MO
Michael Ossipoff
Sat, Sep 17, 2016 8:51 PM
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "Michael Ossipoff" email9648742@gmail.com
Date: Sep 17, 2016 12:52 PM
Subject: MMPO objections
To: t@gmail.com
Cc:
Though NEO, so far, to me at least, seems to show promise, it hasn't been
thoroughly checked out enough to be a proposal.
But it's different with MMPO. We've heard people's best arguments against
MMPO, & it can be said to have already been well-discussed.
No rank method's result will always look right. All will sometimes do
something ridiculous.
A method optimized for 1 purpose or standard can't do well by other
standards.
MMPO achieves what it achieves by looking only at pairwise unpreferredness.
It isn't a positional method, & so you can find an example in which it does
terribly, positionally.
In Kevin's bad-example, it chooses someone twice as bottom-voted as the
other candidates, & nearly not top-voted at all.
It certainly isn't a positional method
MMPO isn't a pairwise-defeats method. So you can find an example where it
does terribly by pairwise defeats.
In Kevin's example, it elects the Condorcet loser, who pairwise loses to
the others by 1000 to 1, if X = 1000.
It certainly isn't a pairwise defeats method.
We've been looking at pairwise defeats methods for so long that we tend,
maybe subconsciously, to evaluate by pairwise defeats standards.
A "beats-diagram" shows
an "=" sign between A & B. They have no defeat, but C has one.
But look under that "=" sign. Half the voters bottom-vote A, & the other
half bottom-end vote B.
Say two groups both despise eachother. Does that mutual despising cancel
out, making both groups un-despised?
But that's the fallacy that the beats-diagram & its "=" sign allows you to
believe.
If the A voters voted among themselves, between B & C, they'd choose C.
If the B voters voted among themselves, between A & C, they'd choose C.
C is the compromise preferred by the A voters, & by the C voters, to
eachother's candidates.
Yes, it's natural to reject a low-favoriteness compromise. Rob Richie would
be proud.
Of course this bad-example makes that compromise as little top-voted as
possible.
I've told, here, why the bad-example isn't as bad as you think.
It doesn't look good by standards other than the one by which it achieves
the elusive goal of MAM-like strategy, without chicken-dilemma.
Distinguish between a harmless election of a low favoriteness compromise, a
compromise outcome that looks bad to an outside observer vs an actual
practical problem, one that will routinely
make strategy problems for voters, and give tangibly (not just
aesthetically) bad results.
When proposing better voting to a community of jurisdiction, of whatever
size, offer them a list of methods, telling the objections to each, & their
answers. ...& telling the advantages of each.
It would be irresponsible to leave out one with an impressive, unique,
powerful combination of strategy advantages.
Let the community, jts voters &/or the initiative proposal committee choose
for themselves. It isn't necessary to make decisions for them.
Michael Ossipoff
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com>
Date: Sep 17, 2016 12:52 PM
Subject: MMPO objections
To: <t@gmail.com>
Cc:
Though NEO, so far, to me at least, seems to show promise, it hasn't been
thoroughly checked out enough to be a proposal.
But it's different with MMPO. We've heard people's best arguments against
MMPO, & it can be said to have already been well-discussed.
No rank method's result will always look right. All will sometimes do
something ridiculous.
A method optimized for 1 purpose or standard can't do well by other
standards.
MMPO achieves what it achieves by looking only at pairwise unpreferredness.
It isn't a positional method, & so you can find an example in which it does
terribly, positionally.
In Kevin's bad-example, it chooses someone twice as bottom-voted as the
other candidates, & nearly not top-voted at all.
It certainly isn't a positional method
MMPO isn't a pairwise-defeats method. So you can find an example where it
does terribly by pairwise defeats.
In Kevin's example, it elects the Condorcet loser, who pairwise loses to
the others by 1000 to 1, if X = 1000.
It certainly isn't a pairwise defeats method.
We've been looking at pairwise defeats methods for so long that we tend,
maybe subconsciously, to evaluate by pairwise defeats standards.
A "beats-diagram" shows
an "=" sign between A & B. They have no defeat, but C has one.
But look under that "=" sign. Half the voters bottom-vote A, & the other
half bottom-end vote B.
Say two groups both despise eachother. Does that mutual despising cancel
out, making both groups un-despised?
But that's the fallacy that the beats-diagram & its "=" sign allows you to
believe.
If the A voters voted among themselves, between B & C, they'd choose C.
If the B voters voted among themselves, between A & C, they'd choose C.
C is the compromise preferred by the A voters, & by the C voters, to
eachother's candidates.
Yes, it's natural to reject a low-favoriteness compromise. Rob Richie would
be proud.
Of course this bad-example makes that compromise as little top-voted as
possible.
I've told, here, why the bad-example isn't as bad as you think.
It doesn't look good by standards other than the one by which it achieves
the elusive goal of MAM-like strategy, without chicken-dilemma.
Distinguish between a harmless election of a low favoriteness compromise, a
compromise outcome that looks bad to an outside observer vs an actual
practical problem, one that will routinely
make strategy problems for voters, and give tangibly (not just
aesthetically) bad results.
When proposing better voting to a community of jurisdiction, of whatever
size, offer them a list of methods, telling the objections to each, & their
answers. ...& telling the advantages of each.
It would be irresponsible to leave out one with an impressive, unique,
powerful combination of strategy advantages.
Let the community, jts voters &/or the initiative proposal committee choose
for themselves. It isn't necessary to make decisions for them.
Michael Ossipoff
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Sun, Sep 18, 2016 6:45 PM
A few more comments:
Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by nearly
everyone?
How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the voters.
...& because it isn't a positional method.
Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
everyone else.
...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to eachother's candidate.
Given that, C's win isn't so surprising or outrageous.
Anyway, the example has no plausibility, at all.
Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its plausibility.
Yes, MMPO doesn't strictly always elect the CW, and I don't like that. It's
a distinct disadvantage. We expect better from a pairwise-count method.
But with sincere voting, & with no indifference, the CWs (sincere CW)
always wins.
For the CW to lose, it's necessary for one of hir pairwise comparisons to
have high turnout, & be relatively nearly tied. ...& for someone else's
pairwise comparisons to all be very low turnout & hir defeats nearly tied.
Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
Michael Ossipoff
On Sep 17, 2016 1:51 PM, "Michael Ossipoff" email9648742@gmail.com wrote:
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "Michael Ossipoff" email9648742@gmail.com
Date: Sep 17, 2016 12:52 PM
Subject: MMPO objections
To: t@gmail.com
Cc:
Though NEO, so far, to me at least, seems to show promise, it hasn't been
thoroughly checked out enough to be a proposal.
But it's different with MMPO. We've heard people's best arguments against
MMPO, & it can be said to have already been well-discussed.
No rank method's result will always look right. All will sometimes do
something ridiculous.
A method optimized for 1 purpose or standard can't do well by other
standards.
MMPO achieves what it achieves by looking only at pairwise unpreferredness.
It isn't a positional method, & so you can find an example in which it
does terribly, positionally.
