Let's say that a subset S of candidates is "uninterrupted" on ballot B iff
no candidate that is not a member of S is ranked between two members of S.
An uninterrupted set that contains some top ranked candidate is "top
tethered." Similarly, a "bottom tethered"
uninterrupted set has at least one candidate that does not outrank any
candidate.
Every "solid coalition" of Woodall is an example of a top tethered
uninterrupted set. Each completely ranked ballot of n candidates has n of
these (non-empty) solid coalitions, as also n bottom tethered uninterrupted
sets, and many more untethered uninterrupted sets. In fact, the total
number of uninterrupted sets on a fully ranked ballot of n candidates would
have to be C(n+1,2) or n(n+1)/2, since it takes two cutoffs to delineate an
uninterrupted set, and there are n+1 slots for those boundary marks.
Let beta be a set of ballots. Then for each subset S of candidates, let
UI(S) be the number of ballots in beta on which S is uninterrupted.
For each ballot B we determine a representative candidate K(B) by
considering the uninterrupted sets S in order of decreasing UI(S).
When a set S is considered, every candidate not in the set becomes
ineligible to represent ballot B, unless this would cause all candidates to
be ineligible, in which case that set is ignored.
When only one candidate is still eligible to represent ballot B, that
candidate is selected as K(B).
For each candidate k, let N(k) be the number of ballots for which k=K(B).
De-cloned Copeland:
Elect the candidate X with the greatest sum (over those k that do not
defeat X) of N(k).
Does that work?
Really, there are at least three versions ... top tethered, bottom
tethered, and untethered ... not to mention acquiescing variants.
If the descending uninterrupted sets end in a tied set of candidates T(B)
to represent ballot B, then B contributes to each of their N(k) values
1/#T(B).
Is this the right way to adapt Woodall's idea for this context?
-Forest
Hi Forest,
Le mardi 10 mai 2022, 00:02:19 UTC−5, Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com a écrit :
Let's say that a subset S of candidates is "uninterrupted" on ballot B iff no candidate
that is not a member of S is ranked between two members of S.
An uninterrupted set that contains some top ranked candidate is "top tethered." Similarly,
a "bottom tethered"
uninterrupted set has at least one candidate that does not outrank any candidate.
Every "solid coalition" of Woodall is an example of a top tethered uninterrupted set.
Each completely ranked ballot of n candidates has n of these (non-empty) solid coalitions,
as also n bottom tethered uninterrupted sets, and many more untethered uninterrupted sets.
In fact, the total number of uninterrupted sets on a fully ranked ballot of n candidates
would have to be C(n+1,2) or n(n+1)/2, since it takes two cutoffs to delineate an
uninterrupted set, and there are n+1 slots for those boundary marks.
Let beta be a set of ballots. Then for each subset S of candidates, let UI(S) be the number
of ballots in beta on which S is uninterrupted.
This sounds like UI(S) measures how likely it is that S consists of clones. It
seems like every singleton set would have a 100% score. (With the untethered
definition.)
For each ballot B we determine a representative candidate K(B) by considering the
uninterrupted sets S in order of decreasing UI(S).
When a set S is considered, every candidate not in the set becomes ineligible to represent
ballot B, unless this would cause all candidates to be ineligible, in which case that set
is ignored.
When only one candidate is still eligible to represent ballot B, that candidate is selected
as K(B).
If I'm right about the above then every ballot immediately runs into a massive
tie. But supposing it doesn't, I am not sure why a high UI score suggests that the
candidate should be representative of the ballot.
For each candidate k, let N(k) be the number of ballots for which k=K(B).
De-cloned Copeland:
Elect the candidate X with the greatest sum (over those k that do not defeat X) of N(k).
Does that work?
Really, there are at least three versions ... top tethered, bottom tethered, and untethered
... not to mention acquiescing variants.
I think your definition is already acquiescing.
With top tethering you might cut down on the UI scores so that only clone sets at
the tops of ballots register. Especially if you use solid and not acquiescing. The
result could be that lone candidates have the highest UI score, according to their
first preference count.
It's a little unclear to me whether the choice of tethering rule affects the
calculation of UI, the sets on B that can be considered, or both. If both, then I
guess you'll usually end up with the first preference as K(B).
If the descending uninterrupted sets end in a tied set of candidates T(B) to represent
ballot B, then B contributes to each of their N(k) values 1/#T(B).
