This is to acknowledge the nominations of Smith//Default-Approval,
Smith//Explicit-Approval, Margins-Sorted Approval, & Smith//DAC.

I’d say include STAR, because that’s what its advocates would want.
 …or would they? Its enactment is going to be voted-on in Eugene next
month, & what if it finishes low here? That would be worse for the
Eugene initiative than not including it.

Of course showing voters about methods’ popularity here is my
stated-purpose for the poll, & the fact that it’s about to be voted on
for enactment would seem to suggest including it.

But the advocates of STAR have been working hard, completely in good
faith, & STAR is a lot better than IRV. Those are two good reasons to
let EqualVote decide on STAR’s inclusion in the poll.

I’ll ask the EqualVote group, & go by what they say.

(In fact STAR, while more complicated than Approval, has nothing like
the amount of count-complexity of Condorcet, or the consequent amount
of count-insecurity & count-fraud vulnerability. I personally don’t
propose STAR, because I regard it as an inbetween compromise between
Approval & the ranked-methods, & I want the absolutely minimal. (I
only propose Condorcet to jurisdictions where people insist on
rankings.) …but, by my simplicity-standard, STAR scores high, even
though I don’t propose it.)

So the nominations list so-far is now (listed in order of nomination):

Approval
RP(wv)
Schulze
IRV
Plurality
MinMax(wv)
Black
Baldwin
Benham
Woodall
Schwartz-Woodall
Smith//Approval (of all ranked)
Smith//Approval (of what is specified)
Margin-Sorted Approval
Smith//DAC

On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 04:03 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:

 I would like to nominate several methods.

 Smith//Approval (Ranking):

 Voters rank from the top only those candidates they "approve",
 equal-ranking allowed,
 the most approved member of the voted Smith set wins.

 Smith//Approval (specified cutoff):

 Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish and can
 also specify an approval
 cutoff/threshold. Default approval is only for candidates ranked
 below no others (i.e. ranked top
 or equal-top).
 The most approved member of the Smith set wins.

 Margins Sorted Approval (specified cutoff):

 Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish and can
 also specify an approval
 cutoff/threshold. Default approval is only for candidates ranked
 below no others (i.e. ranked top
 or equal-top).

 A Forrest Simmons invention. Candidates are listed in approval
 score order and if any adjacent pairs
 are pairwise out of order then this is corrected by flipping the
 out-of-order pair with the smallest
 margin. If there is a tie for this we flip the less approved pair.
 Repeat until there are no adjacent pairs
 of candidates that are pairwise out of order, then elect the
 highest-ordered candidate.

 Smith//:DAC

 Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish,
 equal-ranking allowed.
 Eliminate candidates not in the Smith set and then apply
 Woodall's Descending Acquiescing Coalitions method.

 There is a method I hate that is apparently contending in the real
 world: "STAR". Given the stated purpose of
 this poll, is there a case for including it?

 Chris Benham

This is to acknowledge the nominations of Smith//Default-Approval,
Smith//Explicit-Approval, Margins-Sorted Approval, & Smith//DAC.

I’d say include STAR, because that’s what its advocates would want.  …or
would they? Its enactment is going to be voted-on in Eugene next month, &
what if it finishes low here? That would be worse for the Eugene initiative
than not including it.

Of course showing voters about methods’ popularity here is my
stated-purpose for the poll, & the fact that it’s about to be voted on for
enactment would seem to suggest including it.

But the advocates of STAR have been working hard, completely in good
faith, & STAR is a lot better than IRV. Those are two good reasons to let
EqualVote decide on STAR’s inclusion in the poll.

I’ll ask the EqualVote group, & go by what they say.

(In fact STAR, while more complicated than Approval, has nothing like the
amount of count-complexity of Condorcet, or the consequent amount of
count-insecurity & count-fraud vulnerability. I personally don’t propose
STAR, because I regard it as an inbetween compromise between Approval & the
ranked-methods, & I want the absolutely minimal. (I only propose Condorcet
to jurisdictions where people insist on rankings.) …but, by my
simplicity-standard, STAR scores high, even though I don’t propose it.)

So the nominations list so-far is now (listed in order of nomination):

Approval
RP(wv)
Schulze
IRV
Plurality
MinMax(wv)
Black
Baldwin
Benham
Woodall
Schwartz-Woodall
Smith//Approval (of all ranked)
Smith//Approval (of what is specified)
Margin-Sorted Approval
Smith//DAC

On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 04:03 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:

Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info

And surely anyone here on this list can nominate any method they choose
(and have it accepted/acknowledged) regardless of whether or not the
method's supporters want it nominated.

Chris Benham

On 6/04/2024 10:46 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

This is to acknowledge the nominations of Smith//Default-Approval,
Smith//Explicit-Approval, Margins-Sorted Approval, & Smith//DAC.

