important values from a list of various possibilities,
“governments with strong representation from every region” was picked by
49%, and “MPs who focus primarily on the interests of their local
community” by 42%.

These results were spun by Trudeau and the Liberals as “mixed”, and he
reneged on his promise to support and implement PR. But there is nothing
“mixed” about it. There’s a clear mandate for reforming the voting system,
and it’s possible to design a voting system that fulfills all of the above
values.

GOLD is one possible outcome of such a design process. Furthermore, having
gone through this process, I think that many of the decisions involved in
GOLD's design are clearly the right ones. I'm certainly not saying that
every detail of GOLD as it's currently written up on electorama is beyond
debate, but I do think that the basic skeleton of the idea — in particular,
optional delegation and localized ballots — are pretty well-justified.

I'm posting this message to both electionscience@googlegroups. com
electionscience@googlegroups.com and election-methods@lists.
electorama.com election-methods@lists.electorama.com. On these lists,
we like to talk about theoretical aspects of voting methods. Give us a good
debate about Phragmen vs Ebert or about Sainte-Laguë vs D'Hondt, and we're
happy. But I actually think that, when it comes to proportional methods,
these debates are secondary. Between FPTP and PR, there's a yawning chasm;
between Sainte-Laguë and D'Hondt, or between the honest outcomes of
proportional range voting and of Bucklin transferable voting (to give
arbitrary examples) the difference is in almost all cases a small handful
of seats or fewer.

So the important questions aren't the details of the proportionality
formula, but rather practical matters like ballot design.

As far as I can tell, the PR options generally considered for a case like
BC are dual-vote MMP; multimember-district STV; or open list. All of these
are decent systems. But none of them comes close to matching GOLD at
fulfilling the values above.

- Delegation and localized ballots allow GOLD to give much simpler
ballots than STV.
- The fact that voters have the option to vote out-of-district and/or
not to delegate means that voters have much greater power and politicians
have much more accountability than MMP or open list.
- Pre-eliminating all but the "top two" (occasionally one or three) in
each district provides an incentive against party fragmentation. This is
better than STV, and transfers let it naturally avoid the wasted votes of
similar mechanisms that can be added to MMP or open list.
- One important advantage of GOLD is that it only changes the FPTP
outcome insofar as it has to to achieve proportionality. This makes it
much, much less of a threat to incumbent politicians, especially insofar as
those politicians won "fair and square" under FPTP. (That is, without
relying on natural or artificial gerrymandering, negative campaigning, or
other pathologies of FPTP.)
- In the US context, compatibility with current federal law is an
additional advantage of GOLD.
- GOLD is also precinct-summable, unlike STV or many other "advanced"
proposals.

...

So I think GOLD is the gold standard. But is that just because I'm the one
who designed it? The burden of proof is on me to show that it's not. In
order to meet that burden, I'm interested in having as broad a dialogue as
possible about practical PR reform proposals. Does anybody here think that
MMP, STV, or open list is a better proposal (that is, given similar
investments in activism, more likely to catch on and spread) than GOLD? Are
there other new proposals that offer as many advantages as GOLD does?

Jameson

ps. Here's the current GOLD webpage from Electorama:

Geographic Open List/Delegated voting (GOLD voting) is a proportional
voting method for electing legislators to a multi-seat body. Its main
advantages are: simple ballots, minimal wasted votes, and "do no harm"
(that is, it doesn't change FPTP outcomes unless they're non-proportional).
It assumes the voters have been divided up into one equal-population
riding (aka district or constituency) per seat being elected and that each
candidate has publicly declared their preference order for the other
candidates ("if I don't win, then I want the votes I hold to go to her,
then him, then him, etc."). Precisely one representative per area
(district, riding, or constituency) will win.
Here are the rules. Items in italics are mere explanations or
justifications; the rules themselves are only the non-italic portions.
Voters make two different choices in each race:

