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Papers at the 80th MPSA conference

stephane.rouillon stephane.rouillon

Tue, Sep 5, 2023 4:35 PM

Hello,

It has been a while but I still work on electoral systems.

Here are the links toward two papers I presented:
« How to reconcile stability and representation: a weighted crutch option. »

80th Annual MPSA Conference 2023
tinyurl.com

and « Why break Condorcet cycles when we can make them disappear? »
https://tinyurl.com/2zuuo2r3

Have a nice day.

Stéphane Rouillon, ing. M.Sc.A. Ph.D.
Ancien membre d’un comité expert dont les travaux ont mené à la publication d’une étude du DGEQ en 2007 sur les modalités d’un mode de scrutin mixte compensatoire.

Hello, It has been a while but I still work on electoral systems. Here are the links toward two papers I presented: « How to reconcile stability and representation: a weighted crutch option. » 80th Annual MPSA Conference 2023 tinyurl.com and « Why break Condorcet cycles when we can make them disappear? » https://tinyurl.com/2zuuo2r3 Have a nice day. ----------------------------------------------- Stéphane Rouillon, ing. M.Sc.A. Ph.D. Ancien membre d’un comité expert dont les travaux ont mené à la publication d’une étude du DGEQ en 2007 sur les modalités d’un mode de scrutin mixte compensatoire.

Kristofer Munsterhjelm

Wed, Sep 6, 2023 4:40 PM

On 2023-09-05 18:35, stephane.rouillon wrote:

Hello,

It has been a while but I still work on electoral systems.
Here are the links toward two papers I presented:
« How to reconcile stability and representation: a weighted crutch option. »
80th Annual MPSA Conference 2023 https://tinyurl.com/2p5yo7pf
tinyurl.com https://tinyurl.com/2p5yo7pf

https://tinyurl.com/2p5yo7pf

and « Why break Condorcet cycles when we can make them disappear? »

https://tinyurl.com/2zuuo2r3 https://tinyurl.com/2zuuo2r3

I couldn't find any links to the papers themselves, so I did a little
bit of digging. In case it may be of interest to others, here they are:

"How to reconcile stability and representation":
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370161535_HOW_TO_RECONCILE_STABILITY_AND_REPRESENTATION_A_WEIGHTED_CRUTCH_OPTION

"Why break Condorcet cycles when we can make them disappear?":
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Stephane-Rouillon/publication/370167659_WHY_BREAK_CONDORCET_CYCLES_WHEN_WE_CAN_MAKE_THEM_DISAPPEAR/links/6442fff5d749e4340e2b059b/WHY-BREAK-CONDORCET-CYCLES-WHEN-WE-CAN-MAKE-THEM-DISAPPEAR.pdf

On a related note, usually there seems to be little reason to do ranked
voting with party list PR, because there are so many seats that the
first preference proportions are accurately represented. But it could
be used to give centrists (additional) kingmaker power, e.g.:

34: A>C>B>D
31: B>C>D>A
30: D>C>B>A
5: C>A>B>D

If we want to give one of these parties more seats than their exact
share, it seems more reasonable for that party to be C, not the largest
first preference vote-getter A. But not here:

34: A>B>D>C
31: B>D>A>C
30: D>B>A>C
5: C>A>B>D

even though the first preference distribution is identical.

-km

On 2023-09-05 18:35, stephane.rouillon wrote: > > > Hello, > > It has been a while but I still work on electoral systems. > Here are the links toward two papers I presented: > « How to reconcile stability and representation: a weighted crutch option. » > 80th Annual MPSA Conference 2023 <https://tinyurl.com/2p5yo7pf> > tinyurl.com <https://tinyurl.com/2p5yo7pf> > > > <https://tinyurl.com/2p5yo7pf> > > > <https://tinyurl.com/2p5yo7pf> > > and « Why break Condorcet cycles when we can make them disappear? » > > *https://tinyurl.com/2zuuo2r3* <https://tinyurl.com/2zuuo2r3> I couldn't find any links to the papers themselves, so I did a little bit of digging. In case it may be of interest to others, here they are: "How to reconcile stability and representation": https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370161535_HOW_TO_RECONCILE_STABILITY_AND_REPRESENTATION_A_WEIGHTED_CRUTCH_OPTION "Why break Condorcet cycles when we can make them disappear?": https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Stephane-Rouillon/publication/370167659_WHY_BREAK_CONDORCET_CYCLES_WHEN_WE_CAN_MAKE_THEM_DISAPPEAR/links/6442fff5d749e4340e2b059b/WHY-BREAK-CONDORCET-CYCLES-WHEN-WE-CAN-MAKE-THEM-DISAPPEAR.pdf On a related note, usually there seems to be little reason to do ranked voting with party list PR, because there are so many seats that the first preference proportions are accurately represented. But it *could* be used to give centrists (additional) kingmaker power, e.g.: 34: A>C>B>D 31: B>C>D>A 30: D>C>B>A 5: C>A>B>D If we want to give one of these parties more seats than their exact share, it seems more reasonable for that party to be C, not the largest first preference vote-getter A. But not here: 34: A>B>D>C 31: B>D>A>C 30: D>B>A>C 5: C>A>B>D even though the first preference distribution is identical. -km