1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff)
2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists])

Vermont is considering a Condorcet bill. If there's no Condorcet Winner, then it elects the candidates with the most first choices. The Equal Vote Coalition recommends Ranked Robin, which elects the candidate preferred over the most others: https://rankedrobin.org On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 1:05 PM < election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote: > Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to > election-methods@lists.electorama.com > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com > > You can reach the person managing the list at > election-methods-owner@lists.electorama.com > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff) > 2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists]) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 11:34:57 -0800 > From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > To: EM list <election-methods@electorama.com> > Subject: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals? > Message-ID: > <CAOKDY5BFiodf0Kgq6DyY84Npa== > 1B4KrR1LrDjw2m+Tn6Df0fQ@mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > That question was recently asked. > > Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter. > > So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an organization. > > Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few candidates, in > the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its > particularly great unfamiliarity. > > Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure our > thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t too-vote an > evil. > > How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in > various nonpolitical votes. > > Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a > voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV. > > ?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened for > RCV. > > But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, in > the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for the > pursuit of an initiative. > > Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such as: > > MinMax(wv) > CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA). > > Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles. > > Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the > defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & don?t wish > to beat the CW via burial. > > That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to > find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of > initiative-enactment. > > Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that > focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to > approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative. >

1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff)
2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists])

Fantastic !! That’s good news. Theirs is a good proposal, because Topcount is the natural, most obvious, most un-arbitrary fallback, electing the favorite. It sounds similar to something that I’ve suggested, but haven’t mentioned here: If no voted CW, elect the most favorite candidate who pairbeats the most favorite candidate. Justification: On a normal-distribution, the max & median coincide. Yes, median-crowding can spoil that, but, other than Bernie, we don’t have a median-crowding problem, because it’s necessary to keep up the pretense that the middle is between Democrat & Republican. Therefore it’s likely to elect the person who pairbeats the CW. In a strategic top-cycle, that person is a “Bus” (candidate under whom the buriers bury the CW). Electing Bus 🚌 means that the burial backfires. It’s an effort toward autodeterence, probabilistic deterrence of offensive strategy. Forest Simmons & I have proposed a number of methods trying for autodeterence, & they all use clues about who’s the Bus. This particular one uses the fact that offensive strategy can’t change topcount, & there’s some tendency for median & max probability-density to coincide. For the past 35 years since wv Condorcet was introduced, wv has been the best effort for realizing or approaching the strategy-freeness that Condorcet is ideally capable of. But autodeterence promises to deliver even better on the promise of Condorcet. (On another subject, I’ve been trying to rejoin Slack, but I didn’t realize that it’s necessary to change the password from the old one. Will keep trying.) Ranked-Robin (Copeland) might do a good job of electing the sincere CW in a strategic cycle when there are lots of candidates. But, otherwise, it’s just affected by the vagaries of how split the various parts of the electorate are. On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 16:49 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: > Vermont is considering a Condorcet bill. If there's no Condorcet Winner, > then it elects the candidates with the most first choices. > > The Equal Vote Coalition recommends Ranked Robin, which elects the > candidate preferred over the most others: > https://rankedrobin.org > > On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 1:05 PM < > election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote: > >> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >> election-methods@lists.electorama.com >> >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >> >> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >> >> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >> election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com >> >> You can reach the person managing the list at >> election-methods-owner@lists.electorama.com >> >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." >> >> >> Today's Topics: >> >> 1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff) >> 2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists]) >> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> Message: 1 >> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 11:34:57 -0800 >> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >> To: EM list <election-methods@electorama.com> >> Subject: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals? >> Message-ID: >> <CAOKDY5BFiodf0Kgq6DyY84Npa== >> 1B4KrR1LrDjw2m+Tn6Df0fQ@mail.gmail.com> >> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" >> >> That question was recently asked. >> >> Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter. >> >> So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an organization. >> >> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few candidates, >> in >> the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its >> particularly great unfamiliarity. >> >> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure >> our >> thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t too-vote an >> evil. >> >> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in >> various nonpolitical votes. >> >> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a >> voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV. >> >> ?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened >> for >> RCV. >> >> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, in >> the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for the >> pursuit of an initiative. >> >> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such as: >> >> MinMax(wv) >> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA). >> >> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles. >> >> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the >> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & don?t wish >> to beat the CW via burial. >> >> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to >> find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of >> initiative-enactment. >> >> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that >> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to >> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative. >>

1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff)
2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists])

