Schwarzenegger was Condorcet winner; VPR and Candidate Withdrawal to simplify voter strategy (was Re: Arrow's theorem and cardinal voting systems) (Steve Eppley) Steve, VPR has been mentioned from time to time in the context of what Warren Smith has dubbed "asset voting," and I used to call "candidate proxy." It turns out that Charles Dodgson was way ahead of us on this. Some version of VPR is what we need for these huge elections. I think the recall election in California that elected Schwarznegger has to be the world record holder for the most number of candidates in a gubernatorial race (I wasn't trying to imply anything about the election results with the word "propelled.") Best Regards, Forest > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 21:45:42 -0500 > From: Steve Eppley <seppley@alumni.caltech.edu> > To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > Subject: [EM] Schwarzenegger was Condorcet winner; VPR and Candidate > Withdrawal to simplify voter strategy (was Re: Arrow's theorem and > cardinal voting systems) > Message-ID: <1a5f7d61-5407-4b30-74f9-c6d2a9a2df35@alumni.caltech.edu> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 > > On 1/13/2020 6:32 PM, Forest Simmons wrote: > -snip- > > It's not just Approval that requires some hard thinking in conjunction > with filling out the ballots. Ranking many candidates (think about the > number of candidates in the election that propelled Schwarznegger into > office) may be just as burdensome as trying to decide exactly which > candidates to mark as approved. In Australia you can get around this > difficulty by copying "candidate cards" or by voting the party line. > -snip- > > During the week or so before Schwarzenegger was elected Governor of > California (ousting Governor Gray Davis in a recall election), likely > voters were surveyed by a team of grad students led by economics & > political science professor Rod Kiwiet of Caltech.? The voters were asked > the 6 pairwise preference questions regarding the 4 candidates judged by > Kiwiet to be the top 4 (including Davis).? The survey result was that > Schwarzenegger defeated the other 3 candidates pairwise.? A Condorcet > winner.? So I don't agree that Schwarzenegger was "propelled into office by > the (large) number of candidates" but perhaps I'm unaware of better > evidence. > > Regarding Australia's solution for their tedious lengthy STV PR ballot, a > similar way to make strategy simpler for voters is to use a voting method > in the Vote for a Published Ranking (VPR) family of methods:? > > ???? Before election day, each candidate publishes a ranking of > ???? all the candidates (presumably with him/herself on top).? > ???? Any candidate who doesn't publish is disqualified. > ???? (Alternatively, any candidate who doesn't publish is treated > ???? as if s/he'd published the ranking that has him/herself on top > ???? and all other candidates tied at the bottom.) > > ???? On election day, each voter votes by selecting one candidate. > > ???? Each vote is tallied as if it were the ranking published by the > ???? voter's selected candidate (using society's favorite algorithm > ???? for aggregating voters' rankings). > > Some potential advantages of VPR: > (1) Good candidates wouldn't need as much money to win, since they can win > by persuading some "popular" candidates to rank them over worse > candidates.? It might require only a few phone calls.? > (2) After the candidates publish their rankings, journalists & pundits > would presumably scrutinize the rankings looking for unusual preferences, a > possible sign of corruption.? Presumably many voters would learn about > those oddities before election day, and reconsider who to vote for. > (3) It's relatively simple for the voters.? My hunch is that > strategically-optimal votes would typically be votes for one's favorite > candidate, even when there are many candidates. > (4) It solves problems related to "too many candidates" and "low > information voters" -- in particular that the best candidates might be left > unranked by a lot of voters.? It was this concern, expressed by Mike > Alvarez of Caltech many years ago, which led me to propose VPR in an > article published in 2007 in the Pasadena Weekly:? > https://pasadenaweekly.com/roberts-rules-for-voting/? (In 2007, Rudy > Giuliani was considered a frontrunner for the 2008 Republican presidential > nomination, so his name appears in an example in the article.) > > Two variants of VPR: > 1. NGOs could publish rankings too, and be eligible for selection by > voters on election day. > 2. Given adequate technology in the voting booth... The voter begins by > selecting one candidate.? The voting machine then displays that candidate's > published ranking, and the voter may rearrange it. (A big time saver, yet > the voter has maximal control over his/her ranking.) > > Another way to simplify voter strategy is to allow candidates to withdraw > from contention after election day, after the votes are published (in a > summary format adequate to be tallied using the voting method).? A spoiler > could choose to withdraw to help a compromise defeat a "greater evil."? The > Candidate Withdrawal option would also make voting methods more compatible > with the U.S. Electoral College, because candidates could withdraw to help > a compromise candidate obtain a majority in the Electoral College.? A > variant of Candidate Withdrawal is to allow candidates to withdraw from > particular pairings while remaining in the other pairings (assuming a > pairwise voting method). > > Subscribers to Election-Methods may already be familiar with VPR and > Candidate Withdrawal since they were discussed here many years ago.? I've > read few messages in the last 10-ish years, so I have no clue about what > current subscribers are familiar with. > > --Steve > >