Re: (22) APR: Steve's 22th dialogue with Richard Fobes > Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2015 18:12:57 -0800 > From: <Richard Fobes> ElectionMethods@VoteFair.org > To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > CC: stevebosworth@hotmail.com > Subject: Re: (21) APR: Steve's 20th dialogue with Richard Fobes > > On 11/3/2015 9:16 AM, steve bosworth wrote: > > In this 21^st dialogue, let's return to the question of whether APR or > > VoteFair provides the fairer system for electing multi-winners, e.g. the > > 80 members of California’s legislative assembly. In this post, I wish to > > focus only on one element of your reply to our 20^th dialogue, namely, > > the question of whether or not your ‘VoteFair representation ranking’ > > needlessly wastes votes: > > [... see below ...] S: > > In this context and in the light of this clarification, do you accept > > that APR is ‘fairer’ than VoteFair? > R: > If politics were one-dimensional – which I'll explain shortly – then > your APR method would work well. S: Later, I will argue that one of the advantages of APR over other systems (including VoteFair) is that it allows more “dimensions” to be represented and thus to become part of the binding majority synthesis (laws) produced by the legislative assembly. > […] > > > S: […] > > However, unlike APR, each of your larger electoral districts from which > > 2 ‘districtwide’ seats are elected do not entirely eliminate the > > possibility of relatively safe-seats being produced by gerrymandering > > or by chance. I understand (by using ‘cross-district popularity ranking’ > > (page 5/20 of Chap. 20) that VoteFair representation elects the 2 > > statewide seats by discovering the most popular candidates for the > > largest party underrepresent by the district elections alone. > R: > VoteFair ranking is not vulnerable to gerrymandering, of either the > intentional or unintentional type. Any change in a district boundary > that helps one political party within a district will be offset by a > corresponding loss in the statewide seats. > S: Yes, VoteFair would probably “offset” such help to one party to some extent but APR structurally never gives any special help to any party, “association” or candidate. R:> Later you refer to an example in my book and then refer to a quote in my > book: > > ... 'This leaves the 10 Democratic voters > > appropriately unrepresented ….’ A similar flaw is repeated later on page > > 10/20 of Chap. 20 when the ‘10 voters for ‘White party’ receive no > > representation. Here, you again admit that this application of ‘VoteFair > > representation’ has not ‘proportionately’ produced the ‘ideal match’ > > between ‘voters with their party preferences’….. S: Do you now accept that these quotations are admissions that VoteFair wastes some vote? > R: > All the examples in my book were chosen for use in the United States > where politics is very multidimensional (which I'll get to in a moment) > and where too many political parties would lead to a different kind of > corruption (compared to the kind that now exists). S: All politics outside the US is also “multidimensional” and APR recognizes and represents this even more than does VoteFair. R:> If a large number of political parties were appropriate, then increasing > the number of statewide seats increases the closeness to a mathematical > "ideal." Near the end of the book I point out that if VoteFair ranking > were used in European nations where such mathematical idealism already > dominates, then the number of statewide seats should be increased (which > results in a corresponding decrease in the number of district-specific > seats). > >[….] > In other words, candidate-specific "safe seats" can only exist when the > primary election (or nomination process) is unfair. Both VoteFair > ranking and your APR method eliminate this kind of unfairness. S: I agree that VoteFair would greatly reduce such unfairness but only APR would “eliminate” it. > R:> Now I'll explain the one-dimensional versus multidimensional issue. S: You seem to be correctly seeing APR as making it easier for small parties to be proportionately elected. This seems also to have led you incorrectly to assume that all small parties are “one-dimensional” or single-issue parties. I accept that small parties are more likely to be single-issue parties and that some of these might be large enough to be proportionately elected to the assembly by APR. However, the wider composition of an APR assembly would quickly convince any reps of these parties that, in order for their narrow concerns to be addressed by the assembly, they must present them as an essential part of the multi-dimensional concerns of a majority of the other reps who constituted the assembly (please see my last addition below to this post). > R: > Using your example of electing representatives to the California > legislature, an example of one-dimensional politics would be if > everyone's only political concern was about one issue. > > To borrow a high-profile issue from current Presidential-campaign news, > let's suppose that the one issue facing the California legislature is > whether or not to build a wall between California and Mexico. In this > case your APR method would produce very fair results. That's because it > simply transfers each voter's preference onto the voting that occurs > within the legislature. S: Yes! If so, and given my newly added response above, I do not then see why below you simply “recommend increasing the number of statewide seats”? APR seems to address this problem more efficiently. > R:> VoteFair ranking would also handle this situation well, although for > this one-dimensional situation I would recommend increasing the number > of statewide seats. > > In real-life politics, there are many, many issues. This is what I > refer to as multidimensional. S: Yes, and APR would allow more of these dimensions openly and proportionately to play their part in the legislative process (Please see my last addition to this post). > R:> Even if each issue were simplified into one dimension (which is, alas, > what many people do in their minds), those multiple issues still create > a multidimensional political situation. S: Yes, and this “situation” would be openly represented in the composition of an APR assembly. > R:> To better understand the jump from one-dimensional (single-issue) > politics to multidimensional politics, let's consider two-dimensional > politics. > > In the United States -- and most European nations -- there is a > left-to-right dimension, and an up-versus-down dimension. These can be > thought of as a two-dimensional situation, although each of the two > dimensions is actually multidimensional. > > The left-versus-right dimension mostly corresponds to ethical and > religious issues such as gender inequality, immigration, sexual > orientation, marijuana usage, access to assault weapons, etc. > > The up-versus-down dimension corresponds to economic fairness, where the > voters are up above all the political parties and want economic > fairness, and the biggest campaign contributors are below all the > political parties and those biggest campaign contributors want to > preserve economic advantages for the businesses they own. > S: The many more “dimensions” that APR would give a proportional vote to in the assembly would also include your up/down and right/left agendas (please see the last addition to this post). R:> ….not all rich people are in the group of people who supply the > biggest campaign contributions.) > S: Also we agree, in general, about the distorting and corrupting effect that big private money can have on the political process. Consequently, perhaps both of us want all electoral campaigns to be limited to those which would be publically financed and proportionately assisted by public media (e.g. like the BBC). However, let’s save this issue for a separate dialogue if we disagree about this. Then, I would contend that APR’s “associational” structure would at least make it no more vulnerable to corruption by private money than is VoteFair. Clearly, you have asserted the opposite but I have not yet seen your explanation of exactly how APR’s features make it more vulnerable to such corruption. (Again, please see the last addition to this post.) [….] R:> A big weakness of your APR method is that politicians would find it > easier to play this game of talking about left-versus-right "positions" > and then acting according to unpredictable preferences (such as their > own opinions, the preferences of their biggest campaign contributors, or > the opinions of the people they associate with). > Why can this occur in your APR method? Politicians can behave as > "mavericks" without needing to be at least partially aligned with a > well-understood political party whose actions have been watched for many > years. … S: No. I see APR as making it more difficult for an elected congressperson to display “unpredictable preferences”. This is because of the closer average ideological fit it provides between each congressperson and his or her electorate. This “fit” would make the electorate more likely to expect their rep’s behavior to conform to the promises given during the election. At the same time, APR provides a ready way for voters to replace a disappointing (“maverick”) rep by a better one during the next general election. > R: >Yes, politicians under APR would be aligned with organizations, > but as I've explained before there would be "too many" organizations for > the voters to keep track of. S: The number of “organizations” elected would only be those seen by citizens as representing their own hopes and fears. As now or with VoteFair, different APR citizens would also have different capacities to “keep track”. Also note that APR still allows a citizen, if they so wish, to “keep track” of the behavior of only the one congressperson she most favors and has helped to elect. [….] R: > … too-many situation occurs in U.S. politics where minor political > parties are mostly focused on a few would-be politicians whose views > dominate the party. In other words, minor parties are difficult to > characterize compared to large political parties where lots of > politicians have to work together in a coordinated way. S: Please see the last addition to this post for how an APR assembly is likely to be one in which “lots of politicians [would] work together in a coordinated way”. R: > VoteFair ranking is intentionally designed to limit the number of > political parties who actually get their candidates elected. But it > does this in a way that lists a greater number of minor political > parties on the ballot. …. S: Limiting the number of political parties arbitrarily is not a virtue when this prevents some citizens from being represented most faithfully. APR only limits the number of “associations” (e.g parties) to the number that have received sufficient support during APR’s primary election. [….] > >S: At both of these points, your > > meaning of ‘fair’ seems to conflict with the more usual meaning you > > appropriately seem to give to it in other contexts (and which I also > > endorse), namely, each person must be treated equally and represented as > > accurately as possible. [...] > R: > Both VoteFair ranking and your APR method "treats each voter equally." S: Yes, VoteFair “treats each voter equally” within the limitation of its own system. However, as illustrated by the above quotations from your book, it still leads to some voters not being represented at all, i.e. it wastes some votes. This contrasts with APR which allows each and every voter’s vote to continue to count both mathematically and qualitatively in the legislative assembly. > R: > As for "[representing] each person as accurately as possible," in my > biased opinion, VoteFair ranking produces more representative results. > Of course "representative results" is an ambiguous term, yet I can > imagine that it's possible to measure "representativeness," although I > don't know exactly how this would be done. S: I assume we agree that that when a citizen sees a member of the assembly as speaking and acting in the ways entirely approved by that citizen, then we would say that that member represents that citizen as completely as possible. As you know, APR allows each citizen to guarantee this by adding her vote to the “weighted vote” of the member she most trusts to speak and act in this way. VoteFair does not do this as efficiently. > R:> A measure of representativeness should NOT be done -- as it now is done > in Europe -- by simplistically assuming that each voter's position on > multiple issues can be categorized as fitting into one of the existing > political parties. S: Correct, but APR was constructed to correct this “simplistic assumption” by party-list PR systems. > [….] S: I hope the following last addition to this post will help to explain why I see APR as most likely to help elect a legislative assembly that would 1) be less corrupted by private money; 2) be composed of reps who could be more easily held to account by their respective electorates, 3) be composed of reps more skilled at explaining the merits of their own agendas to their fellow reps, and more determined to form the alliances and to make the compromises necessary so as to be an essential part of a majority that can legislate at least part of their own respective agendas; and thus 4) and assembly that would be more likely to make rational and evidence based laws. This is because, and in addition to APR offering both maximal proportionality and maximal representativeness for each citizen: APR: Finding Common Ground and Forming a Working Majority Coalition With regard