On 24/05/2019 12:43, Richard Lung wrote: > With FAB STV, a blank ballot returned means NOTA (without privileging > that particular preference perm on the ballot paper) and counts as one > vote towards a quota for leaving an empty seat. Any partially blank > vote of preferences also counts to a less extent against a seat being > filled. This procedure establishes absolute preference for the > candidates as a whole, not just relative preference between them. > You would indeed have to tell the voters in advance the consequences > of their being remiss in filling in all the preferences! > > from > Richard Lung. > > On 24/05/2019 00:24, Stéphane Rouillon wrote: >> All criterias (Winning Votes, Margins, Relative Margins) have >> advantages and are acceptable. The fine choice depends on the >> interpretation you told voters that would be made of blank ballots. >> If a blank rank means "all bad", WV is perfect. If it means "all the >> same" Margin is good, and if it means "I don't know but I trust other >> voters to express a valid opinion about this option", then RM is >> perfect. Just tell voters the chosen interpretation of blank tanks in >> advance so they can fill a sincere ballot... >> >> Envoyé de mon iPhone >> >> Le 22 mai 2019 à 20:18, robert bristow-johnson >> <rbj@audioimagination.com <mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com>> a écrit : >> >>> >>> i'm posting this to the list.  i hope it's okay. >>> >>> i had been asked: >>> >>> > This "plausible example" you can think of, why don't you show it >>> to us? >>> >>> i'm not as good as you guys in dreaming up the number of ballots >>> ranked however: >>> >>>   ex. A>B>C>D >>> >>> but could you have a defeat matrix where >>> >>>    A>B>C >>> >>> but   C>A by a smaller defeat strength than A>B or B>C.  But D>A by >>> an even smaller defeat strength, however D<B and D>C? >>> >>> i dunno how to dream up ballot combinations to do that. >>> >>> >>> > Without it all I can say that is that the River winner may or may >>> not be >>> > a "better choice" than the >>> > RP winner. >>> > >>> > River's main practical point is that it easier than Schulze and RP >>> to use. >>> >>> i think it's more complicated than RP.  it's RP with an additional >>> exception. >>> >>> i have to say i am still not convinced of WV.  probably >>> Schulze-Margins is still the best, but RP-Margins good enough and >>> possibly easier to sell to policy makers and the public. >>> >>> i like Margins in principle:  The percentage Margin is >>> (WV-LV)/(WV+LV) and is a measure of the decisiveness of defeat, >>> without respect to the size of the election.  So 5% defeat is a more >>> decisive defeat than a 4% defeat. >>> >>> But if you consider every Condorcet pair as it's own little >>> election, then the salience of the election would be the number of >>> voters that weigh in on it, which is WV+LV. >>> >>> So if the net defeat strength (the index to rank the pairs) is the >>> product of how important the election is with the decisiveness of >>> defeat you get: >>> >>>    (WV+LV) x (WV-LV)/(WV+LV)  =  WV - LV >>> >>> it just seems to me that Margins is better than WV. >>> >>> but say, WV, is a good idea for defeat strength.  is LV a better idea? >>> >>> hmmmm. >>> >>> -- >>> >>> r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com <mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com> >>> >>> "Imagination is more important than knowledge." >>> >>> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for >>> list info >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info > >