Condorcet meeting
I am strongly of the view that the best practical way to narrow down the
field of candidates in one big open primary
to N candidates should be to just use strict ranking ballots with voters
able to rank as many or as few candidates as they like,
and just select the IRV (aka STV) last N candidates.
I worry that if the use of approval ballots for this purpose is
promoted, the powers-that-be won't be interested in anything
more complicated than "just select the N most approved candidates" and
(if the election is for an important powerful office)
we will be left with N corporatist clones.
In say the US presidential election, there is (or can be) quite a bit of
time and campaigning between the primary election and
the main general election, so I don't think it matters much if
candidates without much "approval" in the primary make it on to
the ballot for the final general election.
Chris Benham
Forest Simmonsforest.simmons21 at gmail.com
mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Condorcet%20meeting&In-Reply-To=%3CCANUDvfr_qEUF%3DTUVz%3DNP-rt5OkgtkV7VCoOHHeZvmxCwW90vag%40mail.gmail.com%3E
/Sat Aug 26 15:03:20 PDT 2023/
I
The choice of n should be flexible enough that if two candidates both had
more than 70 percent approval, and nobody else got more than 49 percent,
then n should be only two.
Perhaps every finalist should have at least 71 percent (about root .5) of
the approval of the candidate with the most approval opposition to the max
approval candidate.
That 71 percent parameter is open to adjustment .
The idea is that we should admit into the final stage anybody with almost
as much approval as Chris Benham's max approval opposition challenger.
fws
For practical purposes, this appeals to me the most so far.
But the question remains about how to determine the number N.
Why not just use the number ranked (or approved, as the case may be) on the
average primary ballot?
On Sun, Aug 27, 2023, 12:42 PM C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
I am strongly of the view that the best practical way to narrow down the
field of candidates in one big open primary
to N candidates should be to just use strict ranking ballots with voters
able to rank as many or as few candidates as they like,
and just select the IRV (aka STV) last N candidatesI
I worry that if the use of approval ballots for this purpose is promoted,
the powers-that-be won't be interested in anything
more complicated than "just select the N most approved candidates" and
(if the election is for an important powerful office)
we will be left with N corporatist clones.
In say the US presidential election, there is (or can be) quite a bit of
time and campaigning between the primary election and
the main general election, so I don't think it matters much if candidates
without much "approval" in the primary make it on to
the ballot for the final general election.
Chris Benham
Forest Simmons forest.simmons21 at gmail.com
<election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Condorcet%20meeting&In-Reply-To=%3CCANUDvfr_qEUF%3DTUVz%3DNP-rt5OkgtkV7VCoOHHeZvmxCwW90vag%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
Sat Aug 26 15:03:20 PDT 2023
-
I
The choice of n should be flexible enough that if two candidates both had
more than 70 percent approval, and nobody else got more than 49 percent,
then n should be only two.
Perhaps every finalist should have at least 71 percent (about root .5) of
the approval of the candidate with the most approval opposition to the max
approval candidate.
That 71 percent parameter is open to adjustment .
The idea is that we should admit into the final stage anybody with almost
as much approval as Chris Benham's max approval opposition challenger.
fws
Well, that wouldn't work so well if everybody bullet voted.
On Mon, Aug 28, 2023, 10:24 AM Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com
wrote:
For practical purposes, this appeals to me the most so far.
But the question remains about how to determine the number N.
Why not just use the number ranked (or approved, as the case may be) on
the average primary ballot?
On Sun, Aug 27, 2023, 12:42 PM C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
I am strongly of the view that the best practical way to narrow down the
field of candidates in one big open primary
to N candidates should be to just use strict ranking ballots with voters
able to rank as many or as few candidates as they like,
and just select the IRV (aka STV) last N candidatesI
I worry that if the use of approval ballots for this purpose is promoted,
the powers-that-be won't be interested in anything
more complicated than "just select the N most approved candidates" and
(if the election is for an important powerful office)
we will be left with N corporatist clones.
In say the US presidential election, there is (or can be) quite a bit of
time and campaigning between the primary election and
the main general election, so I don't think it matters much if candidates
without much "approval" in the primary make it on to
the ballot for the final general election.
