FS
Forest Simmons
Wed, Mar 4, 2020 5:44 PM
If the Smith set is a cycle of three, then the methods you mention give the
same result as long as the defeat strength is measured the same way. (You
knew that)
Not all of these satisfy Independence from Pareto Dominated Alternatives.
I doubt that would make a difference in any known public election from the
past, but all else being equal, it is a difference that could make a
difference.
Simplicity of explanation and implementation, along with heuristic appeal,
and other selling points may be more important than any other
distinction among the methods you mention.
For me the easiest to sell formulation of Schulze is in the form of
"beat-path." But that is probably just the mathematician in me appreciating
an elegant way of creating a transitive relation with minimal violence to
the intransitive relation on which it is based.
Thanks for asking this question!
If the Smith set is a cycle of three, then the methods you mention give the
same result as long as the defeat strength is measured the same way. (You
knew that)
Not all of these satisfy Independence from Pareto Dominated Alternatives.
I doubt that would make a difference in any known public election from the
past, but all else being equal, it is a difference that could make a
difference.
Simplicity of explanation and implementation, along with heuristic appeal,
and other selling points may be more important than any other
distinction among the methods you mention.
For me the easiest to sell formulation of Schulze is in the form of
"beat-path." But that is probably just the mathematician in me appreciating
an elegant way of creating a transitive relation with minimal violence to
the intransitive relation on which it is based.
Thanks for asking this question!
TP
Toby Pereira
Fri, May 29, 2020 7:46 PM
Thank you for this response, Forest. I was reminded of this subject again when I re-encountered Jameson Quinn's work on Voter Satisfaction Efficiency the other day. According to his simulations, to be found here https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSE/ ranked pairs performs quite a bit better than the Schulze method. This surprises me since I wouldn't expect much difference in practice (as I put in the original post of this discussion). I'm not sure if Jameson still reads the stuff on this mailing list, but it would be interesting to know what caused the difference.
Toby
On Wednesday, 4 March 2020, 17:45:08 GMT, Forest Simmons fsimmons@pcc.edu wrote:
If the Smith set is a cycle of three, then the methods you mention give the same result as long as the defeat strength is measured the same way. (You knew that)
Not all of these satisfy Independence from Pareto Dominated Alternatives. I doubt that would make a difference in any known public election from the past, but all else being equal, it is a difference that could make a difference.
Simplicity of explanation and implementation, along with heuristic appeal, and other selling points may be more important than any other distinction among the methods you mention.
For me the easiest to sell formulation of Schulze is in the form of "beat-path." But that is probably just the mathematician in me appreciating an elegant way of creating a transitive relation with minimal violence to the intransitive relation on which it is based.
Thanks for asking this question!
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
Thank you for this response, Forest. I was reminded of this subject again when I re-encountered Jameson Quinn's work on Voter Satisfaction Efficiency the other day. According to his simulations, to be found here https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSE/ ranked pairs performs quite a bit better than the Schulze method. This surprises me since I wouldn't expect much difference in practice (as I put in the original post of this discussion). I'm not sure if Jameson still reads the stuff on this mailing list, but it would be interesting to know what caused the difference.
Toby
On Wednesday, 4 March 2020, 17:45:08 GMT, Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote:
If the Smith set is a cycle of three, then the methods you mention give the same result as long as the defeat strength is measured the same way. (You knew that)
Not all of these satisfy Independence from Pareto Dominated Alternatives. I doubt that would make a difference in any known public election from the past, but all else being equal, it is a difference that could make a difference.
Simplicity of explanation and implementation, along with heuristic appeal, and other selling points may be more important than any other distinction among the methods you mention.
For me the easiest to sell formulation of Schulze is in the form of "beat-path." But that is probably just the mathematician in me appreciating an elegant way of creating a transitive relation with minimal violence to the intransitive relation on which it is based.
Thanks for asking this question!
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
RB
robert bristow-johnson
Fri, May 29, 2020 10:46 PM
On May 29, 2020 3:46 PM Toby Pereira tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Thank you for this response, Forest. I was reminded of this subject again when I re-encountered Jameson Quinn's work on Voter Satisfaction Efficiency the other day. According to his simulations, to be found here https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSE/ ranked pairs performs quite a bit better than the Schulze method. This surprises me since I wouldn't expect much difference in practice (as I put in the original post of this discussion). I'm not sure if Jameson still reads the stuff on this mailing list, but it would be interesting to know what caused the difference.
On Wednesday, 4 March 2020, 17:45:08 GMT, Forest Simmons fsimmons@pcc.edu wrote:
If the Smith set is a cycle of three, then the methods you mention give the same result as long as the defeat strength is measured the same way. (You knew that)
Not all of these satisfy Independence from Pareto Dominated Alternatives. I doubt that would make a difference in any known public election from the past, but all else being equal, it is a difference that could make a difference.
Simplicity of explanation and implementation, along with heuristic appeal, and other selling points may be more important than any other distinction among the methods you mention.
For me the easiest to sell formulation of Schulze is in the form of "beat-path." But that is probably just the mathematician in me appreciating an elegant way of creating a transitive relation with minimal violence to the intransitive relation on which it is based.
For me, the easiest sell is what makes for simpler and easy-to-understand legal language, since cycles will be exceedingly rare and a cycle bigger than Rock-Paper-Scissors will almost certainly never happen. And RP and Schulze and River elect the same candidate for the Condorcet case and the 3-candidate Smith set.
Now that is different than the STV-BTR, which I am actively plugging for lawmakers here in Vermont. In the case of Rock-Paper-Scissors, STV-BTR will elect the candidate with the most votes in the semifinal round. But I am finding that the language for STV-BTR is far easier to sell than even RP.
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
> On May 29, 2020 3:46 PM Toby Pereira <tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
>
>
> Thank you for this response, Forest. I was reminded of this subject again when I re-encountered Jameson Quinn's work on Voter Satisfaction Efficiency the other day. According to his simulations, to be found here https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSE/ ranked pairs performs quite a bit better than the Schulze method. This surprises me since I wouldn't expect much difference in practice (as I put in the original post of this discussion). I'm not sure if Jameson still reads the stuff on this mailing list, but it would be interesting to know what caused the difference.
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, 4 March 2020, 17:45:08 GMT, Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote:
>
>
> If the Smith set is a cycle of three, then the methods you mention give the same result as long as the defeat strength is measured the same way. (You knew that)
>
> Not all of these satisfy Independence from Pareto Dominated Alternatives. I doubt that would make a difference in any known public election from the past, but all else being equal, it is a difference that could make a difference.
