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A new Smith-efficient, monotone and cloneproof method (significantly different than Schulze/Ranked Pairs)

GP
Grzegorz Pierczyński
Tue, Mar 11, 2025 9:49 AM

Hi everyone,

I've just invented a new voting rule. It seems to me that it has very good
axiomatic properties (it satisfies e.g., Smith, ISDA, cloneproofness,
monotonicity, reversal symmetry) but I haven't found anything similar in
the voting literature. I'm curious about your thoughts.

The algorithm proceeds in rounds. Each round is structured as follows:

  • we process pairwise matchups from strongest to weakest,
  • in each processed matchup, the winner qualifies for the next round, and
    any further matchups involving them in the current round are skipped,
  • this continues until only one candidate remains unqualified, who is then
    eliminated from the election,
  • then the next round begins with all candidates who qualified from the
    previous round.
    The process repeats until only one candidate remains (which happens after
    m-1 rounds), who is declared the winner. Equivalently, we can stop when
    there is a Condorcet winner in the election.

This method is significantly different from Schulze or Ranked Pairs --- for
example, in an election with 3 candidates in a cycle, it elects the
candidate with the strongest victory, not the one with the weakest defeat.
Do you see any other strengths/weaknesses of this method?

Best,
Grzegorz Pierczyński

Hi everyone, I've just invented a new voting rule. It seems to me that it has very good axiomatic properties (it satisfies e.g., Smith, ISDA, cloneproofness, monotonicity, reversal symmetry) but I haven't found anything similar in the voting literature. I'm curious about your thoughts. The algorithm proceeds in rounds. Each round is structured as follows: * we process pairwise matchups from strongest to weakest, * in each processed matchup, the winner qualifies for the next round, and any further matchups involving them in the current round are skipped, * this continues until only one candidate remains unqualified, who is then eliminated from the election, * then the next round begins with all candidates who qualified from the previous round. The process repeats until only one candidate remains (which happens after m-1 rounds), who is declared the winner. Equivalently, we can stop when there is a Condorcet winner in the election. This method is significantly different from Schulze or Ranked Pairs --- for example, in an election with 3 candidates in a cycle, it elects the candidate with the strongest victory, not the one with the weakest defeat. Do you see any other strengths/weaknesses of this method? Best, Grzegorz Pierczyński
JB
Joshua Boehme
Mon, Mar 17, 2025 11:19 AM

On 3/11/25 5:49 AM, Grzegorz Pierczyński wrote:

I've just invented a new voting rule. It seems to me that it has very good
axiomatic properties (it satisfies e.g., Smith, ISDA, cloneproofness,
monotonicity, reversal symmetry) but I haven't found anything similar in
the voting literature. I'm curious about your thoughts.

Interesting.

However, if I'm understanding the algorithm correctly, it's not monotonic.

In the step-throughs below, an uppercase pair XY means that X qualifies
based on that pairwise matchup; a lowercase pair xy means that at least one
of X and Y was already qualified at that step so nothing happens.

First election:
0 ABCD
2 ADBC
3 ADCB
2 BACD
7 BADC
5 CADB
8 DCBA

Margin of row over column:
A  B  C  D
A  0 -7  1  11
B  7  0 -5  -9
C  -1  5  0 -13
D -11  9 13  0

Algorithm step-through:
D B A (DC ad db BA cb AC)
A D (AD DB)
A (AD)

Second election (same as before except the BACD voters switch to ABCD):
2 ABCD
2 ADBC
3 ADCB
0 BACD
7 BADC
5 CADB
8 DCBA

Margin of row over column:
A  B  C  D
A  0 -3  1  11
B  3  0 -5  -9
C  -1  5  0 -13
D -11  9 13  0

Algorithm step-through:
D C B (DC ad db CB BA)
D C (DC db CB)
D (DC)

A goes from the winner to the first candidate eliminated!

On 3/11/25 5:49 AM, Grzegorz Pierczyński wrote: > I've just invented a new voting rule. It seems to me that it has very good > axiomatic properties (it satisfies e.g., Smith, ISDA, cloneproofness, > monotonicity, reversal symmetry) but I haven't found anything similar in > the voting literature. I'm curious about your thoughts. Interesting. However, if I'm understanding the algorithm correctly, it's not monotonic. In the step-throughs below, an uppercase pair XY means that X qualifies based on that pairwise matchup; a lowercase pair xy means that at least one of X and Y was already qualified at that step so nothing happens. First election: 0 ABCD 2 ADBC 3 ADCB 2 BACD 7 BADC 5 CADB 8 DCBA Margin of row over column: A B C D A 0 -7 1 11 B 7 0 -5 -9 C -1 5 0 -13 D -11 9 13 0 Algorithm step-through: D B A (DC ad db BA cb AC) A D (AD DB) A (AD) Second election (same as before except the BACD voters switch to ABCD): 2 ABCD 2 ADBC 3 ADCB 0 BACD 7 BADC 5 CADB 8 DCBA Margin of row over column: A B C D A 0 -3 1 11 B 3 0 -5 -9 C -1 5 0 -13 D -11 9 13 0 Algorithm step-through: D C B (DC ad db CB BA) D C (DC db CB) D (DC) A goes from the winner to the first candidate eliminated!
TS
Ted Stern
Wed, Mar 19, 2025 10:35 PM