Chris Benham
Forest Simmons forest.simmons21 at gmail.com
<election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Condorcet%20meeting&In-Reply-To=%3CCANUDvfr_qEUF%3DTUVz%3DNP-rt5OkgtkV7VCoOHHeZvmxCwW90vag%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
Sat Aug 26 15:03:20 PDT 2023
-
I
The choice of n should be flexible enough that if two candidates both had
more than 70 percent approval, and nobody else got more than 49 percent,
then n should be only two.
Perhaps every finalist should have at least 71 percent (about root .5) of
the approval of the candidate with the most approval opposition to the max
approval candidate.
That 71 percent parameter is open to adjustment .
The idea is that we should admit into the final stage anybody with almost
as much approval as Chris Benham's max approval opposition challenger.
fws
Forest,
Why not? If that's what they want to do I can't see any problem.
Given that we have LNHarm no voter has any particular incentive to
bullet vote,
and only those voters who are confidant that their favourite can make
the IRV last
N (or only care about getting their favourite elected) will have
incentive to not bother
indicating any lower preferences.
Some of the voters will be concerned that their favourite won't squeeze
in to the
IRV last N, so they'll give one or two lower preferences so that their
single vote
can be transferred. This will likely include some who wouldn't bother
doing that if
they weren't honouring preference-swap deals.
Chris B.
On 29/08/2023 3:18 am, Forest Simmons wrote:
Well, that wouldn't work so well if everybody bullet voted.
On Mon, Aug 28, 2023, 10:24 AM Forest Simmons
forest.simmons21@gmail.com wrote:
For practical purposes, this appeals to me the most so far.
But the question remains about how to determine the number N.
Why not just use the number ranked (or approved, as the case may
be) on the average primary ballot?
On Sun, Aug 27, 2023, 12:42 PM C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
I am strongly of the view that the best practical way to
narrow down the field of candidates in one big open primary
to N candidates should be to just use strict ranking ballots
with voters able to rank as many or as few candidates as they
like,
and just select the IRV (aka STV) last N candidatesI
I worry that if the use of approval ballots for this purpose
is promoted, the powers-that-be won't be interested in anything
more complicated than "just select the N most approved
candidates" and (if the election is for an important
powerful office)
we will be left with N corporatist clones.
In say the US presidential election, there is (or can be)
quite a bit of time and campaigning between the primary
election and
the main general election, so I don't think it matters much if
candidates without much "approval" in the primary make it on to
the ballot for the final general election.
Chris Benham
*Forest Simmons*forest.simmons21 at gmail.com
<mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Condorcet%20meeting&In-Reply-To=%3CCANUDvfr_qEUF%3DTUVz%3DNP-rt5OkgtkV7VCoOHHeZvmxCwW90vag%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
/Sat Aug 26 15:03:20 PDT 2023/
*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
I
The choice of n should be flexible enough that if two candidates both had
more than 70 percent approval, and nobody else got more than 49 percent,
then n should be only two.
Perhaps every finalist should have at least 71 percent (about root .5) of
the approval of the candidate with the most approval opposition to the max
approval candidate.
That 71 percent parameter is open to adjustment .
The idea is that we should admit into the final stage anybody with almost
as much approval as Chris Benham's max approval opposition challenger.
fws
On 8/28/23 19:24, Forest Simmons wrote:
For practical purposes, this appeals to me the most so far.
But the question remains about how to determine the number N.
Why not just use the number ranked (or approved, as the case may be) on
the average primary ballot?
Here's a similar approach with an idea to preserve a kind of clone
independence:
Use STV, but don't eliminate candidates when they're elected, just
reweight the ballots according to surplus instead.
When a candidate is elected again, he only appears once in the final
outcome, but the number of candidates in the outcome is reduced by one
instead. In effect, the duplicate election leads to the election of a
"hole" that takes up a spot without assigning any candidate to that spot.
Say N = 5, so that the Droop quota is 1/6. Then a candidate with
above-majority support (say 1/2 + epsilon) gets three such quotas, and
is elected three times: once to get into the finalist set, and twice
more to reduce the number of other candidates from four to two.
The idea is that if the candidate were to be cloned, then these clones
would occupy three spots of the outcome, so the result is the same; just
in one case, there's only one winner from that bloc and two "holes",
while in the other case, there would be three winners from the bloc.
