Relative vs. Majority Condorcet
CLC,
Yes, that's the main question I'm looking to answer with this poll: do
tied-at-the-top, or other tied-rank mechanisms, have substantial
support on this email list? (ICT is a similar, but not-quite-working,
attempt at satisfying Minimal Defense as well.)
I assume by "mechanisms" you mean * mechanisms to force the method to
comply with Favorite Betrayal*. As far as I can tell, no.
The way you describe ICT I find a bit odd. Kevin's ICA method easily
meets Minimal Defense. ICT instead meets Chicken Dilemma (incompatible
with Minimal Defense) but I think I recall was motivated by some example
where the MCA winner looked quite odd.
I don't recall it but can probably find it later.
Chris B.
On 28/04/2024 12:40 pm, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:
Hi Chris, thanks for your response!
I came to the conclusion that any good more sophisticated FBC
methods need to use Kevin's "Tied at the Top Rule" mechanism.
Yes, that's the main question I'm looking to answer with this poll: do
tied-at-the-top, or other tied-rank mechanisms, have substantial
support on this email list? (ICT is a similar, but not-quite-working,
attempt at satisfying Minimal Defense as well.)
There is some small movement and enthusiasm for Condorcet
compliance, but none that I discern for strict FBC compliance. I
would think most voters would satisfied with the massive reduction
in Compromise incentive compared to FPP afforded by properly
implemented IRV, let alone the still greater reduction we get from
Condorcet.
There's a major IRV-repeal effort underway in Alaska at the moment
because they had one (!) election with a favorite-betrayal incentive.
I'm also not aware of any movements for strict relative-majority
Condorcet compliance. The organization that comes closest is EVC (with
their Copeland//Borda proposal), but even they're not very purist
about it.
And I'm generally allergic to, and find very silly, methods that
fail Irrelevant Ballots Independence like Median Ratings methods
and this "Majority-Condorcet" idea.
I fully agree with you that this is a big problem for median ratings.
A voter who shows up and says they think all the candidates are bad
isn't provide any new information about the relative quality of the
candidates.
However, I don't think an all-equal ballot is providing no
information in every situation. As an example, say we had a system
like approval, but with a 50% threshold for election (and elections
with <50% support for the winner resulting in reopening nominations).
Then, a fully-blank ballot is a way for voters to meaningfully express
their preference for somebody else,//other than the current crop of
candidates.
Something similar applies to the tied-at-the-top rule: a voter who
ties two candidates is saying they want these two candidates to be
compared using the tiebreaking mechanism, /rather than/ the
relative-Condorcet mechanism.
On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at 5:00 AM Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
There was some advantage of ICA & ICT that I really liked, but
public proposals have to be as simple as possible.
In that case I say forget about FBC methods other than Approval.
I came to the conclusion that any good more sophisticated FBC
methods need to use Kevin's "Tied at the Top Rule" mechanism.
There is some small movement and enthusiasm for Condorcet
compliance, but none that I discern for strict FBC compliance. I
would think most voters would satisfied with the massive reduction
in Compromise incentive compared to FPP afforded by properly
implemented IRV, let alone the still greater reduction we get from
Condorcet.
In general FBC is much more slippery and "expensive" (in terms of
being compatible with other criteria) than Condorcet. I went off
my own "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent Fall-back Approval" idea
(which isn't "very simple") when Kevin showed that it fails
Woodall's Plurality criterion.
And I'm generally allergic to, and find very silly, methods that
fail Irrelevant Ballots Independence like Median Ratings methods
and this "Majority-Condorcet" idea.
You have an apparent "majority Condorcet" winner, and then a few
extra ballots that vote for nobody are found and then the winner
changes because the "majority" threshold goes up. Absurd and
potentially embarrassing.
Chris B.
On 27/04/2024 3:40 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
There was some advantage of ICA & ICT that I really liked, but
public proposals have to be as simple as possible. Few methods
proposed here are simple enough for public proposal.
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 22:50 Michael Ossipoff
<email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 10:02 Closed Limelike Curves
<closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
/Does "Majority-Condorcet" mean the CW needs to have a
majority over every other
candidate?/
Yes: a CW needs more than 50% of the vote, including tied
ranks, to defeat every other candidate. This version of
Condorcet is compatible with FBC.