>
> Simplicity of explanation and implementation, along with heuristic appeal, and other selling points may be more important than any other distinction among the methods you mention.
>
> For me the easiest to sell formulation of Schulze is in the form of "beat-path." But that is probably just the mathematician in me appreciating an elegant way of creating a transitive relation with minimal violence to the intransitive relation on which it is based.
>
For me, the easiest sell is what makes for simpler and easy-to-understand legal language, since cycles will be exceedingly rare and a cycle bigger than Rock-Paper-Scissors will almost certainly never happen. And RP and Schulze and River elect the same candidate for the Condorcet case and the 3-candidate Smith set.
Now that is different than the STV-BTR, which I am actively plugging for lawmakers here in Vermont. In the case of Rock-Paper-Scissors, STV-BTR will elect the candidate with the most votes in the semifinal round. But I am finding that the language for STV-BTR is far easier to sell than even RP.
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
RB
robert bristow-johnson
Mon, Apr 12, 2021 4:34 PM
Hay, I know this is resurrecting a thread. But I am about to talk with the Vermont House Government Operations Committee about RCV and what happened in Burlington 12 years ago.
I am sending the legislators my paper: https://drive.google.com/file/d/14assN41UL7Mib9PpwsjM63ZT17k9admC/view?usp=sharing
and, just for shits and grins, this 2004 Scientific American article that is coauthored by a Nobel laureate, Eric Maskin, that plugs doing it the Condorcet way. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m6qn6Y7PAQldKNeIH2Tal6AizF7XY2U4/view?usp=sharing
Are there any scholars here that would like to, via Zoom, help out and appear before a legislative committee in the state of Vermont and testify? Hopefully, you would be in favor or some Condorcet-compliant RCV but even if you're for Approval that would be okay.
I could use some help to not appear that I am the only person in the world that thinks something was wrong in Burlington 2009 and that this something wrong can actually be fixed. I think that I have the facts and arguments straight, but I need more people.
thanks for any help.
robert
On May 29, 2020 3:46 PM Toby Pereira tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Thank you for this response, Forest. I was reminded of this subject again when I re-encountered Jameson Quinn's work on Voter Satisfaction Efficiency the other day. According to his simulations, to be found here https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSE/ ranked pairs performs quite a bit better than the Schulze method. This surprises me since I wouldn't expect much difference in practice (as I put in the original post of this discussion). I'm not sure if Jameson still reads the stuff on this mailing list, but it would be interesting to know what caused the difference.
On Wednesday, 4 March 2020, 17:45:08 GMT, Forest Simmons fsimmons@pcc.edu wrote:
If the Smith set is a cycle of three, then the methods you mention give the same result as long as the defeat strength is measured the same way. (You knew that)
Not all of these satisfy Independence from Pareto Dominated Alternatives. I doubt that would make a difference in any known public election from the past, but all else being equal, it is a difference that could make a difference.
Simplicity of explanation and implementation, along with heuristic appeal, and other selling points may be more important than any other distinction among the methods you mention.
For me the easiest to sell formulation of Schulze is in the form of "beat-path." But that is probably just the mathematician in me appreciating an elegant way of creating a transitive relation with minimal violence to the intransitive relation on which it is based.
For me, the easiest sell is what makes for simpler and easy-to-understand legal language, since cycles will be exceedingly rare and a cycle bigger than Rock-Paper-Scissors will almost certainly never happen. And RP and Schulze and River elect the same candidate for the Condorcet case and the 3-candidate Smith set.
Now that is different than the STV-BTR, which I am actively plugging for lawmakers here in Vermont. In the case of Rock-Paper-Scissors, STV-BTR will elect the candidate with the most votes in the semifinal round. But I am finding that the language for STV-BTR is far easier to sell than even RP.
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Hay, I know this is resurrecting a thread. But I am about to talk with the Vermont House Government Operations Committee about RCV and what happened in Burlington 12 years ago.
I am sending the legislators my paper: https://drive.google.com/file/d/14assN41UL7Mib9PpwsjM63ZT17k9admC/view?usp=sharing
and, just for shits and grins, this 2004 Scientific American article that is coauthored by a Nobel laureate, Eric Maskin, that plugs doing it the Condorcet way. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m6qn6Y7PAQldKNeIH2Tal6AizF7XY2U4/view?usp=sharing
Are there any scholars here that would like to, via Zoom, help out and appear before a legislative committee in the state of Vermont and testify? Hopefully, you would be in favor or *some* Condorcet-compliant RCV but even if you're for Approval that would be okay.
I could use some help to not appear that I am the only person in the world that thinks something was wrong in Burlington 2009 and that this something wrong can actually be fixed. I think that I have the facts and arguments straight, but I need more people.
thanks for any help.
robert
> On 05/29/2020 6:46 PM robert bristow-johnson <rbj@audioimagination.com> wrote:
>
>
> > On May 29, 2020 3:46 PM Toby Pereira <tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Thank you for this response, Forest. I was reminded of this subject again when I re-encountered Jameson Quinn's work on Voter Satisfaction Efficiency the other day. According to his simulations, to be found here https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSE/ ranked pairs performs quite a bit better than the Schulze method. This surprises me since I wouldn't expect much difference in practice (as I put in the original post of this discussion). I'm not sure if Jameson still reads the stuff on this mailing list, but it would be interesting to know what caused the difference.
> >
>
> >
> >
> > On Wednesday, 4 March 2020, 17:45:08 GMT, Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote:
> >
> >
> > If the Smith set is a cycle of three, then the methods you mention give the same result as long as the defeat strength is measured the same way. (You knew that)
> >
> > Not all of these satisfy Independence from Pareto Dominated Alternatives. I doubt that would make a difference in any known public election from the past, but all else being equal, it is a difference that could make a difference.
> >
> > Simplicity of explanation and implementation, along with heuristic appeal, and other selling points may be more important than any other distinction among the methods you mention.
> >
> > For me the easiest to sell formulation of Schulze is in the form of "beat-path." But that is probably just the mathematician in me appreciating an elegant way of creating a transitive relation with minimal violence to the intransitive relation on which it is based.
> >
>
> For me, the easiest sell is what makes for simpler and easy-to-understand legal language, since cycles will be exceedingly rare and a cycle bigger than Rock-Paper-Scissors will almost certainly never happen. And RP and Schulze and River elect the same candidate for the Condorcet case and the 3-candidate Smith set.
>
> Now that is different than the STV-BTR, which I am actively plugging for lawmakers here in Vermont. In the case of Rock-Paper-Scissors, STV-BTR will elect the candidate with the most votes in the semifinal round. But I am finding that the language for STV-BTR is far easier to sell than even RP.
