There are reasons why the CW is the most likely candidate to have the highest Topcounts: … 1. The highest candidate in a ranking is ranked over more candidates. … 2. In an unskewed normal-distribution, max coincides with median. Yes, median-crowding can spoil that, but our elections don’t have median-crowding, because the crowding is at the phony center between Dem & Repub. …though Bernie is probably an instance of Republocrat strategic median-crowding. … 3. Polls confirm it. … That’s why I propose Fav-Defeater as now my favorite autodeterrent method: … Elect the highest Topcount (or Midcount) candidate who pairbeats the highest Topcount candidate. … Offensive strategy can’t affect anyone’s Topcount. … Anyway, Chris’ example: … 46: A (the CW) … 44: B>C (burying A) … 10: C (the Bus) … …is quite extreme, with the CW nearly being a majority-CW. I wanted something more typical. … So I suggest the following example as typical. … CW is the Topcount-winner, because, as I mentioned, the CW is the most likely Topcount-winner. … The BF faction is larger than the Bus faction, because I didn’t want to favor Bus. … Given those requirements, I wanted the factions as nearly equal in size as possible, because, that seems the center about which they’ll vary. … Here’s my example: … 35: CW>BF … 33: BF>Bus … 32: Bus>CW … With only one exception, all of the intended autodeterrent methods that I’ve proposed here, including CTE(Coombs(whole)), elect BF. i.e. they fail autodeterrence in this very typical example. … Failing in that example seems to definitely say something evaluation-meaningful. … But Fav-Defeater elects Bus, & thus succeeds in this example…directly from its definition…which was the intent of that definition. /… A few methods’ choices in that example: … DAC & DSC: CW … Margins-Sorted Topcount: CW … Fav-Defeater: Bus … MinMax(wv), Schulze, & MAM (RP(wv)): Bus ---- Fav-Defeater, MinMax(wv), Schulze, MAM also elect Bus in Chris’ example. … So far then, considering the typicalness of my example, & how different Chris’ example is, Fav-Defeater, MinMax(wv), Schulze & MAM seem the best & most versatile ranked-methods.. ----- I don’t understand the motivation & justification of the double-sorting methods such as Margins-Sorted Topcount. Neither would the would the public, & it’s something essential for public-acceptance. ----- If we dare to be optimistic, we can hope that the public will use the good ranking methods well, & in that case the best Condorcet methods, & even Hare, would be fine. But the voting behavior demonstrated by the many, many people completely wedded to the protection of their precious lesser-evil isn’t encouraging at all. … I used to say that we need Condorcet, to reassure the lesser-evil voters. But it likely won’t reassure them enough. I told why, even with the best Condorcet methods, I’d rank the Acceptables in order of winnability instead of merit, because I regard candidate-merit as dichotomous. …Then why wouldn’t our lesser-evil progressives, for the same reason, do the same, & rank the Democrats over the progressives, topvoting the Dems with the most media-promotion. … So I don’t have confidence in the lesser-evil progressives with a ranked-method. … The pure Cardinal methods, Approval & Score, are the most foolproof methods. They never give any possible incentive to not topvote Favorite. …or any incentive to vote anyone over Favorite. … They’re the public political voting-systems that I want for our timid lesser-evil electorate. … The ranked-methods are a morass.