I guess a lot of CWs wouldn’t be getting elected.
The best Condorcet methods don’t importantly fail FBC. A
sincere CW can only lose by offensive strategy, & the better
Condorcet methods well-deter offensive strategy. No need for
any defensive strategy.
Was it you who once said that people would try offensive
strategy? The whole point of strategy is action based on an
analysis of what the result will be. It’s a strategist’s
business to find that out first.
Anyway when it’s noticed to usually backfire…
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 3:43 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm
<km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote:
On 2024-04-24 12:32, Kevin Venzke wrote:
The second option doesn't offer Smith, but if it
did, I would note that Smith is a
poor guarantee of quality. Here's a 1025-voter
election where a 2-vote candidate is
in the Smith set (along with all other candidates):
2: A>B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
1: B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
2: C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
4: D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
8: E>F>G>H>I>J>K
16: F>G>H>I>J>K
32: G>H>I>J>K
64: H>I>J>K
128: I>J>K
256: J>K
512: K
While this is not realistic, I do think it is
realistic that a candidate of limited
interest to most voters would sometimes manage to
pairwise defeat a more viable
candidate. And we should be ready to interpret this
as noise.
That was phrased a bit oddly in the context of the
rest of your post,
but I understand you to be saying "the worst method
that passes Smith
may still be pretty bad", not necessarily that
proposed methods passing
Smith are actually bad. Is that right?
-km
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The way you describe ICT I find a bit odd.
Yes, I think I made a few mistakes, including confusing ICT with
symmetrical ICT (I have no idea what ICT is, assuming they're different;
electowiki doesn't have an article).
Kevin's ICA method easily meets Minimal Defense. ICT instead meets
Chicken Dilemma (incompatible with Minimal Defense) but I think I recall
was motivated by some example where the MCA winner looked quite odd.
Could you clarify how the chicken criterion is incompatible with Minimal
Defense? Intuitively I thought median ratings would do well against both.
On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:34 PM Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
CLC,
Yes, that's the main question I'm looking to answer with this poll: do
tied-at-the-top, or other tied-rank mechanisms, have substantial support on
this email list? (ICT is a similar, but not-quite-working, attempt at
satisfying Minimal Defense as well.)
I assume by "mechanisms" you mean * mechanisms to force the method to
comply with Favorite Betrayal*. As far as I can tell, no.
The way you describe ICT I find a bit odd. Kevin's ICA method easily
meets Minimal Defense. ICT instead meets Chicken Dilemma (incompatible
with Minimal Defense) but I think I recall was motivated by some example
where the MCA winner looked quite odd.
I don't recall it but can probably find it later.
Chris B.
On 28/04/2024 12:40 pm, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:
Hi Chris, thanks for your response!
I came to the conclusion that any good more sophisticated FBC methods
need to use Kevin's "Tied at the Top Rule" mechanism.
Yes, that's the main question I'm looking to answer with this poll: do
tied-at-the-top, or other tied-rank mechanisms, have substantial support on
this email list? (ICT is a similar, but not-quite-working, attempt at
satisfying Minimal Defense as well.)
There is some small movement and enthusiasm for Condorcet compliance, but
none that I discern for strict FBC compliance. I would think most voters
would satisfied with the massive reduction in Compromise incentive compared
to FPP afforded by properly implemented IRV, let alone the still greater
reduction we get from Condorcet.
There's a major IRV-repeal effort underway in Alaska at the moment because
they had one (!) election with a favorite-betrayal incentive. I'm also not
aware of any movements for strict relative-majority Condorcet compliance.
The organization that comes closest is EVC (with their Copeland//Borda
proposal), but even they're not very purist about it.
And I'm generally allergic to, and find very silly, methods that fail
Irrelevant Ballots Independence like Median Ratings methods and this
"Majority-Condorcet" idea.
I fully agree with you that this is a big problem for median ratings. A
voter who shows up and says they think all the candidates are bad isn't
provide any new information about the relative quality of the candidates.