In Kevin's bad-example, it chooses someone twice as bottom-voted as the
other candidates, & nearly not top-voted at all.
It certainly isn't a positional method
MMPO isn't a pairwise-defeats method. So you can find an example where it
does terribly by pairwise defeats.
In Kevin's example, it elects the Condorcet loser, who pairwise loses to
the others by 1000 to 1, if X = 1000.
It certainly isn't a pairwise defeats method.
We've been looking at pairwise defeats methods for so long that we tend,
maybe subconsciously, to evaluate by pairwise defeats standards.
A "beats-diagram" shows
an "=" sign between A & B. They have no defeat, but C has one.
But look under that "=" sign. Half the voters bottom-vote A, & the other
half bottom-end vote B.
Say two groups both despise eachother. Does that mutual despising cancel
out, making both groups un-despised?
But that's the fallacy that the beats-diagram & its "=" sign allows you to
believe.
If the A voters voted among themselves, between B & C, they'd choose C.
If the B voters voted among themselves, between A & C, they'd choose C.
C is the compromise preferred by the A voters, & by the C voters, to
eachother's candidates.
Yes, it's natural to reject a low-favoriteness compromise. Rob Richie
would be proud.
Of course this bad-example makes that compromise as little top-voted as
possible.
I've told, here, why the bad-example isn't as bad as you think.
It doesn't look good by standards other than the one by which it achieves
the elusive goal of MAM-like strategy, without chicken-dilemma.
Distinguish between a harmless election of a low favoriteness compromise,
a compromise outcome that looks bad to an outside observer vs an actual
practical problem, one that will routinely
make strategy problems for voters, and give tangibly (not just
aesthetically) bad results.
When proposing better voting to a community of jurisdiction, of whatever
size, offer them a list of methods, telling the objections to each, & their
answers. ...& telling the advantages of each.
It would be irresponsible to leave out one with an impressive, unique,
powerful combination of strategy advantages.
Let the community, jts voters &/or the initiative proposal committee
choose for themselves. It isn't necessary to make decisions for them.
Michael Ossipoff
A few more comments:
Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by nearly
everyone?
How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the voters.
...& because it isn't a positional method.
Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
everyone else.
...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to eachother's candidate.
Given that, C's win isn't so surprising or outrageous.
Anyway, the example has no plausibility, at all.
Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its plausibility.
Yes, MMPO doesn't strictly always elect the CW, and I don't like that. It's
a distinct disadvantage. We expect better from a pairwise-count method.
But with sincere voting, & with no indifference, the CWs (sincere CW)
always wins.
For the CW to lose, it's necessary for one of hir pairwise comparisons to
have high turnout, & be relatively nearly tied. ...& for someone else's
pairwise comparisons to all be very low turnout & hir defeats nearly tied.
Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
Michael Ossipoff
On Sep 17, 2016 1:51 PM, "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com>
> Date: Sep 17, 2016 12:52 PM
> Subject: MMPO objections
> To: <t@gmail.com>
> Cc:
>
> Though NEO, so far, to me at least, seems to show promise, it hasn't been
> thoroughly checked out enough to be a proposal.
>
> But it's different with MMPO. We've heard people's best arguments against
> MMPO, & it can be said to have already been well-discussed.
>
> No rank method's result will always look right. All will sometimes do
> something ridiculous.
>
> A method optimized for 1 purpose or standard can't do well by other
> standards.
>
> MMPO achieves what it achieves by looking only at pairwise unpreferredness.
>
> It isn't a positional method, & so you can find an example in which it
> does terribly, positionally.
>
> In Kevin's bad-example, it chooses someone twice as bottom-voted as the
> other candidates, & nearly not top-voted at all.
>
> It certainly isn't a positional method
>
> MMPO isn't a pairwise-defeats method. So you can find an example where it
> does terribly by pairwise defeats.
>
> In Kevin's example, it elects the Condorcet loser, who pairwise loses to
> the others by 1000 to 1, if X = 1000.
>
> It certainly isn't a pairwise defeats method.
>
> We've been looking at pairwise defeats methods for so long that we tend,
> maybe subconsciously, to evaluate by pairwise defeats standards.
>
> A "beats-diagram" shows
> an "=" sign between A & B. They have no defeat, but C has one.
>
> But look under that "=" sign. Half the voters bottom-vote A, & the other
> half bottom-end vote B.
>
> Say two groups both despise eachother. Does that mutual despising cancel
> out, making both groups un-despised?
>
> But that's the fallacy that the beats-diagram & its "=" sign allows you to
> believe.
>
> If the A voters voted among themselves, between B & C, they'd choose C.
>
> If the B voters voted among themselves, between A & C, they'd choose C.
>
> C is the compromise preferred by the A voters, & by the C voters, to
> eachother's candidates.
>
> Yes, it's natural to reject a low-favoriteness compromise. Rob Richie
> would be proud.
>
> Of course this bad-example makes that compromise as little top-voted as
> possible.
>
> I've told, here, why the bad-example isn't as bad as you think.
>
> It doesn't look good by standards other than the one by which it achieves
> the elusive goal of MAM-like strategy, without chicken-dilemma.
>
> Distinguish between a harmless election of a low favoriteness compromise,
> a compromise outcome that looks bad to an outside observer vs an actual
> practical problem, one that will routinely
> make strategy problems for voters, and give tangibly (not just
> aesthetically) bad results.
>
> When proposing better voting to a community of jurisdiction, of whatever
> size, offer them a list of methods, telling the objections to each, & their
> answers. ...& telling the advantages of each.
>
> It would be irresponsible to leave out one with an impressive, unique,
> powerful combination of strategy advantages.
>
> Let the community, jts voters &/or the initiative proposal committee
> choose for themselves. It isn't necessary to make decisions for them.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
C
C.Benham
Wed, Sep 21, 2016 12:25 AM
Mike,
The MinMax Pairwise Opposition (MMPO) "bad example" we are talking about:
x: A
1: A=C
1: B=C
x: B
x = any number greater than 1. MMPO elects C.
On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by
nearly everyone?
How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the voters.
...& because it isn't a positional method.
Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
everyone else.
...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to each other's
candidate.
C: There's no evidence on the ballots for that assertion.
Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its plausibility.
C: Not when it's that bad. And not even when it's merely very bad in
such a simple example. It is more understandable
and perhaps forgiveable for an algorithm to become "confused" in a
complicated example (with say, lots of candidates
and cycles within cycles).
Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
C: I don't agree with most of the premises in that question. Other
methods meet FBC and CD. What's so good about Later-no-Harm with a
random-fill incentive?
The result is completely outrageous and absurd.
The correct result is an A=B tie. All but 2 of the voters were wronged,
because their favourites should have a 50% probability of winning.
Chris Benham
On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
A few more comments:
Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by
nearly everyone?
How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the voters.
...& because it isn't a positional method.
Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
everyone else.
...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to eachother's candidate.
Given that, C's win isn't so surprising or outrageous.
Anyway, the example has no plausibility, at all.
Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its plausibility.
Yes, MMPO doesn't strictly always elect the CW, and I don't like that.
It's a distinct disadvantage. We expect better from a pairwise-count
method.