I would probably reserve one of the five spots for the primary CW,
though. Ideally it would use a proportional ordering or a pairwise STV
variant, but then we're moving into "deluxe, complex method" territory.
-km
Very ingenious and practical, since you are just repurposing standard, off
the shelf procedures.
On Mon, Aug 28, 2023, 12:37 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de
wrote:
On 8/28/23 19:24, Forest Simmons wrote:
For practical purposes, this appeals to me the most so far.
But the question remains about how to determine the number N.
Why not just use the number ranked (or approved, as the case may be) on
the average primary ballot?
Here's a similar approach with an idea to preserve a kind of clone
independence:
Use STV, but don't eliminate candidates when they're elected, just
reweight the ballots according to surplus instead.
When a candidate is elected again, he only appears once in the final
outcome, but the number of candidates in the outcome is reduced by one
instead. In effect, the duplicate election leads to the election of a
"hole" that takes up a spot without assigning any candidate to that spot.
Say N = 5, so that the Droop quota is 1/6. Then a candidate with
above-majority support (say 1/2 + epsilon) gets three such quotas, and
is elected three times: once to get into the finalist set, and twice
more to reduce the number of other candidates from four to two.
The idea is that if the candidate were to be cloned, then these clones
would occupy three spots of the outcome, so the result is the same; just
in one case, there's only one winner from that bloc and two "holes",
while in the other case, there would be three winners from the bloc.
I would probably reserve one of the five spots for the primary CW,
though. Ideally it would use a proportional ordering or a pairwise STV
variant, but then we're moving into "deluxe, complex method" territory.
-km
Thanks for those insights!
I hope that the Condorcet Club can see the value of IRV in this context.
On Mon, Aug 28, 2023, 12:09 PM C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
Forest,
Why not? If that's what they want to do I can't see any problem.
Given that we have LNHarm no voter has any particular incentive to bullet
vote,
and only those voters who are confidant that their favourite can make the
IRV last
N (or only care about getting their favourite elected) will have incentive
to not bother
indicating any lower preferences.
Some of the voters will be concerned that their favourite won't squeeze in
to the
IRV last N, so they'll give one or two lower preferences so that their
single vote
can be transferred. This will likely include some who wouldn't bother
doing that if
they weren't honouring preference-swap deals.
Chris B.
On 29/08/2023 3:18 am, Forest Simmons wrote:
Well, that wouldn't work so well if everybody bullet voted.
On Mon, Aug 28, 2023, 10:24 AM Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com
wrote:
For practical purposes, this appeals to me the most so far.
But the question remains about how to determine the number N.
Why not just use the number ranked (or approved, as the case may be) on
the average primary ballot?
On Sun, Aug 27, 2023, 12:42 PM C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
I am strongly of the view that the best practical way to narrow down the
field of candidates in one big open primary
to N candidates should be to just use strict ranking ballots with voters
able to rank as many or as few candidates as they like,
and just select the IRV (aka STV) last N candidatesI
I worry that if the use of approval ballots for this purpose is
promoted, the powers-that-be won't be interested in anything
more complicated than "just select the N most approved candidates" and
(if the election is for an important powerful office)
we will be left with N corporatist clones.
In say the US presidential election, there is (or can be) quite a bit of
time and campaigning between the primary election and
the main general election, so I don't think it matters much if
candidates without much "approval" in the primary make it on to
the ballot for the final general election.
Chris Benham
Forest Simmons forest.simmons21 at gmail.com
<election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Condorcet%20meeting&In-Reply-To=%3CCANUDvfr_qEUF%3DTUVz%3DNP-rt5OkgtkV7VCoOHHeZvmxCwW90vag%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
Sat Aug 26 15:03:20 PDT 2023
-
I
The choice of n should be flexible enough that if two candidates both had
more than 70 percent approval, and nobody else got more than 49 percent,
then n should be only two.
Perhaps every finalist should have at least 71 percent (about root .5) of
the approval of the candidate with the most approval opposition to the max
approval candidate.
That 71 percent parameter is open to adjustment .
The idea is that we should admit into the final stage anybody with almost
as much approval as Chris Benham's max approval opposition challenger.
fws
Asking what's wrong with bullet voting is equivalent to asking what's
wrong with FPTP. The answer is not that it subverts the system, but that
it withholds information the system would use to good effect. The whole
of ranked voting theory is based on exploiting the information which
bullet-voters withhold.
