I think I just did it! Let's have some strategic manipulation stats with a similar setting as before: impartial culture, 97 voters, 5 candidates, 5k elections, 32k coalitional tries per election. Here's Smith,IRV: Burial, no compromise: 398 0.0796 Compromise, no burial: 1237 0.2474 Burial and compromise: 4 0.0008 Two-sided: 0 0 Other coalition strats: 791 0.1582 ========================================== Manipulable elections: 2430 0.486 As I mentioned, I would expect pushover/nonmonotonicity to appear as "other coalition strats", because nonmonotonicity is either of the form "A doesn't win, lowering A makes him win" or "A wins, raising him makes A lose". Let the election where A loses be called "before" and the one where A wins "after". Then if voters who prefer A to the winner can make A win by going from before to after, then that's a valid other strategy and would show up under Other. Now, here's Smith,Method X: Burial, no compromise: 449 0.091614 Compromise, no burial: 1092 0.222812 Burial and compromise: 40 0.0081616 Two-sided: 878 0.179147 Other coalition strats: 0 0 ========================================== Manipulable elections: 2459 0.501734 So roughly the same strategy susceptibility as IRV, *but no Other strats*. So it's very likely there's no pushover, and thus the method is monotone. What is this method X? More to come :-) -km