1. *Choose a candidate*.
   - The ballot lists the candidates running locally, with their
   parties and their first three transfer preferences (explained below).
   - Voters may write in candidates from further away.
2. *Choose a transfer method* for when your first choice is no longer
in the running. There are 2 basic options:
   - *Open list*: Trust the *voters* of your chosen candidate’s party.
- If your first choice is no longer in the running, your vote is
   transferred to the remaining candidates from your chosen party, in
   proportion to the number of direct votes they got.
   - This is the default if you vote for a local, non-independent
   candidate.
   - *If every voter chose this option, this would be like an “open
   list” voting method; that is, seats would be divided proportionally by
   party, and go to the highest vote-getters within the party.*
   - *If you choose this option, your vote will never be transferred
   out of the party. Since independent candidates are considered to each be in
   a party by themselves, voters for those candidates should only choose this
   option if they do not want their vote to be transferred.*
- *Delegated*: Trust the *candidate* (that is, the pre-declared
   preferences of your chosen candidate.)
- Each candidate must publicly pre-declare ordered preferences between
   the other candidates. If the candidate is no longer in the running, these
   votes will go to the highest remaining candidate on their pre-declared
   preference list.
   - *This is the default if you vote for a non-local and/or
   independent candidate.*
   - *If a voter mistakenly marks both transfer methods, the default
   applies (as if they had chosen neither).*

The basic vote-counting process has 5 steps (based on Single Transferrable
Voting):

1. Tally votes
   - Each ballot counts as 1 point for the chosen candidate.
2. Eliminate candidates without enough support in their riding
   - The top candidate in each riding, counting local votes only, is
   never eliminated.
   - The second candidate in each riding, counting local votes only,
   is eliminated only if their local votes are fewer than half those of the
   top.
   - Others are eliminated by default, surviving only if their local
   votes are more than half those of the top AND their total direct votes
   (including non-local write-ins) are more than those of the top local
   candidate. (For this rule, "top" is counted by local votes only, but "those
   of" includes non-local votes.)
   - *This makes sure that no riding is badly mis-represented just
   because a given party "deserves" more winners.*
   - *It also helps discourage voters from splintering into small
   single-issue parties. If a party can’t pass this threshold in even one
   riding, it won’t get seats. But those votes can still be transferred, so
   those voters can still be represented by a relatively sympathetic candidate
   from a slightly larger party.*
3. Find winners and transfer leftovers.
   - If V is the total number of valid (non-exhausted) votes, and S is
   the number of unfilled seats, then a “quota” is defined as Q=V/(S+1). This
   ensures that each full “quota” of voters will get a seat, with less than
   one “quota” of vote left unrepresented even though they still have a valid
   preference.
   - Any candidate with a full quota of votes at any time is elected.
   If their winning vote total is W>Q, then the leftover fraction (W-Q)/W of
   all of their votes is transferred.
   - Whenever a candidate wins, all other candidates from their riding
   are eliminated.
4. Eliminate the candidate who's furthest behind in their riding and
transfer votes
   - *If a candidate's current full tally is 1000 votes (including
   local votes, direct write-ins, and transferred votes), and the top full
   tally of any remaining candidate in their riding is 2000, then they are
   1000 behind in their riding.*
   - *This rule means that the last remaining candidate in a riding is
   not eligible for elimination.*
   - See above for the transfer methods a voter can choose.
5. If there are still seats to fill, repeat from step 3.

Once all winners are chosen, each winning party is responsible for
assigning each district they did not win to be "additional territory" of
one of their winning representatives. Representatives are responsible to
all citizens from their own district, and also to hear petitions from their
"additional territory". That means that if you are in the minority in your
district, you will still have a sympathetic representative to petition.
Proportional or semiproportional?[edit
http://wiki.electorama.com/w/index.php?title=Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting&action=edit&section=1
]
GOLD voting is proportional in a two-party context. If there are more than
two parties, though, it is only semiproportional; smaller parties without a
clear regional character may get less than their proportional share. But if
that happens, their votes will not be ignored; they will have a say on
which of the larger parties gets more seats, and even on which candidates
from that allied larger party win. Thus, a smaller party will be able to
promote their issues by favoring those candidates who prioritize those
issues. Also, if there are two competing party coalitions, with all voters
choosing one of the alliances and all candidates preferring same-coalition
candidates over opposite-coalition ones, then GOLD will be fully
proportional between the two coalitions.
Note that other proportional voting methods sometimes are used with extra
rules designed to stop fringe parties from winning seats. For instance, in
the German mixed-member "proportional" method, a party that gets less than
5% or 2 direct seats does not get a proportional allotment of seats. Thus,
technically speaking, even the German system is really only
semiproportional, not truly proportional.
Advantages[edit
http://wiki.electorama.com/w/index.php?title=Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting&action=edit&section=2
]
The advantages of this method are as follows. First, the advantages common
to all proportional representation methods:

- Equality: partisan gerrymandering is impossible, and each party gets
its fair share of seats.
- Representation: Almost all voters are truly represented; even if you
are a minority in your district, your vote helps elect a candidate of a
party you sympathize with.