However, I don't think an all-equal ballot is providing no information in
every situation. As an example, say we had a system like approval, but with
a 50% threshold for election (and elections with <50% support for the
winner resulting in reopening nominations). Then, a fully-blank ballot is a
way for voters to meaningfully express their preference for somebody else, other
than the current crop of candidates.
Something similar applies to the tied-at-the-top rule: a voter who ties
two candidates is saying they want these two candidates to be compared
using the tiebreaking mechanism, rather than the relative-Condorcet
mechanism.
On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at 5:00 AM Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
There was some advantage of ICA & ICT that I really liked, but public
proposals have to be as simple as possible.
In that case I say forget about FBC methods other than Approval. I came
to the conclusion that any good more sophisticated FBC methods need to use
Kevin's "Tied at the Top Rule" mechanism.
There is some small movement and enthusiasm for Condorcet compliance, but
none that I discern for strict FBC compliance. I would think most voters
would satisfied with the massive reduction in Compromise incentive compared
to FPP afforded by properly implemented IRV, let alone the still greater
reduction we get from Condorcet.
In general FBC is much more slippery and "expensive" (in terms of being
compatible with other criteria) than Condorcet. I went off my own
"Irrelevant-Ballot Independent Fall-back Approval" idea (which isn't "very
simple") when Kevin showed that it fails Woodall's Plurality criterion.
And I'm generally allergic to, and find very silly, methods that fail
Irrelevant Ballots Independence like Median Ratings methods and this
"Majority-Condorcet" idea.
You have an apparent "majority Condorcet" winner, and then a few extra
ballots that vote for nobody are found and then the winner changes because
the "majority" threshold goes up. Absurd and potentially embarrassing.
Chris B.
On 27/04/2024 3:40 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
There was some advantage of ICA & ICT that I really liked, but public
proposals have to be as simple as possible. Few methods proposed here are
simple enough for public proposal.
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 22:50 Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 10:02 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
Does "Majority-Condorcet" mean the CW needs to have a majority over
every other candidate?
Yes: a CW needs more than 50% of the vote, including tied ranks, to
defeat every other candidate. This version of Condorcet is compatible with
FBC.
I guess a lot of CWs wouldn’t be getting elected.
The best Condorcet methods don’t importantly fail FBC. A sincere CW can
only lose by offensive strategy, & the better Condorcet methods well-deter
offensive strategy. No need for any defensive strategy.
Was it you who once said that people would try offensive strategy? The
whole point of strategy is action based on an analysis of what the result
will be. It’s a strategist’s business to find that out first.
Anyway when it’s noticed to usually backfire…
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 3:43 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote:
On 2024-04-24 12:32, Kevin Venzke wrote:
The second option doesn't offer Smith, but if it did, I would note
that Smith is a
poor guarantee of quality. Here's a 1025-voter election where a
2-vote candidate is
in the Smith set (along with all other candidates):
2: A>B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
1: B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
2: C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
4: D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
8: E>F>G>H>I>J>K
16: F>G>H>I>J>K
32: G>H>I>J>K
64: H>I>J>K
128: I>J>K
256: J>K
512: K
While this is not realistic, I do think it is realistic that a
candidate of limited
interest to most voters would sometimes manage to pairwise defeat a
more viable
candidate. And we should be ready to interpret this as noise.
That was phrased a bit oddly in the context of the rest of your post,
but I understand you to be saying "the worst method that passes Smith
may still be pretty bad", not necessarily that proposed methods
passing
Smith are actually bad. Is that right?
-km
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
list info
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
CLC,
"ICT" stands for "Improved Condorcet//Top-ratings". "Symmetrical ICT" is
someone's eccentric idea that I never understood and/or saw the point of.
ICA typically uses 3-slot ratings ballots (I'm sure that was the
version first proposed). If counting tied at the top ballots such as
A=B counting as both A>B and B>A there are some candidates that pairwise
beat all the others (it is now possible that A and B will "pairwise
beat" each other), disqualify all the others then elect the candidate
that is rated above bottom on most ballots. If there are no such
pairwise "beats all" candidates then do the same thing.