I’d say include STAR, because that’s what its advocates would want.  …or
would they? Its enactment is going to be voted-on in Eugene next month, &
what if it finishes low here? That would be worse for the Eugene initiative
than not including it.

Of course showing voters about methods’ popularity here is my
stated-purpose for the poll, & the fact that it’s about to be voted on for
enactment would seem to suggest including it.

But the advocates of STAR have been working hard, completely in good
faith, & STAR is a lot better than IRV. Those are two good reasons to let
EqualVote decide on STAR’s inclusion in the poll.

I’ll ask the EqualVote group, & go by what they say.

(In fact STAR, while more complicated than Approval, has nothing like the
amount of count-complexity of Condorcet, or the consequent amount of
count-insecurity & count-fraud vulnerability. I personally don’t propose
STAR, because I regard it as an inbetween compromise between Approval & the
ranked-methods, & I want the absolutely minimal. (I only propose Condorcet
to jurisdictions where people insist on rankings.) …but, by my
simplicity-standard, STAR scores high, even though I don’t propose it.)

So the nominations list so-far is now (listed in order of nomination):

Approval
RP(wv)
Schulze
IRV
Plurality
MinMax(wv)
Black
Baldwin
Benham
Woodall
Schwartz-Woodall
Smith//Approval (of all ranked)
Smith//Approval (of what is specified)
Margin-Sorted Approval
Smith//DAC

On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 04:03 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:

On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 06:43 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:

As you know, I’ve been a lot more favorable to Hare than most. But:

1. I’ve realized that the choices, sometimes strategic, that Approval puts
   on the voter are a lot better than the count-complexity &
   computation-intensiveness—& consequent count-insecurity & count-fraud
   vulnerability of the ranked methods such as Condorcet & Hare.

That count-fraud problem is the worst, but, overall, Approval is much
easier to introduce, describe, explain, propose—& much easier & inexpensive
to implement (can be implemented at zero cost, without even
software-modification), administer & audit against error &
count-fraud…compared to any other multicandidate-suitable method.
…especially the ranked-methods.

I’d much rather trust voters to use Approval well than trust that the
count/m-staff won’t be bribed to do fraud.

Approval is the absolutely minimal method that allows & counts
multicandidate comparison…& therefore the unique completely unarbitrary
method.

Score & STAR? They have a strategy-problem that Approval doesn’t have,
when some people vote sincerely (merit-proportionate) & others vote
strategically (all-or-nothing).

But I nonetheless would rather have that than the problems of the
rank-methods.

Likewise, Score & STAR are less simple than the absolutely minimal
Approval, & so I much prefer Approval.  …but Score & STAR don’t even come
close to the computational complexity of Condorcet & Hare.

I prefer Score(0-5) to STAR because of the strategy-complications &
problems of the runoff, & the resulting FBC failure that you pointed out.
But, for public political elections, STAR still beats Condorcet & Hare, due
to their count-complexity.

2. Hare, while sharing the count-complexity of Condorcet (& additionally
   requiring either one big central count, or lots of back-&-forth information
   transfer between precincts & Central) doesn’t share Condorcet’s
   strategy-freeness…requiring a favorite-burying top-end defensive-strategy
   to protect acceptables from unacceptables.  …with the risk that timid
   lesser-evil voters will do the same to protect their lesser evil.

Sure, Hare elects the favorite of the largest faction of the
mutual-majority when there is one,  but the support isn’t always mutual.

You can hope that, with Compromise as your 2nd-choice, if Favorite
eliminates Compromise, Compromise’s voters will transfer to Favorite
because they’re both progressives.  But, for one thing, if Compromise’s
voters transfer the other way, an unacceptable could be elected. That’s too
big a chance to take when there are completely unacceptable candidates.

For another thing, if they transfer to a perceived progressive, it might
not be Favorite, & might not even be very (or at-all) progressive.

I used to think that Hare was alright for polls, but Hare can have its
problem & do a funny trick, do a Silly, even in a poll. It demonstrated
that in a Free-&-Equal poll.

But I like Hare for choosing a pizza 🍕 topping or a 🍿 etc.

Easy handcount too.

I prefer Condorcet, especially RP(wv), for polls, & to propose to
jurisdictions where people insist on rankings. But not for public political
elections, for the abovestated reasons.

I'd like to nominate

Margin Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal rated whole).

On Sat, Apr 6, 2024, 12:27 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:

I also nominated STAR earlier but I think I'm blocked by Michael. Someone
might want to convey the point below to him as well (about overestimating
the influence of this poll). I also previously nominated Smith//Score
(elect the score winner of the Smith set), so if someone is able to get
that added, I would be grateful.