This method also keeps all the strong points of the current voting system.
(The current system is horrible in general, but it still has its strong
points.)

- Simplicity: you just choose one candidate, and the ballot is short.
- Accountability: voters, not parties, choose who is elected.
- Unity: discourages splinter parties, because candidates without a
strong local base of support are eliminated up-front.
- Geography: Everyone has a representative who lives relatively close
to them.

Similar methods[edit
http://wiki.electorama.com/w/index.php?title=Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting&action=edit&section=3
]
OL/D voting
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Open_List/Delegated_(OL/D)_voting:
basically the same, but without the constraint of one candidate per riding,
and with a slightly weaker elimination rule.
Proportional 3RD voting
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Proportional_3RD_voting: a similar
system, for a nonpartisan context without ridings.

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

2017-07-11 13:39 GMT-04:00 Toby Pereira <tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk>: > I think GOLD looks like it's probably a good method, and it looks like an > incremental modification of previous methods you've defined and discussed > (such as PAL). > Yes. I regard GOLD as the culmination of the series of method proposals that includes PAL and OL/D. > A few things though: > > You mention that candidates must publicly declare a preference order of > the other candidates for when votes are transferred. Although it's not > explicitly mentioned, I think under PAL party candidates were compelled to > list candidates of their own party above all others. They also had a strict > number of layers, so, for example, all candidates from one party would be > tied in their rankings rather than a candidate having the ability to give > individual ranks to every candidate. Does any of that apply here? > I have been deliberately vague on that point in defining GOLD as a general idea, because I think that different implementations of GOLD could reasonably differ on this detail. But when I tried to redraft the Fair Representation Act <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1nfpFrGNXA8KJHw0Rd6YByyXyx2Gj_awi16apSUr9L0s/edit> to institute GOLD instead of multimember STV <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1AWhaCWxG2TkvsASkbYt6Gf4NihvzCupcJL5cM9Qu9BQ/edit>, I mandated a maximum of 6 rating levels, a minimum of 2 candidates in any level used, and a rule that no same-party candidate may be rated strictly below a different-party candidate. > > I'm not sure I fully follow the vote tallying section, but I'm assuming > it's close enough to STV to make it generally proportional while fitting > other criteria you want, such as making sure each elected candidate is > popular enough in their own area. > That's the idea, yes. > > But I do wonder if having precisely one candidate elected per area is > going to look that good though. With mixed-member, you get a local > candidate anyway without worrying about proportionality, and then the > top-up MPs are there to make the result proportional. And with STV, the > proportionality comes from having wider areas with several MPs elected. > > I presume the philosophy behind this is that it seems most fair to have > one MP per constituency, and you don't end up with two different types of > MP like in mixed-member. STV gives complex ballots and people won't feel > quite so connected to MPs that cover a wider area - it might be that all > the MPs in your area happen to come from the other side geographically. But > I think some people might be annoyed that their MP is not the most popular > candidate in their area, and they might perceive it as their MP being there > just to make up the proportional balance. And they will look across at the > next area and wonder why they were allowed their most popular candidate and > not forced to give them up for some sort of "greater good" (proportional > representation). I know you have implemented rules to make sure that the > elected candidate is not a "nobody" in their own area, but I don't think it > will appease everyone. I think that that is arguably one advantage of > mixed-member, in that every area gets the MP most popular with the voters > (well, according to the voting method being used). > These are reasonable concerns. I'd answer them with the following points: - As a relatively recent addition to my definition of GOLD, I've included a mandate¹ for winning parties to assign each district that they didn't win as "additional territory" to one of their winning representatives. (Search for "Once all the winners..." in the text below to see this requirement.) So, say there was a member of party X who happened to be among the plurality of their own district but still got a local winner from party Y due to transferred votes. Such a person would still be in the "additional territory" of a party-X candidate; in almost all cases, one whom their vote had helped elect. So they'd still have a sympathetic representative responsible for hearing their petitions. - This aspect of GOLD is an advantage in the US context because it makes the method compatible with current federal law. - It's also an advantage in terms of making the system more acceptable to incumbent politicians, because it means that the GOLD outcome will differ from the FPTP outcome only insofar as the latter is disproportionate, and/or insofar as GOLD motivates or allows different behavior from voters (including cross-district voting). In other words: if you are an incumbent from a party which has not benefitted from