Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 207, Issue 18
From: Steve Bosworth
TO: Kevin Venzke
You want to replace Top Two Primaries.
Could not the objections to top two primaries, and all the difficulties and problems mentioned in your post below, be optimally solved by removing such primaries altogether? Instead, elect the winner in the general election by using Majority Judgment (MJ). Regardless of the number of candidates, and provided that at least one candidate has received a grade of at least Acceptable from at least 50% plus 1 of all the ballots cast, MJ guarantees that the winner has received the highest median grade from at least 50% plus 1 of all the ballots cast. If no candidate has received 50% plus 1 grade of at least Acceptable, the winner will still be supported by a plurality.
As you know, MJ invites each voter to judge the suitability for office of one or more of the candidates as either Excellent (ideal), Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject (entirely unsuitable). Voters may give the same grade to any number of candidates. Each candidate who is not explicitly graded is counted as a ‘Reject’ by that voter. As a result, all candidates have the same number of evaluations but a different set of grades awarded from all voters. The MJ winner is the one who receives an absolute majority of all the grades equal to, or higher than, the highest median grade given to any candidate. This median grade can be found as follows:
-
Place all the grades given to each candidate, high to low, left to right in a row, with the name of each candidate on the left of each row.
-
The median grade for each candidate is in the middle of each row. Specifically, the middle grade for an odd number of voters, or the grade on the right in the middle for an even number of voters.
The winner is the candidate with the highest median grade. If more than one candidate has the same highest median grade, remove the current median grade from each tied candidate and start again at step 1 with those tied candidates.
4. What do you think?
5. Steve Bosworth (stevebosworth@hotmail.com
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Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 207, Issue 18
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Today's Topics:
- Re: California (Re: Two round methods) (Kevin Venzke)
Message: 1
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 2021 19:07:06 +0000 (UTC)
From: Kevin Venzke stepjak@yahoo.fr
To: Rob Lanphier roblan@gmail.com
Cc: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] California (Re: Two round methods)
Message-ID: 1736107612.1784776.1633892826970@mail.yahoo.com
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Hi Rob,
Thanks for all this background.
I mostly like the jungle primary, or top-two runoff, but it's true that the finalists might
get chosen arbitrarily, and we're only assured that a Condorcet Loser won't win.
Rob Lanphier roblan@gmail.com wrote earlier:
?
Hmm? In the American system you can't win with a majority on the first "round" because only
half the political spectrum participates in a contest. Republican and Democratic are done
separately.
?
This is true in many parts of our fine nation, but guess what?
Welcome to California!? That's not the way that we do it here.
I knew this, but understood you as being surprised that a two-round system could ever sensibly
end after one round.
If it were possible to win a majority of the electorate during the primaries, you would
practically have to elect that person. Otherwise you have the potential that small changes
in turnout could reverse the result. That would be really bad.
?
What if TWO people won a majority approval in the primary election?
Let's keep using the CA-10 example from above, and take all of the
candidates that received more than 10,000 votes in the primary:
?
- Jeff Denham (incumbent, Republican) 45,719 votes (37.6%)
- Josh Harder (Democratic) 20,742 votes (17.0%)
- Ted D. Howze (Republican)? 17,723 votes (14.6%)
- Michael Eggman (Democratic) 12,446 votes (10.2%)
- Virginia Madue?o (Democratic) 11,178 votes (9.2%)
- Others (11.4%)
- Total: 121,757 votes (100.0%)
?
At least a couple folks I spoke to liked Virginia Madue?o, but rallied
around Josh Harder after the primary election.? As I recall, on
election night, Denham and Howze were in the lead, and Harder was a
close third.? It was only the mail-in ballots that swung toward
Harder.? But note: this election was a "vote-for-only-one" (FPTP)
election.? I know that many people that I spoke with in CA-10 were
eager to get ANYONE other than a Republican.
My hunch is that Denham, Harder, Cox, Eggman and Madue?o could have
gotten over 50% approval.? Maybe even Howze.