What I like about Ranked Robin is that it's still "elect the candidate with the most _____", which I think will be an easier cognitive transition for voters, and you get a results screen where each candidate gets a (usually) different number of things and the one with the most wins. Transparent results is a big block for Condorcet methods. On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 8:52 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > Fantastic !! That’s good news. Theirs is a good proposal, because Topcount > is the natural, most obvious, most un-arbitrary fallback, electing the > favorite. > > It sounds similar to something that I’ve suggested, but haven’t mentioned > here: > > If no voted CW, elect the most favorite candidate who pairbeats the most > favorite candidate. > > Justification: On a normal-distribution, the max & median coincide. Yes, > median-crowding can spoil that, but, other than Bernie, we don’t have a > median-crowding problem, because it’s necessary to keep up the pretense > that the middle is between Democrat & Republican. > > Therefore it’s likely to elect the person who pairbeats the CW. In a > strategic top-cycle, that person is a “Bus” (candidate under whom the > buriers bury the CW). Electing Bus 🚌 means that the burial backfires. > > It’s an effort toward autodeterence, probabilistic deterrence of offensive > strategy. > > Forest Simmons & I have proposed a number of methods trying for > autodeterence, & they all use clues about who’s the Bus. This particular > one uses the fact that offensive strategy can’t change topcount, & there’s > some tendency for median & max probability-density to coincide. > > For the past 35 years since wv Condorcet was introduced, wv has been the > best effort for realizing or approaching the strategy-freeness that > Condorcet is ideally capable of. > > But autodeterence promises to deliver even better on the promise of > Condorcet. > > (On another subject, I’ve been trying to rejoin Slack, but I didn’t > realize that it’s necessary to change the password from the old one. Will > keep trying.) > > Ranked-Robin (Copeland) might do a good job of electing the sincere CW in > a strategic cycle when there are lots of candidates. But, otherwise, it’s > just affected by the vagaries of how split the various parts of the > electorate are. > > > > > On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 16:49 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: > >> Vermont is considering a Condorcet bill. If there's no Condorcet Winner, >> then it elects the candidates with the most first choices. >> >> The Equal Vote Coalition recommends Ranked Robin, which elects the >> candidate preferred over the most others: >> https://rankedrobin.org >> >> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 1:05 PM < >> election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote: >> >>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >>> election-methods@lists.electorama.com >>> >>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >>> >>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >>> >>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >>> election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com >>> >>> You can reach the person managing the list at >>> election-methods-owner@lists.electorama.com >>> >>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." >>> >>> >>> Today's Topics: >>> >>> 1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff) >>> 2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists]) >>> >>> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> Message: 1 >>> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 11:34:57 -0800 >>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >>> To: EM list <election-methods@electorama.com> >>> Subject: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals? >>> Message-ID: >>> <CAOKDY5BFiodf0Kgq6DyY84Npa== >>> 1B4KrR1LrDjw2m+Tn6Df0fQ@mail.gmail.com> >>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" >>> >>> That question was recently asked. >>> >>> Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter. >>> >>> So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an >>> organization. >>> >>> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few candidates, >>> in >>> the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its >>> particularly great unfamiliarity. >>> >>> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure >>> our >>> thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t too-vote an >>> evil. >>> >>> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in >>> various nonpolitical votes. >>> >>> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a >>> voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV. >>> >>> ?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened >>> for >>> RCV. >>> >>> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, in >>> the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for >>> the >>> pursuit of an initiative. >>> >>> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such >>> as: >>> >>> MinMax(wv) >>> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA). >>> >>> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles. >>> >>> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the >>> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & don?t >>> wish >>> to beat the CW via burial. >>> >>> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to >>> find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of >>> initiative-enactment. >>> >>> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that >>> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to >>> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative. >>>

1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff)
2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists])

