On 2024-03-20 09:57, Michael Garman wrote:

What do you think about the following reasoning? Call it the "fool me
twice" problem.

Suppose that a jurisdiction is considering switching from FPTP to Borda.
The main organization is heavily marketing Borda as the one ranked
voting system, equating the ranked ballot format to Borda, the method.

Meanwhile, an organization promoting MDDA (majority defeat
disqualification approval) is slowly growing. Someone (call him John)
favors MDDA and thinks that due to Borda's clone problem, it will
quickly be repealed. Then, he reasons, the jurisdiction will think that
ranking equals Borda, so that when some other ranked method is proposed
(MDDA, say), they will remember the failure of Borda that led to its
repeal and say "no; fool me twice, shame on me".

Suppose for the sake of argument that there is a considerable chance
that Borda would be repealed if it were enacted, and a lesser chance
that MDDA would. Is then John in the right to withhold his support for
Borda? Would it be right for the MDDA organization to try to counter the
Borda organization's marketing by saying more ranked methods exist, even
if doing so reduces the chance that Borda is enacted?

Note that I'm not asking if you think the fool me twice problem is
likely to happen with IRV. Just whether it's reasonable for someone who
thinks enacting a (to his mind) flawed method can cause a backlash, to
not go for that method.

-km

likely to happen with IRV. Just whether it's reasonable for someone who
thinks enacting a (to his mind) flawed method can cause a backlash, to
not go for that method.

For sure. It's a reasonable argument.

I think the principal consideration to bear in mind is where the
opposition is coming from and what their arguments are. If I were an
activist in a community where the prevailing opinion was that reform was
necessary, I'd be all for having a debate about the merits of different
methods and the relative logistical complications they might pose.

My concern right now is that most people aren't open to any reform, and
if the public-facing image they see is a reform movement that can't even
agree on a measure to push, they'll be even more skeptical. Not that we
can't or shouldn't have these debates, of course. But I think the Seattle
2022 example -- where the IRV supporters were at fault! -- is exactly the
opposite of what we want to happen. Overall support for the first part of
the question -- the one that was essentially "should we scrap FPP?" was way
lower than it would have been if there hadn't been confusion over competing
proposals and the impression of a fractured reform community.

I'm all for convincing people of the need for reform first and foremost
and then convincing them of specific methods later. Now, you could argue
that certain reforms would turn the public off the idea of structural
change once and for all, and I'd take those concerns seriously.

On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 8:07 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote:

Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info

I'm all for convincing people of the need for reform first and foremost

I don't think convincing people the current system is bad is very helpful
unless you have a better alternative. People tend to flail about and pick
the first system they think of or hear about—like IRV—and sometimes even
pick a disastrous system like Borda. After a state or city picks a new
system, they usually stick with it for decades out of pure inertia, meaning
it locks us out of systems that actually improve the election's results. If
nothing else, promoting these systems wastes time and effort that could be
better-spent elsewhere.

It's also easier to argue for a better policy than a worse one. If reform
movements didn't have so many problems with Nobel-laureate economists and
political scientists writing newspaper articles and papers about IRV not
working that well, and didn't have major disasters like Alaska's 2022
election to deal with, things would probably be an easier sell.

It's worth noting we have a case study of this. During the Progressive Era
in the 1910s, lots of US cities adopted new voting systems, typically STV.
These rules survived only a few decades before repeal. Most famously, in
New York, STV caused so many monotonicity failures that the city decided to
kill the only large-scale proportional representation system in the United
States after officials derided it for being a lottery.

It's taken 100 years for the electoral reform movement to recover and get
a second chance. I don't want to wait another 100 years for a reform that
might actually stick this time.

On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 4:12 PM Michael Garman <
michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote:

Much of the opposition to STV came from the fact that it was electing
— shudder! black people and even communists — in a political climate
where those were seen as two of the worst traits a politician could
have. That, more than non-monotonicity, was what did it in in NYC and
elsewhere. I don’t find “reactionaries won’t like it” to be a
convincing argument against progress.