This is potentially tedious because the possible results of all ties can't usually
be found by a single pass through the sets (unless no sets have tied strength). And
you need to assess this potentially for each unique ballot.
Is this the right way to adapt Woodall's idea for this context?
Woodall used this concept in a lot of different ways (not just solid and
acquiescing), including reproducing versions of Schulze. But in all cases the score
of a set would correspond in some way to voter support for the set. Of course, he
was always looking to find the winning candidate at the end. Maybe other
applications are possible.
Kevin
El mar., 10 de may. de 2022 5:28 p. m., Kevin Venzke stepjak@yahoo.fr
escribió:
Hi Forest,
Le mardi 10 mai 2022, 00:02:19 UTC−5, Forest Simmons <
forest.simmons21@gmail.com> a écrit :
Let's say that a subset S of candidates is "uninterrupted" on ballot B
iff no candidate
that is not a member of S is ranked between two members of S.
An uninterrupted set that contains some top ranked candidate is "top
tethered." Similarly,
a "bottom tethered"
uninterrupted set has at least one candidate that does not outrank any
candidate.
Every "solid coalition" of Woodall is an example of a top tethered
uninterrupted set.
Each completely ranked ballot of n candidates has n of these (non-empty)
solid coalitions,
as also n bottom tethered uninterrupted sets, and many more untethered
uninterrupted sets.
In fact, the total number of uninterrupted sets on a fully ranked ballot
of n candidates
would have to be C(n+1,2) or n(n+1)/2, since it takes two cutoffs to
delineate an
uninterrupted set, and there are n+1 slots for those boundary marks.
Let beta be a set of ballots. Then for each subset S of candidates, let
UI(S) be the number
of ballots in beta on which S is uninterrupted.
This sounds like UI(S) measures how likely it is that S consists of
clones. It
seems like every singleton set would have a 100% score. (With the
untethered
definition.)
I made the mistake of copying and pasting from the DSC article ... for the
untethered you have to consider the sets in descending order of
cardinality, and within cardinality, descending UI score.
For each ballot B we determine a representative candidate K(B) by
considering the
uninterrupted sets S in order of decreasing UI(S).
When a set S is considered, every candidate not in the set becomes
ineligible to represent
ballot B, unless this would cause all candidates to be ineligible, in
which case that set
is ignored.
When only one candidate is still eligible to represent ballot B, that
candidate is selected
as K(B).
If I'm right about the above then every ballot immediately runs into a
massive
tie. But supposing it doesn't, I am not sure why a high UI score suggests
that the
candidate should be representative of the ballot.
The ballot's representative for the clone count.
We are trying to get a probability measure (by normalizing the N(k) counts)
on the set of candidates.
We want the measure to nrespect clone sets and be neutral. The clone sets
should come out identically for reversed ballots ... so also the
probability measure.
If a candidate is cloned the probability of original candidate should be
distributed among its clones.
It was a big mistake years ago for me to assume that the probabilities
should be winning probabilities.
For each candidate k, let N(k) be the number of ballotntstives for which
k=K(B).
De-cloned Copeland:
Elect the candidate X with the greatest sum (over those k that do not
defeat X) of N(k).
Does that work?
Really, there are at least three versions ... top tethered, bottom
tethered, and untethered
... not to mention acquiescing variants.
I think your definition is already acquiescing.
With top tethering you might cut down on the UI scores so that only clone
sets at
the tops of ballots register. Especially if you use solid and not
acquiescing. The
result could be that lone candidates have the highest UI score, according
to their
first preference count.
It's a little unclear to me whether the choice of tethering rule affects
the
calculation of UI, the sets on B that can be considered, or both. If both,
then I
guess you'll usually end up with the first preference as K(B).
If the descending uninterrupted sets end in a tied set of candidates
T(B) to represent
ballot B, then B contributes to each of their N(k) values 1/#T(B).
This is potentially tedious because the possible results of all ties can't
usually
be found by a single pass through the sets (unless no sets have tied
strength). And
you need to assess this potentially for each unique ballot.
Is this the right way to adapt Woodall's idea for this context?
Woodall used this concept in a lot of different ways (not just solid and
acquiescing), including reproducing versions of Schulze. But in all cases
the score
of a set would correspond in some way to voter support for the set. Of
course, he
was always looking to find the winning candidate at the end. Maybe other
applications are possible.
Kevin