Yes, that has a bestness-sound that would appeal to people. But so do some of the other simple Condorcet versions. …& its need for a tiebreaker counts against its simplicity. CW,Fav & CW,IA intuitively choose someone superlative too. Admittedly MinMax(wv) needs specification of how to measure defeat-strength. …thereby lengthening the definition. CW,IA beat it in the STAR-poll that I conducted. On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:26 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: > What I like about Ranked Robin is that it's still "elect the candidate > with the most _____", which I think will be an easier cognitive > transition for voters, and you get a results screen where each candidate > gets a (usually) different number of things and the one with the most wins. > Transparent results is a big block for Condorcet methods. > > On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 8:52 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Fantastic !! That’s good news. Theirs is a good proposal, because >> Topcount is the natural, most obvious, most un-arbitrary fallback, electing >> the favorite. >> >> It sounds similar to something that I’ve suggested, but haven’t mentioned >> here: >> >> If no voted CW, elect the most favorite candidate who pairbeats the most >> favorite candidate. >> >> Justification: On a normal-distribution, the max & median coincide. Yes, >> median-crowding can spoil that, but, other than Bernie, we don’t have a >> median-crowding problem, because it’s necessary to keep up the pretense >> that the middle is between Democrat & Republican. >> >> Therefore it’s likely to elect the person who pairbeats the CW. In a >> strategic top-cycle, that person is a “Bus” (candidate under whom the >> buriers bury the CW). Electing Bus 🚌 means that the burial backfires. >> >> It’s an effort toward autodeterence, probabilistic deterrence of >> offensive strategy. >> >> Forest Simmons & I have proposed a number of methods trying for >> autodeterence, & they all use clues about who’s the Bus. This particular >> one uses the fact that offensive strategy can’t change topcount, & there’s >> some tendency for median & max probability-density to coincide. >> >> For the past 35 years since wv Condorcet was introduced, wv has been the >> best effort for realizing or approaching the strategy-freeness that >> Condorcet is ideally capable of. >> >> But autodeterence promises to deliver even better on the promise of >> Condorcet. >> >> (On another subject, I’ve been trying to rejoin Slack, but I didn’t >> realize that it’s necessary to change the password from the old one. Will >> keep trying.) >> >> Ranked-Robin (Copeland) might do a good job of electing the sincere CW in >> a strategic cycle when there are lots of candidates. But, otherwise, it’s >> just affected by the vagaries of how split the various parts of the >> electorate are. >> >> >> >> >> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 16:49 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: >> >>> Vermont is considering a Condorcet bill. If there's no Condorcet Winner, >>> then it elects the candidates with the most first choices. >>> >>> The Equal Vote Coalition recommends Ranked Robin, which elects the >>> candidate preferred over the most others: >>> https://rankedrobin.org >>> >>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 1:05 PM < >>> election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >>>> election-methods@lists.electorama.com >>>> >>>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >>>> >>>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >>>> >>>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >>>> election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com >>>> >>>> You can reach the person managing the list at >>>> election-methods-owner@lists.electorama.com >>>> >>>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >>>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." >>>> >>>> >>>> Today's Topics: >>>> >>>> 1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff) >>>> 2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists]) >>>> >>>> >>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> >>>> Message: 1 >>>> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 11:34:57 -0800 >>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >>>> To: EM list <election-methods@electorama.com> >>>> Subject: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals? >>>> Message-ID: >>>> <CAOKDY5BFiodf0Kgq6DyY84Npa== >>>> 1B4KrR1LrDjw2m+Tn6Df0fQ@mail.gmail.com> >>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" >>>> >>>> That question was recently asked. >>>> >>>> Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter. >>>> >>>> So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an >>>> organization. >>>> >>>> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few >>>> candidates, in >>>> the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its >>>> particularly great unfamiliarity. >>>> >>>> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure >>>> our >>>> thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t too-vote an >>>> evil. >>>> >>>> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in >>>> various nonpolitical votes. >>>> >>>> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a >>>> voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV. >>>> >>>> ?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened >>>> for >>>> RCV. >>>> >>>> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, >>>> in >>>> the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for >>>> the >>>> pursuit of an initiative. >>>> >>>> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such >>>> as: >>>> >>>> MinMax(wv) >>>> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA). >>>> >>>> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles. >>>> >>>> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the >>>> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & don?t >>>> wish >>>> to beat the CW via burial. >>>> >>>> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to >>>> find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of >>>> initiative-enactment. >>>> >>>> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that >>>> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to >>>> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative. >>>>