Toby

On Saturday, 6 April 2024 at 16:44:00 BST, Michael Garman <
michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote:

initiative than not including it.

I thought this poll was meant to be an objective search for the truth, not
a cudgel to advance an agenda. I also think you’re vastly overestimating
the influence this little poll is going to have.

In any case, I’m nominating STAR. Someone please relay the message to
Ossipoff as I believe he’s blocked me.

Michael J. Garman | he/him

Digital & Campus Organizer | Rank the Vote

Book a meeting with me! https://calendly.com/michael-j-garman

(401) 644-4108 | michael.garman@rankthevote.us

On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 2:16 PM Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:

This is to acknowledge the nominations of Smith//Default-Approval,
Smith//Explicit-Approval, Margins-Sorted Approval, & Smith//DAC.

I’d say include STAR, because that’s what its advocates would want.  …or
would they? Its enactment is going to be voted-on in Eugene next month, &
what if it finishes low here? That would be worse for the Eugene initiative
than not including it.

Of course showing voters about methods’ popularity here is my
stated-purpose for the poll, & the fact that it’s about to be voted on for
enactment would seem to suggest including it.

But the advocates of STAR have been working hard, completely in good
faith, & STAR is a lot better than IRV. Those are two good reasons to let
EqualVote decide on STAR’s inclusion in the poll.

I’ll ask the EqualVote group, & go by what they say.

(In fact STAR, while more complicated than Approval, has nothing like the
amount of count-complexity of Condorcet, or the consequent amount of
count-insecurity & count-fraud vulnerability. I personally don’t propose
STAR, because I regard it as an inbetween compromise between Approval & the
ranked-methods, & I want the absolutely minimal. (I only propose Condorcet
to jurisdictions where people insist on rankings.) …but, by my
simplicity-standard, STAR scores high, even though I don’t propose it.)

So the nominations list so-far is now (listed in order of nomination):

Approval
RP(wv)
Schulze
IRV
Plurality
MinMax(wv)
Black
Baldwin
Benham
Woodall
Schwartz-Woodall
Smith//Approval (of all ranked)
Smith//Approval (of what is specified)
Margin-Sorted Approval
Smith//DAC

On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 04:03 Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au wrote:

I would like to nominate several methods.

Smith//Approval (Ranking):

Voters rank from the top only those candidates they "approve",
equal-ranking allowed,
the most approved member of the voted Smith set wins.

Smith//Approval (specified cutoff):

Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish and can also
specify an approval
cutoff/threshold. Default approval is only for candidates ranked below no
others (i.e. ranked top
or equal-top).
The most approved member of the Smith set wins.

Margins Sorted Approval (specified cutoff):

Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish and can also
specify an approval
cutoff/threshold. Default approval is only for candidates ranked below no
others (i.e. ranked top
or equal-top).

A Forrest Simmons invention. Candidates are listed in approval score order
and if any adjacent pairs
are pairwise out of order then this is corrected by flipping the
out-of-order pair with the smallest
margin. If there is a tie for this we flip the less approved pair. Repeat
until there are no adjacent pairs
of candidates that are pairwise out of order, then elect the
highest-ordered candidate.

Smith//:DAC

Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish, equal-ranking
allowed.
Eliminate candidates not in the Smith set and then apply
Woodall's Descending Acquiescing Coalitions method.

There is a method I hate that is apparently contending in the real world:
"STAR". Given the stated purpose of
this poll, is there a case for including it?

Chris Benham

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
<election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%20on%20voting-systems%2C%0A%20to%20inform%20voters%20in%20upcoming%20enactment-elections&In-Reply-To=%3CCAOKDY5BkSGJkX%3D7zWXBr2t1SBNVMNj96wm-T8ubvr_wGM5h51w%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
Wed Apr 3 22:13:28 PDT 2024

EM used to do a lot of polls, but now never does. So I wouldn’t propose
one, if it weren’t for the fact that, this year, the voters of at least two
states are going to vote on whether to enact a certain voting-system.

It seems to me—tell me if I’m wrong—that those people have a right to know
how people familiar with voting-systems feel about the relative merits of
some voting-systems.

So, though I claim that polls are valuable for demonstrating the experience
of using the voting systems, & how they work, & what they’ll do—& are
therefore useful & worthwhile for their own sake—this poll that I now
propose isn’t a poll for its own sake.

It is, as I said, proposed for the important practical purpose of letting
the voters in the upcoming enactment-elections know how we feel about the
relative merits of some voting-systems, including the one that they’re
about to vote on the enactment of.

The voting-method for the poll:

It seems to me that Schulze is the most popular ranked voting-system, among
the people at EM.

…& it seems to me that the last time we voted on EM’s collective favorite
voting-system, Approval won.

Those seem the top-two, in EM popularity.

Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info

Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info