ICT is the same except that where ICA elects the not-disqualified
candidate that is rated above bottom on the highest number of ballots,
ICT elects the candidate that's rated top on the highest number of ballots.
The classic multi-purpose scenario:
49 A (sincere might be A>B)
24 B (sincere might be B>C)
27 C>B (sincere)
Chicken Dilemma specifies that is this scenario the B voters must not be
able to get away with a Defection strategy against B and so B mustn't
win, while Sincere Defense specifies that the A voters must not be able
to get away with their "offensive truncation" against the presumed
"sincere CW" B and so A must not win, in large part to save the C>B
voters the regret of not having Compromised by voting B>C or B.
Sincere Defense (or the simplest version of it) says that if more than
half the voters vote X above Y and Y no higher than equal-bottom then Y
can't win. And Woodall's Plurality criterion says that C can't win
because A has more first-place votes than C has any sort of (above
bottom) votes.
Definition
Each voter is either an A voter, a B voter, or a C voter. Each faction
votes its candidate (strictly) over everybody else.
Premise
-
There are 3 candidates: A, B, and C.
-
The A voters and the B voters, combined, add up to more than half
of the voters in the election. -
The A voters are more numerous than the B voters. The C voters are
more numerous than the A voters, and more numerous than the B voters. -
The A voters vote B over C. The B voters refuse to vote A over anyone.
-
None of the C voters vote A or B over the other.
Requirement
B doesn't win
I thought I recalled that CD says that C in the "premise" ( A in my
example) must win. In any case you can't have compliance with all three
of Sincere Defense, Chicken Dilemma and Plurality.
Chris B.
On 29/04/2024 10:08 am, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:
The way you describe ICT I find a bit odd.
Yes, I think I made a few mistakes, including confusing ICT with
symmetrical ICT (I have no idea what ICT is, assuming they're
different; electowiki doesn't have an article).
Kevin's ICA method easily meets Minimal Defense. ICT instead
meets Chicken Dilemma (incompatible with Minimal Defense) but I
think I recall was motivated by some example where the MCA winner
looked quite odd.
Could you clarify how the chicken criterion is incompatible with
Minimal Defense? Intuitively I thought median ratings would do well
against both.
On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:34 PM Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
CLC,
Yes, that's the main question I'm looking to answer with this
poll: do tied-at-the-top, or other tied-rank mechanisms, have
substantial support on this email list? (ICT is a similar, but
not-quite-working, attempt at satisfying Minimal Defense as well.)
I assume by "mechanisms" you mean * mechanisms to force the
method to comply with Favorite Betrayal*. As far as I can tell, no.
The way you describe ICT I find a bit odd. Kevin's ICA method
easily meets Minimal Defense. ICT instead meets Chicken Dilemma
(incompatible with Minimal Defense) but I think I recall was
motivated by some example where the MCA winner looked quite odd.
I don't recall it but can probably find it later.
Chris B.
On 28/04/2024 12:40 pm, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:
Hi Chris, thanks for your response!
I came to the conclusion that any good more sophisticated
FBC methods need to use Kevin's "Tied at the Top Rule"
mechanism.
Yes, that's the main question I'm looking to answer with this
poll: do tied-at-the-top, or other tied-rank mechanisms, have
substantial support on this email list? (ICT is a similar, but
not-quite-working, attempt at satisfying Minimal Defense as well.)
There is some small movement and enthusiasm for Condorcet
compliance, but none that I discern for strict FBC
compliance. I would think most voters would satisfied with
the massive reduction in Compromise incentive compared to FPP
afforded by properly implemented IRV, let alone the still
greater reduction we get from Condorcet.
There's a major IRV-repeal effort underway in Alaska at the
moment because they had one (!) election with a favorite-betrayal
incentive. I'm also not aware of any movements for strict
relative-majority Condorcet compliance. The organization that
comes closest is EVC (with their Copeland//Borda proposal), but
even they're not very purist about it.
And I'm generally allergic to, and find very silly, methods
that fail Irrelevant Ballots Independence like Median Ratings
methods and this "Majority-Condorcet" idea.
I fully agree with you that this is a big problem for median
ratings. A voter who shows up and says they think all the
candidates are bad isn't provide any new information about the
relative quality of the candidates.
However, I don't think an all-equal ballot is providing no
information in every situation. As an example, say we had a
system like approval, but with a 50% threshold for election (and
elections with <50% support for the winner resulting in reopening
nominations). Then, a fully-blank ballot is a way for voters to
meaningfully express their preference for somebody else,//other
than the current crop of candidates.
Something similar applies to the tied-at-the-top rule: a voter
who ties two candidates is saying they want these two candidates
to be compared using the tiebreaking mechanism, /rather than/ the
relative-Condorcet mechanism.
On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at 5:00 AM Chris Benham
<cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
There was some advantage of ICA & ICT that I really liked,
but public proposals have to be as simple as possible.
In that case I say forget about FBC methods other than
Approval. I came to the conclusion that any good more
sophisticated FBC methods need to use Kevin's "Tied at the
Top Rule" mechanism.
There is some small movement and enthusiasm for Condorcet
compliance, but none that I discern for strict FBC
compliance. I would think most voters would satisfied with
the massive reduction in Compromise incentive compared to FPP
afforded by properly implemented IRV, let alone the still
greater reduction we get from Condorcet.
In general FBC is much more slippery and "expensive" (in
terms of being compatible with other criteria) than
Condorcet. I went off my own "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent
Fall-back Approval" idea (which isn't "very simple") when
Kevin showed that it fails Woodall's Plurality criterion.
And I'm generally allergic to, and find very silly, methods
that fail Irrelevant Ballots Independence like Median Ratings
methods and this "Majority-Condorcet" idea.
You have an apparent "majority Condorcet" winner, and then a
few extra ballots that vote for nobody are found and then the
winner changes because the "majority" threshold goes up.
Absurd and potentially embarrassing.
Chris B.
On 27/04/2024 3:40 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
There was some advantage of ICA & ICT that I really liked,
but public proposals have to be as simple as possible. Few
methods proposed here are simple enough for public proposal.
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 22:50 Michael Ossipoff
<email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 10:02 Closed Limelike Curves
<closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
/Does "Majority-Condorcet" mean the CW needs to have
a majority over every other
candidate?/
Yes: a CW needs more than 50% of the vote, including
tied ranks, to defeat every other candidate. This
version of Condorcet is compatible with FBC.
I guess a lot of CWs wouldn’t be getting elected.
The best Condorcet methods don’t importantly fail FBC. A
sincere CW can only lose by offensive strategy, & the
better Condorcet methods well-deter offensive strategy.
No need for any defensive strategy.
Was it you who once said that people would try offensive
strategy? The whole point of strategy is action based on
an analysis of what the result will be. It’s a
strategist’s business to find that out first.
Anyway when it’s noticed to usually backfire…
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 3:43 AM Kristofer
Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote:
On 2024-04-24 12:32, Kevin Venzke wrote:
The second option doesn't offer Smith, but if
it did, I would note that Smith is a
poor guarantee of quality. Here's a 1025-voter
election where a 2-vote candidate is
in the Smith set (along with all other
candidates):
2: A>B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
1: B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
2: C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
4: D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
8: E>F>G>H>I>J>K
16: F>G>H>I>J>K
32: G>H>I>J>K
64: H>I>J>K
128: I>J>K
256: J>K
512: K
While this is not realistic, I do think it is
realistic that a candidate of limited
interest to most voters would sometimes manage
to pairwise defeat a more viable
candidate. And we should be ready to interpret
this as noise.
That was phrased a bit oddly in the context of
the rest of your post,
but I understand you to be saying "the worst
method that passes Smith
may still be pretty bad", not necessarily that
proposed methods passing
Smith are actually bad. Is that right?
-km
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see
https://electorama.com/em for list info
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see
https://electorama.com/em for list info
----
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
(This is a resend with a typo corrected.)
CLC,
"ICT" stands for "Improved Condorcet//Top-ratings". "Symmetrical ICT" is
someone's eccentric idea that I never understood and/or saw the point of.
ICA typically uses 3-slot ratings ballots (I'm sure that was the
version first proposed). If counting tied at the top ballots such as
A=B counting as both A>B and B>A there are some candidates that pairwise
beat all the others (it is now possible that A and B will "pairwise
beat" each other), disqualify all the others then elect the candidate
that is rated above bottom on most ballots. If there are no such
pairwise "beats all" candidates then do the same thing.
ICT is the same except that where ICA elects the not-disqualified
candidate that is rated above bottom on the highest number of ballots,
ICT elects the candidate that's rated top on the highest number of ballots.
The classic multi-purpose scenario:
49 A (sincere might be A>B)
24 B (sincere might be B>C)
27 C>B (sincere)
Chicken Dilemma specifies that is this scenario the B voters must not be
able to get away with a Defection strategy against C and so B mustn't
win, while Sincere Defense specifies that the A voters must not be able
to get away with their "offensive truncation" against the presumed
"sincere CW" B and so A must not win, in large part to save the C>B
voters the regret of not having Compromised by voting B>C or B.
Sincere Defense (or the simplest version of it) says that if more than
half the voters vote X above Y and Y no higher than equal-bottom then Y
can't win. And Woodall's Plurality criterion says that C can't win
because A has more first-place votes than C has any sort of (above
bottom) votes.
Definition
Each voter is either an A voter, a B voter, or a C voter. Each faction
votes its candidate (strictly) over everybody else.
Premise
-
There are 3 candidates: A, B, and C.
-
The A voters and the B voters, combined, add up to more than half
of the voters in the election. -
The A voters are more numerous than the B voters. The C voters are
more numerous than the A voters, and more numerous than the B voters. -
The A voters vote B over C. The B voters refuse to vote A over anyone.
-
None of the C voters vote A or B over the other.
Requirement
B doesn't win
I thought I recalled that CD says that C in the "premise" ( A in my
example) must win. In any case you can't have compliance with all three
of Sincere Defense, Chicken Dilemma and Plurality.
Chris B.
On 29/04/2024 10:08 am, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:
The way you describe ICT I find a bit odd.
Yes, I think I made a few mistakes, including confusing ICT with
symmetrical ICT (I have no idea what ICT is, assuming they're
different; electowiki doesn't have an article).
Kevin's ICA method easily meets Minimal Defense. ICT instead
meets Chicken Dilemma (incompatible with Minimal Defense) but I
think I recall was motivated by some example where the MCA winner
looked quite odd.
Could you clarify how the chicken criterion is incompatible with
Minimal Defense? Intuitively I thought median ratings would do well
against both.
On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:34 PM Chris Benham cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au
wrote:
CLC,
Yes, that's the main question I'm looking to answer with this
poll: do tied-at-the-top, or other tied-rank mechanisms, have
substantial support on this email list? (ICT is a similar, but
not-quite-working, attempt at satisfying Minimal Defense as well.)
I assume by "mechanisms" you mean * mechanisms to force the
method to comply with Favorite Betrayal*. As far as I can tell, no.
The way you describe ICT I find a bit odd. Kevin's ICA method
easily meets Minimal Defense. ICT instead meets Chicken Dilemma
(incompatible with Minimal Defense) but I think I recall was
motivated by some example where the MCA winner looked quite odd.
I don't recall it but can probably find it later.
Chris B.
On 28/04/2024 12:40 pm, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:
Hi Chris, thanks for your response!
I came to the conclusion that any good more sophisticated
FBC methods need to use Kevin's "Tied at the Top Rule"
mechanism.
Yes, that's the main question I'm looking to answer with this
poll: do tied-at-the-top, or other tied-rank mechanisms, have
substantial support on this email list? (ICT is a similar, but
not-quite-working, attempt at satisfying Minimal Defense as well.)
There is some small movement and enthusiasm for Condorcet
compliance, but none that I discern for strict FBC
compliance. I would think most voters would satisfied with
the massive reduction in Compromise incentive compared to FPP
afforded by properly implemented IRV, let alone the still
greater reduction we get from Condorcet.