gerrymandering, and if you are not unusually unpopular with your constituents so that they'll be especially likely to vote out-of-district, and if you do not expect the number of seats that go to third parties under GOLD to be greater than the gerrymandering disadvantage your party suffered under FPTP, then your seat is as safe with GOLD as it was under FPTP. The first two criteria there are likely to hold for most incumbents in any place that has any chance of passing a PR reform; and the third criterion is likely to be close enough to holding that you can reasonably de-emphasize it when talking to incumbents. - Finally, the "one per district" rule of GOLD helps to justify the "pre-elimination" step, which helps discourage excessive party splintering (a la Israel). One could still add a pre-elimination or other quota-like step in OL/D (that is, GOLD without the one-per-district rule), but it would seem more arbitrary. I think that having a mechanism to discourage excessive splintering is an important feature of a practical PR method. (Note that the corresponding rule for MMP, such as Germany's 5% quota, leads inevitably to wasted votes and thus to voters strategically ignoring new parties, while in GOLD the votes can still transfer usefully and thus smaller parties can still play a productive role and exercise real power via their transfer orders even before they are large enough to win any seats. I think that's clearly an advantage to GOLD over MMP.) > > While I'm here, I might as well throw in another method, which I described > here - https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/electionscience/ > aP7ybKMb1zs/giaYAh6wAwAJ It is a mixed-member method, but it uses > approval or score ballots rather than plurality/First Past the Post. I also > discuss it in this video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EjeBEBZjm9Y If > you don't want to watch that, I think it's still worth going to 2:33 to see > the score ballot and 12:10 to see the approval ballot, which I think are > both nice and simple for the level of proportional representation you get > from them. > I like this idea, but I don't want to get this thread off-topic. > Toby > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn@gmail.com> > *To:* electionsciencefoundation <electionscience@googlegroups.com>; EM < > election-methods@lists.electorama.com> > *Sent:* Monday, 3 July 2017, 18:15 > *Subject:* [EM] GOLD voting: the most practical PR proposal? > > I sent essentially the same message as below, with a different subject, > earlier today, to the same two lists. I'm re-sending it now because on > second thought it should be in its own separate thread. The only changes > between the below and the earlier message, besides the subject line, are: > > - I've fixed the copy of the webpage at the end to reflect the latest > adjustments. > - I mention precinct-summability as an advantage of GOLD. > > ----- > > I designed GOLD voting > <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting> > specifically for situations like BC, and I put the finishing touches on the > system in response to my simulation results based on the BC outcome. So I > think that GOLD is basically the ideal proposal for BC, as well as being > uniquely well-suited as a reform in the US context. > > (Note: at the end of this email, I'll paste the current version of the > electorama page) > > What's good about GOLD? I think the starting point for asking that > question is first to establish what voters (and, insofar as they're not in > conflict with voters, politicians) are looking for from a voting system. > > And that brings us to the mydemocracy.ca poll. That poll had some serious > flaws: it tended to pose its questions in the form of "A or B" false > dilemmas, rather than just asking "How important is A? How important is B?" > In fact, the entire poll can be seen as a strategy by the Liberals to > deep-six election reform. Nevertheless, the poll is, as far as I know, > unequalled for its sample size in probing the electoral values of an > English-speaking population accustomed to FPTP. > > So, what did it find? What do Canadians think their electoral system > should be like? > > - It should lead to a greater diversity of views in Parliament (65% > agree, 13% disagree; and 70% want power to be spread over more than just > one party). > - However, it should not lead to too many small parties (59% agree, > 41% disagree). > - Ballots should remain relatively simple (59% agree, 41% disagree). > - MPs should be more accountable to their constituents than to their > party (77% agree, 23% disagree). > - The poll did not ask whether voters believe that the “constituents” > mentioned above must be defined by geographic area (riding). However, when > asked to pick the important values from a list of various possibilities, > “governments with strong representation from every region” was picked by > 49%, and “MPs who focus primarily on the interests of their local > community” by 42%. > > These results were spun by Trudeau and the Liberals as “mixed”, and he > reneged on his promise to support and implement PR. But there is nothing > “mixed” about it. There’s a clear mandate for reforming the voting system, > and it’s possible to design a voting system that fulfills all of the above > values. > > GOLD is one possible outcome of such a design process. Furthermore, having > gone through this process, I think that many of the decisions involved in > GOLD's design are clearly the right ones. I'm certainly not saying that > every detail of GOLD as it's currently written up on electorama is beyond > debate, but I do think that the basic skeleton of the idea — in particular, > optional delegation