Hi everyone,
I've just invented a new voting rule. It seems to me that it has very good
axiomatic properties (it satisfies e.g., Smith, ISDA, cloneproofness,
monotonicity, reversal symmetry) but I haven't found anything similar in
the voting literature. I'm curious about your thoughts.
The algorithm proceeds in rounds. Each round is structured as follows:
This method is significantly different from Schulze or Ranked Pairs --- for
example, in an election with 3 candidates in a cycle, it elects the
candidate with the strongest victory, not the one with the weakest defeat.
Do you see any other strengths/weaknesses of this method?
Best,
Grzegorz Pierczyński
On 3/11/25 5:49 AM, Grzegorz Pierczyński wrote:
I've just invented a new voting rule. It seems to me that it has very good
axiomatic properties (it satisfies e.g., Smith, ISDA, cloneproofness,
monotonicity, reversal symmetry) but I haven't found anything similar in
the voting literature. I'm curious about your thoughts.
Interesting.
However, if I'm understanding the algorithm correctly, it's not monotonic.
In the step-throughs below, an uppercase pair XY means that X qualifies
based on that pairwise matchup; a lowercase pair xy means that at least one
of X and Y was already qualified at that step so nothing happens.
First election:
0 ABCD
2 ADBC
3 ADCB
2 BACD
7 BADC
5 CADB
8 DCBA
Margin of row over column:
A B C D
A 0 -7 1 11
B 7 0 -5 -9
C -1 5 0 -13
D -11 9 13 0
Algorithm step-through:
D B A (DC ad db BA cb AC)
A D (AD DB)
A (AD)
Second election (same as before except the BACD voters switch to ABCD):
2 ABCD
2 ADBC
3 ADCB
0 BACD
7 BADC
5 CADB
8 DCBA
Margin of row over column:
A B C D
A 0 -3 1 11
B 3 0 -5 -9
C -1 5 0 -13
D -11 9 13 0
Algorithm step-through:
D C B (DC ad db CB BA)
D C (DC db CB)
D (DC)
A goes from the winner to the first candidate eliminated!
In addition, I believe the method fails Burial, Chicken Dilemma
(defection), and forced cycle.
On Mon, Mar 17, 2025, 04:19 Joshua Boehme joshua.p.boehme@gmail.com wrote:
On 3/11/25 5:49 AM, Grzegorz Pierczyński wrote:
I've just invented a new voting rule. It seems to me that it has very
good
axiomatic properties (it satisfies e.g., Smith, ISDA, cloneproofness,
monotonicity, reversal symmetry) but I haven't found anything similar in
the voting literature. I'm curious about your thoughts.
Interesting.
However, if I'm understanding the algorithm correctly, it's not monotonic.
In the step-throughs below, an uppercase pair XY means that X qualifies
based on that pairwise matchup; a lowercase pair xy means that at least
one
of X and Y was already qualified at that step so nothing happens.
First election:
0 ABCD
2 ADBC
3 ADCB
2 BACD
7 BADC
5 CADB
8 DCBA
Margin of row over column:
A B C D
A 0 -7 1 11
B 7 0 -5 -9
C -1 5 0 -13
D -11 9 13 0
Algorithm step-through:
D B A (DC ad db BA cb AC)
A D (AD DB)
A (AD)
Second election (same as before except the BACD voters switch to ABCD):
2 ABCD
2 ADBC
3 ADCB
0 BACD
7 BADC
5 CADB
8 DCBA
Margin of row over column:
A B C D
A 0 -3 1 11
B 3 0 -5 -9
C -1 5 0 -13
D -11 9 13 0
Algorithm step-through:
D C B (DC ad db CB BA)
D C (DC db CB)
D (DC)
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On 2025-03-19 23:35, Ted Stern wrote:
In addition, I believe the method fails Burial, Chicken Dilemma
(defection), and forced cycle.
What do you mean by failing Burial and forced cycle?
-km