to finding common ground and forming a working majority in the assembly with ideologically different congresspersons, paradoxically, the advantage that each APR member of the House is likely to have is that he knows that he has been elected by citizens who expect and trust him to work and vote to promote their common scale of values. As elaborated below, this ideological bond between each citizen and her rep would seem more likely to provide the kind of congresspersons to engage in the kind of productive debates and negotiations in the House to form a majority coalition to help solve the real problems facing the country. This advantage is enhanced during APR’s general election when each citizen guarantees that her vote will be added to the ‘weighted vote’ in the legislative assembly of her most favored representative (or the one most favored by her first choice but eliminated candidate). It should also be understood that a foundation for the growth of this qualitative advantage would have been provided earlier by the way APR recruits its candidates. Firstly, APR’s primary election discovers the voluntary organizations in the country that are most trusted by its citizens. It then helps politically to energizes these organizations by recognizing them as the official electoral ‘associations’ through which each citizen will later elect their own congressperson. This recognition, in turn, should stimulate more attractive candidates to seek to represent both one of these associations and the citizens with whom they have an ideological bond. In contrast to other electoral systems, APR’s later election of the most favored of these better candidates would seem also to combine to raise the average quality of representation in the assembly even further, both from the points of view of citizens and associations. Additionally: The growth of these closer bonds between citizens and their representatives would seem to be assisted by another element of the “bottom-up” primary election itself. It asks citizens to start to familiarize themselves with the existing members, officials, and other potential candidates of their preferred organizations months before each voter has to finalize her ranking of candidates during the general election. If so, the average breadth and depth of knowledge so acquired by voters in order to rank individual candidates would also seem likely to be greater than is generally acquired by citizens using other electoral systems. The average closer bond between each citizen using APR and her rep would also seem to grow partly as a result of the time between APR’s two elections. These months would allow each association, its candidates and its registered voters to coordinate their thinking and planning about how best to run their common campaign in the coming general election. Because an APR congressperson would be more clearly expected to work and vote to promote the scale of values he shares with his largely homogeneous electorate, he would seem to be both more able and likely to negotiate solutions to common problems together with fellow but ideologically different congresspersons. This is because each APR rep would probably enjoy more trust from his electorate. Consequently, each member’s explanation of why he and his electorate should support a given compromise solution to a common problem is more likely to be accepted by this electorate. While no one may see the compromise as being perfect, each congressperson and his electorate is more likely to accept that it at least provides net benefits for each ideologically different sponsor and his electorate. A trusting voter is more likely to believe her own congressperson’s claim that a given compromise is necessary. This closer bond between each rep and his electorate would also seem to make each congressperson’s work in the assembly more focused and known to be backed by his association and his electors. This greater clarity and focus would seem to help each APR congressperson to present the strongest possible case for his legislative proposals to the other members of the House. Consequently, an assembly composed of such able, different, well informed, clashing, and focused reps would seem to provide an optimal debating and negotiating chamber for the production of creative and evidence based solutions to common problems. The wisdom of any decisions resulting from this deliberative process is also likely to be aided by the simple fact that it would take place in an assembly whose composition most accurately reflects the real variety and intensity of the concerns of all citizens. The extra ability with which APR reps would seem to be able to negotiate compromises, would also seem to make it more likely that APR congresspersons would respond to the imperative to form a working majority in the assembly. Without such a majority coalition, any wise legislative solutions to problems that such rational deliberations might have discovered could not be passed into law. Each APR rep is more likely to see that if he is not a part of the majority that will shape the assembly’s binding decisions, his own agenda, and that of his electorate, will not be advanced. In a parliamentary system, the formation of such a coalition also has the advantage that the assembly can ensure that the government (the executive organ of the state) will be led by a chief executive (prime minister) who can be most trusted to apply the laws as expected by the assembly. In summary, it is because APR is more likely to produce, on average, a closer ideological fit between each citizen and her congressperson that APR is more likely to help solve the real problems facing the country. They are more likely to do this because of the greater expectation on the part of their different electorates that progress must actually be made with respect to the goals of each of the ideological different electorates who elected them. To do this, compromises must be made and a working majority coalition formed. The likelihood of this happening using APR contrasts with the gridlock that is frequently produced by the more defuse, vague, and often conflicting agendas held by the congresspersons and their electors using existing electoral systems. Finally, APR’s primary elections and associations should also help to reduce the sometimes anti-democratic power of great wealth, celebrity, and the mass media. I see this as likely given the extent to which APR’s ‘associations’ would emerge from previously existing voluntary organizations in society. These associations could benefit from the loyalties among the population such organizations had enjoyed prior to them being recognized as 'associations'. Presumably, many of these organizations would already have some communication and mobilization resources that are entirely independent of celebrity, the richest sections of society, and the mass media. Thus, the adoption of APR would probably help to reduce the relative power of these sometimes anti-democratic forces in determining how people and their representatives vote. APR’s official political recognition of these voluntary organizations would seem to assist many citizens more firmly, securely, and independently to see that their own abiding interests are best promoted and protected through the associational and representational connections validated by APR. What do you think? Steve P.S. If you are interested in considering how certain additional constitutional understands might make it even more likely that APR reps would form themselves into a working majority coalition, please ask me also to email to you my attachment called, '15-secure-executive'.

