Yes, I fully agree on that point; nobody I know likes it when the nurse asks how much it hurts on a scale of one to ten! El mié., 6 de oct. de 2021 9:49 p. m., steve bosworth < stevebosworth@hotmail.com> escribió: > TO: Forest > FROM: Steve > > Thank you for forcing me to see that no voting method, including MJ, can > "guarantee" that its winner will be supported by an absolute majority of > all the ballots cast. MJ guarantees this only if an absolute majority of > all the ballots cast for at least one candidate have awarded them a grade > of at least Acceptable. Otherwise, the MJ winner is the candidate who has > received a plurality of such grades. > > In these circumstances, electing this plurality candidate is justified by > the democratic assumption that other things being equal, a candidate with > more votes than other candidates is probably more suited for office. For > the same reason, an absolute majority candidate is probably more suited > than a winning candidate with less support than a majority. > > At the same time, do you disagree with me that compared to voting by using > marks, numbers, or rankings; grading candidates allows voters more > meaningfully and informatively to express their qualitative judgments about > the candidates? > > I look forward to our next dialogue. > Steve > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> > *Sent:* Wednesday, October 6, 2021 7:38 PM > *To:* steve bosworth <stevebosworth@hotmail.com> > *Cc:* EM <Election-methods@lists.electorama.com> > *Subject:* Deterministic Epsilon Consensus Idea stimulated by a question > of Steve Bosworth (was Election-Methods Digest, Vol 207, Issue 9) > > Steve's query about Chiastic Approval included the following .... > > Also, correct me if I'm mistaken that XA does not guarantee that its > winner will be elected with the support of a majority of all the votes > (ballots) cast. > > The short answer is "no" ... no method can guarantee majority voter > support for its winner, unless they can guarantee that at least one > candidate is ranked, rated, scored, or graded above bottom on more than > half of the ballots submitted. > > The long answer is, "Why stop at half or two-thirds, as some methods > require ... why not go for full 100% consensus?" > > But, you may object, full consensus is not always possible. Well, neither > is forty percent support always possible, but that doesn't stop the > Constitution from requiring two-thirds of the voters' support for certain > kinds of amendments, etc. > > One expedient that has been suggested is the NOTA option for the case when > the quota is not met. This option gives new meaning to the word "approval" > ... as Mike Ossipoff used to say, you approve a candidate if you would > rather see her elected than have to come back next month to vote for > someone else. > > I would like to suggest another option based on the standard MJ grade > ballot ... > > Each candidate X gets a score that is given by the sum .. > > S(X) = Sum (over j from zero to five) of the product > > a(j)*epsilon^j, > > where epsilon is a value to be determined by the voters ... and the > respective values of a(j), for j in {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} are the number of > ballots on which candidate X is graded strictly above reject, poor, > acceptable, good, or very good, respectively. > > Also each voter has the option of voting for a value of epsilon in the set > {.01, .02, ... .99, 1.00}. The median of the distribution of these votes > determines the value of epsilon. > > Elect the candidate X with the max value of S(X) (once the epsilon value > has been determined). > > Note that if, for some j, the coefficient a(j) is the total number of > ballots, then we can say candidate X is a full consensus candidate at level > j. > > If there are several full consensus level j candidates, then the higher > degree terms will determine the winner. > > Thanks! > > FWS >