On Mon, Mar 25, 2024 at 6:08 PM Closed Limelike Curves
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com wrote:

     I'm all for convincing people of the need for reform first and
     foremost and then convincing them of specific methods later.
     Now, you could argue that certain reforms would turn the
     public off the idea of structural change once and for all, and
     I'd take those concerns seriously.

 I don't think convincing people the current system is bad is very
 helpful unless you have a better alternative. People tend to flail
 about and pick the first system they think of or hear about—like
 IRV—and sometimes even pick a disastrous system like Borda. After
 a state or city picks a new system, they usually stick with it for
 decades out of pure inertia, meaning it locks us out of systems
 that actually improve the election's results. If nothing else,
 promoting these systems wastes time and effort that could be
 better-spent elsewhere.

 It's also easier to argue for a better policy than a worse one. If
 reform movements didn't have so many problems with Nobel-laureate
 economists and political scientists writing newspaper articles and
 papers about IRV not working that well, and didn't have major
 disasters like Alaska's 2022 election to deal with, things would
 probably be an easier sell.

 It's worth noting we have a case study of this. During the
 Progressive Era in the 1910s, lots of US cities adopted new voting
 systems, typically STV. These rules survived only a few decades
 before repeal. Most famously, in New York, STV caused so many
 monotonicity failures that the city decided to kill the only
 large-scale proportional representation system in the United
 States after officials derided it for being a lottery.

 It's taken 100 years for the electoral reform movement to recover
 and get a second chance. I don't want to wait another 100 years
 for a reform that might actually stick this time.

 On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 4:12 PM Michael Garman
 <michael.garman@rankthevote.us> wrote:

     problem is
     likely to happen with IRV. Just whether it's reasonable for
     someone who
     thinks enacting a (to his mind) flawed method can cause a
     backlash, to
     not go for that method.

     For sure. It's a reasonable argument.

     I think the principal consideration to bear in mind is where
     the opposition is coming from and what their arguments are. If
     I were an activist in a community where the prevailing opinion
     was that reform was necessary, I'd be all for having a debate
     about the merits of different methods and the relative
     logistical complications they might pose.

     My concern right now is that most people aren't open to
     /any/ reform, and if the public-facing image they see is a
     reform movement that can't even agree on a measure to push,
     they'll be even more skeptical. Not that we can't or shouldn't
     have these debates, of course. But I think the Seattle 2022
     example -- where the IRV supporters were at fault! -- is
     exactly the opposite of what we want to happen. Overall
     support for the first part of the question -- the one that was
     essentially "should we scrap FPP?" was way lower than it would
     have been if there hadn't been confusion over competing
     proposals and the impression of a fractured reform community.

     I'm all for convincing people of the need for reform first and
     foremost and then convincing them of specific methods later.
     Now, you could argue that certain reforms would turn the
     public off the idea of structural change once and for all, and
     I'd take those concerns seriously.

     On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 8:07 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm
     <km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote:

         On 2024-03-20 09:57, Michael Garman wrote:

         only reform

         perfect system.

         pragmatism. I believe

         the ballot,

         Oregon, should

         approval. Beyond

         about completely

         see in practice

         asked for an up or

         defend voting for the

         exactly what

         What do you think about the following reasoning? Call it
         the "fool me
         twice" problem.

         Suppose that a jurisdiction is considering switching from
         FPTP to Borda.
         The main organization is heavily marketing Borda as the
         one ranked
         voting system, equating the ranked ballot format to Borda,
         the method.

         Meanwhile, an organization promoting MDDA (majority defeat
         disqualification approval) is slowly growing. Someone
         (call him John)
         favors MDDA and thinks that due to Borda's clone problem,
         it will
         quickly be repealed. Then, he reasons, the jurisdiction
         will think that
         ranking equals Borda, so that when some other ranked
         method is proposed
         (MDDA, say), they will remember the failure of Borda that
         led to its
         repeal and say "no; fool me twice, shame on me".

         Suppose for the sake of argument that there is a
         considerable chance
         that Borda would be repealed if it were enacted, and a
         lesser chance
         that MDDA would. Is then John in the right to withhold his
         support for
         Borda? Would it be right for the MDDA organization to try
         to counter the
         Borda organization's marketing by saying more ranked
         methods exist, even
         if doing so reduces the chance that Borda is enacted?