Steve, you don't seem to be carefully reading what I write. As an example, I wrote: > R: > VoteFair ranking is intentionally designed to limit the number of >> political parties who actually get their candidates elected. But it >> does this in a way that lists a greater number of minor political >> parties on the ballot. …. Your reply was: > S:Limiting the number of political parties arbitrarily is not a virtue > when this prevents some citizens from being represented most > faithfully. APR only limits the number of “associations” (e.g parties) to > the number that have received sufficient support during APR’s primary > election. VoteFair ranking does not "arbitrarily" limit the number of parties. Please re-read the chapter titled "It's Party Time!: Voting For Parties And Keeping Ballots Short" (in "Ending The Hidden Unfairness In U.S. Elections"). It explains how VoteFair party ranking carefully(!) identifies which political parties deserve to have candidates on the ballot. (And it explains how the method prevents large parties from having "shadow" parties whose purpose would be to reduce the number of candidates from small parties.) Steve, another pattern in your messages is that you repeatedly claim advantages for your APR method as if they apply to a comparison with VoteFair ranking, even though they are really just advantages over current voting methods. (By current methods I mean the ones commonly used in the U.S. and Europe.) Specifically, your following claims for APR also apply to VoteFair ranking (if the word "association" is replaced by "party"): > .... a foundation for the growth of this qualitative > advantage would have been provided earlier by the way [the method] recruits its > candidates. > .... [the] primary election discovers the ... organizations in > the country that are most trusted by its citizens. > ... should > stimulate more attractive candidates ... > ... [the] election of the > most favored of these better candidates would seem also to combine to > raise the average quality of representation in the assembly .... > ... closer bonds between citizens and their > representatives ... > ... It asks citizens to start to > familiarize themselves with the existing members, officials, and other > potential candidates of their preferred organizations months before each > voter has to finalize her ranking of candidates during the general > election. > ... [time] would allow each association, its candidates and > its registered voters to coordinate their thinking and planning about > how best to run their common campaign in the coming general election. > ... This closer bond between each rep and his electorate would also seem to > make each congressperson’s work in the assembly more focused and known > to be backed by his association and his electors. > ... more likely to produce, on average, a > closer ideological fit between each citizen and her congressperson ... > ... more likely to help solve the real problems facing the > country. They are more likely to do this because of the greater > expectation on the part of their different electorates that progress > must actually be made with respect to the goals of each of the > ideological different electorates who elected them. > .... this ideological bond between each citizen > and her rep would seem more likely to provide the kind of > congresspersons to engage in the kind of productive debates and > negotiations in the House to [...] help solve the > real problems facing the country. > ... Consequently, an assembly composed of such able, > different, well informed, clashing, and focused reps would seem to > provide an optimal debating and negotiating chamber for the production > of creative and evidence based solutions to common problems. The wisdom > of any decisions resulting from this deliberative process is also likely > to be aided by the simple fact that it would take place in an assembly > whose composition most accurately reflects the real variety and > intensity of the concerns of all citizens. > ... [an elected representative] would seem to be both more able and likely to > negotiate solutions to common problems together with fellow but > ideologically different congresspersons. This is because each [representative] > would probably enjoy more trust from his electorate. All of these claimed advantages also apply to VoteFair ranking. Yes, these claims are valid advantages for your APR method compared to existing voting methods. But you have been stating that you want to compare your APR method to VoteFair ranking, so please do not imply that these advantages are relevant in comparing your APR method with VoteFair ranking. Now let's look at some other advantages you claim for APR. Your latest message (copied below) also claims some advantages that I did not include above. That's because they involve your words "largely homogeneous electorate" and "coalition," which suggest a possible misunderstanding. > Because an APR congressperson would be more clearly expected to work and > vote to promote the scale of values he shares with his largely > homogeneous electorate, .... A "largely homogeneous electorate" is exactly the opposite of the concept that politics is multi-dimensional. I explained this concept in my last message, but I don't think you fully understand what I'm writing, so, let's consider an example. Expanding on the California example from last time, consider a female latina voter who votes for a female latina representative even though that representative has the opposite preference for whether to build a wall between California and Mexico. In your APR claims you imply that this won't happen. I do not make such a claim about VoteFair ranking. You said you agree that politics in the U.S. and Europe is multi-dimensional. So how can you claim that a representative who is elected using your APR method can possibly fully -- in all dimensions -- represent the tens of thousands of voters who elected that representative? Now let's consider your use of the words "coalition" and "working majority." > The extra ability with