>
> --
>
> r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
RL
Rob Lanphier
Mon, Apr 12, 2021 5:28 PM
Hi Robert,
I may be able to help, and I'm certainly willing to recruit others.
When is the next public hearing? What's the timeline that you're
working against?
Rob
On Mon, Apr 12, 2021 at 9:34 AM robert bristow-johnson
rbj@audioimagination.com wrote:
Hay, I know this is resurrecting a thread. But I am about to talk with the Vermont House Government Operations Committee about RCV and what happened in Burlington 12 years ago.
I am sending the legislators my paper: https://drive.google.com/file/d/14assN41UL7Mib9PpwsjM63ZT17k9admC/view?usp=sharing
and, just for shits and grins, this 2004 Scientific American article that is coauthored by a Nobel laureate, Eric Maskin, that plugs doing it the Condorcet way. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m6qn6Y7PAQldKNeIH2Tal6AizF7XY2U4/view?usp=sharing
Are there any scholars here that would like to, via Zoom, help out and appear before a legislative committee in the state of Vermont and testify? Hopefully, you would be in favor or some Condorcet-compliant RCV but even if you're for Approval that would be okay.
I could use some help to not appear that I am the only person in the world that thinks something was wrong in Burlington 2009 and that this something wrong can actually be fixed. I think that I have the facts and arguments straight, but I need more people.
thanks for any help.
robert
On May 29, 2020 3:46 PM Toby Pereira tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Thank you for this response, Forest. I was reminded of this subject again when I re-encountered Jameson Quinn's work on Voter Satisfaction Efficiency the other day. According to his simulations, to be found here https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSE/ ranked pairs performs quite a bit better than the Schulze method. This surprises me since I wouldn't expect much difference in practice (as I put in the original post of this discussion). I'm not sure if Jameson still reads the stuff on this mailing list, but it would be interesting to know what caused the difference.
On Wednesday, 4 March 2020, 17:45:08 GMT, Forest Simmons fsimmons@pcc.edu wrote:
If the Smith set is a cycle of three, then the methods you mention give the same result as long as the defeat strength is measured the same way. (You knew that)
Not all of these satisfy Independence from Pareto Dominated Alternatives. I doubt that would make a difference in any known public election from the past, but all else being equal, it is a difference that could make a difference.
Simplicity of explanation and implementation, along with heuristic appeal, and other selling points may be more important than any other distinction among the methods you mention.
For me the easiest to sell formulation of Schulze is in the form of "beat-path." But that is probably just the mathematician in me appreciating an elegant way of creating a transitive relation with minimal violence to the intransitive relation on which it is based.
For me, the easiest sell is what makes for simpler and easy-to-understand legal language, since cycles will be exceedingly rare and a cycle bigger than Rock-Paper-Scissors will almost certainly never happen. And RP and Schulze and River elect the same candidate for the Condorcet case and the 3-candidate Smith set.
Now that is different than the STV-BTR, which I am actively plugging for lawmakers here in Vermont. In the case of Rock-Paper-Scissors, STV-BTR will elect the candidate with the most votes in the semifinal round. But I am finding that the language for STV-BTR is far easier to sell than even RP.
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Hi Robert,
I may be able to help, and I'm certainly willing to recruit others.
When is the next public hearing? What's the timeline that you're
working against?
Rob
On Mon, Apr 12, 2021 at 9:34 AM robert bristow-johnson
<rbj@audioimagination.com> wrote:
>
> Hay, I know this is resurrecting a thread. But I am about to talk with the Vermont House Government Operations Committee about RCV and what happened in Burlington 12 years ago.
>
> I am sending the legislators my paper: https://drive.google.com/file/d/14assN41UL7Mib9PpwsjM63ZT17k9admC/view?usp=sharing
>
> and, just for shits and grins, this 2004 Scientific American article that is coauthored by a Nobel laureate, Eric Maskin, that plugs doing it the Condorcet way. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m6qn6Y7PAQldKNeIH2Tal6AizF7XY2U4/view?usp=sharing
>
> Are there any scholars here that would like to, via Zoom, help out and appear before a legislative committee in the state of Vermont and testify? Hopefully, you would be in favor or *some* Condorcet-compliant RCV but even if you're for Approval that would be okay.
>
> I could use some help to not appear that I am the only person in the world that thinks something was wrong in Burlington 2009 and that this something wrong can actually be fixed. I think that I have the facts and arguments straight, but I need more people.
>
> thanks for any help.
>
> robert
>
> > On 05/29/2020 6:46 PM robert bristow-johnson <rbj@audioimagination.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > > On May 29, 2020 3:46 PM Toby Pereira <tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > Thank you for this response, Forest. I was reminded of this subject again when I re-encountered Jameson Quinn's work on Voter Satisfaction Efficiency the other day. According to his simulations, to be found here https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSE/ ranked pairs performs quite a bit better than the Schulze method. This surprises me since I wouldn't expect much difference in practice (as I put in the original post of this discussion). I'm not sure if Jameson still reads the stuff on this mailing list, but it would be interesting to know what caused the difference.
> > >
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Wednesday, 4 March 2020, 17:45:08 GMT, Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > If the Smith set is a cycle of three, then the methods you mention give the same result as long as the defeat strength is measured the same way. (You knew that)
> > >
> > > Not all of these satisfy Independence from Pareto Dominated Alternatives. I doubt that would make a difference in any known public election from the past, but all else being equal, it is a difference that could make a difference.
> > >
> > > Simplicity of explanation and implementation, along with heuristic appeal, and other selling points may be more important than any other distinction among the methods you mention.
> > >
> > > For me the easiest to sell formulation of Schulze is in the form of "beat-path." But that is probably just the mathematician in me appreciating an elegant way of creating a transitive relation with minimal violence to the intransitive relation on which it is based.
> > >
> >
> > For me, the easiest sell is what makes for simpler and easy-to-understand legal language, since cycles will be exceedingly rare and a cycle bigger than Rock-Paper-Scissors will almost certainly never happen. And RP and Schulze and River elect the same candidate for the Condorcet case and the 3-candidate Smith set.
> >
> > Now that is different than the STV-BTR, which I am actively plugging for lawmakers here in Vermont. In the case of Rock-Paper-Scissors, STV-BTR will elect the candidate with the most votes in the semifinal round. But I am finding that the language for STV-BTR is far easier to sell than even RP.
> >
> > --
> >
> > r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
> >
> > "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> --
>
> r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
V
VoteFair
Tue, Apr 13, 2021 4:25 PM
Robert, if I'm available I could join you on the Zoom call.