But the voters had their favorites. Would they really approve the entire list, if they
knew there would be a second round that doesn't eliminate the alternatives? I don't think
so. So for my method proposal I think it is fine to end the method if there is majority
approval. (For a top-two, some remarks are below.)
My thoughts on the design constraints here, for a second round with two candidates only.
-
I would want to retain the non-partisan nature of the first round. I don't see a way of
preserving this while having any concept of party included in the method definition. -
If we advance exactly two candidates to a second round, we want to use a method that is
good at estimating the two most likely "best" candidates. Your concerns show that
vote-for-one is inadequate. And I dare say your hypothetical here actually shows why
approval is inadequate.
If a major party (say 40%+ of the voters) has the stance "let's elect any candidate from
our party, to ensure the winner is not from the other party", they may be able to achieve
this even without majority approval. Two candidates with 45% approval could both advance.
Maybe the best (eliminative) option is the one mentioned in 2018, to pair the approval
winner with the candidate posing the greatest "approval opposition" to him, meaning that
the same 45% of the voters can't pick both finalists.
In some strange scenarios this could create a bad second round: Suppose that 80% of the
voters approve A and B, and the other 20% approve C. Then C is in the second round. That
would be wasteful.
The right question to ask is a bit elusive. The right question is not "which candidate is
most likely to beat A pairwise?" because that will not actually give a different answer
as far as we can tell from the first round approval ballots. It's going to be the second
most approved candidate.
But should top-two selection always imply a concept of proportional representation; i.e.
that the two finalists "represent" as many voters as possible? I am not sure why,
theoretically. It would help maximize the policy difference between the two finalists,
which might be good for participation rate and the appearance that the vote was worth
holding. But maximizing the policy differences between two finalists is certainly NOT
generally music to my ears: It makes it sound like center squeeze is actually a goal.
The approach of my non-eliminative suggestion, to say it again, is to pick just one best,
and then go to the voters again and check if there's any way to show it was the wrong
pick.
Kevin
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End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 207, Issue 18
From: Steve Bosworth
TO: Kevin Venzke
You want to replace Top Two Primaries, and you say that you "mostly like the jungle primary, or top-two runoff, but it's true that the finalists might get chosen arbitrarily, and we're only assured that a Condorcet Loser won't win."
Could not your objections to top two primaries be optimally solved by removing such primaries altogether? Instead, elect the winner in the general election by using Majority Judgment (MJ). Regardless of the number of candidates, and provided that at least one candidate has received a grade of at least Acceptable from at least 50% plus 1 of all the ballots cast, MJ guarantees that the winner has received the highest median grade from at least 50% plus 1 of all the ballots cast. If no candidate has received 50% plus 1 grade of at least Acceptable, the winner will still be supported by a plurality.
As you know, MJ invites each voter to judge the suitability for office of one or more of the candidates as either Excellent (ideal), Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject (entirely unsuitable). Voters may give the same grade to any number of candidates. Each candidate who is not explicitly graded is counted as a ‘Reject’ by that voter. As a result, all candidates have the same number of evaluations but a different set of grades awarded from all voters. The MJ winner is the one who receives an absolute majority of all the grades equal to, or higher than, the highest median grade given to any candidate. This median grade can be found as follows:
-
Place all the grades given to each candidate, high to low, left to right in a row, with the name of each candidate on the left of each row.
-
The median grade for each candidate is in the middle of each row. Specifically, the middle grade for an odd number of voters, or the grade on the right in the middle for an even number of voters.
The winner is the candidate with the highest median grade. If more than one candidate has the same highest median grade, remove the current median grade from each tied candidate and start again at step 1 with those tied candidates.
4. What do you think?
5. Steve Bosworth (stevebosworth@hotmail.com)
Today's Topics:
- Re: California (Re: Two round methods) (Kevin Venzke)
Message: 1
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 2021 19:07:06 +0000 (UTC)
From: Kevin Venzke stepjak@yahoo.fr
To: Rob Lanphier roblan@gmail.com
Cc: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] California (Re: Two round methods)
Message-ID: 1736107612.1784776.1633892826970@mail.yahoo.com
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Hi Rob,
Thanks for all this background. stepjak@yahoo.fr
I mostly like the jungle primary, or top-two runoff, but it's true that the finalists might
get chosen arbitrarily, and we're only assured that a Condorcet Loser won't win.