which APR reps would seem to be able to negotiate > compromises, would also seem to make it more likely that APR > congresspersons would respond to the imperative to form a working > majority in the assembly. Without such a majority coalition, any wise > legislative solutions to problems that such rational deliberations might > have discovered could not be passed into law. Each APR rep is more likely > to see that if he is not a part of the majority that will shape the > assembly’s binding decisions, his own agenda, and that of his > electorate, will not be advanced. The basis of this forum is to focus on claims that are backed up by mathematics, so let's get mathematical. A coalition or working majority usually constitutes 51 percent to about 65 percent, and that coalition can pass laws without compromising with the other 49 percent to 35 percent of the representatives. Yet you say about APR: > ... [the elected representative] would seem to be both more able and likely to > negotiate solutions to common problems together with fellow but > ideologically different congresspersons. If your APR method were used in California, the "conservatives" and "liberals" would compete, and whichever side has the majority of elected representatives would pass laws without regard for the other side. That is not true negotiation. In order to get true negotiation between the majority and the minority (of legislators), the legislature would have to adopt fairer voting methods within the legislature. My interactive website at www.NegotiationTool.com demonstrates how that kind of voting can be done. Electing representative who better represent the voters is only the first step toward the kind of problem-solving, compromise-seeking negotiations that voters want. Using better voting methods within a legislature is the next step. Your APR method involves the first step of improving -- over current methods -- the election process. However, your APR method would not necessarily lead to the problem-solving, compromise-seeking negotiations that you idealize. Yes, getting better elected officials -- who represent the voters instead of the biggest campaign contributors -- would improve negotiations within a legislature, but VoteFair ranking would also provide the same benefit. Remember that in your APR method it is easy for only 51 percent of the voters to be represented when a law is passed. That easily leads to oppression of the minority of voters -- namely the "associations" that comprise the other 49 percent. The moment you refer to one elected politician as representing tens of thousands of citizens, you are overlooking that the similarity of those citizens –- as measured as members of one of your associations -– have to be one-dimensional. As I've said before, if politics were one-dimensional, your APR method would work well. Yet we both agreed that the politics in most nations is multi-dimensional. So, your claims about each elected representative fully representing each voter is not a valid mathematical claim. This topic leads to the issue of understanding the difference between "proportional" and "representative." The concept of proportionality is one-dimensional, and is based on some kind of measurement. And that measurement is just a single number. Remember that single numbers are what your APR method uses. By contrast, representation involves the reality of politics being multi-dimensional. Any attempt to measure representation should -- to be meaningful -- involve multiple measurements. For example, the composition of a legislature can be measured not only in terms of political party affiliation, but also can be measured by the number of females versus males, and can be measured by religious affiliation, and can be measured by financial net worth, and so on. I'm not suggesting that such measurements be made. Rather, I'm suggesting that a single representative has orientations that are not as simple as political-party -- or "association" -- affiliation. Getting back to the general topic of VoteFair versus APR, you wrote: > S:I hope the following last addition to this post will help to explain > why I see APR as most likely to help elect a legislative assembly that would > > 1)be less corrupted by private money; > > 2)be composed of reps who could be more easily held to account by their > respective electorates, > > 3)be composed of reps more skilled at explaining the merits of their own > agendas to their fellow reps, and more determined to form the alliances > and to make the compromises necessary so as to be an essential part of a > majority that can legislate at least part of their own respective > agendas; and thus > > 4)and assembly that would be more likely to make rational and evidence > based laws. VoteFair ranking would also produce these same advantages. > S:I assume we agree that that when a citizen sees a member of the > assembly as speaking and acting in the ways entirely approved by that > citizen, then we would say that that member represents that citizen as > completely as possible. As you know, APR allows each citizen to > guarantee this by adding her vote to the “weighted vote” of the member > she most trusts to speak and act in this way. VoteFair does not do this > as efficiently. I disagree. You have worded the above paragraph in a convoluted way, so I have to clarify: * I do agree that "when a citizen sees a member of the [legislature] as speaking and acting in the ways entirely approved by that citizen, then we would say that that member represents that citizen as completely as possible." * My statement "I disagree" regards the word "this" in "VoteFair does not do this as efficiently" as referring to the first sentence about representation. * I am not commenting on your second sentence, which refers to an APR-specific feature. This feature is a characteristic of the APR method, but it does not imply full representation. To be clear, you have not yet provided evidence, either mathematical or otherwise, that supports your claim that your APR method would produce better representation than what VoteFair ranking would produce. Please continue to ask questions because I'm assuming that our discussion is helping readers of this forum better understand subtle yet important aspects of voting. Richard Fobes On 11/15/2015 12:06 PM, steve bosworth wrote: > Re: (22) APR: Steve's 22th dialogue with Richard Fobes > >> Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2015 18:12:57 -0800 >> From: <Richard Fobes>ElectionMethods@VoteFair.org >> To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com >> CC: stevebosworth@hotmail.com >> Subject: Re: (21) APR: Steve's 20th dialogue with Richard Fobes >> >> On 11/3/2015 9:16 AM, steve bosworth wrote: >> > In this 21^st dialogue, let's return to the question of whether APR or >> > VoteFair provides the fairer system for electing