But with sincere voting, & with no indifference, the CWs (sincere CW)
always wins.
For the CW to lose, it's necessary for one of hir pairwise comparisons
to have high turnout, & be relatively nearly tied. ...& for someone
else's pairwise comparisons to all be very low turnout & hir defeats
nearly tied.
Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
Michael Ossipoff
On Sep 17, 2016 1:51 PM, "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com
mailto:email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com
<mailto:email9648742@gmail.com>>
Date: Sep 17, 2016 12:52 PM
Subject: MMPO objections
To: <t@gmail.com <mailto:t@gmail.com>>
Cc:
Though NEO, so far, to me at least, seems to show promise, it
hasn't been thoroughly checked out enough to be a proposal.
But it's different with MMPO. We've heard people's best arguments
against MMPO, & it can be said to have already been well-discussed.
No rank method's result will always look right. All will sometimes
do something ridiculous.
A method optimized for 1 purpose or standard can't do well by
other standards.
MMPO achieves what it achieves by looking only at pairwise
unpreferredness.
It isn't a positional method, & so you can find an example in
which it does terribly, positionally.
In Kevin's bad-example, it chooses someone twice as bottom-voted
as the other candidates, & nearly not top-voted at all.
It certainly isn't a positional method
MMPO isn't a pairwise-defeats method. So you can find an example
where it does terribly by pairwise defeats.
In Kevin's example, it elects the Condorcet loser, who pairwise
loses to the others by 1000 to 1, if X = 1000.
It certainly isn't a pairwise defeats method.
We've been looking at pairwise defeats methods for so long that we
tend, maybe subconsciously, to evaluate by pairwise defeats standards.
A "beats-diagram" shows
an "=" sign between A & B. They have no defeat, but C has one.
But look under that "=" sign. Half the voters bottom-vote A, & the
other half bottom-end vote B.
Say two groups both despise eachother. Does that mutual despising
cancel out, making both groups un-despised?
But that's the fallacy that the beats-diagram & its "=" sign
allows you to believe.
If the A voters voted among themselves, between B & C, they'd
choose C.
If the B voters voted among themselves, between A & C, they'd
choose C.
C is the compromise preferred by the A voters, & by the C voters,
to eachother's candidates.
Yes, it's natural to reject a low-favoriteness compromise. Rob
Richie would be proud.
Of course this bad-example makes that compromise as little
top-voted as possible.
I've told, here, why the bad-example isn't as bad as you think.
It doesn't look good by standards other than the one by which it
achieves the elusive goal of MAM-like strategy, without
chicken-dilemma.
Distinguish between a harmless election of a low favoriteness
compromise, a compromise outcome that looks bad to an outside
observer vs an actual practical problem, one that will routinely
make strategy problems for voters, and give tangibly (not just
aesthetically) bad results.
When proposing better voting to a community of jurisdiction, of
whatever size, offer them a list of methods, telling the
objections to each, & their answers. ...& telling the advantages
of each.
It would be irresponsible to leave out one with an impressive,
unique, powerful combination of strategy advantages.
Let the community, jts voters &/or the initiative proposal
committee choose for themselves. It isn't necessary to make
decisions for them.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com
Version: 2016.0.7797 / Virus Database: 4656/13038 - Release Date: 09/18/16
Mike,
The MinMax Pairwise Opposition (MMPO) "bad example" we are talking about:
x: A
1: A=C
1: B=C
x: B
x = any number greater than 1. MMPO elects C.
On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by
> nearly everyone?
>
> How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the voters.
>
> ...& because it isn't a positional method.
>
> Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
> everyone else.
>
> ...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to each other's
> candidate.
>
C: There's no evidence on the ballots for that assertion.
> Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its plausibility.
C: Not when it's that bad. And not even when it's merely very bad in
such a simple example. It is more understandable
and perhaps forgiveable for an algorithm to become "confused" in a
complicated example (with say, lots of candidates
and cycles within cycles).
> Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
> because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
> anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
C: I don't agree with most of the premises in that question. Other
methods meet FBC and CD. What's so good about Later-no-Harm with a
random-fill incentive?
The result is completely outrageous and absurd.
The correct result is an A=B tie. All but 2 of the voters were wronged,
because their favourites should have a 50% probability of winning.
Chris Benham
On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> A few more comments:
>
> Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by
> nearly everyone?
>
> How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the voters.
>
> ...& because it isn't a positional method.
>
> Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
> everyone else.
>
> ...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to eachother's candidate.
>
> Given that, C's win isn't so surprising or outrageous.
>
> Anyway, the example has no plausibility, at all.
>
> Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its plausibility.
>
> Yes, MMPO doesn't strictly always elect the CW, and I don't like that.
> It's a distinct disadvantage. We expect better from a pairwise-count
> method.
>
> But with sincere voting, & with no indifference, the CWs (sincere CW)
> always wins.
>
> For the CW to lose, it's necessary for one of hir pairwise comparisons
> to have high turnout, & be relatively nearly tied. ...& for someone
> else's pairwise comparisons to all be very low turnout & hir defeats
> nearly tied.
>
> Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
> because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
> anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
> On Sep 17, 2016 1:51 PM, "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com
> <mailto:email9648742@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com
> <mailto:email9648742@gmail.com>>
> Date: Sep 17, 2016 12:52 PM
> Subject: MMPO objections
> To: <t@gmail.com <mailto:t@gmail.com>>
> Cc:
>
> Though NEO, so far, to me at least, seems to show promise, it
> hasn't been thoroughly checked out enough to be a proposal.
>
> But it's different with MMPO. We've heard people's best arguments
> against MMPO, & it can be said to have already been well-discussed.
>
> No rank method's result will always look right. All will sometimes
> do something ridiculous.
>
> A method optimized for 1 purpose or standard can't do well by
> other standards.
>
> MMPO achieves what it achieves by looking only at pairwise
> unpreferredness.
>
> It isn't a positional method, & so you can find an example in
> which it does terribly, positionally.
>
> In Kevin's bad-example, it chooses someone twice as bottom-voted
> as the other candidates, & nearly not top-voted at all.
>
> It certainly isn't a positional method
>
> MMPO isn't a pairwise-defeats method. So you can find an example
> where it does terribly by pairwise defeats.
>
> In Kevin's example, it elects the Condorcet loser, who pairwise
> loses to the others by 1000 to 1, if X = 1000.
>
> It certainly isn't a pairwise defeats method.
>
> We've been looking at pairwise defeats methods for so long that we
> tend, maybe subconsciously, to evaluate by pairwise defeats standards.
>
> A "beats-diagram" shows
> an "=" sign between A & B. They have no defeat, but C has one.
>
> But look under that "=" sign. Half the voters bottom-vote A, & the
> other half bottom-end vote B.
>
> Say two groups both despise eachother. Does that mutual despising
> cancel out, making both groups un-despised?
>
> But that's the fallacy that the beats-diagram & its "=" sign
> allows you to believe.
>
> If the A voters voted among themselves, between B & C, they'd
> choose C.
>
> If the B voters voted among themselves, between A & C, they'd
> choose C.