In addition, I believe the method fails Burial, Chicken Dilemma
(defection), and forced cycle.

On Mon, Mar 17, 2025, 04:19 Joshua Boehme joshua.p.boehme@gmail.com wrote:

On 3/11/25 5:49 AM, Grzegorz Pierczyński wrote:

I've just invented a new voting rule. It seems to me that it has very

good

axiomatic properties (it satisfies e.g., Smith, ISDA, cloneproofness,
monotonicity, reversal symmetry) but I haven't found anything similar in
the voting literature. I'm curious about your thoughts.

Interesting.

However, if I'm understanding the algorithm correctly, it's not monotonic.

In the step-throughs below, an uppercase pair XY means that X qualifies
based on that pairwise matchup; a lowercase pair xy means that at least
one
of X and Y was already qualified at that step so nothing happens.

First election:
0 ABCD
2 ADBC
3 ADCB
2 BACD
7 BADC
5 CADB
8 DCBA

Margin of row over column:
A  B  C  D
A  0 -7  1  11
B  7  0 -5  -9
C  -1  5  0 -13
D -11  9 13  0

Algorithm step-through:
D B A (DC ad db BA cb AC)
A D (AD DB)
A (AD)

Second election (same as before except the BACD voters switch to ABCD):
2 ABCD
2 ADBC
3 ADCB
0 BACD
7 BADC
5 CADB
8 DCBA

Margin of row over column:
A  B  C  D
A  0 -3  1  11
B  3  0 -5  -9
C  -1  5  0 -13
D -11  9 13  0

Algorithm step-through:
D C B (DC ad db CB BA)
D C (DC db CB)
D (DC)

A goes from the winner to the first candidate eliminated!

Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info

In addition, I believe the method fails Burial, Chicken Dilemma (defection), and forced cycle. On Mon, Mar 17, 2025, 04:19 Joshua Boehme <joshua.p.boehme@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On 3/11/25 5:49 AM, Grzegorz Pierczyński wrote: > > > I've just invented a new voting rule. It seems to me that it has very > good > > axiomatic properties (it satisfies e.g., Smith, ISDA, cloneproofness, > > monotonicity, reversal symmetry) but I haven't found anything similar in > > the voting literature. I'm curious about your thoughts. > > Interesting. > > However, if I'm understanding the algorithm correctly, it's not monotonic. > > In the step-throughs below, an uppercase pair XY means that X qualifies > based on that pairwise matchup; a lowercase pair xy means that at least > one > of X and Y was already qualified at that step so nothing happens. > > > First election: > 0 ABCD > 2 ADBC > 3 ADCB > 2 BACD > 7 BADC > 5 CADB > 8 DCBA > > Margin of row over column: > A B C D > A 0 -7 1 11 > B 7 0 -5 -9 > C -1 5 0 -13 > D -11 9 13 0 > > Algorithm step-through: > D B A (DC ad db BA cb AC) > A D (AD DB) > A (AD) > > > Second election (same as before except the BACD voters switch to ABCD): > 2 ABCD > 2 ADBC > 3 ADCB > 0 BACD > 7 BADC > 5 CADB > 8 DCBA > > Margin of row over column: > A B C D > A 0 -3 1 11 > B 3 0 -5 -9 > C -1 5 0 -13 > D -11 9 13 0 > > Algorithm step-through: > D C B (DC ad db CB BA) > D C (DC db CB) > D (DC) > > > > A goes from the winner to the first candidate eliminated! > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >
KM
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Sun, Mar 23, 2025 2:46 PM

On 2025-03-19 23:35, Ted Stern wrote:

In addition, I believe the method fails Burial, Chicken Dilemma
(defection), and forced cycle.

What do you mean by failing Burial and forced cycle?

-km

On 2025-03-19 23:35, Ted Stern wrote: > In addition, I believe the method fails Burial, Chicken Dilemma > (defection), and forced cycle. What do you mean by failing Burial and forced cycle? -km