multi-winners, e.g. the >> > 80 members of California’s legislative assembly. In this post, I wish to >> > focus only on one element of your reply to our 20^th dialogue, namely, >> > the question of whether or not your ‘VoteFair representation ranking’ >> > needlessly wastes votes: >> > [... see below ...] > S: > > In this context and in the light of this clarification, do you accept >> > that APR is ‘fairer’ than VoteFair? >> > R: > If politics were one-dimensional – which I'll explain shortly – then >> your APR method would work well. > > S:Later, I will argue that one of the advantages of APR over other > systems (including VoteFair) is that it allows more “dimensions” to be > represented and thus to become part of the binding majority synthesis > (laws) produced by the legislative assembly. >> > […] >> >> > S: […] > > However, unlike APR, each of your larger electoral > districts from which >> > 2 ‘districtwide’ seats are elected do not entirely eliminate the >> > possibility of relatively safe-seats being produced by gerrymandering >> > or by chance. I understand (by using ‘cross-district popularity ranking’ >> > (page 5/20 of Chap. 20) that VoteFair representation elects the 2 >> > statewide seats by discovering the most popular candidates for the >> > largest party underrepresent by the district elections alone. >> > R: > VoteFair ranking is not vulnerable to gerrymandering, of either the >> intentional or unintentional type. Any change in a district boundary >> that helps one political party within a district will be offset by a >> corresponding loss in the statewide seats. >> > > S: Yes, VoteFair would probably “offset” such help to one party to some > extent but APR structurally never gives any special help to any party, > “association” or candidate. > > R:> Later you refer to an example in my book and then refer to a quote > in my >> book: >> > ... 'This leaves the 10 Democratic voters >> > appropriately unrepresented ….’ A similar flaw is repeated later on page >> > 10/20 of Chap. 20 when the ‘10 voters for ‘White party’ receive no >> > representation. Here, you again admit that this application of ‘VoteFair >> > representation’ has not ‘proportionately’ produced the ‘ideal match’ >> > between ‘voters with their party preferences’….. > > S:Do you now accept that these quotations are admissions that VoteFair > wastes some vote? > >> > R: > All the examples in my book were chosen for use in the United States >> where politics is very multidimensional (which I'll get to in a moment) >> and where too many political parties would lead to a different kind of >> corruption (compared to the kind that now exists). > > S:All politics outside the US is also “multidimensional” and APR > recognizes and represents this even more than does VoteFair. > > R:> If a large number of political parties were appropriate, then > increasing >> the number of statewide seats increases the closeness to a mathematical >> "ideal." Near the end of the book I point out that if VoteFair ranking >> were used in European nations where such mathematical idealism already >> dominates, then the number of statewide seats should be increased (which >> results in a corresponding decrease in the number of district-specific >> seats). >> >>[….] >> In other words, candidate-specific "safe seats" can only exist when the >> primary election (or nomination process) is unfair. Both VoteFair >> ranking and your APR method eliminate this kind of unfairness. > > S:I agree that VoteFair would greatly reduce such unfairness but only > APR would “eliminate” it. > > >> > R:> Now I'll explain the one-dimensional versus multidimensional issue. > > S:You seem to be correctly seeing APR as making it easier for small > parties to be proportionately elected. This seems also to have led you > incorrectly to assume that all small parties are “one-dimensional” or > single-issue parties.I accept that small parties are more likely to be > single-issue parties and that some of these might be large enough to be > proportionately elected to the assembly by APR. However, the wider > composition of an APR assembly would quickly convince any reps of these > parties that, in order for their narrow concerns to be addressed by the > assembly, they must present them as an essential part of the > multi-dimensional concerns of a majority of the other reps who > constituted the assembly (please see my last addition below to this post). >> > R: > Using your example of electing representatives to the California >> legislature, an example of one-dimensional politics would be if >> everyone's only political concern was about one issue. >> >> To borrow a high-profile issue from current Presidential-campaign news, >> let's suppose that the one issue facing the California legislature is >> whether or not to build a wall between California and Mexico. In this >> case your APR method would produce very fair results. That's because it >> simply transfers each voter's preference onto the voting that occurs >> within the legislature. > > S: Yes!If so, and given my newly added response above, I do not then see > why below you simply “recommend increasing the number of statewide > seats”?APR seems to address this problem more efficiently. >> > R:> VoteFair ranking would also handle this situation well, although for >> this one-dimensional situation I would recommend increasing the number >> of statewide seats. >> >> In real-life politics, there are many, many issues. This is what I >> refer to as multidimensional. > > S: Yes, and APR would allow more of these dimensions openly and > proportionately to play their part in the legislative process (Please > see my last addition to this post). >> > R:> Even if each issue were simplified into one dimension (which is, alas, >> what many people do in their minds), those multiple issues still create >> a multidimensional political situation. > > S: Yes, and this “situation” would be openly represented in the > composition of an APR assembly. >> > R:> To better understand the jump from one-dimensional (single-issue) >> politics to multidimensional politics, let's consider two-dimensional >> politics. >> >> In the United States -- and most European nations -- there is a >> left-to-right dimension, and an up-versus-down dimension. These can be >> thought of as a two-dimensional situation, although each of the two >> dimensions is actually multidimensional. >> >> The left-versus-right dimension mostly corresponds to ethical and >> religious issues such as gender inequality, immigration, sexual >> orientation, marijuana usage, access to assault weapons, etc. >> >> The up-versus-down dimension corresponds to economic fairness, where the >> voters are up above all the political parties and want economic >> fairness, and the biggest campaign contributors are below all the >> political parties and those biggest campaign