>
> C is the compromise preferred by the A voters, & by the C voters,
> to eachother's candidates.
>
> Yes, it's natural to reject a low-favoriteness compromise. Rob
> Richie would be proud.
>
> Of course this bad-example makes that compromise as little
> top-voted as possible.
>
> I've told, here, why the bad-example isn't as bad as you think.
>
> It doesn't look good by standards other than the one by which it
> achieves the elusive goal of MAM-like strategy, without
> chicken-dilemma.
>
> Distinguish between a harmless election of a low favoriteness
> compromise, a compromise outcome that looks bad to an outside
> observer vs an actual practical problem, one that will routinely
> make strategy problems for voters, and give tangibly (not just
> aesthetically) bad results.
>
> When proposing better voting to a community of jurisdiction, of
> whatever size, offer them a list of methods, telling the
> objections to each, & their answers. ...& telling the advantages
> of each.
>
> It would be irresponsible to leave out one with an impressive,
> unique, powerful combination of strategy advantages.
>
> Let the community, jts voters &/or the initiative proposal
> committee choose for themselves. It isn't necessary to make
> decisions for them.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
> No virus found in this message.
> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com>
> Version: 2016.0.7797 / Virus Database: 4656/13038 - Release Date: 09/18/16
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Wed, Sep 21, 2016 10:33 PM
This matter is moot, because Smith//MMPO has replaced Plain MMPO as an
advocacy of mine.
...partly because I wouldn't want to devote time & writing-space to
answering these prejudices when offering proposals.
...partly because rank methods are for people who want or need to rank,
making Smith a good trade for FBC.
Replying farther down. Can't delete text:
On Sep 20, 2016 5:29 PM, "C.Benham" cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
Mike,
The MinMax Pairwise Opposition (MMPO) "bad example" we are talking
x: A
1: A=C
1: B=C
x: B
x = any number greater than 1. MMPO elects C.
Yes
Replying farther down. Can't delete text.
On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by
How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the
...& because it isn't a positional method.
Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to each other's
C: There's no evidence on the ballots for that assertion.
Yes, there is.
The ballots show that the A voters collectively prefer C to B.
If the A voters voted between B & C, they'd choose C.
Likewise for the B voters. In a vote, they'd choose C over A.
Surely the importance of bad-example depends on its plausibility.
C: Not when it's that bad.
You haven't shown that it's bad. You've told why it bothers your prejudices.
Anyway, even if it were bad, how bad is something bad that won't happen?
You continue. I reply farther down.
And not even when it's merely very bad in such a simple example. It is
more understandable
and perhaps forgiveable for an algorithm to become "confused" in a
complicated example (with say, lots of candidates
and cycles within cycles).
Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
C: I don't agree with most of the premises in that question.
(endquote)
Ok, whom does it wrong?
:^)
Not the A voters, none of whom prefer B to C.
You think it's plausible & likely to happen?
You said:
Other methods meet FBC and CD. What's so good about Later-no-Harm with a
random-fill incentive?
(endquote)
I didn't advocate it for LNHa. Not even for FBC.
It's main merits are Weak CD & MAM-like strategy. (available with
Smith//MMPO too).
No, few other methods share those properties.
You continued:
The result is completely outrageous and absurd.
Thank you for sharing your subjective prejudices.
Who is wronged by the "outrage"?
Yes, I admit that you're used to positional methods & pairwise defeat
methods. ...& that many people are troubled by what they aren't used to.
The correct result is an A=B tie. All but 2 of the voters were wronged,
because their favourites should have a 50% probability of winning.
Nonsense. B isn't one of the A voters' favorites.
When you're indifferent between 2 candidates, you aren't wronged when one
wins instead of the other.
Michael Ossipoff
Chris Benham
On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
A few more comments:
Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by
How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the
...& because it isn't a positional method.
Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to eachother's candidate.
Given that, C's win isn't so surprising or outrageous.
Anyway, the example has no plausibility, at all.
Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its plausibility.
Yes, MMPO doesn't strictly always elect the CW, and I don't like that.
It's a distinct disadvantage. We expect better from a pairwise-count method.
But with sincere voting, & with no indifference, the CWs (sincere CW)
For the CW to lose, it's necessary for one of hir pairwise comparisons
to have high turnout, & be relatively nearly tied. ...& for someone
else's pairwise comparisons to all be very low turnout & hir defeats nearly
tied.
Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "Michael Ossipoff" email9648742@gmail.com
Date: Sep 17, 2016 12:52 PM
Subject: MMPO objections
To: t@gmail.com
Cc:
Though NEO, so far, to me at least, seems to show promise, it hasn't
been thoroughly checked out enough to be a proposal.
But it's different with MMPO. We've heard people's best arguments
against MMPO, & it can be said to have already been well-discussed.
No rank method's result will always look right. All will sometimes do
A method optimized for 1 purpose or standard can't do well by other
MMPO achieves what it achieves by looking only at pairwise
It isn't a positional method, & so you can find an example in which it
does terribly, positionally.
In Kevin's bad-example, it chooses someone twice as bottom-voted as the
other candidates, & nearly not top-voted at all.
It certainly isn't a positional method
MMPO isn't a pairwise-defeats method. So you can find an example where
it does terribly by pairwise defeats.
In Kevin's example, it elects the Condorcet loser, who pairwise loses
to the others by 1000 to 1, if X = 1000.
It certainly isn't a pairwise defeats method.
We've been looking at pairwise defeats methods for so long that we
tend, maybe subconsciously, to evaluate by pairwise defeats standards.
A "beats-diagram" shows
an "=" sign between A & B. They have no defeat, but C has one.
But look under that "=" sign. Half the voters bottom-vote A, & the
other half bottom-end vote B.
Say two groups both despise eachother. Does that mutual despising
cancel out, making both groups un-despised?
But that's the fallacy that the beats-diagram & its "=" sign allows you
If the A voters voted among themselves, between B & C, they'd choose C.
If the B voters voted among themselves, between A & C, they'd choose C.
C is the compromise preferred by the A voters, & by the C voters, to
Yes, it's natural to reject a low-favoriteness compromise. Rob Richie
Of course this bad-example makes that compromise as little top-voted as
I've told, here, why the bad-example isn't as bad as you think.
It doesn't look good by standards other than the one by which it
achieves the elusive goal of MAM-like strategy, without chicken-dilemma.
Distinguish between a harmless election of a low favoriteness
compromise, a compromise outcome that looks bad to an outside observer vs
an actual practical problem, one that will routinely
make strategy problems for voters, and give tangibly (not just
aesthetically) bad results.
When proposing better voting to a community of jurisdiction, of
whatever size, offer them a list of methods, telling the objections to
each, & their answers. ...& telling the advantages of each.
It would be irresponsible to leave out one with an impressive, unique,
powerful combination of strategy advantages.
Let the community, jts voters &/or the initiative proposal committee
choose for themselves. It isn't necessary to make decisions for them.
No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2016.0.7797 / Virus Database: 4656/13038 - Release Date:
This matter is moot, because Smith//MMPO has replaced Plain MMPO as an
advocacy of mine.
