I noticed you used a points system to count the votes in your ballot. This is characteristic of non-proportional counts. In statistics, it is the difference between weighting in arithmetic progression (akin to Borda method) and weighting in arithmetic proportion (akin to Gregory method). The former is only used when a guess or estimate has to be made of the latter, in weighting classes of data. Proportional counting is more accurate. But mathematics has become politicised by the Machine, particularly in their ruthless routing of all but Cambridgecity elections. (A similar political spirit has kept Kris Maharaj, an innocent man, in a Floridajail, since the early nineteen eighties.)  Furthermore, the use of which voting method, to count a ballot on voting methods, has already decided the best available option. But a conventional count of single-member systems cannot use the best available method. However this does involve preference voting or ranked choice voting, which is a rebuff to single-preference votes or the stub vote, commonly called “the vote.”Voting for one-choice preferences, in a many-preference ballot, is as much to say that personal opinion over-rules the realities of the matter. This is in flat contradiction to the HG Wells statement, that voting methods, like anything else, are capable of scientific (knowledgeable) treatment. Voting method is not a matter of opinion but a matter of demonstration. It is demonstrated that the vote is an ordinal vote, not least by the denunciation of “wasted votes,” and the urging of tactical/strategic voting. Regards, Richard Lung. On 19/05/2024 17:40, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > On 2024-05-18 21:20, Toby Pereira wrote: >> Thanks for doing this Kristofer. If I counted correctly Ranked Pairs >> beat Benham 5-4 with two ties, so not a particularly significant >> result in that respect. But it must have had at least two more >> approvals given that Minmax is between them. > > That's a good point - I should post the Approval counts too :-) > > Here they are: > > Ranked Pairs (wv)                    8 > Minmax (wv)                          7 > Benham                               6 > STAR                                 6 > Woodall                              6 > Approval                             5 > Approval with manual runoff          4 > Margins-Sorted Approval              4 > Schulze                              4 > Schwartz Woodall                     3 > Smith//Approval (explicit)           3 > Smith//Approval (implicit)           3 > Smith//Score                         3 > Baldwin                              2 > BTR-IRV (write-in)                   2 > Condorcet//Borda (Black)             2 > Condorcet//Plurality (write-in)      2 > Copeland//Borda (Ranked Robin)       2 > Double Defeat, Hare                  2 > IRV                                  2 > Majority Judgement                   1 > Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes  1 > Max Strength Transitive Beatpath     1 > Raynaud                              1 > RCIPE                                1 > Score (write-in)                     1 > Smith//DAC                           1 > Borda (write-in)                     0 > Plurality                            0 > > -km > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info

On 2024-05-20 11:33, Richard Lung wrote: > Furthermore, the use of which voting method, to count a ballot on > voting methods, has already decided the best available option. But a > conventional count of single-member systems cannot use the best > available method. Not necessarily. The EM poll would have returned Ranked Pairs as the winner no matter what Condorcet method had been used, as Ranked Pairs was the Condorcet winner. Similarly, it was also the Approval winner. If it were true that methods would return themselves as winners, then we would have expected Approval to be the Approval winner. In that respect, the poll *does* bring additional information. The choice of method does not force the outcome. > This is in flat contradiction to the HG Wells statement, that voting > methods, like anything else, are capable of scientific (knowledgeable) > treatment. Voting method is not a matter of opinion but a matter of > demonstration. It is demonstrated that the vote is an ordinal vote, not > least by the denunciation of “wasted votes,” and the urging of > tactical/strategic voting. I don't know what you're saying here. In particular I struggle to understand the last sentence. -km

On 2024-05-20 11:33, Richard Lung wrote: > > But a conventional count of single-member systems cannot use the > best available method. Perhaps we could have a poll on ways to determine representatives. Including things like sortition, Fred Gohlke's triad method, asset, delegable proxy, and so on. But not right away - or if it is right away, then someone else would have to administer it :-) -km