         Note that I'm not asking if you think the fool me twice
         problem is
         likely to happen with IRV. Just whether it's reasonable
         for someone who
         thinks enacting a (to his mind) flawed method can cause a
         backlash, to
         not go for that method.

         -km

     ----


     Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
     for list info

Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em  for list info

Exactly so, Michael Garman. opposition was incited against STV because:
You'll get a black mayor.

Indeed you would. The one or two communists elected by STV in NYC were
representing sweated labour in the textile industry. No mention of the fact
that abolishing STV gave one-party rule. In NYC the Machine, Tammany Hall
bankrupted the city, for the classic reason of lack of opposition holding
to account. The city machines held "battering ram" referendums with the
money and publicity on side. They succumbed to the onslaught except in
Cambridge with a 30,000 strong MIT, which had to endure 6 referendums in 16
years. Such was the fanatical meal-ticket politics of the one-party
machines. STV had been promoted, despite politicians power-greed, by
mathematicians, who knew their business and weren't afraid of "the key to
democracy."

As for the profered non-monotonicity reason for abolishing STV, this is
solely in the Arrow-theorem-doctrinaire critics imagination, bearing no
connection to reality. The non-monotonicity of STV just owes to it trailing
a remnant of plurality voting, in its "last past the post" exclusion count.
The Surplus transfer election count, especially Meek method, is monotonic.

I have invented an STV exclusion count which is an iteration of the
election count; both therefore monotonic; a "scientific" one-truth voting
method, unlike other voting methods the world uses. I posted programmers
links, none of which, the list manager has so far redeemed.

Regards,

Richard Lung.

On 25/03/2024 17:18, Michael Garman wrote:

Much of the opposition to STV came from the fact that it was electing —
shudder! black people and even communists — in a political climate where
those were seen as two of the worst traits a politician could have. That,
more than non-monotonicity, was what did it in in NYC and elsewhere. I
don’t find “reactionaries won’t like it” to be a convincing argument
against progress.

On Mon, Mar 25, 2024 at 6:08 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:

Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info

 As for the profered non-monotonicity reason for abolishing STV,
 this is solely in the Arrow-theorem-doctrinaire critics
 imagination, bearing no connection to reality.

No idea what this refers to, given STV isn't related to Arrow's theorem.

 The non-monotonicity of STV just owes to it trailing a remnant of
 plurality voting, in its "last past the post" exclusion count.

No, the issue is the multi-stage method—the more elimination rounds
you have, the more likely you are to have a negative voting weight
event. Pretty much every sequential-loser method has the same problem.

  The Surplus transfer election count, especially Meek method, is
 monotonic.

That's also not correct; see Pukelsheim's book on apportionment for
why every quota rule method is nonmonotonic. I do think /most/ of
STV's nonmonotonicity comes down to the IRV elimination, though.

On Mon, Mar 25, 2024 at 12:39 PM Richard Lung
voting@ukscientists.com wrote:

 Exactly so, Michael Garman. opposition was incited against STV
 because: You'll get a black mayor.

 Indeed you would. The one or two communists elected by STV in NYC
 were representing sweated labour in the textile industry. No
 mention of the fact that abolishing STV gave one-party rule. In
 NYC the Machine, Tammany Hall bankrupted the city, for the classic
 reason of lack of opposition holding to account. The city machines
 held "battering ram" referendums with the money and publicity on
 side. They succumbed to the onslaught except in Cambridge with a
 30,000 strong MIT, which had to endure 6 referendums in 16 years.
 Such was the fanatical meal-ticket politics of the one-party
 machines. STV had been promoted, despite politicians power-greed,
 by mathematicians, who knew their business and weren't afraid of
 "the key to democracy."

 As for the profered non-monotonicity reason for abolishing STV,
 this is solely in the Arrow-theorem-doctrinaire critics
 imagination, bearing no connection to reality. The
 non-monotonicity of STV just owes to it trailing a remnant of
 plurality voting, in its "last past the post" exclusion count. The
 Surplus transfer election count, especially Meek method, is monotonic.