...partly because I wouldn't want to devote time & writing-space to
answering these prejudices when offering proposals.
...partly because rank methods are for people who want or need to rank,
making Smith a good trade for FBC.
Replying farther down. Can't delete text:
On Sep 20, 2016 5:29 PM, "C.Benham" <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
>
> Mike,
>
> The MinMax Pairwise Opposition (MMPO) "bad example" we are talking
about:
>
> x: A
> 1: A=C
> 1: B=C
> x: B
>
> x = any number greater than 1. MMPO elects C.
Yes
Replying farther down. Can't delete text.
>
>
>
> On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>> Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by
nearly everyone?
>>
>> How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the
voters.
>>
>> ...& because it isn't a positional method.
>>
>> Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
everyone else.
>>
>> ...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to each other's
candidate.
>
You said:
>
> C: There's no evidence on the ballots for that assertion.
Yes, there is.
The ballots show that the A voters collectively prefer C to B.
If the A voters voted between B & C, they'd choose C.
Likewise for the B voters. In a vote, they'd choose C over A.
>
>
>> Surely the importance of bad-example depends on its plausibility.
>
>
> C: Not when it's that bad.
You haven't shown that it's bad. You've told why it bothers your prejudices.
Anyway, even if it were bad, how bad is something bad that won't happen?
You continue. I reply farther down.
And not even when it's merely very bad in such a simple example. It is
more understandable
> and perhaps forgiveable for an algorithm to become "confused" in a
complicated example (with say, lots of candidates
> and cycles within cycles).
>
>
>> Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
>
>
> C: I don't agree with most of the premises in that question.
(endquote)
Ok, whom does it wrong?
:^)
Not the A voters, none of whom prefer B to C.
You think it's plausible & likely to happen?
You said:
Other methods meet FBC and CD. What's so good about Later-no-Harm with a
random-fill incentive?
(endquote)
I didn't advocate it for LNHa. Not even for FBC.
It's main merits are Weak CD & MAM-like strategy. (available with
Smith//MMPO too).
No, few other methods share those properties.
You continued:
> The result is completely outrageous and absurd.
Thank you for sharing your subjective prejudices.
Who is wronged by the "outrage"?
Yes, I admit that you're used to positional methods & pairwise defeat
methods. ...& that many people are troubled by what they aren't used to.
> The correct result is an A=B tie. All but 2 of the voters were wronged,
because their favourites should have a 50% probability of winning.
Nonsense. B isn't one of the A voters' favorites.
When you're indifferent between 2 candidates, you aren't wronged when one
wins instead of the other.
Michael Ossipoff
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
>
>
> On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>> A few more comments:
>>
>> Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by
nearly everyone?
>>
>> How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the
voters.
>>
>> ...& because it isn't a positional method.
>>
>> Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
everyone else.
>>
>> ...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to eachother's candidate.
>>
>> Given that, C's win isn't so surprising or outrageous.
>>
>> Anyway, the example has no plausibility, at all.
>>
>> Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its plausibility.
>>
>> Yes, MMPO doesn't strictly always elect the CW, and I don't like that.
It's a distinct disadvantage. We expect better from a pairwise-count method.
>>
>> But with sincere voting, & with no indifference, the CWs (sincere CW)
always wins.
>>
>> For the CW to lose, it's necessary for one of hir pairwise comparisons
to have high turnout, & be relatively nearly tied. ...& for someone
else's pairwise comparisons to all be very low turnout & hir defeats nearly
tied.
>>
>> Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>> On Sep 17, 2016 1:51 PM, "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com>
wrote:
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> From: "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com>
>>> Date: Sep 17, 2016 12:52 PM
>>> Subject: MMPO objections
>>> To: <t@gmail.com>
>>> Cc:
>>>
>>> Though NEO, so far, to me at least, seems to show promise, it hasn't
been thoroughly checked out enough to be a proposal.
>>>
>>> But it's different with MMPO. We've heard people's best arguments
against MMPO, & it can be said to have already been well-discussed.
>>>
>>> No rank method's result will always look right. All will sometimes do
something ridiculous.
>>>
>>> A method optimized for 1 purpose or standard can't do well by other
standards.
>>>
>>> MMPO achieves what it achieves by looking only at pairwise
unpreferredness.
>>>
>>> It isn't a positional method, & so you can find an example in which it
does terribly, positionally.
>>>
>>> In Kevin's bad-example, it chooses someone twice as bottom-voted as the
other candidates, & nearly not top-voted at all.
>>>
>>> It certainly isn't a positional method
>>>
>>> MMPO isn't a pairwise-defeats method. So you can find an example where
it does terribly by pairwise defeats.
>>>
>>> In Kevin's example, it elects the Condorcet loser, who pairwise loses
to the others by 1000 to 1, if X = 1000.
>>>
>>> It certainly isn't a pairwise defeats method.
>>>
>>> We've been looking at pairwise defeats methods for so long that we
tend, maybe subconsciously, to evaluate by pairwise defeats standards.
>>>
>>> A "beats-diagram" shows
>>> an "=" sign between A & B. They have no defeat, but C has one.
>>>
>>> But look under that "=" sign. Half the voters bottom-vote A, & the
other half bottom-end vote B.
>>>
>>> Say two groups both despise eachother. Does that mutual despising
cancel out, making both groups un-despised?
>>>
>>> But that's the fallacy that the beats-diagram & its "=" sign allows you
to believe.
>>>
>>> If the A voters voted among themselves, between B & C, they'd choose C.
>>>
>>> If the B voters voted among themselves, between A & C, they'd choose C.
>>>
>>> C is the compromise preferred by the A voters, & by the C voters, to
eachother's candidates.
>>>
>>> Yes, it's natural to reject a low-favoriteness compromise. Rob Richie
would be proud.
>>>
>>> Of course this bad-example makes that compromise as little top-voted as
possible.
>>>
>>> I've told, here, why the bad-example isn't as bad as you think.
>>>
>>> It doesn't look good by standards other than the one by which it
achieves the elusive goal of MAM-like strategy, without chicken-dilemma.
>>>
>>> Distinguish between a harmless election of a low favoriteness
compromise, a compromise outcome that looks bad to an outside observer vs
an actual practical problem, one that will routinely
>>> make strategy problems for voters, and give tangibly (not just
aesthetically) bad results.
>>>
>>> When proposing better voting to a community of jurisdiction, of
whatever size, offer them a list of methods, telling the objections to
each, & their answers. ...& telling the advantages of each.
>>>
>>> It would be irresponsible to leave out one with an impressive, unique,
powerful combination of strategy advantages.
>>>
>>> Let the community, jts voters &/or the initiative proposal committee
choose for themselves. It isn't necessary to make decisions for them.
>>>
>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>>
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info
>>
>>
>>
>> No virus found in this message.
>> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
>> Version: 2016.0.7797 / Virus Database: 4656/13038 - Release Date:
09/18/16
>
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Wed, Sep 21, 2016 10:54 PM
Ok, the A voters' favorite is A, & it looks more right for hir to have a
50% chance of winning.