contributors want to >> preserve economic advantages for the businesses they own. >> > > S:The many more “dimensions” that APR would give a proportional vote to > in the assembly would also include your up/down and right/left agendas > (please see the last addition to this post). > > > R:> ….not all rich people are in the group of people who supply the >> biggest campaign contributions.) >> > > S: Also we agree, in general, about the distorting and corrupting effect > that big private money can have on the political process.Consequently, > perhaps both of us want all electoral campaigns to be limited to those > which would be publically financed and proportionately assisted by > public media (e.g. like the BBC).However, let’s save this issue for a > separate dialogue if we disagree about this.Then, I would contend that > APR’s “associational” structure would at least make it no more > vulnerable to corruption by private money than is VoteFair.Clearly, you > have asserted the opposite but I have not yet seen your explanation of > exactly how APR’s features make it more vulnerable to such > corruption.(Again, please see the last addition to this post.) > > [….] > R:> A big weakness of your APR method is that politicians would find it >> easier to play this game of talking about left-versus-right "positions" >> and then acting according to unpredictable preferences (such as their >> own opinions, the preferences of their biggest campaign contributors, or >> the opinions of the people they associate with). > >> Why can this occur in your APR method? Politicians can behave as >> "mavericks" without needing to be at least partially aligned with a >> well-understood political party whose actions have been watched for many >> years. … > > S:No.I see APR as making it more difficult for an elected congressperson > to display “unpredictable preferences”.This is because of the closer > average ideological fit it provides between each congressperson and his > or her electorate.This “fit” would make the electorate more likely to > expect their rep’s behavior to conform to the promises given during the > election.At the same time, APR provides a ready way for voters to > replace a disappointing (“maverick”) rep by a better one during the next > general election. >> > R: >Yes, politicians under APR would be aligned with organizations, >> but as I've explained before there would be "too many" organizations for >> the voters to keep track of. > > S:The number of “organizations” elected would only be those seen by > citizens as representing their own hopes and fears.As now or with > VoteFair, different APR citizens would also have different capacities to > “keep track”.Also note that APR still allows a citizen, if they so wish, > to “keep track” of the behavior of only the one congressperson she most > favors and has helped to elect. > [….] > > > R: > … too-many situation occurs in U.S. politics where minor political >> parties are mostly focused on a few would-be politicians whose views >> dominate the party. In other words, minor parties are difficult to >> characterize compared to large political parties where lots of >> politicians have to work together in a coordinated way. > S:Please see the last addition to this post for how an APR assembly is > likely to be one in which “lots of politicians [would] work together in > a coordinated way”. > > > R: > VoteFair ranking is intentionally designed to limit the number of >> political parties who actually get their candidates elected. But it >> does this in a way that lists a greater number of minor political >> parties on the ballot. …. > > S:Limiting the number of political parties arbitrarily is not a virtue > when this prevents some citizens from being represented most > faithfully.APR only limits the number of “associations” (e.g parties) to > the number that have received sufficient support during APR’s primary > election. > > [….] > > >> >S: At both of these points, your >> > meaning of ‘fair’ seems to conflict with the more usual meaning you >> > appropriately seem to give to it in other contexts (and which I also >> > endorse), namely, each person must be treated equally and represented as >> > accurately as possible. [...] >> > R: > Both VoteFair ranking and your APR method "treats each voter equally." > > S:Yes, VoteFair “treats each voter equally” within the limitation of its > own system.However, as illustrated by the above quotations from your > book, it still leads to some voters not being represented at all, i.e. > it wastes some votes.This contrasts with APR which allows each and every > voter’s vote to continue to count both mathematically and qualitatively > in the legislative assembly. >> > R: > As for "[representing] each person as accurately as possible," in my >> biased opinion, VoteFair ranking produces more representative results. >> Of course "representative results" is an ambiguous term, yet I can >> imagine that it's possible to measure "representativeness," although I >> don't know exactly how this would be done. > > S:I assume we agree that that when a citizen sees a member of the > assembly as speaking and acting in the ways entirely approved by that > citizen, then we would say that that member represents that citizen as > completely as possible. As you know, APR allows each citizen to > guarantee this by adding her vote to the “weighted vote” of the member > she most trusts to speak and act in this way.VoteFair does not do this > as efficiently. > >> > R:> A measure of representativeness should NOT be done -- as it now is done >> in Europe -- by simplistically assuming that each voter's position on >> multiple issues can be categorized as fitting into one of the existing >> political parties. > > S:Correct, but APR was constructed to correct this “simplistic > assumption” by party-list PR systems. >> [….] > > S:I hope the following last addition to this post will help to explain > why I see APR as most likely to help elect a legislative assembly that would > > 1)be less corrupted by private money; > > 2)be composed of reps who could be more easily held to account by their > respective electorates, > > 3)be composed of reps more skilled at explaining the merits of their own > agendas to their fellow reps, and more determined to form the alliances > and to make the compromises necessary so as to be an essential part of a > majority that can legislate at least part of their own respective > agendas; and thus > > 4)and assembly that would be more likely to make rational and evidence > based laws. > > This is because, and in addition to APR offering both maximal > proportionality and maximal representativeness for each citizen: > > *APR: Finding Common Ground and Forming a Working Majority Coalition* > > With regard to finding common ground and forming a working majority in > the assembly with ideologically different