I would be extremely nervous, and prefer having a prepared statement to
read and/or prepared talking points, yet lately I've been getting
experience answering election-method questions via video. In
particular, some weeks ago I got my feet wet by testifying in an Oregon
state Senate legislative committee meeting via video.
Although eventually I prefer the Condorcet-Kemeny method, currently I'm
advocating Ranked Choice Including Pairwise Elimination, aka "RCIPE"
pronounced "recipe." That's what we're specifying for the Ranked Choice
Oregon ballot initiative. Basically it inserts a "safety net" that
eliminates the Condorcet loser when there is one. Of course it would
have prevented the Burlington failure.
Here in Oregon the fans of STAR voting are pushing the legislature for
their method, so in response I created the following comparison table
that compares IRV with STAR and RCIPE. It should clarify my perspective
regarding the ambiguous term "RCV."
https://www.rankedchoiceoregon.org/comparison_table_rco_star_irv.pdf
Feel free to share this document if you think that's appropriate.
You have my email address, so contact me as needed.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/12/2021 9:34 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Hay, I know this is resurrecting a thread. But I am about to talk with the Vermont House Government Operations Committee about RCV and what happened in Burlington 12 years ago.
I am sending the legislators my paper: https://drive.google.com/file/d/14assN41UL7Mib9PpwsjM63ZT17k9admC/view?usp=sharing
and, just for shits and grins, this 2004 Scientific American article that is coauthored by a Nobel laureate, Eric Maskin, that plugs doing it the Condorcet way. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m6qn6Y7PAQldKNeIH2Tal6AizF7XY2U4/view?usp=sharing
Are there any scholars here that would like to, via Zoom, help out and appear before a legislative committee in the state of Vermont and testify? Hopefully, you would be in favor or some Condorcet-compliant RCV but even if you're for Approval that would be okay.
I could use some help to not appear that I am the only person in the world that thinks something was wrong in Burlington 2009 and that this something wrong can actually be fixed. I think that I have the facts and arguments straight, but I need more people.
thanks for any help.
robert
Robert, if I'm available I could join you on the Zoom call.
I would be extremely nervous, and prefer having a prepared statement to
read and/or prepared talking points, yet lately I've been getting
experience answering election-method questions via video. In
particular, some weeks ago I got my feet wet by testifying in an Oregon
state Senate legislative committee meeting via video.
Although eventually I prefer the Condorcet-Kemeny method, currently I'm
advocating Ranked Choice Including Pairwise Elimination, aka "RCIPE"
pronounced "recipe." That's what we're specifying for the Ranked Choice
Oregon ballot initiative. Basically it inserts a "safety net" that
eliminates the Condorcet loser when there is one. Of course it would
have prevented the Burlington failure.
Here in Oregon the fans of STAR voting are pushing the legislature for
their method, so in response I created the following comparison table
that compares IRV with STAR and RCIPE. It should clarify my perspective
regarding the ambiguous term "RCV."
https://www.rankedchoiceoregon.org/comparison_table_rco_star_irv.pdf
Feel free to share this document if you think that's appropriate.
You have my email address, so contact me as needed.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/12/2021 9:34 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> Hay, I know this is resurrecting a thread. But I am about to talk with the Vermont House Government Operations Committee about RCV and what happened in Burlington 12 years ago.
>
> I am sending the legislators my paper: https://drive.google.com/file/d/14assN41UL7Mib9PpwsjM63ZT17k9admC/view?usp=sharing
>
> and, just for shits and grins, this 2004 Scientific American article that is coauthored by a Nobel laureate, Eric Maskin, that plugs doing it the Condorcet way. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m6qn6Y7PAQldKNeIH2Tal6AizF7XY2U4/view?usp=sharing
>
> Are there any scholars here that would like to, via Zoom, help out and appear before a legislative committee in the state of Vermont and testify? Hopefully, you would be in favor or *some* Condorcet-compliant RCV but even if you're for Approval that would be okay.
>
> I could use some help to not appear that I am the only person in the world that thinks something was wrong in Burlington 2009 and that this something wrong can actually be fixed. I think that I have the facts and arguments straight, but I need more people.
>
> thanks for any help.
>
> robert
>
RB
robert bristow-johnson
Wed, Apr 14, 2021 7:52 PM
Thank you Rob and Richard.
I had a 10 minute interview with the Chair and Vice-Chair of the committee. The legislature is extremely busy with covid issues and the hot issue for this committee right now is about pensions for state employees. There are a couple of bills bringing RCV to state elections and those bills are on hold and not going anywhere at all, for the moment.
But the voters of the City of Burlington did pass the Charter Change returning RCV to Burlington after 11 years and uncorrected. Same old Hare RCV that FairVote sells everyone else. Because it's a Charter Change (which is like amending the city's constitution), this requires legislative process and approval. We had other charter changes (some involving restrictions on gun possession) that were passed by voters and never approved of by the state government, but most of the time the state government endorses charter changes that win in the city election.
When this Charter Change becomes a bill and is introduced to the legislature, it will be directed to the Government Operations Committee. That's when they will hear from me and that's when I could use some help in numbers. I think you guys know what the issue is, FairVote has mostly succeeded at disingenuously conflating the ranked-ballot with the Hare method. This is obvious when they ditched "IRV" after that label has lost cache and replaced it with the term "RCV" which sounds better and implies that only their method (Hare RCV) is the only way to deal with these ranked ballots. Most people and most legislators bought into that conflation and do not understand that there are other ways of looking at the ranked ballots and implementing democracy.
I am promised by the Chair and Vice-Chair that they will read my paper and that I will be invited to address the committee. My hope is that I will be able to present a short PowerPoint (essentially the same as here https://www.cctv.org/watch-tv/programs/burlington-ballot-item-forum-irv-discussion ) but I don't think that I will get that much time.
As soon as I find out more about when this Charter Change comes up, I will contact y'all and we can discuss what we can do. But feel free to contact me or even post here on the list what you might be thinking about this and how best to advocate.
I wouldn't mind getting help from across the pond from folks like Juho or Markus or anyone else that might support reforming Hare STV.
Thank you.
-- robert
On 04/13/2021 12:25 PM VoteFair electionmethods@votefair.org wrote:
Robert, if I'm available I could join you on the Zoom call.
I would be extremely nervous, and prefer having a prepared statement to
read and/or prepared talking points, yet lately I've been getting
experience answering election-method questions via video. In
particular, some weeks ago I got my feet wet by testifying in an Oregon
state Senate legislative committee meeting via video.