But, with everyone bottom-voted by at least half of the voters, no one's
very compelling.
Yes, ideally it should be A or B.
But in real life there's be someone more liked in the election. Absurd
result in a situation that would never happen.
On Sep 20, 2016 5:29 PM, "C.Benham" cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
Mike,
The MinMax Pairwise Opposition (MMPO) "bad example" we are talking about:
x: A
1: A=C
1: B=C
x: B
x = any number greater than 1. MMPO elects C.
On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by nearly
everyone?
How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the voters.
...& because it isn't a positional method.
Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
everyone else.
...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to each other's candidate.
C: There's no evidence on the ballots for that assertion.
Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its plausibility.
C: Not when it's that bad. And not even when it's merely very bad in such
a simple example. It is more understandable
and perhaps forgiveable for an algorithm to become "confused" in a
complicated example (with say, lots of candidates
and cycles within cycles).
Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
C: I don't agree with most of the premises in that question. Other
methods meet FBC and CD. What's so good about Later-no-Harm with a
random-fill incentive?
The result is completely outrageous and absurd.
The correct result is an A=B tie. All but 2 of the voters were wronged,
because their favourites should have a 50% probability of winning.
Chris Benham
On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
A few more comments:
Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by nearly
everyone?
How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the voters.
...& because it isn't a positional method.
Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
everyone else.
...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to eachother's candidate.
Given that, C's win isn't so surprising or outrageous.
Anyway, the example has no plausibility, at all.
Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its plausibility.
Yes, MMPO doesn't strictly always elect the CW, and I don't like that.
It's a distinct disadvantage. We expect better from a pairwise-count method.
But with sincere voting, & with no indifference, the CWs (sincere CW)
always wins.
For the CW to lose, it's necessary for one of hir pairwise comparisons to
have high turnout, & be relatively nearly tied. ...& for someone else's
pairwise comparisons to all be very low turnout & hir defeats nearly tied.
Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
Michael Ossipoff
On Sep 17, 2016 1:51 PM, "Michael Ossipoff" email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "Michael Ossipoff" email9648742@gmail.com
Date: Sep 17, 2016 12:52 PM
Subject: MMPO objections
To: t@gmail.com
Cc:
Though NEO, so far, to me at least, seems to show promise, it hasn't been
thoroughly checked out enough to be a proposal.
But it's different with MMPO. We've heard people's best arguments against
MMPO, & it can be said to have already been well-discussed.
No rank method's result will always look right. All will sometimes do
something ridiculous.
A method optimized for 1 purpose or standard can't do well by other
standards.
MMPO achieves what it achieves by looking only at pairwise
unpreferredness.
It isn't a positional method, & so you can find an example in which it
does terribly, positionally.
In Kevin's bad-example, it chooses someone twice as bottom-voted as the
other candidates, & nearly not top-voted at all.
It certainly isn't a positional method
MMPO isn't a pairwise-defeats method. So you can find an example where it
does terribly by pairwise defeats.
In Kevin's example, it elects the Condorcet loser, who pairwise loses to
the others by 1000 to 1, if X = 1000.
It certainly isn't a pairwise defeats method.
We've been looking at pairwise defeats methods for so long that we tend,
maybe subconsciously, to evaluate by pairwise defeats standards.
A "beats-diagram" shows
an "=" sign between A & B. They have no defeat, but C has one.
But look under that "=" sign. Half the voters bottom-vote A, & the other
half bottom-end vote B.
Say two groups both despise eachother. Does that mutual despising cancel
out, making both groups un-despised?
But that's the fallacy that the beats-diagram & its "=" sign allows you
to believe.
If the A voters voted among themselves, between B & C, they'd choose C.
If the B voters voted among themselves, between A & C, they'd choose C.
C is the compromise preferred by the A voters, & by the C voters, to
eachother's candidates.
Yes, it's natural to reject a low-favoriteness compromise. Rob Richie
would be proud.
Of course this bad-example makes that compromise as little top-voted as
possible.
I've told, here, why the bad-example isn't as bad as you think.
It doesn't look good by standards other than the one by which it achieves
the elusive goal of MAM-like strategy, without chicken-dilemma.
Distinguish between a harmless election of a low favoriteness compromise,
a compromise outcome that looks bad to an outside observer vs an actual
practical problem, one that will routinely
make strategy problems for voters, and give tangibly (not just
aesthetically) bad results.
When proposing better voting to a community of jurisdiction, of whatever
size, offer them a list of methods, telling the objections to each, & their
answers. ...& telling the advantages of each.
It would be irresponsible to leave out one with an impressive, unique,
powerful combination of strategy advantages.
Let the community, jts voters &/or the initiative proposal committee
choose for themselves. It isn't necessary to make decisions for them.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2016.0.7797 / Virus Database: 4656/13038 - Release Date: 09/18/16
Ok, the A voters' favorite is A, & it looks more right for hir to have a
50% chance of winning.
But, with everyone bottom-voted by at least half of the voters, no one's
very compelling.
Yes, ideally it should be A or B.
But in real life there's be someone more liked in the election. Absurd
result in a situation that would never happen.
On Sep 20, 2016 5:29 PM, "C.Benham" <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
> Mike,
>
> The MinMax Pairwise Opposition (MMPO) "bad example" we are talking about:
>
> x: A
> 1: A=C
> 1: B=C
> x: B
>
> x = any number greater than 1. MMPO elects C.
>
>
> On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by nearly
> everyone?
>
> How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the voters.
>
> ...& because it isn't a positional method.
>
> Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
> everyone else.
>
> ...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to each other's candidate.
>
>
> C: There's no evidence on the ballots for that assertion.
>
> Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its plausibility.
>
>
> C: Not when it's that bad. And not even when it's merely very bad in such
> a simple example. It is more understandable
> and perhaps forgiveable for an algorithm to become "confused" in a
> complicated example (with say, lots of candidates
> and cycles within cycles).
>
> Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
> because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
> anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
>
>
> C: I don't agree with most of the premises in that question. Other
> methods meet FBC and CD. What's so good about Later-no-Harm with a
> random-fill incentive?
>
> The result is completely outrageous and absurd.
>
> The correct result is an A=B tie. All but 2 of the voters were wronged,
> because their favourites should have a 50% probability of winning.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
>
> On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> A few more comments:
>
> Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by nearly
> everyone?
>
> How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the voters.
>
> ...& because it isn't a positional method.
>
> Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
> everyone else.
>
> ...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to eachother's candidate.
>
> Given that, C's win isn't so surprising or outrageous.
>
> Anyway, the example has no plausibility, at all.
>
> Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its plausibility.
>
> Yes, MMPO doesn't strictly always elect the CW, and I don't like that.
> It's a distinct disadvantage. We expect better from a pairwise-count method.
>
> But with sincere voting, & with no indifference, the CWs (sincere CW)
> always wins.
>
> For the CW to lose, it's necessary for one of hir pairwise comparisons to
> have high turnout, & be relatively nearly tied. ...& for someone else's
> pairwise comparisons to all be very low turnout & hir defeats nearly tied.
>
> Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
> because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
> anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
>
> Michael Ossipoff
> On Sep 17, 2016 1:51 PM, "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com>
>> Date: Sep 17, 2016 12:52 PM
>> Subject: MMPO objections
>> To: <t@gmail.com>
>> Cc:
>>
>> Though NEO, so far, to me at least, seems to show promise, it hasn't been
>> thoroughly checked out enough to be a proposal.
>>
>> But it's different with MMPO. We've heard people's best arguments against
>> MMPO, & it can be said to have already been well-discussed.
>>
>> No rank method's result will always look right. All will sometimes do
>> something ridiculous.
>>
>> A method optimized for 1 purpose or standard can't do well by other
>> standards.
>>
>> MMPO achieves what it achieves by looking only at pairwise
>> unpreferredness.
>>
>> It isn't a positional method, & so you can find an example in which it
>> does terribly, positionally.
>>
>> In Kevin's bad-example, it chooses someone twice as bottom-voted as the
>> other candidates, & nearly not top-voted at all.
>>
>> It certainly isn't a positional method
>>
>> MMPO isn't a pairwise-defeats method. So you can find an example where it
>> does terribly by pairwise defeats.
>>
>> In Kevin's example, it elects the Condorcet loser, who pairwise loses to
>> the others by 1000 to 1, if X = 1000.
>>
>> It certainly isn't a pairwise defeats method.
>>
>> We've been looking at pairwise defeats methods for so long that we tend,
>> maybe subconsciously, to evaluate by pairwise defeats standards.
>>
>> A "beats-diagram" shows
>> an "=" sign between A & B. They have no defeat, but C has one.
>>
>> But look under that "=" sign. Half the voters bottom-vote A, & the other
>> half bottom-end vote B.
>>
>> Say two groups both despise eachother. Does that mutual despising cancel
>> out, making both groups un-despised?
>>
>> But that's the fallacy that the beats-diagram & its "=" sign allows you
>> to believe.
>>
>> If the A voters voted among themselves, between B & C, they'd choose C.
>>
>> If the B voters voted among themselves, between A & C, they'd choose C.
>>
>> C is the compromise preferred by the A voters, & by the C voters, to
>> eachother's candidates.
>>
>> Yes, it's natural to reject a low-favoriteness compromise. Rob Richie
>> would be proud.
>>
>> Of course this bad-example makes that compromise as little top-voted as
>> possible.
>>
>> I've told, here, why the bad-example isn't as bad as you think.
>>
>> It doesn't look good by standards other than the one by which it achieves
>> the elusive goal of MAM-like strategy, without chicken-dilemma.
>>
>> Distinguish between a harmless election of a low favoriteness compromise,
>> a compromise outcome that looks bad to an outside observer vs an actual
>> practical problem, one that will routinely
>> make strategy problems for voters, and give tangibly (not just
>> aesthetically) bad results.
>>
>> When proposing better voting to a community of jurisdiction, of whatever
>> size, offer them a list of methods, telling the objections to each, & their
>> answers. ...& telling the advantages of each.
>>
>> It would be irresponsible to leave out one with an impressive, unique,
>> powerful combination of strategy advantages.
>>
>> Let the community, jts voters &/or the initiative proposal committee
>> choose for themselves. It isn't necessary to make decisions for them.
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
>
> No virus found in this message.
> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
> Version: 2016.0.7797 / Virus Database: 4656/13038 - Release Date: 09/18/16
>
>
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Wed, Sep 21, 2016 11:37 PM
I didn't say that C is the best winner. But you said it's an "outrage".
Half the voters saying C is just as good as A, and the other half saying C
is just as good as B...Surely that should dampen your outrage.
The A voters could have voted A>B>C, had they cared.
No surprise that it doesn't give the results of a positional method or a
pairwise-defeats method. Best? No, but your outrage seems a bit exaggerated.
Michael Ossipoff
On Sep 20, 2016 5:29 PM, "C.Benham" cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
Mike,
The MinMax Pairwise Opposition (MMPO) "bad example" we are talking about:
x: A
1: A=C
1: B=C
x: B
x = any number greater than 1. MMPO elects C.
On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by nearly
everyone?
How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the voters.
...& because it isn't a positional method.
Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
everyone else.
...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to each other's candidate.
C: There's no evidence on the ballots for that assertion.
Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its plausibility.
C: Not when it's that bad. And not even when it's merely very bad in such
a simple example. It is more understandable
and perhaps forgiveable for an algorithm to become "confused" in a
complicated example (with say, lots of candidates
and cycles within cycles).
Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
C: I don't agree with most of the premises in that question. Other
methods meet FBC and CD. What's so good about Later-no-Harm with a
random-fill incentive?
The result is completely outrageous and absurd.
The correct result is an A=B tie. All but 2 of the voters were wronged,
because their favourites should have a 50% probability of winning.
Chris Benham
On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
A few more comments:
Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by nearly
everyone?
How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the voters.
...& because it isn't a positional method.
Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
everyone else.
...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to eachother's candidate.
Given that, C's win isn't so surprising or outrageous.
Anyway, the example has no plausibility, at all.
Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its plausibility.
Yes, MMPO doesn't strictly always elect the CW, and I don't like that.
It's a distinct disadvantage. We expect better from a pairwise-count method.
But with sincere voting, & with no indifference, the CWs (sincere CW)
always wins.
For the CW to lose, it's necessary for one of hir pairwise comparisons to
have high turnout, & be relatively nearly tied. ...& for someone else's
pairwise comparisons to all be very low turnout & hir defeats nearly tied.
Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
Michael Ossipoff
On Sep 17, 2016 1:51 PM, "Michael Ossipoff" email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "Michael Ossipoff" email9648742@gmail.com
Date: Sep 17, 2016 12:52 PM
Subject: MMPO objections
To: t@gmail.com
Cc:
Though NEO, so far, to me at least, seems to show promise, it hasn't been
thoroughly checked out enough to be a proposal.
But it's different with MMPO. We've heard people's best arguments against
MMPO, & it can be said to have already been well-discussed.
No rank method's result will always look right. All will sometimes do
something ridiculous.
A method optimized for 1 purpose or standard can't do well by other
standards.
MMPO achieves what it achieves by looking only at pairwise
unpreferredness.
It isn't a positional method, & so you can find an example in which it
does terribly, positionally.
In Kevin's bad-example, it chooses someone twice as bottom-voted as the
other candidates, & nearly not top-voted at all.
It certainly isn't a positional method
MMPO isn't a pairwise-defeats method. So you can find an example where it
does terribly by pairwise defeats.
In Kevin's example, it elects the Condorcet loser, who pairwise loses to
the others by 1000 to 1, if X = 1000.
It certainly isn't a pairwise defeats method.
We've been looking at pairwise defeats methods for so long that we tend,
maybe subconsciously, to evaluate by pairwise defeats standards.
A "beats-diagram" shows
an "=" sign between A & B. They have no defeat, but C has one.
But look under that "=" sign. Half the voters bottom-vote A, & the other
half bottom-end vote B.
Say two groups both despise eachother. Does that mutual despising cancel
out, making both groups un-despised?