1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff)
2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists])

It already covers some scenarios that do not have a Condorcet Winner. Other scenarios should be framed as ties; that allows us to be wonky (or random) with our tiebreaking mechanic without scrutiny from the public. For Ranked Robin, the tiebreaker is to elect the tied candidate with the best average rank. Put another way, call the tied candidates finalists and the finalist with the greatest sum of margins over other finalists is elected. In the case of two finalists, this just elects the finalist preferred over the other, which would be the most palatable to the public. On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 4:11 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > Yes, that has a bestness-sound that would appeal to people. But so do some > of the other simple Condorcet versions. > > …& its need for a tiebreaker counts against its simplicity. > > CW,Fav & CW,IA intuitively choose someone superlative too. > > Admittedly MinMax(wv) needs specification of how to measure > defeat-strength. …thereby lengthening the definition. > > CW,IA beat it in the STAR-poll that I conducted. > > > > > On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:26 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: > >> What I like about Ranked Robin is that it's still "elect the candidate >> with the most _____", which I think will be an easier cognitive >> transition for voters, and you get a results screen where each candidate >> gets a (usually) different number of things and the one with the most wins. >> Transparent results is a big block for Condorcet methods. >> >> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 8:52 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Fantastic !! That’s good news. Theirs is a good proposal, because >>> Topcount is the natural, most obvious, most un-arbitrary fallback, electing >>> the favorite. >>> >>> It sounds similar to something that I’ve suggested, but haven’t >>> mentioned here: >>> >>> If no voted CW, elect the most favorite candidate who pairbeats the most >>> favorite candidate. >>> >>> Justification: On a normal-distribution, the max & median coincide. Yes, >>> median-crowding can spoil that, but, other than Bernie, we don’t have a >>> median-crowding problem, because it’s necessary to keep up the pretense >>> that the middle is between Democrat & Republican. >>> >>> Therefore it’s likely to elect the person who pairbeats the CW. In a >>> strategic top-cycle, that person is a “Bus” (candidate under whom the >>> buriers bury the CW). Electing Bus 🚌 means that the burial backfires. >>> >>> It’s an effort toward autodeterence, probabilistic deterrence of >>> offensive strategy. >>> >>> Forest Simmons & I have proposed a number of methods trying for >>> autodeterence, & they all use clues about who’s the Bus. This particular >>> one uses the fact that offensive strategy can’t change topcount, & there’s >>> some tendency for median & max probability-density to coincide. >>> >>> For the past 35 years since wv Condorcet was introduced, wv has been the >>> best effort for realizing or approaching the strategy-freeness that >>> Condorcet is ideally capable of. >>> >>> But autodeterence promises to deliver even better on the promise of >>> Condorcet. >>> >>> (On another subject, I’ve been trying to rejoin Slack, but I didn’t >>> realize that it’s necessary to change the password from the old one. Will >>> keep trying.) >>> >>> Ranked-Robin (Copeland) might do a good job of electing the sincere CW >>> in a strategic cycle when there are lots of candidates. But, otherwise, >>> it’s just affected by the vagaries of how split the various parts of the >>> electorate are. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 16:49 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: >>> >>>> Vermont is considering a Condorcet bill. If there's no Condorcet >>>> Winner, then it elects the candidates with the most first choices. >>>> >>>> The Equal Vote Coalition recommends Ranked Robin, which elects the >>>> candidate preferred over the most others: >>>> https://rankedrobin.org >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 1:05 PM < >>>> election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >>>>> election-methods@lists.electorama.com >>>>> >>>>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >>>>> >>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >>>>> >>>>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >>>>> election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com >>>>> >>>>> You can reach the person managing the list at >>>>> election-methods-owner@lists.electorama.com >>>>> >>>>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >>>>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Today's Topics: >>>>> >>>>> 1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff) >>>>> 2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists]) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> >>>>> Message: 1 >>>>> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 11:34:57 -0800 >>>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >>>>> To: EM list <election-methods@electorama.com> >>>>> Subject: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals? >>>>> Message-ID: >>>>> <CAOKDY5BFiodf0Kgq6DyY84Npa== >>>>> 1B4KrR1LrDjw2m+Tn6Df0fQ@mail.gmail.com> >>>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" >>>>> >>>>> That question was recently asked. >>>>> >>>>> Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter. >>>>> >>>>> So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an >>>>> organization. >>>>> >>>>> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few >>>>> candidates, in >>>>> the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its >>>>> particularly great unfamiliarity. >>>>> >>>>> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully >>>>> reassure our >>>>> thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t too-vote an >>>>> evil. >>>>> >>>>> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in >>>>> various nonpolitical votes. >>>>> >>>>> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a >>>>> voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV. >>>>> >>>>> ?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise >>>>> happened for >>>>> RCV. >>>>> >>>>> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, >>>>> in >>>>> the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for >>>>> the >>>>> pursuit of an initiative. >>>>> >>>>> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such >>>>> as: >>>>> >>>>> MinMax(wv) >>>>> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA). >>>>> >>>>> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles. >>>>> >>>>> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the >>>>> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & don?t >>>>> wish >>>>> to beat the CW via burial. >>>>> >>>>> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to >>>>> find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of >>>>> initiative-enactment. >>>>> >>>>> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that >>>>> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked >>>>> to >>>>> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative. >>>>>

