Smithification seems to reduce the vulnerability of methods to coalitional
strategies, but it can force you to violate other important criteria. Has
anyone tried to figure out how close we can get to Smith//* without giving
up on these? Is there some variant of Smith//* that lets you hold onto,
say, participation?
(I know Smith methods are unlikely to fail participation, but violating
participation has a problem in that it might make such methods
unconstitutional in various countries; German courts have ruled on this
exact question in the context of apportionment, and nonparticipation is a
likely avenue for challenging results in US courts.)
Smithification seems to reduce the vulnerability of methods to coalitional
strategies, but it can force you to violate other important criteria. Has
anyone tried to figure out how close we can get to Smith//* without giving
up on these? Is there some variant of Smith//* that lets you hold onto,
say, participation?
(I know Smith methods are *unlikely* to fail participation, but violating
participation has a problem in that it might make such methods
unconstitutional in various countries; German courts have ruled on this
exact question in the context of apportionment, and nonparticipation is a
likely avenue for challenging results in US courts.)