I think Chris's summary of how his system might work is fair.
Supporters of minor parties give their first preferences accordingly,
and compromise with a mainstream candidate for their second preferences.
Supporters of mainstream parties (the majority) bullet vote. They don't
consider the merits of little-known alternatives because it's too much
effort, and because minor parties get squeezed out by the election
method in any case. This is very much like PR based on plurality (with a
little compromising thrown in), and unlike PR by STV except insofar as
FPTP is its limiting case.
But if this summary is pessimistic, voters might indeed fill in
ranked preference ballots to a reasonable depth. In this case, it seems
to me that they're being put to unconscionable lengths for what is only
a primary, and they have no way of knowing where to stop.
Such criticisms are futile unless it's possible to do better; but I
had hoped that my own method was better, in that it achieved roughly the
benefits of voting to depth four at roughly the cost of voting to depth
one.
CJC
On 28/08/2023 21:09, C.Benham wrote:
Forest,
Why not? If that's what they want to do I can't see any problem.
Given that we have LNHarm no voter has any particular incentive to
bullet vote,
and only those voters who are confidant that their favourite can make
the IRV last
N (or only care about getting their favourite elected) will have
incentive to not bother
indicating any lower preferences.
Some of the voters will be concerned that their favourite won't
squeeze in to the
IRV last N, so they'll give one or two lower preferences so that their
single vote
can be transferred. This will likely include some who wouldn't bother
doing that if
they weren't honouring preference-swap deals.
Chris B.
On 29/08/2023 3:18 am, Forest Simmons wrote:
Well, that wouldn't work so well if everybody bullet voted.
On Mon, Aug 28, 2023, 10:24 AM Forest Simmons
forest.simmons21@gmail.com wrote:
For practical purposes, this appeals to me the most so far.
But the question remains about how to determine the number N.
Why not just use the number ranked (or approved, as the case may
be) on the average primary ballot?
On Sun, Aug 27, 2023, 12:42 PM C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
I am strongly of the view that the best practical way to
narrow down the field of candidates in one big open primary
to N candidates should be to just use strict ranking ballots
with voters able to rank as many or as few candidates as they
like,
and just select the IRV (aka STV) last N candidatesI
I worry that if the use of approval ballots for this purpose
is promoted, the powers-that-be won't be interested in anything
more complicated than "just select the N most approved
candidates" and (if the election is for an important
powerful office)
we will be left with N corporatist clones.
In say the US presidential election, there is (or can be)
quite a bit of time and campaigning between the primary
election and
the main general election, so I don't think it matters much
if candidates without much "approval" in the primary make it
on to
the ballot for the final general election.
Chris Benham
*Forest Simmons*forest.simmons21 at gmail.com
<mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Condorcet%20meeting&In-Reply-To=%3CCANUDvfr_qEUF%3DTUVz%3DNP-rt5OkgtkV7VCoOHHeZvmxCwW90vag%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
/Sat Aug 26 15:03:20 PDT 2023/
*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
I
The choice of n should be flexible enough that if two candidates both had
more than 70 percent approval, and nobody else got more than 49 percent,
then n should be only two.
Perhaps every finalist should have at least 71 percent (about root .5) of
the approval of the candidate with the most approval opposition to the max
approval candidate.
That 71 percent parameter is open to adjustment .
The idea is that we should admit into the final stage anybody with almost
as much approval as Chris Benham's max approval opposition challenger.
fws
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
On Tue, Aug 29, 2023, 11:32 AM Colin Champion <
colin.champion@routemaster.app> wrote:
Asking what's wrong with bullet voting is equivalent to asking what's
wrong with FPTP.
Not so. What's wrong with FPTP is that it ONLY allows bullet voting. Big
difference!
Allowing bullet voting is not the same as requiring it. Even IRV allows
bullet voting ... as it should. Nothing wrong with it. If lots of people
want to bullet vote, go ahead and try to persuade them otherwise ... if you
know somebody worthy of their vote ... but not to just vote for the sake of
voting ... vote for candidates that inspire you by their honesty and wisdom
... not by their refurbished recycled slogans or lame claims to lesser
evilism.
In Australia truncation is not permitted. Ask Chris Benham where that leads!
The answer is not that it subverts the system, but that it withholds
information the system would use to good effect. The whole of ranked voting
theory is based on exploiting the information which bullet-voters withhold.
I think Chris's summary of how his system might work is fair. Supporters
of minor parties give their first preferences accordingly, and compromise
with a mainstream candidate for their second preferences. Supporters of
mainstream parties (the majority) bullet vote. They don't consider the
merits of little-known alternatives because it's too much effort, and
because minor parties get squeezed out by the election method in any case.
This is very much like PR based on plurality (with a little compromising
thrown in), and unlike PR by STV except insofar as FPTP is its limiting
case.
But if this summary is pessimistic, voters might indeed fill in ranked
preference ballots to a reasonable depth. In this case, it seems to me that
they're being put to unconscionable lengths for what is only a primary, and
they have no way of knowing where to stop.
Such criticisms are futile unless it's possible to do better; but I had
hoped that my own method was better, in that it achieved roughly the
benefits of voting to depth four at roughly the cost of voting to depth
one.
CJC
On 28/08/2023 21:09, C.Benham wrote:
Forest,
Why not? If that's what they want to do I can't see any problem.
Given that we have LNHarm no voter has any particular incentive to bullet
vote,
and only those voters who are confidant that their favourite can make the
IRV last
N (or only care about getting their favourite elected) will have incentive
to not bother
indicating any lower preferences.
Some of the voters will be concerned that their favourite won't squeeze in
to the
IRV last N, so they'll give one or two lower preferences so that their
single vote
can be transferred. This will likely include some who wouldn't bother
doing that if
they weren't honouring preference-swap deals.
Chris B.
On 29/08/2023 3:18 am, Forest Simmons wrote:
Well, that wouldn't work so well if everybody bullet voted.
On Mon, Aug 28, 2023, 10:24 AM Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com
wrote:
For practical purposes, this appeals to me the most so far.
But the question remains about how to determine the number N.
Why not just use the number ranked (or approved, as the case may be) on
the average primary ballot?
On Sun, Aug 27, 2023, 12:42 PM C.Benham cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
I am strongly of the view that the best practical way to narrow down the
field of candidates in one big open primary
to N candidates should be to just use strict ranking ballots with voters
able to rank as many or as few candidates as they like,
and just select the IRV (aka STV) last N candidatesI
I worry that if the use of approval ballots for this purpose is
promoted, the powers-that-be won't be interested in anything
more complicated than "just select the N most approved candidates" and
(if the election is for an important powerful office)
we will be left with N corporatist clones.
In say the US presidential election, there is (or can be) quite a bit of
time and campaigning between the primary election and
the main general election, so I don't think it matters much if
candidates without much "approval" in the primary make it on to
the ballot for the final general election.
Chris Benham
Forest Simmons forest.simmons21 at gmail.com
<election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Condorcet%20meeting&In-Reply-To=%3CCANUDvfr_qEUF%3DTUVz%3DNP-rt5OkgtkV7VCoOHHeZvmxCwW90vag%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
Sat Aug 26 15:03:20 PDT 2023
-
I
The choice of n should be flexible enough that if two candidates both had
more than 70 percent approval, and nobody else got more than 49 percent,
then n should be only two.
Perhaps every finalist should have at least 71 percent (about root .5) of
the approval of the candidate with the most approval opposition to the max
approval candidate.
That 71 percent parameter is open to adjustment .
The idea is that we should admit into the final stage anybody with almost
as much approval as Chris Benham's max approval opposition challenger.
fws
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
An Australian recently said that only in the lower house elections using
Alternative Vote are all the candidates to be preferenced. But this does
mean that you may have to elect your direct opponent. I think it was Bob
Ritchie who (rightly) objected to this. An official government video
over-looked this travesty merely pointing to those poor bastards in the
UK and USA who only have an x marks the spot vote (a bullet vote).
Some electoral experts have not taken kindly to my pointing out that my
invention of Binomial STV prevents the Australian travesty of electoral
justice, because last preferences count against. as much as first
preferences count for, a candidate.
Regards,
Richard Lung.
On 30/08/2023 02:41, Forest Simmons wrote:
On Tue, Aug 29, 2023, 11:32 AM Colin Champion
colin.champion@routemaster.app wrote:
Asking what's wrong with bullet voting is equivalent to asking
what's wrong with FPTP.