1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff)
2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists])

Okay, but I’m just saying that having to specify a tiebreaker loses some brevity & simplicity. …&, should my candidate win instead of yours because one issue-space persuasion had more candidates running than another one did? My candidate beats more candidates than yours does, merely because their faction was more split. On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 16:36 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: > It already covers some scenarios that do not have a Condorcet Winner. > Other scenarios should be framed as ties; that allows us to be wonky (or > random) with our tiebreaking mechanic without scrutiny from the public. For > Ranked Robin, the tiebreaker is to elect the tied candidate with the best > average rank. Put another way, call the tied candidates finalists and the > finalist with the greatest sum of margins over other finalists is elected. > In the case of two finalists, this just elects the finalist preferred over > the other, which would be the most palatable to the public. > > On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 4:11 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Yes, that has a bestness-sound that would appeal to people. But so do >> some of the other simple Condorcet versions. >> >> …& its need for a tiebreaker counts against its simplicity. >> >> CW,Fav & CW,IA intuitively choose someone superlative too. >> >> Admittedly MinMax(wv) needs specification of how to measure >> defeat-strength. …thereby lengthening the definition. >> >> CW,IA beat it in the STAR-poll that I conducted. >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:26 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: >> >>> What I like about Ranked Robin is that it's still "elect the candidate >>> with the most _____", which I think will be an easier cognitive >>> transition for voters, and you get a results screen where each candidate >>> gets a (usually) different number of things and the one with the most wins. >>> Transparent results is a big block for Condorcet methods. >>> >>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 8:52 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Fantastic !! That’s good news. Theirs is a good proposal, because >>>> Topcount is the natural, most obvious, most un-arbitrary fallback, electing >>>> the favorite. >>>> >>>> It sounds similar to something that I’ve suggested, but haven’t >>>> mentioned here: >>>> >>>> If no voted CW, elect the most favorite candidate who pairbeats the >>>> most favorite candidate. >>>> >>>> Justification: On a normal-distribution, the max & median coincide. >>>> Yes, median-crowding can spoil that, but, other than Bernie, we don’t have >>>> a median-crowding problem, because it’s necessary to keep up the pretense >>>> that the middle is between Democrat & Republican. >>>> >>>> Therefore it’s likely to elect the person who pairbeats the CW. In a >>>> strategic top-cycle, that person is a “Bus” (candidate under whom the >>>> buriers bury the CW). Electing Bus 🚌 means that the burial backfires. >>>> >>>> It’s an effort toward autodeterence, probabilistic deterrence of >>>> offensive strategy. >>>> >>>> Forest Simmons & I have proposed a number of methods trying for >>>> autodeterence, & they all use clues about who’s the Bus. This particular >>>> one uses the fact that offensive strategy can’t change topcount, & there’s >>>> some tendency for median & max probability-density to coincide. >>>> >>>> For the past 35 years since wv Condorcet was introduced, wv has been >>>> the best effort for realizing or approaching the strategy-freeness that >>>> Condorcet is ideally capable of. >>>> >>>> But autodeterence promises to deliver even better on the promise of >>>> Condorcet. >>>> >>>> (On another subject, I’ve been trying to rejoin Slack, but I didn’t >>>> realize that it’s necessary to change the password from the old one. Will >>>> keep trying.) >>>> >>>> Ranked-Robin (Copeland) might do a good job of electing the sincere CW >>>> in a strategic cycle when there are lots of candidates. But, otherwise, >>>> it’s just affected by the vagaries of how split the various parts of the >>>> electorate are. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 16:49 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Vermont is considering a Condorcet bill. If there's no Condorcet >>>>> Winner, then it elects the candidates with the most first choices. >>>>> >>>>> The Equal Vote Coalition recommends Ranked Robin, which elects the >>>>> candidate preferred over the most others: >>>>> https://rankedrobin.org >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 1:05 PM < >>>>> election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >>>>>> election-methods@lists.electorama.com >>>>>> >>>>>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >>>>>> >>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >>>>>> >>>>>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >>>>>> election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com >>>>>> >>>>>> You can reach the person managing the list at >>>>>> election-methods-owner@lists.electorama.com >>>>>> >>>>>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >>>>>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Today's Topics: >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff) >>>>>> 2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists]) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> >>>>>> Message: 1 >>>>>> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 11:34:57 -0800 >>>>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >>>>>> To: EM list <election-methods@electorama.com> >>>>>> Subject: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals? >>>>>> Message-ID: >>>>>> <CAOKDY5BFiodf0Kgq6DyY84Npa== >>>>>> 1B4KrR1LrDjw2m+Tn6Df0fQ@mail.gmail.com> >>>>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" >>>>>> >>>>>> That question was recently asked. >>>>>> >>>>>> Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter. >>>>>> >>>>>> So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an >>>>>> organization. >>>>>> >>>>>> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few >>>>>> candidates, in >>>>>> the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its >>>>>> particularly great unfamiliarity. >>>>>> >>>>>> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully >>>>>> reassure our >>>>>> thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t too-vote >>>>>> an >>>>>> evil. >>>>>> >>>>>> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in >>>>>> various nonpolitical votes. >>>>>> >>>>>> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a >>>>>> voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV. >>>>>> >>>>>> ?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise >>>>>> happened for >>>>>> RCV. >>>>>> >>>>>> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, >>>>>> online, in >>>>>> the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, >>>>>> for the >>>>>> pursuit of an initiative. >>>>>> >>>>>> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, >>>>>> such as: >>>>>> >>>>>> MinMax(wv) >>>>>> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA). >>>>>> >>>>>> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles. >>>>>> >>>>>> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the >>>>>> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & don?t >>>>>> wish >>>>>> to beat the CW via burial. >>>>>> >>>>>> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, >>>>>> to >>>>>> find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of >>>>>> initiative-enactment. >>>>>> >>>>>> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that >>>>>> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked >>>>>> to >>>>>> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative. >>>>>>