and localized ballots — are pretty well-justified. > > I'm posting this message to both electionscience@googlegroups. com > <electionscience@googlegroups.com> and election-methods@lists. > electorama.com <election-methods@lists.electorama.com>. On these lists, > we like to talk about theoretical aspects of voting methods. Give us a good > debate about Phragmen vs Ebert or about Sainte-Laguë vs D'Hondt, and we're > happy. But I actually think that, when it comes to proportional methods, > these debates are secondary. Between FPTP and PR, there's a yawning chasm; > between Sainte-Laguë and D'Hondt, or between the honest outcomes of > proportional range voting and of Bucklin transferable voting (to give > arbitrary examples) the difference is in almost all cases a small handful > of seats or fewer. > > So the important questions aren't the details of the proportionality > formula, but rather practical matters like ballot design. > > As far as I can tell, the PR options generally considered for a case like > BC are dual-vote MMP; multimember-district STV; or open list. All of these > are decent systems. But none of them comes close to matching GOLD at > fulfilling the values above. > > - Delegation and localized ballots allow GOLD to give much simpler > ballots than STV. > - The fact that voters have the option to vote out-of-district and/or > not to delegate means that voters have much greater power and politicians > have much more accountability than MMP or open list. > - Pre-eliminating all but the "top two" (occasionally one or three) in > each district provides an incentive against party fragmentation. This is > better than STV, and transfers let it naturally avoid the wasted votes of > similar mechanisms that can be added to MMP or open list. > - One important advantage of GOLD is that it only changes the FPTP > outcome insofar as it has to to achieve proportionality. This makes it > much, much less of a threat to incumbent politicians, especially insofar as > those politicians won "fair and square" under FPTP. (That is, without > relying on natural or artificial gerrymandering, negative campaigning, or > other pathologies of FPTP.) > - In the US context, compatibility with current federal law is an > additional advantage of GOLD. > - GOLD is also precinct-summable, unlike STV or many other "advanced" > proposals. > > ... > > So I think GOLD is the gold standard. But is that just because I'm the one > who designed it? The burden of proof is on me to show that it's not. In > order to meet that burden, I'm interested in having as broad a dialogue as > possible about practical PR reform proposals. Does anybody here think that > MMP, STV, or open list is a better proposal (that is, given similar > investments in activism, more likely to catch on and spread) than GOLD? Are > there other new proposals that offer as many advantages as GOLD does? > > Jameson > > ps. Here's the current GOLD webpage from Electorama: > > Geographic Open List/Delegated voting (GOLD voting) is a proportional > voting method for electing legislators to a multi-seat body. Its main > advantages are: simple ballots, minimal wasted votes, and "do no harm" > (that is, it doesn't change FPTP outcomes unless they're non-proportional). > It assumes the voters have been divided up into one equal-population > riding (aka district or constituency) per seat being elected and that each > candidate has publicly declared their preference order for the other > candidates ("if I don't win, then I want the votes I hold to go to her, > then him, then him, etc."). Precisely one representative per area > (district, riding, or constituency) will win. > Here are the rules. Items in italics are mere explanations or > justifications; the rules themselves are only the non-italic portions. > Voters make two different choices in each race: > > 1. *Choose a candidate*. > - The ballot lists the candidates running locally, with their > parties and their first three transfer preferences (explained below). > - Voters may write in candidates from further away. > 2. *Choose a transfer method* for when your first choice is no longer > in the running. There are 2 basic options: > - *Open list*: Trust the *voters* of your chosen candidate’s party. > - If your first choice is no longer in the running, your vote is > transferred to the remaining candidates from your chosen party, in > proportion to the number of direct votes they got. > - This is the default if you vote for a local, non-independent > candidate. > - *If every voter chose this option, this would be like an “open > list” voting method; that is, seats would be divided proportionally by > party, and go to the highest vote-getters within the party.* > - *If you choose this option, your vote will never be transferred > out of the party. Since independent candidates are considered to each be in > a party by themselves, voters for those candidates should only choose this > option if they do not want their vote to be transferred.* > - *Delegated*: Trust the *candidate* (that is, the pre-declared > preferences of your chosen candidate.) > - Each candidate must publicly pre-declare ordered preferences between > the other candidates. If the candidate is no longer in the running, these > votes will go to the highest remaining candidate on their pre-declared > preference list. > - *This is the default if you vote for a non-local and/or > independent candidate.* > - *If a voter mistakenly marks both transfer methods, the default > applies (as if they had chosen neither).