congresspersons, > paradoxically, the advantage that each APR member of the House is likely > to have is that he knows that he has been elected by citizens who expect > and trust him to work and vote to promote their common scale of > values.As elaborated below, this ideological bond between each citizen > and her rep would seem more likely to provide the kind of > congresspersons to engage in the kind of productive debates and > negotiations in the House to form a majority coalition to help solve the > real problems facing the country. > > This advantage is enhanced during APR’s general election when each > citizen guarantees that her vote will be added to the ‘weighted vote’ in > the legislative assembly of her most favored representative (or the one > most favored by her first choice but eliminated candidate).It should > also be understood that a foundation for the growth of this qualitative > advantage would have been provided earlier by the way APR recruits its > candidates. > > Firstly, APR’s primary election discovers the voluntary organizations in > the country that are most trusted by its citizens. It then helps > politically to energizes these organizations by recognizing them as the > official electoral ‘associations’ through which each citizen will later > elect their own congressperson.This recognition, in turn, should > stimulate more attractive candidates to seek to represent both one of > these associations and the citizens with whom they have an ideological > bond.In contrast to other electoral systems, APR’s later election of the > most favored of these better candidates would seem also to combine to > raise the average quality of representation in the assembly even > further, both from the points of view of citizens and associations. > > Additionally: > > The growth of these closer bonds between citizens and their > representatives would seem to be assisted by another element of the > “bottom-up” primary election itself.It asks citizens to start to > familiarize themselves with the existing members, officials, and other > potential candidates of their preferred organizations months before each > voter has to finalize her ranking of candidates during the general > election.If so, the average breadth and depth of knowledge so acquired > by voters in order to rank individual candidates would also seem likely > to be greater than is generally acquired by citizens using other > electoral systems. > > The average closer bond between each citizen using APR and her rep would > also seem to grow partly as a result of the time between APR’s two > elections.These months would allow each association, its candidates and > its registered voters to coordinate their thinking and planning about > how best to run their common campaign in the coming general election. > > > This closer bond between each rep and his electorate would also seem to > make each congressperson’s work in the assembly more focused and known > to be backed by his association and his electors. This greater clarity > and focus would seem to help each APR congressperson to present the > strongest possible case for his legislative proposals to the other > members of the House.Consequently, an assembly composed of such able, > different, well informed, clashing, and focused reps would seem to > provide an optimal debating and negotiating chamber for the production > of creative and evidence based solutions to common problems. The wisdom > of any decisions resulting from this deliberative process is also likely > to be aided by the simple fact that it would take place in an assembly > whose composition most accurately reflects the real variety and > intensity of the concerns of all citizens. > > The extra ability with which APR reps would seem to be able to negotiate > compromises, would also seem to make it more likely that APR > congresspersons would respond to the imperative to form a working > majority in the assembly. Without such a majority coalition, any wise > legislative solutions to problems that such rational deliberations might > have discovered could not be passed into law.Each APR rep is more likely > to see that if he is not a part of the majority that will shape the > assembly’s binding decisions, his own agenda, and that of his > electorate, will not be advanced. > > In a parliamentary system, the formation of such a coalition also has > the advantage that the assembly can ensure that the government (the > executive organ of the state) will be led by a chief executive (prime > minister) who can be most trusted to apply the laws as expected by the > assembly. > > In summary, it is because APR is more likely to produce, on average, a > closer ideological fit between each citizen and her congressperson that > APR is more likely to help solve the real problems facing the > country.They are more likely to do this because of the greater > expectation on the part of their different electorates that progress > must actually be made with respect to the goals of each of the > ideological different electorates who elected them. To do this, > compromises must be made and a working majority coalition formed.The > likelihood of this happening using APR contrasts with the gridlock that > is frequently produced by the more defuse, vague, and often conflicting > agendas held by the congresspersons and their electors using existing > electoral systems. > > Finally, APR’s primary elections and associations should also help to > reduce the sometimes anti-democratic power of great wealth, celebrity, > and the mass media.I see this as likely given the extent to which APR’s > ‘associations’ would emerge from previously existing voluntary > organizations in society. These associations could benefit from the > loyalties among the population such organizations had enjoyed prior to > them being recognized as 'associations'.Presumably, many of these > organizations would already have some communication and mobilization > resources that are entirely independent of celebrity, the richest > sections of society, and the mass media. Thus, the adoption of APR would > probably help to reduce the relative power of these sometimes > anti-democratic forces in determining how people and their > representatives vote. APR’s official political recognition of these > voluntary organizations would seem to assist many citizens more firmly, > securely, and independently to see that their own abiding interests are > best promoted and protected through the associational and > representational connections validated by APR. > > What do you think? > > Steve > > P.S.If you are interested in considering how certain additional > constitutional understandsmight make it even more likely that APR reps > would form themselves into a working majority coalition, please ask me > also to email to you my attachment called, '15-secure-executive'. >