Although eventually I prefer the Condorcet-Kemeny method, currently I'm
advocating Ranked Choice Including Pairwise Elimination, aka "RCIPE"
pronounced "recipe." That's what we're specifying for the Ranked Choice
Oregon ballot initiative. Basically it inserts a "safety net" that
eliminates the Condorcet loser when there is one. Of course it would
have prevented the Burlington failure.
Here in Oregon the fans of STAR voting are pushing the legislature for
their method, so in response I created the following comparison table
that compares IRV with STAR and RCIPE. It should clarify my perspective
regarding the ambiguous term "RCV."
https://www.rankedchoiceoregon.org/comparison_table_rco_star_irv.pdf
Feel free to share this document if you think that's appropriate.
You have my email address, so contact me as needed.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/12/2021 9:34 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Hay, I know this is resurrecting a thread. But I am about to talk with the Vermont House Government Operations Committee about RCV and what happened in Burlington 12 years ago.
I am sending the legislators my paper: https://drive.google.com/file/d/14assN41UL7Mib9PpwsjM63ZT17k9admC/view?usp=sharing
and, just for shits and grins, this 2004 Scientific American article that is coauthored by a Nobel laureate, Eric Maskin, that plugs doing it the Condorcet way. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m6qn6Y7PAQldKNeIH2Tal6AizF7XY2U4/view?usp=sharing
Are there any scholars here that would like to, via Zoom, help out and appear before a legislative committee in the state of Vermont and testify? Hopefully, you would be in favor or some Condorcet-compliant RCV but even if you're for Approval that would be okay.
I could use some help to not appear that I am the only person in the world that thinks something was wrong in Burlington 2009 and that this something wrong can actually be fixed. I think that I have the facts and arguments straight, but I need more people.
thanks for any help.
robert
On 04/12/2021 1:28 PM Rob Lanphier roblan@gmail.com wrote:
Hi Robert,
I may be able to help, and I'm certainly willing to recruit others.
When is the next public hearing? What's the timeline that you're
working against?
Rob
On Mon, Apr 12, 2021 at 9:34 AM robert bristow-johnson
rbj@audioimagination.com wrote:
Hay, I know this is resurrecting a thread. But I am about to talk with the Vermont House Government Operations Committee about RCV and what happened in Burlington 12 years ago.
I am sending the legislators my paper: https://drive.google.com/file/d/14assN41UL7Mib9PpwsjM63ZT17k9admC/view?usp=sharing
and, just for shits and grins, this 2004 Scientific American article that is coauthored by a Nobel laureate, Eric Maskin, that plugs doing it the Condorcet way. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m6qn6Y7PAQldKNeIH2Tal6AizF7XY2U4/view?usp=sharing
Are there any scholars here that would like to, via Zoom, help out and appear before a legislative committee in the state of Vermont and testify? Hopefully, you would be in favor or some Condorcet-compliant RCV but even if you're for Approval that would be okay.
I could use some help to not appear that I am the only person in the world that thinks something was wrong in Burlington 2009 and that this something wrong can actually be fixed. I think that I have the facts and arguments straight, but I need more people.
thanks for any help.
robert
On May 29, 2020 3:46 PM Toby Pereira tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Thank you for this response, Forest. I was reminded of this subject again when I re-encountered Jameson Quinn's work on Voter Satisfaction Efficiency the other day. According to his simulations, to be found here https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSE/ ranked pairs performs quite a bit better than the Schulze method. This surprises me since I wouldn't expect much difference in practice (as I put in the original post of this discussion). I'm not sure if Jameson still reads the stuff on this mailing list, but it would be interesting to know what caused the difference.
On Wednesday, 4 March 2020, 17:45:08 GMT, Forest Simmons fsimmons@pcc.edu wrote:
If the Smith set is a cycle of three, then the methods you mention give the same result as long as the defeat strength is measured the same way. (You knew that)
Not all of these satisfy Independence from Pareto Dominated Alternatives. I doubt that would make a difference in any known public election from the past, but all else being equal, it is a difference that could make a difference.
Simplicity of explanation and implementation, along with heuristic appeal, and other selling points may be more important than any other distinction among the methods you mention.
For me the easiest to sell formulation of Schulze is in the form of "beat-path." But that is probably just the mathematician in me appreciating an elegant way of creating a transitive relation with minimal violence to the intransitive relation on which it is based.
For me, the easiest sell is what makes for simpler and easy-to-understand legal language, since cycles will be exceedingly rare and a cycle bigger than Rock-Paper-Scissors will almost certainly never happen. And RP and Schulze and River elect the same candidate for the Condorcet case and the 3-candidate Smith set.
Now that is different than the STV-BTR, which I am actively plugging for lawmakers here in Vermont. In the case of Rock-Paper-Scissors, STV-BTR will elect the candidate with the most votes in the semifinal round. But I am finding that the language for STV-BTR is far easier to sell than even RP.
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Thank you Rob and Richard.
I had a 10 minute interview with the Chair and Vice-Chair of the committee. The legislature is extremely busy with covid issues and the hot issue for this committee right now is about pensions for state employees. There are a couple of bills bringing RCV to state elections and those bills are on hold and not going anywhere at all, for the moment.
But the voters of the City of Burlington *did* pass the Charter Change returning RCV to Burlington after 11 years and uncorrected. Same old Hare RCV that FairVote sells everyone else. Because it's a Charter Change (which is like amending the city's constitution), this requires legislative process and approval. We had other charter changes (some involving restrictions on gun possession) that were passed by voters and never approved of by the state government, but most of the time the state government endorses charter changes that win in the city election.
When this Charter Change becomes a bill and is introduced to the legislature, it will be directed to the Government Operations Committee. That's when they will hear from me and that's when I could use some help in numbers. I think you guys know what the issue is, FairVote has mostly succeeded at disingenuously conflating the ranked-ballot with the Hare method. This is obvious when they ditched "IRV" after that label has lost cache and replaced it with the term "RCV" which sounds better and implies that **only** their method (Hare RCV) is the only way to deal with these ranked ballots. Most people and most legislators bought into that conflation and do not understand that there are other ways of looking at the ranked ballots and implementing democracy.
I am promised by the Chair and Vice-Chair that they will read my paper and that I will be invited to address the committee. My hope is that I will be able to present a short PowerPoint (essentially the same as here https://www.cctv.org/watch-tv/programs/burlington-ballot-item-forum-irv-discussion ) but I don't think that I will get that much time.
As soon as I find out more about when this Charter Change comes up, I will contact y'all and we can discuss what we can do. But feel free to contact me or even post here on the list what you might be thinking about this and how best to advocate.
I wouldn't mind getting help from across the pond from folks like Juho or Markus or anyone else that might support reforming Hare STV.
Thank you.
-- robert
> On 04/13/2021 12:25 PM VoteFair <electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
>
>
> Robert, if I'm available I could join you on the Zoom call.
>
> I would be extremely nervous, and prefer having a prepared statement to
> read and/or prepared talking points, yet lately I've been getting
> experience answering election-method questions via video. In
> particular, some weeks ago I got my feet wet by testifying in an Oregon
> state Senate legislative committee meeting via video.
>
> Although eventually I prefer the Condorcet-Kemeny method, currently I'm
> advocating Ranked Choice Including Pairwise Elimination, aka "RCIPE"
> pronounced "recipe." That's what we're specifying for the Ranked Choice
> Oregon ballot initiative. Basically it inserts a "safety net" that
> eliminates the Condorcet loser when there is one. Of course it would
> have prevented the Burlington failure.
>
> Here in Oregon the fans of STAR voting are pushing the legislature for
> their method, so in response I created the following comparison table
> that compares IRV with STAR and RCIPE. It should clarify my perspective
> regarding the ambiguous term "RCV."
>
> https://www.rankedchoiceoregon.org/comparison_table_rco_star_irv.pdf
>
> Feel free to share this document if you think that's appropriate.
>
> You have my email address, so contact me as needed.
>
> Richard Fobes
> The VoteFair guy
>
>
> On 4/12/2021 9:34 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> > Hay, I know this is resurrecting a thread. But I am about to talk with the Vermont House Government Operations Committee about RCV and what happened in Burlington 12 years ago.
> >
> > I am sending the legislators my paper: https://drive.google.com/file/d/14assN41UL7Mib9PpwsjM63ZT17k9admC/view?usp=sharing
> >
> > and, just for shits and grins, this 2004 Scientific American article that is coauthored by a Nobel laureate, Eric Maskin, that plugs doing it the Condorcet way. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m6qn6Y7PAQldKNeIH2Tal6AizF7XY2U4/view?usp=sharing
> >
> > Are there any scholars here that would like to, via Zoom, help out and appear before a legislative committee in the state of Vermont and testify? Hopefully, you would be in favor or *some* Condorcet-compliant RCV but even if you're for Approval that would be okay.
> >
> > I could use some help to not appear that I am the only person in the world that thinks something was wrong in Burlington 2009 and that this something wrong can actually be fixed. I think that I have the facts and arguments straight, but I need more people.
> >
> > thanks for any help.
> >
> > robert
> >
> On 04/12/2021 1:28 PM Rob Lanphier <roblan@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> Hi Robert,
>
> I may be able to help, and I'm certainly willing to recruit others.
> When is the next public hearing? What's the timeline that you're
> working against?
>
> Rob
>
> On Mon, Apr 12, 2021 at 9:34 AM robert bristow-johnson
> <rbj@audioimagination.com> wrote:
> >
> > Hay, I know this is resurrecting a thread. But I am about to talk with the Vermont House Government Operations Committee about RCV and what happened in Burlington 12 years ago.
> >
> > I am sending the legislators my paper: https://drive.google.com/file/d/14assN41UL7Mib9PpwsjM63ZT17k9admC/view?usp=sharing
> >
> > and, just for shits and grins, this 2004 Scientific American article that is coauthored by a Nobel laureate, Eric Maskin, that plugs doing it the Condorcet way. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m6qn6Y7PAQldKNeIH2Tal6AizF7XY2U4/view?usp=sharing
> >
> > Are there any scholars here that would like to, via Zoom, help out and appear before a legislative committee in the state of Vermont and testify? Hopefully, you would be in favor or *some* Condorcet-compliant RCV but even if you're for Approval that would be okay.
> >
> > I could use some help to not appear that I am the only person in the world that thinks something was wrong in Burlington 2009 and that this something wrong can actually be fixed. I think that I have the facts and arguments straight, but I need more people.
> >
> > thanks for any help.
> >
> > robert
> >
> > > On 05/29/2020 6:46 PM robert bristow-johnson <rbj@audioimagination.com> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > > On May 29, 2020 3:46 PM Toby Pereira <tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Thank you for this response, Forest. I was reminded of this subject again when I re-encountered Jameson Quinn's work on Voter Satisfaction Efficiency the other day. According to his simulations, to be found here https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSE/ ranked pairs performs quite a bit better than the Schulze method. This surprises me since I wouldn't expect much difference in practice (as I put in the original post of this discussion). I'm not sure if Jameson still reads the stuff on this mailing list, but it would be interesting to know what caused the difference.
> > > >
> > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Wednesday, 4 March 2020, 17:45:08 GMT, Forest Simmons <fsimmons@pcc.edu> wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > If the Smith set is a cycle of three, then the methods you mention give the same result as long as the defeat strength is measured the same way. (You knew that)
> > > >
> > > > Not all of these satisfy Independence from Pareto Dominated Alternatives. I doubt that would make a difference in any known public election from the past, but all else being equal, it is a difference that could make a difference.
> > > >
> > > > Simplicity of explanation and implementation, along with heuristic appeal, and other selling points may be more important than any other distinction among the methods you mention.
> > > >
> > > > For me the easiest to sell formulation of Schulze is in the form of "beat-path." But that is probably just the mathematician in me appreciating an elegant way of creating a transitive relation with minimal violence to the intransitive relation on which it is based.
> > > >
> > >
> > > For me, the easiest sell is what makes for simpler and easy-to-understand legal language, since cycles will be exceedingly rare and a cycle bigger than Rock-Paper-Scissors will almost certainly never happen. And RP and Schulze and River elect the same candidate for the Condorcet case and the 3-candidate Smith set.
> > >
> > > Now that is different than the STV-BTR, which I am actively plugging for lawmakers here in Vermont. In the case of Rock-Paper-Scissors, STV-BTR will elect the candidate with the most votes in the semifinal round. But I am finding that the language for STV-BTR is far easier to sell than even RP.
> > >
> > > --
> > >
> > > r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
> > >
> > > "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
> >
> > --
> >
> > r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
> >
> > "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
> > ----
> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
V
VoteFair
Thu, Apr 15, 2021 3:45 AM
I looked at your proposed wording change and I like the fact that it's a
simple way to improve IRV. (Anything helps.)
As I understand it, there's a pairwise comparison between the two
candidates who have the fewest transferred votes, and the loser in that
pair is eliminated.
Perhaps you should give it a name. Perhaps one that begins with the
words "Ranked Choice ...". But not Ranked Choice Including Pairwise
Elimination, aka RCIPE, because that's already in use.
Such a name makes it clearer that there is more than one kind of "ranked
choice voting."
IMO most Condorcet methods do not qualify as "ranked choice voting"
because that term seems to imply that candidates are eliminated one at a
time.
If the FairVote folks claim that the RCV name is for a specific
vote-counting method, you can point out that their intended definition
is "IRV + STV" which is not just one vote-counting method.
If you give the method a name, then I'd suggest that you add an article
to Electowiki under that name. That allows you to answer the question
"where is it described?" with a link to an at-least-somewhat
peer-reviewed "publication."
It's sad that the money behind the FairVote organization has enabled so
many people to be brainwashed into believing that Condorcet methods
cannot be trusted. Yet at least we can try to offer better methods that
eliminate candidates one at a time, and that can be manually counted for
demonstration purposes.
Sigh, one baby step at a time ....
Richard
On 4/14/2021 12:52 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Thank you Rob and Richard.
I had a 10 minute interview with the Chair and Vice-Chair of the committee. The legislature is extremely busy with covid issues and the hot issue for this committee right now is about pensions for state employees. There are a couple of bills bringing RCV to state elections and those bills are on hold and not going anywhere at all, for the moment.
But the voters of the City of Burlington did pass the Charter Change returning RCV to Burlington after 11 years and uncorrected. Same old Hare RCV that FairVote sells everyone else. Because it's a Charter Change (which is like amending the city's constitution), this requires legislative process and approval. We had other charter changes (some involving restrictions on gun possession) that were passed by voters and never approved of by the state government, but most of the time the state government endorses charter changes that win in the city election.
When this Charter Change becomes a bill and is introduced to the legislature, it will be directed to the Government Operations Committee. That's when they will hear from me and that's when I could use some help in numbers. I think you guys know what the issue is, FairVote has mostly succeeded at disingenuously conflating the ranked-ballot with the Hare method. This is obvious when they ditched "IRV" after that label has lost cache and replaced it with the term "RCV" which sounds better and implies that only their method (Hare RCV) is the only way to deal with these ranked ballots. Most people and most legislators bought into that conflation and do not understand that there are other ways of looking at the ranked ballots and implementing democracy.
I am promised by the Chair and Vice-Chair that they will read my paper and that I will be invited to address the committee. My hope is that I will be able to present a short PowerPoint (essentially the same as here https://www.cctv.org/watch-tv/programs/burlington-ballot-item-forum-irv-discussion ) but I don't think that I will get that much time.
As soon as I find out more about when this Charter Change comes up, I will contact y'all and we can discuss what we can do. But feel free to contact me or even post here on the list what you might be thinking about this and how best to advocate.
I wouldn't mind getting help from across the pond from folks like Juho or Markus or anyone else that might support reforming Hare STV.
Thank you.
-- robert
I looked at your proposed wording change and I like the fact that it's a
simple way to improve IRV. (Anything helps.)
As I understand it, there's a pairwise comparison between the two
candidates who have the fewest transferred votes, and the loser in that
pair is eliminated.
Perhaps you should give it a name. Perhaps one that begins with the
words "Ranked Choice ...". But not Ranked Choice Including Pairwise
Elimination, aka RCIPE, because that's already in use.
Such a name makes it clearer that there is more than one kind of "ranked
choice voting."
IMO most Condorcet methods do not qualify as "ranked choice voting"
because that term seems to imply that candidates are eliminated one at a
time.
If the FairVote folks claim that the RCV name is for a specific
vote-counting method, you can point out that their intended definition
is "IRV + STV" which is not just one vote-counting method.
If you give the method a name, then I'd suggest that you add an article
to Electowiki under that name. That allows you to answer the question
"where is it described?" with a link to an at-least-somewhat
peer-reviewed "publication."
It's sad that the money behind the FairVote organization has enabled so
many people to be brainwashed into believing that Condorcet methods
cannot be trusted. Yet at least we can try to offer better methods that
eliminate candidates one at a time, and that can be manually counted for
demonstration purposes.
Sigh, one baby step at a time ....
Richard
On 4/14/2021 12:52 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>
> Thank you Rob and Richard.
>
> I had a 10 minute interview with the Chair and Vice-Chair of the committee. The legislature is extremely busy with covid issues and the hot issue for this committee right now is about pensions for state employees. There are a couple of bills bringing RCV to state elections and those bills are on hold and not going anywhere at all, for the moment.
>
> But the voters of the City of Burlington *did* pass the Charter Change returning RCV to Burlington after 11 years and uncorrected. Same old Hare RCV that FairVote sells everyone else. Because it's a Charter Change (which is like amending the city's constitution), this requires legislative process and approval. We had other charter changes (some involving restrictions on gun possession) that were passed by voters and never approved of by the state government, but most of the time the state government endorses charter changes that win in the city election.
>
> When this Charter Change becomes a bill and is introduced to the legislature, it will be directed to the Government Operations Committee. That's when they will hear from me and that's when I could use some help in numbers. I think you guys know what the issue is, FairVote has mostly succeeded at disingenuously conflating the ranked-ballot with the Hare method. This is obvious when they ditched "IRV" after that label has lost cache and replaced it with the term "RCV" which sounds better and implies that **only** their method (Hare RCV) is the only way to deal with these ranked ballots. Most people and most legislators bought into that conflation and do not understand that there are other ways of looking at the ranked ballots and implementing democracy.
>
> I am promised by the Chair and Vice-Chair that they will read my paper and that I will be invited to address the committee. My hope is that I will be able to present a short PowerPoint (essentially the same as here https://www.cctv.org/watch-tv/programs/burlington-ballot-item-forum-irv-discussion ) but I don't think that I will get that much time.
>
> As soon as I find out more about when this Charter Change comes up, I will contact y'all and we can discuss what we can do. But feel free to contact me or even post here on the list what you might be thinking about this and how best to advocate.
>
> I wouldn't mind getting help from across the pond from folks like Juho or Markus or anyone else that might support reforming Hare STV.
>
> Thank you.
>
> -- robert
KM
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Thu, Apr 15, 2021 4:29 PM
On 15/04/2021 05.45, VoteFair wrote:
I looked at your proposed wording change and I like the fact that it's a
simple way to improve IRV. (Anything helps.)
As I understand it, there's a pairwise comparison between the two
candidates who have the fewest transferred votes, and the loser in that
pair is eliminated.
Perhaps you should give it a name. Perhaps one that begins with the
words "Ranked Choice ...". But not Ranked Choice Including Pairwise
Elimination, aka RCIPE, because that's already in use.
On 15/04/2021 05.45, VoteFair wrote:
> I looked at your proposed wording change and I like the fact that it's a
> simple way to improve IRV. (Anything helps.)
>
> As I understand it, there's a pairwise comparison between the two
> candidates who have the fewest transferred votes, and the loser in that
> pair is eliminated.
>
> Perhaps you should give it a name. Perhaps one that begins with the
> words "Ranked Choice ...". But not Ranked Choice Including Pairwise
> Elimination, aka RCIPE, because that's already in use.
It's called BTR-IRV in this post:
https://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/LKfc52OI/an-example-of-btr-stv#post4
(Electowiki also has a page on it:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Bottom-Two-Runoff_IRV)
That's Bottom Two Runoff (but also "better").
The term "ranked choice voting" is too ambiguous for me to tell whether
you could just move it right over and call the method BTR-RCV. To me,
"ranked choice" sounds like just another way of saying "ranked", but of
course, FairVote thinks differently.
-km
RB
robert bristow-johnson
Thu, Apr 15, 2021 5:56 PM
On 04/15/2021 12:29 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de wrote:
On 15/04/2021 05.45, VoteFair wrote:
I looked at your proposed wording change and I like the fact that it's a
simple way to improve IRV. (Anything helps.)
As I understand it, there's a pairwise comparison between the two
candidates who have the fewest transferred votes, and the loser in that
pair is eliminated.
Perhaps you should give it a name. Perhaps one that begins with the
words "Ranked Choice ...". But not Ranked Choice Including Pairwise
Elimination, aka RCIPE, because that's already in use.
actually at the top of the thread it was called "BTR-STV". I include a screenshot, but i dunno if the list will pass attachments. i considered BTR-RCV but i didn't like two "R"s. i sent Rob LeGrand an email longer ago and i don't think he objected.
because FairVote has ditched "IRV" (because it lost cache) and dishonestly replaced it with the more general term "RCV", I want to associate "IRV" with only the Hare (or Ware) method. Not with a reform that makes in Condorcet compliant.
I credit Hare more than Ware for this method that is in wide use today. Hare's innovation is the Single Transferrable Vote which gave this method some legal meat on the bones. Hare kept it generalized for multi-winner elections. Ware's only contribution was "Hay, let's use this Hare method for single-winner elections."
Because of FairVote's appropriation of "RCV" for the Hare method that they are selling, I want to always differentiate the Hare method from all the other RCV methods (Borda, Bucklin, and the several Condorcet methods).
I believe "Hare RCV" is the best label I can toss in to make sure people know what I am talking about in relation to the now common term "RCV".
My personal favorite Condorcet method is not BTR-STV because it is still sequential rounds and does not allow equal ranking of candidates. But as I said on this mailing list at least a couple times: Some Condorcet RCV is better than any non-Condorcet RCV. Especially since I am already arguing about a corner case (when Hare RCV did not elect the Condorcet winner). The difference between the Condorcet methods is the corner of the corner case. Already FairVote is arguing that what happened in Burlington is likely to never happen again and happened only once out of something like 300 RCV elections.
But (with apologies to Markus) what is important is to get a decent Condorcet method into some simple and completely self-contained legal language understandable in the common tongue. Somewhere on this list someone pointed out BTR-IRV to me (since I was not here in 2006, I only joined after the Burlington 2009 election and it was my current opponent, Terry Bouricius, that told me about this list in 2009). BTW, he called this my "personal pet project" when he was describing the Charter Change question on the CCTV. I can find a YouTube link if you're interested.
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
> On 04/15/2021 12:29 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote:
>
>
> On 15/04/2021 05.45, VoteFair wrote:
> > I looked at your proposed wording change and I like the fact that it's a
> > simple way to improve IRV. (Anything helps.)
> >
> > As I understand it, there's a pairwise comparison between the two
> > candidates who have the fewest transferred votes, and the loser in that
> > pair is eliminated.
> >
> > Perhaps you should give it a name. Perhaps one that begins with the
> > words "Ranked Choice ...". But not Ranked Choice Including Pairwise
> > Elimination, aka RCIPE, because that's already in use.
>
> It's called BTR-IRV in this post:
> https://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/LKfc52OI/an-example-of-btr-stv#post4
> (Electowiki also has a page on it:
> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Bottom-Two-Runoff_IRV)
>
> That's Bottom Two Runoff (but also "better").
>
> The term "ranked choice voting" is too ambiguous for me to tell whether
> you could just move it right over and call the method BTR-RCV. To me,
> "ranked choice" sounds like just another way of saying "ranked", but of
> course, FairVote thinks differently.
>
> -km
actually at the top of the thread it was called "BTR-STV". I include a screenshot, but i dunno if the list will pass attachments. i considered BTR-RCV but i didn't like two "R"s. i sent Rob LeGrand an email longer ago and i don't think he objected.
because FairVote has ditched "IRV" (because it lost cache) and dishonestly replaced it with the more general term "RCV", I want to associate "IRV" with **only** the Hare (or Ware) method. Not with a reform that makes in Condorcet compliant.
I credit Hare more than Ware for this method that is in wide use today. Hare's innovation is the Single Transferrable Vote which gave this method some legal meat on the bones. Hare kept it generalized for multi-winner elections. Ware's only contribution was "Hay, let's use this Hare method for single-winner elections."
Because of FairVote's appropriation of "RCV" for the Hare method that they are selling, I want to always differentiate the Hare method from all the other RCV methods (Borda, Bucklin, and the several Condorcet methods).
I believe "Hare RCV" is the best label I can toss in to make sure people know what I am talking about in relation to the now common term "RCV".
My personal favorite Condorcet method is not BTR-STV because it is still sequential rounds and does not allow equal ranking of candidates. But as I said on this mailing list at least a couple times: **Some** Condorcet RCV is better than any non-Condorcet RCV. Especially since I am already arguing about a corner case (when Hare RCV did not elect the Condorcet winner). The difference between the Condorcet methods is the *corner* of the corner case. Already FairVote is arguing that what happened in Burlington is likely to never happen again and happened only once out of something like 300 RCV elections.
But (with apologies to Markus) what is important is to get a decent Condorcet method into some simple and completely self-contained legal language understandable in the common tongue. Somewhere on this list someone pointed out BTR-IRV to me (since I was not here in 2006, I only joined after the Burlington 2009 election and it was my current opponent, Terry Bouricius, that told me about this list in 2009). BTW, he called this my "personal pet project" when he was describing the Charter Change question on the CCTV. I can find a YouTube link if you're interested.
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."