* > > The basic vote-counting process has 5 steps (based on Single Transferrable > Voting): > > 1. Tally votes > - Each ballot counts as 1 point for the chosen candidate. > 2. Eliminate candidates without enough support in their riding > - The top candidate in each riding, counting local votes only, is > never eliminated. > - The second candidate in each riding, counting local votes only, > is eliminated only if their local votes are fewer than half those of the > top. > - Others are eliminated by default, surviving only if their local > votes are more than half those of the top AND their total direct votes > (including non-local write-ins) are more than those of the top local > candidate. (For this rule, "top" is counted by local votes only, but "those > of" includes non-local votes.) > - *This makes sure that no riding is badly mis-represented just > because a given party "deserves" more winners.* > - *It also helps discourage voters from splintering into small > single-issue parties. If a party can’t pass this threshold in even one > riding, it won’t get seats. But those votes can still be transferred, so > those voters can still be represented by a relatively sympathetic candidate > from a slightly larger party.* > 3. Find winners and transfer leftovers. > - If V is the total number of valid (non-exhausted) votes, and S is > the number of unfilled seats, then a “quota” is defined as Q=V/(S+1). This > ensures that each full “quota” of voters will get a seat, with less than > one “quota” of vote left unrepresented even though they still have a valid > preference. > - Any candidate with a full quota of votes at any time is elected. > If their winning vote total is W>Q, then the leftover fraction (W-Q)/W of > all of their votes is transferred. > - Whenever a candidate wins, all other candidates from their riding > are eliminated. > 4. Eliminate the candidate who's furthest behind in their riding and > transfer votes > - *If a candidate's current full tally is 1000 votes (including > local votes, direct write-ins, and transferred votes), and the top full > tally of any remaining candidate in their riding is 2000, then they are > 1000 behind in their riding.* > - *This rule means that the last remaining candidate in a riding is > not eligible for elimination.* > - See above for the transfer methods a voter can choose. > 5. If there are still seats to fill, repeat from step 3. > > Once all winners are chosen, each winning party is responsible for > assigning each district they did not win to be "additional territory" of > one of their winning representatives. Representatives are responsible to > all citizens from their own district, and also to hear petitions from their > "additional territory". That means that if you are in the minority in your > district, you will still have a sympathetic representative to petition. > Proportional or semiproportional?[edit > <http://wiki.electorama.com/w/index.php?title=Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting&action=edit&section=1> > ] > GOLD voting is proportional in a two-party context. If there are more than > two parties, though, it is only semiproportional; smaller parties without a > clear regional character may get less than their proportional share. But if > that happens, their votes will not be ignored; they will have a say on > which of the larger parties gets more seats, and even on which candidates > from that allied larger party win. Thus, a smaller party will be able to > promote their issues by favoring those candidates who prioritize those > issues. Also, if there are two competing party coalitions, with all voters > choosing one of the alliances and all candidates preferring same-coalition > candidates over opposite-coalition ones, then GOLD will be fully > proportional between the two coalitions. > Note that other proportional voting methods sometimes are used with extra > rules designed to stop fringe parties from winning seats. For instance, in > the German mixed-member "proportional" method, a party that gets less than > 5% or 2 direct seats does not get a proportional allotment of seats. Thus, > technically speaking, even the German system is really only > semiproportional, not truly proportional. > Advantages[edit > <http://wiki.electorama.com/w/index.php?title=Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting&action=edit&section=2> > ] > The advantages of this method are as follows. First, the advantages common > to all proportional representation methods: > > - Equality: partisan gerrymandering is impossible, and each party gets > its fair share of seats. > - Representation: Almost all voters are truly represented; even if you > are a minority in your district, your vote helps elect a candidate of a > party you sympathize with. > > This method also keeps all the strong points of the current voting system. > (The current system is horrible in general, but it still has its strong > points.) > > - Simplicity: you just choose one candidate, and the ballot is short. > - Accountability: voters, not parties, choose who is elected. > - Unity: discourages splinter parties, because candidates without a > strong local base of support are eliminated up-front. > - Geography: Everyone has a representative who lives relatively close > to them. > > Similar methods[edit > <http://wiki.electorama.com/w/index.php?title=Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting&action=edit&section=3> > ] > OL/D voting > <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Open_List/Delegated_(OL/D)_voting>: > basically the same, but without the constraint of one candidate per riding, > and with a slightly weaker elimination rule. > Proportional 3RD voting > <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Proportional_3RD_voting>: a similar > system, for a nonpartisan context without ridings. > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > > >