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Variable Inferred Approval Sorted Margins Elimination

C
C.Benham
Wed, Jun 19, 2019 5:59 PM

This is my favourite Condorcet method that uses high-intensity Score
ballots (say 0-100):

*Voters fill out high-intensity Score ballots (say 0-100) with many more
available distinct scores
(or rating slots) than there are candidates. Default score is zero.

  1. Inferring ranking from scores, if there is a pairwise beats-all
    candidate that candidate wins.

  2. Otherwise infer approval from score by interpreting each ballot as
    showing approval for the
    candidates it scores above the average (mean) of the scores it gives.
    Then use Approval Sorted Margins to order the candidates and eliminate
    the lowest-ordered
    candidate.

  3. Among remaining candidates, ignoring eliminated candidates, repeat
    steps 1 and 2 until
    there is a winner.*

To save time we can start by eliminating all the non-members of the
Smith set and stop when
we have ordered the last 3 candidates and then elect the highest-ordered
one.

https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins

In simple 3-candidate case this is the same as Approval Sorted Margins
where the voters signal
their approval cut-offs  just by having a large gap in the scores they give.

That method fulfils Forest's recent 3-candidate, 3-groups of voters
scenarios requirements, resists Burial
relatively well and meets mono-raise. The motivation behind this version
is to minimise any disadvantage
held by naive (and/or uninformed) sincere voters.

Chris Benham

Forest Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20What%20are%20some%20simple%20methods%20that%20accomplish%20the%20following%0A%20conditions%3F&In-Reply-To=%3CCAP29onet%2BO9hCZJ6hvNnnpUWNyrDkKa9xFXrX5P-RPoF6ndtfw%40mail.gmail.com%3E
/Thu May 30 /

In the example profiles below 100 = P+Q+R, and  50>P>Q>R>0.

I am interested in simple methods that always ...

(1) elect candidate A given the following profile:
P: A
Q: B>>C
R: C,

and
(2) elect candidate C given
P: A
Q: B>C>>
R: C,

and
(3) elect candidate B given
P: A
Q: B>>C  (or B>C)
R: C>>B. (or C>B)


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This is my favourite Condorcet method that uses high-intensity Score ballots (say 0-100): *Voters fill out high-intensity Score ballots (say 0-100) with many more available distinct scores (or rating slots) than there are candidates. Default score is zero. 1. Inferring ranking from scores, if there is a pairwise beats-all candidate that candidate wins. 2. Otherwise infer approval from score by interpreting each ballot as showing approval for the candidates it scores above the average (mean) of the scores it gives. Then use Approval Sorted Margins to order the candidates and eliminate the lowest-ordered candidate. 3. Among remaining candidates, ignoring eliminated candidates, repeat steps 1 and 2 until there is a winner.* To save time we can start by eliminating all the non-members of the Smith set and stop when we have ordered the last 3 candidates and then elect the highest-ordered one. https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins In simple 3-candidate case this is the same as Approval Sorted Margins where the voters signal their approval cut-offs  just by having a large gap in the scores they give. That method fulfils Forest's recent 3-candidate, 3-groups of voters scenarios requirements, resists Burial relatively well and meets mono-raise. The motivation behind this version is to minimise any disadvantage held by naive (and/or uninformed) sincere voters. Chris Benham *Forest Simmons* fsimmons at pcc.edu <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20What%20are%20some%20simple%20methods%20that%20accomplish%20the%20following%0A%20conditions%3F&In-Reply-To=%3CCAP29onet%2BO9hCZJ6hvNnnpUWNyrDkKa9xFXrX5P-RPoF6ndtfw%40mail.gmail.com%3E> /Thu May 30 / > In the example profiles below 100 = P+Q+R, and  50>P>Q>R>0. > > I am interested in simple methods that always ... > > (1) elect candidate A given the following profile: > P: A > Q: B>>C > R: C, > > and > (2) elect candidate C given > P: A > Q: B>C>> > R: C, > > and > (3) elect candidate B given > P: A > Q: B>>C  (or B>C) > R: C>>B. (or C>B) > --- This email has been checked for viruses by AVG. https://www.avg.com