 I have invented an STV exclusion count which is an iteration of
 the election count; both therefore monotonic; a "scientific"
 one-truth voting method, unlike other voting methods the world
 uses. I posted programmers links, none of which, the list manager
 has so far redeemed.

 Regards,

 Richard Lung.


 On 25/03/2024 17:18, Michael Garman wrote:

Thank you for your reply.

Perhaps you have "no idea" because your reasoning doesn't strictly follow.
And perhaps you jump in with your (further) "No" without a real
disagreement.

Apportionment has its place in Congress, for instance, but is the feature
of oligarchic party list systems, in the context of voting methods
discussed, and quotas the feature of democratic forms of "proportional
representation."

Regards,

Richard Lung.

On 25/03/2024 23:42, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:

As for the profered non-monotonicity reason for abolishing STV, this is

No idea what this refers to, given STV isn't related to Arrow's theorem.

The non-monotonicity of STV just owes to it trailing a remnant of

No, the issue is the multi-stage method—the more elimination rounds you
have, the more likely you are to have a negative voting weight event.
Pretty much every sequential-loser method has the same problem.

The Surplus transfer election count, especially Meek method, is monotonic.

That's also not correct; see Pukelsheim's book on apportionment for why
every quota rule method is nonmonotonic. I do think most of STV's
nonmonotonicity comes down to the IRV elimination, though.

On Mon, Mar 25, 2024 at 12:39 PM Richard Lung voting@ukscientists.com
wrote:

On Mon, Mar 25, 2024 at 12:39 PM Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com
mailto:voting@ukscientists.com> wrote:

No, the issue is the multi-stage method—the more elimination rounds you
have, the more likely you are to have a negative voting weight event.
Pretty much every sequential-loser method has the same problem.

That's also not correct; see Pukelsheim's book on apportionment for why
every quota rule method is nonmonotonic. I do think /most/ of STV's
nonmonotonicity comes down to the IRV elimination, though.

On 2024-03-26 00:42, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:

Yes, though I think three candidates suffice for weighted positional.
Say you have a Condorcet cycle, A>B>C>A, and the base method passes
majority and monotonicity but fails either LIIA or strong monotonicity
for three candidates. Then it's possible that raising A can lead the
loser of the first round to go from C to B, e.g. the base method's
ordering going from something like

B>A>C

to

A>C>B

which, in the context of an elimination method, means that in the
original election, C is eliminated and then A beats B pairwise; but
after A is raised, B is eliminated and C beats A pairwise.

"Strong monotonicity" is my term for the stronger mono-raise where
raising A can't change whether the outcome ranks some other B ahead of
C. Range passes it, for instance, but it's very rare in ranked methods.

I'm prettty sure you can prove such a strong monotonicity failure for
every weighted positional method by using linear programming. And
probably for a bunch of other methods as well.

To my knowledge, his 2014 book only mentions house size monotonicity and
vote ratio monotonicity. House monotonicity is compatible with quota.
(Imagine a method that eliminates the one winner that won't cause a
quota violation later on, and then continues doing so until the right
number of seats has been reached.)

Vote-ratio monotonicity seems to be closer to mono-add-top, since
Pukelsheim talks about a party's weight increasing while another party's
weight is fixed at unity. I haven't looked into the proof in detail, but
I suspect the reason that this works is because adding weight changes
the value of the quota. Plain old mono-raise wouldn't do that, because
the number of voters doesn't change.

(Here's an interesting thought: Set the elimination order to some
predetermined order before running STV. Use the same logic: while
someone has more than a quota, elect him and redistribute surpluses.
Then eliminate the remaining candidate who's ranked last on the
predetermined order, and repeat. Is this method monotone? Doing it like
this would remove the IRV/strong monotonicity failure-related problems
mentioned above.)

I just downloaded the EM archives from
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/
to run a grep through the links and find any software links.

And I think this is it:

https://github.com/Esrot-Clients/STV_CSV/tree/master

referenced in this post:

http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-October/004988.html

So it has already been posted :-)

-km

Am I misunderstanding this, or is it just independence of irrelevant
alternatives?