Best Ever Single Winner Method?
This is a three slot method: voters can mark candidates "preferred,"
"acceptable," or blank (no mark).
There is a simple, low cost, (but not instant) runoff between the the
candidate with the greatest number of preferred ratings and the candidate
with the greatest approval (preferred plus acceptable ratings).
The runoff is by candidate proxy, i.e. by asset voting. A candidate's
asset total is the number of ballots (or fractions thereof) on which she is
marked "preferred."
So if you mark three candidates as preferred, each one of them gets a third
of an asset from your ballot.
In general three slot methods get off to a great start, but get bogged down
in deciding what to do when it is not clear whether the approval winner or
the plurality winner should be the method winner.
And every time we propose asset voting we get bogged down in rules to
constrain the candidates to some reasonable way of using their assets to
settle on a winner.
This hybrid method avoids both problems in one fell swoop!
Hybrid method, using runoffs. I'm not sure the complication is
necessary, over simple Asset, and "reasonable" is for the voters to
judge, in any Asset method.
But this is a good method.
The best voting systems are not deterministic.
Runoff voting is the widest- used "advanced method." In fact, it's very
old, standard democratic process simply keeps voting until someone gets
a majority. No eliminations. IRV went around killing a method superior
to IRV (because of what actually happens in runoffs, and especially if
write-ins are allowed in a runoff. Simple top two runoff without
write-ins is guaranteed to find a simple and meaningless majority.
People are suckers for words with the core meaning gutted.
The runoff can be avoided if preferred and acceptable coincide, and
acceptable is a majority. But runoffs, especially with write-is allowed,
validate that a majority acceptance is informed, not merely an artifact
of appearances in the primary.
I still prefer to handle single-winner elections with an Asset Assembly,
majority of "effective proxies" required for completion. The entire
electorate is represented in the Electoral College and could negotiate a
winner. (The Asset Assembly is a standard assembly, each seat elected by
a quota of transferred or direct votes. I expect that in mature Asset,
almost all effective votes will be indirect, transferred, from people
the voters actually know and can communicate with. This is a solution to
the problem of scale in democracy.)
On 5/15/2019 4:21 PM, Forest Simmons wrote:
This is a three slot method: voters can mark candidates "preferred,"
"acceptable," or blank (no mark).
There is a simple, low cost, (but not instant) runoff between the the
candidate with the greatest number of preferred ratings and the
candidate with the greatest approval (preferred plus acceptable ratings).
The runoff is by candidate proxy, i.e. by asset voting. A candidate's
asset total is the number of ballots (or fractions thereof) on which
she is marked "preferred."
So if you mark three candidates as preferred, each one of them gets a
third of an asset from your ballot.
In general three slot methods get off to a great start, but get bogged
down in deciding what to do when it is not clear whether the approval
winner or the plurality winner should be the method winner.
And every time we propose asset voting we get bogged down in rules to
constrain the candidates to some reasonable way of using their assets
to settle on a winner.
This hybrid method avoids both problems in one fell swoop!
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
Forest,
Why, in this 3-slot method, do you want the winner to be either the Top
Ratings winner or the Approval winner?
What is wrong with the Condorcet winner?
Given that you have chosen that the winner be one of two candidates,
how do you justify not simply picking
the one that pairwise beats the other?
I am allergic to needlessly giving losing candidates any more power to
influence the result than any other voter.
In my book all acceptable 3-slot methods should meet either FBC or
(3-slot) Condorcet. (We know that meeting both
isn't possible). Your suggested method meets neither.
49: A
48: B
03: C>B
In this example A is the Top-Ratings winner and B is the Approval winner.
In your "asset voting" runoff A and B both vote for themselves, but say
C is a supporter of plurality voting and so thinks that
A is the legitimate winner and besides, A has promised him a really good
job if he wins office (which A "might"not have
done if C hadn't been a candidate in this election) and so C votes for A
and A wins.
B is of course the Condorcet winner and in this example all acceptable
methods will elect B. (Otherwise what was the point
of replacing plurality voting?).
Acceptable 3-slot methods? For FBC compliance I like IBIFA:
*If any candidate X is rated Top on more ballots than any non-X
candidate is approved on ballots that don't top-rate X, then
the X with the highest Top-ratings score wins.
Otherwise the most approved candidate wins.*
Also good for FBC compliance is "Improved Condorcet", Top-Ratings (aka ICT).
For compliance with 3-slot Condorcet I suggest Smith//Approval or
Smith//Top or (at a pinch, for greater simplicity)
Condorcet//Approval.
Chris Benham
On 16/05/2019 5:51 am, Forest Simmons wrote:
This is a three slot method: voters can mark candidates "preferred,"
"acceptable," or blank (no mark).
There is a simple, low cost, (but not instant) runoff between the the
candidate with the greatest number of preferred ratings and the
candidate with the greatest approval (preferred plus acceptable ratings).
The runoff is by candidate proxy, i.e. by asset voting. A candidate's
asset total is the number of ballots (or fractions thereof) on which
she is marked "preferred."
So if you mark three candidates as preferred, each one of them gets a
third of an asset from your ballot.
In general three slot methods get off to a great start, but get bogged
down in deciding what to do when it is not clear whether the approval
winner or the plurality winner should be the method winner.
And every time we propose asset voting we get bogged down in rules to
constrain the candidates to some reasonable way of using their assets
to settle on a winner.
This hybrid method avoids both problems in one fell swoop!
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
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I like it. It does seem to play the weaknesses of three-slot and asset
against each other. I'll have to keep this one in mind.
~ Andy
On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 1:21 PM Forest Simmons fsimmons@pcc.edu wrote:
This is a three slot method: voters can mark candidates "preferred,"
"acceptable," or blank (no mark).
There is a simple, low cost, (but not instant) runoff between the the
candidate with the greatest number of preferred ratings and the candidate
with the greatest approval (preferred plus acceptable ratings).
The runoff is by candidate proxy, i.e. by asset voting. A candidate's
asset total is the number of ballots (or fractions thereof) on which she is
marked "preferred."
So if you mark three candidates as preferred, each one of them gets a
third of an asset from your ballot.
In general three slot methods get off to a great start, but get bogged
down in deciding what to do when it is not clear whether the approval
winner or the plurality winner should be the method winner.
And every time we propose asset voting we get bogged down in rules to
constrain the candidates to some reasonable way of using their assets to
settle on a winner.
This hybrid method avoids both problems in one fell swoop!
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info