But that's the fallacy that the beats-diagram & its "=" sign allows you
to believe.
If the A voters voted among themselves, between B & C, they'd choose C.
If the B voters voted among themselves, between A & C, they'd choose C.
C is the compromise preferred by the A voters, & by the C voters, to
eachother's candidates.
Yes, it's natural to reject a low-favoriteness compromise. Rob Richie
would be proud.
Of course this bad-example makes that compromise as little top-voted as
possible.
I've told, here, why the bad-example isn't as bad as you think.
It doesn't look good by standards other than the one by which it achieves
the elusive goal of MAM-like strategy, without chicken-dilemma.
Distinguish between a harmless election of a low favoriteness compromise,
a compromise outcome that looks bad to an outside observer vs an actual
practical problem, one that will routinely
make strategy problems for voters, and give tangibly (not just
aesthetically) bad results.
When proposing better voting to a community of jurisdiction, of whatever
size, offer them a list of methods, telling the objections to each, & their
answers. ...& telling the advantages of each.
It would be irresponsible to leave out one with an impressive, unique,
powerful combination of strategy advantages.
Let the community, jts voters &/or the initiative proposal committee
choose for themselves. It isn't necessary to make decisions for them.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2016.0.7797 / Virus Database: 4656/13038 - Release Date: 09/18/16
I didn't say that C is the best winner. But you said it's an "outrage".
Half the voters saying C is just as good as A, and the other half saying C
is just as good as B...Surely that should dampen your outrage.
The A voters could have voted A>B>C, had they cared.
No surprise that it doesn't give the results of a positional method or a
pairwise-defeats method. Best? No, but your outrage seems a bit exaggerated.
Michael Ossipoff
On Sep 20, 2016 5:29 PM, "C.Benham" <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
> Mike,
>
> The MinMax Pairwise Opposition (MMPO) "bad example" we are talking about:
>
> x: A
> 1: A=C
> 1: B=C
> x: B
>
> x = any number greater than 1. MMPO elects C.
>
>
> On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by nearly
> everyone?
>
> How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the voters.
>
> ...& because it isn't a positional method.
>
> Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
> everyone else.
>
> ...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to each other's candidate.
>
>
> C: There's no evidence on the ballots for that assertion.
>
> Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its plausibility.
>
>
> C: Not when it's that bad. And not even when it's merely very bad in such
> a simple example. It is more understandable
> and perhaps forgiveable for an algorithm to become "confused" in a
> complicated example (with say, lots of candidates
> and cycles within cycles).
>
> Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
> because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
> anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
>
>
> C: I don't agree with most of the premises in that question. Other
> methods meet FBC and CD. What's so good about Later-no-Harm with a
> random-fill incentive?
>
> The result is completely outrageous and absurd.
>
> The correct result is an A=B tie. All but 2 of the voters were wronged,
> because their favourites should have a 50% probability of winning.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
>
> On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> A few more comments:
>
> Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by nearly
> everyone?
>
> How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the voters.
>
> ...& because it isn't a positional method.
>
> Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
> everyone else.
>
> ...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to eachother's candidate.
>
> Given that, C's win isn't so surprising or outrageous.
>
> Anyway, the example has no plausibility, at all.
>
> Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its plausibility.
>
> Yes, MMPO doesn't strictly always elect the CW, and I don't like that.
> It's a distinct disadvantage. We expect better from a pairwise-count method.
>
> But with sincere voting, & with no indifference, the CWs (sincere CW)
> always wins.
>
> For the CW to lose, it's necessary for one of hir pairwise comparisons to
> have high turnout, & be relatively nearly tied. ...& for someone else's
> pairwise comparisons to all be very low turnout & hir defeats nearly tied.
>
> Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
> because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
> anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
>
> Michael Ossipoff
> On Sep 17, 2016 1:51 PM, "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742@gmail.com>
>> Date: Sep 17, 2016 12:52 PM
>> Subject: MMPO objections
>> To: <t@gmail.com>
>> Cc:
>>
>> Though NEO, so far, to me at least, seems to show promise, it hasn't been
>> thoroughly checked out enough to be a proposal.
>>
>> But it's different with MMPO. We've heard people's best arguments against
>> MMPO, & it can be said to have already been well-discussed.
>>
>> No rank method's result will always look right. All will sometimes do
>> something ridiculous.
>>
>> A method optimized for 1 purpose or standard can't do well by other
>> standards.
>>
>> MMPO achieves what it achieves by looking only at pairwise
>> unpreferredness.
>>
>> It isn't a positional method, & so you can find an example in which it
>> does terribly, positionally.
>>
>> In Kevin's bad-example, it chooses someone twice as bottom-voted as the
>> other candidates, & nearly not top-voted at all.
>>
>> It certainly isn't a positional method
>>
>> MMPO isn't a pairwise-defeats method. So you can find an example where it
>> does terribly by pairwise defeats.
>>
>> In Kevin's example, it elects the Condorcet loser, who pairwise loses to
>> the others by 1000 to 1, if X = 1000.
>>
>> It certainly isn't a pairwise defeats method.
>>
>> We've been looking at pairwise defeats methods for so long that we tend,
>> maybe subconsciously, to evaluate by pairwise defeats standards.
>>
>> A "beats-diagram" shows
>> an "=" sign between A & B. They have no defeat, but C has one.
>>
>> But look under that "=" sign. Half the voters bottom-vote A, & the other
>> half bottom-end vote B.
>>
>> Say two groups both despise eachother. Does that mutual despising cancel
>> out, making both groups un-despised?
>>
>> But that's the fallacy that the beats-diagram & its "=" sign allows you
>> to believe.
>>
>> If the A voters voted among themselves, between B & C, they'd choose C.
>>
>> If the B voters voted among themselves, between A & C, they'd choose C.
>>
>> C is the compromise preferred by the A voters, & by the C voters, to
>> eachother's candidates.
>>
>> Yes, it's natural to reject a low-favoriteness compromise. Rob Richie
>> would be proud.
>>
>> Of course this bad-example makes that compromise as little top-voted as
>> possible.
>>
>> I've told, here, why the bad-example isn't as bad as you think.
>>
>> It doesn't look good by standards other than the one by which it achieves
>> the elusive goal of MAM-like strategy, without chicken-dilemma.
>>
>> Distinguish between a harmless election of a low favoriteness compromise,
>> a compromise outcome that looks bad to an outside observer vs an actual
>> practical problem, one that will routinely
>> make strategy problems for voters, and give tangibly (not just
>> aesthetically) bad results.
>>
>> When proposing better voting to a community of jurisdiction, of whatever
>> size, offer them a list of methods, telling the objections to each, & their
>> answers. ...& telling the advantages of each.
>>
>> It would be irresponsible to leave out one with an impressive, unique,
>> powerful combination of strategy advantages.
>>
>> Let the community, jts voters &/or the initiative proposal committee
>> choose for themselves. It isn't necessary to make decisions for them.
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
>
> No virus found in this message.
> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
> Version: 2016.0.7797 / Virus Database: 4656/13038 - Release Date: 09/18/16
>
>
>