Not so. What's wrong with FPTP is that it ONLY allows bullet voting.
Big difference!
Allowing bullet voting is not the same as requiring it. Even IRV
allows bullet voting ... as it should. Nothing wrong with it. If lots
of people want to bullet vote, go ahead and try to persuade them
otherwise ... if you know somebody worthy of their vote ... but not to
just vote for the sake of voting ... vote for candidates that inspire
you by their honesty and wisdom ... not by their refurbished recycled
slogans or lame claims to lesser evilism.
In Australia truncation is not permitted. Ask Chris Benham where that
leads!
The answer is not that it subverts the system, but that it
withholds information the system would use to good effect. The
whole of ranked voting theory is based on exploiting the
information which bullet-voters withhold.
I think Chris's summary of how his system might work is fair.
Supporters of minor parties give their first preferences
accordingly, and compromise with a mainstream candidate for their
second preferences. Supporters of mainstream parties (the
majority) bullet vote. They don't consider the merits of
little-known alternatives because it's too much effort, and
because minor parties get squeezed out by the election method in
any case. This is very much like PR based on plurality (with a
little compromising thrown in), and unlike PR by STV except
insofar as FPTP is its limiting case.
But if this summary is pessimistic, voters might indeed fill in
ranked preference ballots to a reasonable depth. In this case, it
seems to me that they're being put to unconscionable lengths for
what is only a primary, and they have no way of knowing where to stop.
Such criticisms are futile unless it's possible to do better;
but I had hoped that my own method was better, in that it achieved
roughly the benefits of voting to depth four at roughly the cost
of voting to depth one.
CJC
On 28/08/2023 21:09, C.Benham wrote:
Forest,
Why not? If that's what they want to do I can't see any problem.
Given that we have LNHarm no voter has any particular incentive
to bullet vote,
and only those voters who are confidant that their favourite can
make the IRV last
N (or only care about getting their favourite elected) will have
incentive to not bother
indicating any lower preferences.
Some of the voters will be concerned that their favourite won't
squeeze in to the
IRV last N, so they'll give one or two lower preferences so that
their single vote
can be transferred. This will likely include some who wouldn't
bother doing that if
they weren't honouring preference-swap deals.
Chris B.
On 29/08/2023 3:18 am, Forest Simmons wrote:
Well, that wouldn't work so well if everybody bullet voted.
On Mon, Aug 28, 2023, 10:24 AM Forest Simmons
<forest.simmons21@gmail.com> wrote:
For practical purposes, this appeals to me the most so far.
But the question remains about how to determine the number N.
Why not just use the number ranked (or approved, as the case
may be) on the average primary ballot?
On Sun, Aug 27, 2023, 12:42 PM C.Benham
<cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
I am strongly of the view that the best practical way to
narrow down the field of candidates in one big open primary
to N candidates should be to just use strict ranking
ballots with voters able to rank as many or as few
candidates as they like,
and just select the IRV (aka STV) last N candidatesI
I worry that if the use of approval ballots for this
purpose is promoted, the powers-that-be won't be
interested in anything
more complicated than "just select the N most approved
candidates" and (if the election is for an important
powerful office)
we will be left with N corporatist clones.
In say the US presidential election, there is (or can
be) quite a bit of time and campaigning between the
primary election and
the main general election, so I don't think it matters
much if candidates without much "approval" in the
primary make it on to
the ballot for the final general election.
Chris Benham
*Forest Simmons*forest.simmons21 at gmail.com
<mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Condorcet%20meeting&In-Reply-To=%3CCANUDvfr_qEUF%3DTUVz%3DNP-rt5OkgtkV7VCoOHHeZvmxCwW90vag%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
/Sat Aug 26 15:03:20 PDT 2023/
*
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I
The choice of n should be flexible enough that if two candidates both had
more than 70 percent approval, and nobody else got more than 49 percent,
then n should be only two.
Perhaps every finalist should have at least 71 percent (about root .5) of
the approval of the candidate with the most approval opposition to the max
approval candidate.
That 71 percent parameter is open to adjustment .
The idea is that we should admit into the final stage anybody with almost
as much approval as Chris Benham's max approval opposition challenger.
fws
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