1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff)
2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists])

The tiebreaker does have hypothetical cloning problems, but it's only in the case of ties, which are rare. The whole point of framing it as a tiebreaker is that we only have to specify it in the law, not in the marketing. On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 4:57 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > Okay, but I’m just saying that having to specify a tiebreaker loses some > brevity & simplicity. > > …&, should my candidate win instead of yours because one issue-space > persuasion had more candidates running than another one did? > > My candidate beats more candidates than yours does, merely because their > faction was more split. > > On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 16:36 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: > >> It already covers some scenarios that do not have a Condorcet Winner. >> Other scenarios should be framed as ties; that allows us to be wonky (or >> random) with our tiebreaking mechanic without scrutiny from the public. For >> Ranked Robin, the tiebreaker is to elect the tied candidate with the best >> average rank. Put another way, call the tied candidates finalists and the >> finalist with the greatest sum of margins over other finalists is elected. >> In the case of two finalists, this just elects the finalist preferred over >> the other, which would be the most palatable to the public. >> >> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 4:11 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Yes, that has a bestness-sound that would appeal to people. But so do >>> some of the other simple Condorcet versions. >>> >>> …& its need for a tiebreaker counts against its simplicity. >>> >>> CW,Fav & CW,IA intuitively choose someone superlative too. >>> >>> Admittedly MinMax(wv) needs specification of how to measure >>> defeat-strength. …thereby lengthening the definition. >>> >>> CW,IA beat it in the STAR-poll that I conducted. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:26 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: >>> >>>> What I like about Ranked Robin is that it's still "elect the candidate >>>> with the most _____", which I think will be an easier cognitive >>>> transition for voters, and you get a results screen where each candidate >>>> gets a (usually) different number of things and the one with the most wins. >>>> Transparent results is a big block for Condorcet methods. >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 8:52 AM Michael Ossipoff < >>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Fantastic !! That’s good news. Theirs is a good proposal, because >>>>> Topcount is the natural, most obvious, most un-arbitrary fallback, electing >>>>> the favorite. >>>>> >>>>> It sounds similar to something that I’ve suggested, but haven’t >>>>> mentioned here: >>>>> >>>>> If no voted CW, elect the most favorite candidate who pairbeats the >>>>> most favorite candidate. >>>>> >>>>> Justification: On a normal-distribution, the max & median coincide. >>>>> Yes, median-crowding can spoil that, but, other than Bernie, we don’t have >>>>> a median-crowding problem, because it’s necessary to keep up the pretense >>>>> that the middle is between Democrat & Republican. >>>>> >>>>> Therefore it’s likely to elect the person who pairbeats the CW. In a >>>>> strategic top-cycle, that person is a “Bus” (candidate under whom the >>>>> buriers bury the CW). Electing Bus 🚌 means that the burial backfires. >>>>> >>>>> It’s an effort toward autodeterence, probabilistic deterrence of >>>>> offensive strategy. >>>>> >>>>> Forest Simmons & I have proposed a number of methods trying for >>>>> autodeterence, & they all use clues about who’s the Bus. This particular >>>>> one uses the fact that offensive strategy can’t change topcount, & there’s >>>>> some tendency for median & max probability-density to coincide. >>>>> >>>>> For the past 35 years since wv Condorcet was introduced, wv has been >>>>> the best effort for realizing or approaching the strategy-freeness that >>>>> Condorcet is ideally capable of. >>>>> >>>>> But autodeterence promises to deliver even better on the promise of >>>>> Condorcet. >>>>> >>>>> (On another subject, I’ve been trying to rejoin Slack, but I didn’t >>>>> realize that it’s necessary to change the password from the old one. Will >>>>> keep trying.) >>>>> >>>>> Ranked-Robin (Copeland) might do a good job of electing the sincere CW >>>>> in a strategic cycle when there are lots of candidates. But, otherwise, >>>>> it’s just affected by the vagaries of how split the various parts of the >>>>> electorate are. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 16:49 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Vermont is considering a Condorcet bill. If there's no Condorcet >>>>>> Winner, then it elects the candidates with the most first choices. >>>>>> >>>>>> The Equal Vote Coalition recommends Ranked Robin, which elects the >>>>>> candidate preferred over the most others: >>>>>> https://rankedrobin.org >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 1:05 PM < >>>>>> election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >>>>>>> election-methods@lists.electorama.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >>>>>>> election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You can reach the person managing the list at >>>>>>> election-methods-owner@lists.electorama.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >>>>>>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Today's Topics: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff) >>>>>>> 2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists]) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Message: 1 >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 11:34:57 -0800 >>>>>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >>>>>>> To: EM list <election-methods@electorama.com> >>>>>>> Subject: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals? >>>>>>> Message-ID: >>>>>>> <CAOKDY5BFiodf0Kgq6DyY84Npa== >>>>>>> 1B4KrR1LrDjw2m+Tn6Df0fQ@mail.gmail.com> >>>>>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That question was recently asked. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an >>>>>>> organization. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few >>>>>>> candidates, in >>>>>>> the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its >>>>>>> particularly great unfamiliarity. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully >>>>>>> reassure our >>>>>>> thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t too-vote >>>>>>> an >>>>>>> evil. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> various nonpolitical votes. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact >>>>>>> a >>>>>>> voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise >>>>>>> happened for >>>>>>> RCV. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, >>>>>>> online, in >>>>>>> the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, >>>>>>> for the >>>>>>> pursuit of an initiative. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, >>>>>>> such as: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> MinMax(wv) >>>>>>> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the >>>>>>> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & >>>>>>> don?t wish >>>>>>> to beat the CW via burial. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of >>>>>>> initiative-enactment. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that >>>>>>> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be >>>>>>> asked to >>>>>>> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative. >>>>>>>

1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff)
2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists])

Opponents can then criticize the proposal because of its undisclosed indecisiveness & tiebreaker-need. If advocates don’t mention it, opponents will. Only *sincere* top-cycles are rare. A faction would often be able to make one via burial. …& well might, unless there’s a feature that can be expected to make it backfire. That’s the goal of the Condorcet versions that I propose. …in order to minimize or eliminate need for defensive-strategy. On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 17:04 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: > The tiebreaker does have hypothetical cloning problems, but it's only in > the case of ties, which are rare. The whole point of framing it as a > tiebreaker is that we only have to specify it in the law, not in the > marketing. > > On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 4:57 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Okay, but I’m just saying that having to specify a tiebreaker loses some >> brevity & simplicity. >> >> …&, should my candidate win instead of yours because one issue-space >> persuasion had more candidates running than another one did? >> >> My candidate beats more candidates than yours does, merely because their >> faction was more split. >> >> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 16:36 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: >> >>> It already covers some scenarios that do not have a Condorcet Winner. >>> Other scenarios should be framed as ties; that allows us to be wonky (or >>> random) with our tiebreaking mechanic without scrutiny from the public. For >>> Ranked Robin, the tiebreaker is to elect the tied candidate with the best >>> average rank. Put another way, call the tied candidates finalists and the >>> finalist with the greatest sum of margins over other finalists is elected. >>> In the case of two finalists, this just elects the finalist preferred over >>> the other, which would be the most palatable to the public. >>> >>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 4:11 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Yes, that has a bestness-sound that would appeal to people. But so do >>>> some of the other simple Condorcet versions. >>>> >>>> …& its need for a tiebreaker counts against its simplicity. >>>> >>>> CW,Fav & CW,IA intuitively choose someone superlative too. >>>> >>>> Admittedly MinMax(wv) needs specification of how to measure >>>> defeat-strength. …thereby lengthening the definition. >>>> >>>> CW,IA beat it in the STAR-poll that I conducted. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:26 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: >>>> >>>>> What I like about Ranked Robin is that it's still "elect the candidate >>>>> with the most _____", which I think will be an easier cognitive >>>>> transition for voters, and you get a results screen where each candidate >>>>> gets a (usually) different number of things and the one with the most wins. >>>>> Transparent results is a big block for Condorcet methods. >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 8:52 AM Michael Ossipoff < >>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Fantastic !! That’s good news. Theirs is a good proposal, because >>>>>> Topcount is the natural, most obvious, most un-arbitrary fallback, electing >>>>>> the favorite. >>>>>> >>>>>> It sounds similar to something that I’ve suggested, but haven’t >>>>>> mentioned here: >>>>>> >>>>>> If no voted CW, elect the most favorite candidate who pairbeats the >>>>>> most favorite candidate. >>>>>> >>>>>> Justification: On a normal-distribution, the max & median coincide. >>>>>> Yes, median-crowding can spoil that, but, other than Bernie, we don’t have >>>>>> a median-crowding problem, because it’s necessary to keep up the pretense >>>>>> that the middle is between Democrat & Republican. >>>>>> >>>>>> Therefore it’s likely to elect the person who pairbeats the CW. In a >>>>>> strategic top-cycle, that person is a “Bus” (candidate under whom the >>>>>> buriers bury the CW). Electing Bus 🚌 means that the burial backfires. >>>>>> >>>>>> It’s an effort toward autodeterence, probabilistic deterrence of >>>>>> offensive strategy. >>>>>> >>>>>> Forest Simmons & I have proposed a number of methods trying for >>>>>> autodeterence, & they all use clues about who’s the Bus. This particular >>>>>> one uses the fact that offensive strategy can’t change topcount, & there’s >>>>>> some tendency for median & max probability-density to coincide. >>>>>> >>>>>> For the past 35 years since wv Condorcet was introduced, wv has been >>>>>> the best effort for realizing or approaching the strategy-freeness that >>>>>> Condorcet is ideally capable of. >>>>>> >>>>>> But autodeterence promises to deliver even better on the promise of >>>>>> Condorcet. >>>>>> >>>>>> (On another subject, I’ve been trying to rejoin Slack, but I didn’t >>>>>> realize that it’s necessary to change the password from the old one. Will >>>>>> keep trying.) >>>>>> >>>>>> Ranked-Robin (Copeland) might do a good job of electing the sincere >>>>>> CW in a strategic cycle when there are lots of candidates. But, otherwise, >>>>>> it’s just affected by the vagaries of how split the various parts of the >>>>>> electorate are. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 16:49 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Vermont is considering a Condorcet bill. If there's no Condorcet >>>>>>> Winner, then it elects the candidates with the most first choices. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The Equal Vote Coalition recommends Ranked Robin, which elects the >>>>>>> candidate preferred over the most others: >>>>>>> https://rankedrobin.org >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 1:05 PM < >>>>>>> election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >>>>>>>> election-methods@lists.electorama.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >>>>>>>> election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You can reach the person managing the list at >>>>>>>> election-methods-owner@lists.electorama.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >>>>>>>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Today's Topics: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff) >>>>>>>> 2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists]) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Message: 1 >>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 11:34:57 -0800 >>>>>>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >>>>>>>> To: EM list <election-methods@electorama.com> >>>>>>>> Subject: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals? >>>>>>>> Message-ID: >>>>>>>> <CAOKDY5BFiodf0Kgq6DyY84Npa== >>>>>>>> 1B4KrR1LrDjw2m+Tn6Df0fQ@mail.gmail.com> >>>>>>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> That question was recently asked. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an >>>>>>>> organization. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few >>>>>>>> candidates, in >>>>>>>> the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its >>>>>>>> particularly great unfamiliarity. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully >>>>>>>> reassure our >>>>>>>> thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t >>>>>>>> too-vote an >>>>>>>> evil. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> various nonpolitical votes. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright >>>>>>>> enact a >>>>>>>> voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise >>>>>>>> happened for >>>>>>>> RCV. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, >>>>>>>> online, in >>>>>>>> the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, >>>>>>>> for the >>>>>>>> pursuit of an initiative. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, >>>>>>>> such as: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> MinMax(wv) >>>>>>>> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the >>>>>>>> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & >>>>>>>> don?t wish >>>>>>>> to beat the CW via burial. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or >>>>>>>> online, to >>>>>>>> find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of >>>>>>>> initiative-enactment. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that >>>>>>>> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be >>>>>>>> asked to >>>>>>>> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative. >>>>>>>>

1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff)
2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists])