Rob Lanphier roblan@gmail.com wrote earlier:
?
Hmm? In the American system you can't win with a majority on the first "round" because only
half the political spectrum participates in a contest. Republican and Democratic are done
separately.
?
This is true in many parts of our fine nation, but guess what?
Welcome to California!? That's not the way that we do it here.
I knew this, but understood you as being surprised that a two-round system could ever sensibly
end after one round.
If it were possible to win a majority of the electorate during the primaries, you would
practically have to elect that person. Otherwise you have the potential that small changes
in turnout could reverse the result. That would be really bad.
?
What if TWO people won a majority approval in the primary election?
Let's keep using the CA-10 example from above, and take all of the
candidates that received more than 10,000 votes in the primary:
?
- Jeff Denham (incumbent, Republican) 45,719 votes (37.6%)
- Josh Harder (Democratic) 20,742 votes (17.0%)
- Ted D. Howze (Republican)? 17,723 votes (14.6%)
- Michael Eggman (Democratic) 12,446 votes (10.2%)
- Virginia Madue?o (Democratic) 11,178 votes (9.2%)
- Others (11.4%)
- Total: 121,757 votes (100.0%)
?
At least a couple folks I spoke to liked Virginia Madue?o, but rallied
around Josh Harder after the primary election.? As I recall, on
election night, Denham and Howze were in the lead, and Harder was a
close third.? It was only the mail-in ballots that swung toward
Harder.? But note: this election was a "vote-for-only-one" (FPTP)
election.? I know that many people that I spoke with in CA-10 were
eager to get ANYONE other than a Republican.
My hunch is that Denham, Harder, Cox, Eggman and Madue?o could have
gotten over 50% approval.? Maybe even Howze.
But the voters had their favorites. Would they really approve the entire list, if they
knew there would be a second round that doesn't eliminate the alternatives? I don't think
so. So for my method proposal I think it is fine to end the method if there is majority
approval. (For a top-two, some remarks are below.)
My thoughts on the design constraints here, for a second round with two candidates only.
-
I would want to retain the non-partisan nature of the first round. I don't see a way of
preserving this while having any concept of party included in the method definition. -
If we advance exactly two candidates to a second round, we want to use a method that is
good at estimating the two most likely "best" candidates. Your concerns show that
vote-for-one is inadequate. And I dare say your hypothetical here actually shows why
approval is inadequate.
If a major party (say 40%+ of the voters) has the stance "let's elect any candidate from
our party, to ensure the winner is not from the other party", they may be able to achieve
this even without majority approval. Two candidates with 45% approval could both advance.
Maybe the best (eliminative) option is the one mentioned in 2018, to pair the approval
winner with the candidate posing the greatest "approval opposition" to him, meaning that
the same 45% of the voters can't pick both finalists.
In some strange scenarios this could create a bad second round: Suppose that 80% of the
voters approve A and B, and the other 20% approve C. Then C is in the second round. That
would be wasteful.
The right question to ask is a bit elusive. The right question is not "which candidate is
most likely to beat A pairwise?" because that will not actually give a different answer
as far as we can tell from the first round approval ballots. It's going to be the second
most approved candidate.
But should top-two selection always imply a concept of proportional representation; i.e.
that the two finalists "represent" as many voters as possible? I am not sure why,
theoretically. It would help maximize the policy difference between the two finalists,
which might be good for participation rate and the appearance that the vote was worth
holding. But maximizing the policy differences between two finalists is certainly NOT
generally music to my ears: It makes it sound like center squeeze is actually a goal.
The approach of my non-eliminative suggestion, to say it again, is to pick just one best,
and then go to the voters again and check if there's any way to show it was the wrong
pick.
Kevin
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End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 207, Issue 18