Could you run the ballots through your method? It would be interesting to see. Toby On Monday 20 May 2024 at 10:33:45 BST, Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com> wrote: I noticed you used a points system to count the votes in your ballot. This is characteristic of non-proportional counts. In statistics, it is the difference between weighting in arithmetic progression (akin to Borda method) and weighting in arithmetic proportion (akin to Gregory method). The former is only used when a guess or estimate has to be made of the latter, in weighting classes of data. Proportional counting is more accurate. But mathematics has become politicised by the Machine, particularly in their ruthless routing of all but Cambridge city elections. (A similar political spirit has kept Kris Maharaj, an innocent man, in a Florida jail, since the early nineteen eighties.)  Furthermore, the use of which voting method, to count a ballot on voting methods, has already decided the best available option. But a conventional count of single-member systems cannot use the best available method. However this does involve preference voting or ranked choice voting, which is a rebuff to single-preference votes or the stub vote, commonly called “the vote.”Voting for one-choice preferences, in a many-preference ballot, is as much to say that personal opinion over-rules the realities of the matter. This is in flat contradiction to the HG Wells statement, that voting methods, like anything else, are capable of scientific (knowledgeable) treatment. Voting method is not a matter of opinion but a matter of demonstration. It is demonstrated that the vote is an ordinal vote, not least by the denunciation of “wasted votes,” and the urging of tactical/strategic voting. Regards, Richard Lung. On 19/05/2024 17:40, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: On 2024-05-18 21:20, Toby Pereira wrote: Thanks for doing this Kristofer. If I counted correctly Ranked Pairs beat Benham 5-4 with two ties, so not a particularly significant result in that respect. But it must have had at least two more approvals given that Minmax is between them. That's a good point - I should post the Approval counts too :-) Here they are: Ranked Pairs (wv)                    8 Minmax (wv)                          7 Benham                               6 STAR                                 6 Woodall                              6 Approval                             5 Approval with manual runoff          4 Margins-Sorted Approval              4 Schulze                              4 Schwartz Woodall                     3 Smith//Approval (explicit)           3 Smith//Approval (implicit)           3 Smith//Score                         3 Baldwin                              2 BTR-IRV (write-in)                   2 Condorcet//Borda (Black)             2 Condorcet//Plurality (write-in)      2 Copeland//Borda (Ranked Robin)       2 Double Defeat, Hare                  2 IRV                                  2 Majority Judgement                   1 Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes  1 Max Strength Transitive Beatpath     1 Raynaud                              1 RCIPE                                1 Score (write-in)                     1 Smith//DAC                           1 Borda (write-in)                     0 Plurality                            0 -km ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info

Not meaningfully. Firstly because it would be beside the point to have a method to choose methods, which would be a paradox, (which is not clear from KM discourse). Secondly, the method I  would use, is only realistic for a recognisable normal distribution of voters, say 32 voters (2^5). A point I was trying to make was that holding such a ballot on ballots does not in any way decide an appropriate ballot, tho it is used as such in referendums. Of course it may give some information. That was not the point I was making. It just is paradoxical as a definitive solution the voters are landed with in a referendum. Lastly, I have no technical knowledge to implement a Binomial STV, and its computer count requirements (a Meek-style election count, and the same for an exclusion count). No quota reduction. All abstentions counted, to weigh relative importance of election and exclusion. Regards, Richard Lung. On 20/05/2024 17:08, Toby Pereira wrote: > Could you run the ballots through your method? It would be interesting > to see. > > Toby > > On Monday 20 May 2024 at 10:33:45 BST, Richard Lung > <voting@ukscientists.com> wrote: > > > > I noticed you used a points system to count the votes in your ballot. > This is characteristic of non-proportional counts. In statistics, it > is the difference between weighting in arithmetic progression (akin to > Borda method) and weighting in arithmetic proportion (akin to Gregory > method). The former is only used when a guess or estimate has to be > made of the latter, in weighting classes of data. > > Proportional counting is more accurate. But mathematics has become > politicised by the Machine, particularly in their ruthless routing of > all but Cambridgecity elections. (A similar political spirit has kept > Kris Maharaj, an innocent man, in a Floridajail, since the early > nineteen eighties.) > >  Furthermore, the use of which voting method, to count a ballot on > voting methods, has already decided the best available option. But a > conventional count of single-member systems cannot use the best > available method. > > However this does involve preference voting or ranked choice voting, > which is a rebuff to single-preference votes or the stub vote, > commonly called “the vote.”Voting for one-choice preferences, in a > many-preference ballot, is as much to say that personal opinion > over-rules the realities of the matter. > > This is in flat contradiction to the HG Wells statement, that voting > methods, like anything else, are capable of scientific (knowledgeable) > treatment. Voting method is not a matter of opinion but a matter of > demonstration. It is demonstrated that the vote is an ordinal vote, > not least by the denunciation of “wasted votes,” and the urging of > tactical/strategic voting. > > Regards, > > Richard Lung. > > > > On 19/05/2024 17:40, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: >> On 2024-05-18 21:20, Toby Pereira wrote: >>> Thanks for doing this Kristofer. If I counted correctly Ranked Pairs >>> beat Benham 5-4 with two ties, so not a particularly significant >>> result in that respect. But it must have had at least two more >>> approvals given that Minmax is between them. >> >> That's a good point - I should post the Approval counts too :-) >> >> Here they are: >> >> Ranked Pairs (wv)                    8 >> Minmax (wv)                          7 >> Benham                               6 >> STAR                                 6 >> Woodall                              6 >> Approval                             5 >> Approval with manual runoff          4 >> Margins-Sorted Approval              4 >> Schulze                              4 >> Schwartz Woodall                     3 >> Smith//Approval (explicit)           3 >> Smith//Approval (implicit)           3 >> Smith//Score                         3 >> Baldwin                              2 >> BTR-IRV (write-in)                   2 >> Condorcet//Borda (Black)             2 >> Condorcet//Plurality (write-in)      2 >> Copeland//Borda (Ranked Robin)       2 >> Double Defeat, Hare                  2 >> IRV                                  2 >> Majority Judgement                   1 >> Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes  1 >> Max Strength Transitive Beatpath     1 >> Raynaud                              1 >> RCIPE                                1 >> Score (write-in)                     1 >> Smith//DAC                           1 >> Borda (write-in)                     0 >> Plurality                            0 >> >> -km >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em >> <https://electorama.com/em> for list info >>