> Opponents can then criticize the proposal because of its undisclosed indecisiveness & tiebreaker-need. If advocates don’t mention it, opponents will. No, they won't. I've collected thousands of signatures for alternative voting method petitions and done countless panels and interviews and presentations. Tiebreakers come up at about the frequency of actual ties. And, again, the tiebreaker would be defined, so if someone asks, we'll have a definitive answer. We just won't waste our time advertising it. On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 5:17 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > Opponents can then criticize the proposal because of its undisclosed > indecisiveness & tiebreaker-need. If advocates don’t mention it, opponents > will. > > Only *sincere* top-cycles are rare. A faction would often be able to make > one via burial. > > …& well might, unless there’s a feature that can be expected to make it > backfire. That’s the goal of the Condorcet versions that I propose. > > …in order to minimize or eliminate need for defensive-strategy. > > On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 17:04 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: > >> The tiebreaker does have hypothetical cloning problems, but it's only in >> the case of ties, which are rare. The whole point of framing it as a >> tiebreaker is that we only have to specify it in the law, not in the >> marketing. >> >> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 4:57 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Okay, but I’m just saying that having to specify a tiebreaker loses some >>> brevity & simplicity. >>> >>> …&, should my candidate win instead of yours because one issue-space >>> persuasion had more candidates running than another one did? >>> >>> My candidate beats more candidates than yours does, merely because their >>> faction was more split. >>> >>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 16:36 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: >>> >>>> It already covers some scenarios that do not have a Condorcet Winner. >>>> Other scenarios should be framed as ties; that allows us to be wonky (or >>>> random) with our tiebreaking mechanic without scrutiny from the public. For >>>> Ranked Robin, the tiebreaker is to elect the tied candidate with the best >>>> average rank. Put another way, call the tied candidates finalists and the >>>> finalist with the greatest sum of margins over other finalists is elected. >>>> In the case of two finalists, this just elects the finalist preferred over >>>> the other, which would be the most palatable to the public. >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 4:11 PM Michael Ossipoff < >>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Yes, that has a bestness-sound that would appeal to people. But so do >>>>> some of the other simple Condorcet versions. >>>>> >>>>> …& its need for a tiebreaker counts against its simplicity. >>>>> >>>>> CW,Fav & CW,IA intuitively choose someone superlative too. >>>>> >>>>> Admittedly MinMax(wv) needs specification of how to measure >>>>> defeat-strength. …thereby lengthening the definition. >>>>> >>>>> CW,IA beat it in the STAR-poll that I conducted. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:26 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> What I like about Ranked Robin is that it's still "elect the >>>>>> candidate with the most _____", which I think will be an easier cognitive >>>>>> transition for voters, and you get a results screen where each candidate >>>>>> gets a (usually) different number of things and the one with the most wins. >>>>>> Transparent results is a big block for Condorcet methods. >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 8:52 AM Michael Ossipoff < >>>>>> email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Fantastic !! That’s good news. Theirs is a good proposal, because >>>>>>> Topcount is the natural, most obvious, most un-arbitrary fallback, electing >>>>>>> the favorite. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It sounds similar to something that I’ve suggested, but haven’t >>>>>>> mentioned here: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If no voted CW, elect the most favorite candidate who pairbeats the >>>>>>> most favorite candidate. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Justification: On a normal-distribution, the max & median coincide. >>>>>>> Yes, median-crowding can spoil that, but, other than Bernie, we don’t have >>>>>>> a median-crowding problem, because it’s necessary to keep up the pretense >>>>>>> that the middle is between Democrat & Republican. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Therefore it’s likely to elect the person who pairbeats the CW. In a >>>>>>> strategic top-cycle, that person is a “Bus” (candidate under whom the >>>>>>> buriers bury the CW). Electing Bus 🚌 means that the burial backfires. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It’s an effort toward autodeterence, probabilistic deterrence of >>>>>>> offensive strategy. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Forest Simmons & I have proposed a number of methods trying for >>>>>>> autodeterence, & they all use clues about who’s the Bus. This particular >>>>>>> one uses the fact that offensive strategy can’t change topcount, & there’s >>>>>>> some tendency for median & max probability-density to coincide. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For the past 35 years since wv Condorcet was introduced, wv has been >>>>>>> the best effort for realizing or approaching the strategy-freeness that >>>>>>> Condorcet is ideally capable of. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But autodeterence promises to deliver even better on the promise of >>>>>>> Condorcet. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (On another subject, I’ve been trying to rejoin Slack, but I didn’t >>>>>>> realize that it’s necessary to change the password from the old one. Will >>>>>>> keep trying.) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ranked-Robin (Copeland) might do a good job of electing the sincere >>>>>>> CW in a strategic cycle when there are lots of candidates. But, otherwise, >>>>>>> it’s just affected by the vagaries of how split the various parts of the >>>>>>> electorate are. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 16:49 Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Vermont is considering a Condorcet bill. If there's no Condorcet >>>>>>>> Winner, then it elects the candidates with the most first choices. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The Equal Vote Coalition recommends Ranked Robin, which elects the >>>>>>>> candidate preferred over the most others: >>>>>>>> https://rankedrobin.org >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 1:05 PM < >>>>>>>> election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >>>>>>>>> election-methods@lists.electorama.com >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >>>>>>>>> election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> You can reach the person managing the list at >>>>>>>>> election-methods-owner@lists.electorama.com >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >>>>>>>>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Today's Topics: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff) >>>>>>>>> 2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists]) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Message: 1 >>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 11:34:57 -0800 >>>>>>>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>> To: EM list <election-methods@electorama.com> >>>>>>>>> Subject: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals? >>>>>>>>> Message-ID: >>>>>>>>> <CAOKDY5BFiodf0Kgq6DyY84Npa== >>>>>>>>> 1B4KrR1LrDjw2m+Tn6Df0fQ@mail.gmail.com> >>>>>>>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> That question was recently asked. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an >>>>>>>>> organization. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few >>>>>>>>> candidates, in >>>>>>>>> the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its >>>>>>>>> particularly great unfamiliarity. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully >>>>>>>>> reassure our >>>>>>>>> thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t >>>>>>>>> too-vote an >>>>>>>>> evil. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating >>>>>>>>> it in >>>>>>>>> various nonpolitical votes. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright >>>>>>>>> enact a >>>>>>>>> voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise >>>>>>>>> happened for >>>>>>>>> RCV. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, >>>>>>>>> online, in >>>>>>>>> the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, >>>>>>>>> for the >>>>>>>>> pursuit of an initiative. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, >>>>>>>>> such as: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> MinMax(wv) >>>>>>>>> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the >>>>>>>>> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & >>>>>>>>> don?t wish >>>>>>>>> to beat the CW via burial. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or >>>>>>>>> online, to >>>>>>>>> find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of >>>>>>>>> initiative-enactment. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be >>>>>>>>> asked to >>>>>>>>> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an >>>>>>>>> initiative. >>>>>>>>>