There's a major IRV-repeal effort underway in Alaska at the
moment because they had one (!) election with a favorite-betrayal
incentive. I'm also not aware of any movements for strict
relative-majority Condorcet compliance. The organization that
comes closest is EVC (with their Copeland//Borda proposal), but
even they're not very purist about it.
And I'm generally allergic to, and find very silly, methods
that fail Irrelevant Ballots Independence like Median Ratings
methods and this "Majority-Condorcet" idea.
I fully agree with you that this is a big problem for median
ratings. A voter who shows up and says they think all the
candidates are bad isn't provide any new information about the
relative quality of the candidates.
However, I don't think an all-equal ballot is providing no
information in every situation. As an example, say we had a
system like approval, but with a 50% threshold for election (and
elections with <50% support for the winner resulting in reopening
nominations). Then, a fully-blank ballot is a way for voters to
meaningfully express their preference for somebody else,//other
than the current crop of candidates.
Something similar applies to the tied-at-the-top rule: a voter
who ties two candidates is saying they want these two candidates
to be compared using the tiebreaking mechanism, /rather than/ the
relative-Condorcet mechanism.
On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at 5:00 AM Chris Benham
<cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
There was some advantage of ICA & ICT that I really liked,
but public proposals have to be as simple as possible.
In that case I say forget about FBC methods other than
Approval. I came to the conclusion that any good more
sophisticated FBC methods need to use Kevin's "Tied at the
Top Rule" mechanism.
There is some small movement and enthusiasm for Condorcet
compliance, but none that I discern for strict FBC
compliance. I would think most voters would satisfied with
the massive reduction in Compromise incentive compared to FPP
afforded by properly implemented IRV, let alone the still
greater reduction we get from Condorcet.
In general FBC is much more slippery and "expensive" (in
terms of being compatible with other criteria) than
Condorcet. I went off my own "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent
Fall-back Approval" idea (which isn't "very simple") when
Kevin showed that it fails Woodall's Plurality criterion.
And I'm generally allergic to, and find very silly, methods
that fail Irrelevant Ballots Independence like Median Ratings
methods and this "Majority-Condorcet" idea.
You have an apparent "majority Condorcet" winner, and then a
few extra ballots that vote for nobody are found and then the
winner changes because the "majority" threshold goes up.
Absurd and potentially embarrassing.
Chris B.
On 27/04/2024 3:40 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
There was some advantage of ICA & ICT that I really liked,
but public proposals have to be as simple as possible. Few
methods proposed here are simple enough for public proposal.
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 22:50 Michael Ossipoff
<email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 10:02 Closed Limelike Curves
<closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
/Does "Majority-Condorcet" mean the CW needs to have
a majority over every other
candidate?/
Yes: a CW needs more than 50% of the vote, including
tied ranks, to defeat every other candidate. This
version of Condorcet is compatible with FBC.
I guess a lot of CWs wouldn’t be getting elected.
The best Condorcet methods don’t importantly fail FBC. A
sincere CW can only lose by offensive strategy, & the
better Condorcet methods well-deter offensive strategy.
No need for any defensive strategy.
Was it you who once said that people would try offensive
strategy? The whole point of strategy is action based on
an analysis of what the result will be. It’s a
strategist’s business to find that out first.
Anyway when it’s noticed to usually backfire…
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 3:43 AM Kristofer
Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote:
On 2024-04-24 12:32, Kevin Venzke wrote:
The second option doesn't offer Smith, but if
it did, I would note that Smith is a
poor guarantee of quality. Here's a 1025-voter
election where a 2-vote candidate is
in the Smith set (along with all other
candidates):
2: A>B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
1: B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
2: C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
4: D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
8: E>F>G>H>I>J>K
16: F>G>H>I>J>K
32: G>H>I>J>K
64: H>I>J>K
128: I>J>K
256: J>K
512: K
While this is not realistic, I do think it is
realistic that a candidate of limited
interest to most voters would sometimes manage
to pairwise defeat a more viable
candidate. And we should be ready to interpret
this as noise.
That was phrased a bit oddly in the context of
the rest of your post,
but I understand you to be saying "the worst
method that passes Smith
may still be pretty bad", not necessarily that
proposed methods passing
Smith are actually bad. Is that right?
-km
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