Suppose, for a moment, there were never any cycles...
On 01/23/2023 9:08 AM EST Kevin Venzke stepjak@yahoo.fr wrote:
Hi Robert,
Ok, you make your position clear that you don't really think choice of method imparts
different incentives on anyone.
uhm, is that what I said? How did you come to such clarity on my position? You said:
To the extent a method deals badly with spoilers, the interested parties will aim to avoid
the issue through their nomination choices or voting advice.
And I replied:
I doubt it. I doubt that, on the local, state, or national level, anyone will be looking at this to strategically nominate candidates that somehow will prevail if FPTP fails to get a majority or if IRV fails to elect the CW or if a Condorcet method has to deal with a cycle. I predict zero nominations will be materially affected by such considerations.
I'm saying that parties will nominate who they nominate based on the party's internal politics and whether the general election is FPTP, IRV, or a Condorcet method, will not likely change who is nominated.
It certainly could change who is elected in the general election. And whether FPTP, IRV, or Condorcet is used in the primary election process, that could change who is nominated. But the subtle complexity of the method in the general will most likely never affect the nomination debate where Republican A will say "I will prevail against the Democrat if IRV is used whereas my opponent, Republican B, will fail to." That conversation will never happen at any essential level.
I would think you would at least agree that if the Alaska race had been determined under
FPP, Begich would probably receive fewer votes, assuming he would insist on running,
I do. But if it was FPTP and Palin didn't run, I am quite confident that Begich would be in the U.S. House at this time. Certainly he would have been in October.
given
an expectation of placing third, with a greater likelihood of playing spoiler. (Ditto this
basic idea for most three-way IRV races.)
Yes, but it wasn't Begich who was the spoiler in August.
For example FPP always elects the CW on those ballots.
Oh, that seems to me to be a little disingenuous. There's only one ranking level other than
unranked. You don't know who the CW is if voters were allowed to be more specific about
their preferences. It's like the Approval folks insisting that their better at electing the
CW than IRV.
So what do you think would happen if FPP was actually conducted with rank ballots?
Oh, c'mon, Kevin... If the voters were issued ranked ballots and told that only their first-choice vote will count and the candidate with most first-choice votes in the one-and-only round will be elected, what I think would happen is massive voter confusion.
I dare
speculate that most FPP elections are won with a full majority,
I agree. In fact, most FPTP elections have only one or two candidates on the ballot.
so the use of rank ballots
would probably not dent FPP's observable Condorcet efficiency by much.
So what? FPTP will also elect the Hare winner or the Borda winner or the Bucklin winner or even the Approval winner if all you have is one ranking level other than the implicit unranked level.
Although maybe you have the belief that while method choice doesn't affect voter behavior,
I never said that. I said that I doubt that the method used in the general election will change who is nominated.
ballot format does,
Well, yah, you can confuse the hell outa voters with a ballot format that is incongruent to the method.
and so using rank ballots for FPP would result in half of elections
getting spoiled by voters refusing to use FPP strategy. I don't believe that, myself.
WTF??!! Using ranked ballots for FPTP will result in confused voters and a potentially massive lawsuit. It's a goofy scenario.
I consider FPTP strategy only with mark-only-one ballots and plurality rule in the tallying method. I consider IRV or Condorcet only with ranked ballots and there should be enough ranking levels that no voter (or very few) are denied their right to fully weigh in on their relative preferences with every candidate.
The only difference in voting strategy (I would call these voting tactics, my semantic is that "compromising" is a tactic and less a "strategy") I would attribute to Hare vs. Condorcet is, if it's Hare and the election is perceived as a close 3-way race, there may be voters on either the Left or Right wing (the wing that is perceived as weaker) that may choose to compromise and vote for the centrist so that the spoiled election that happened in Burlington 2009 or in Alaska in August 2022 will not happen to them. That's the only effect on different voting tactic I would predict between RCV decided by Hare vs. Condorcet.
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
Hi Robert,
Thanks for clarifying. I think we have some miscommunication somehow. This is what I wrote:
To the extent a method deals badly with spoilers, the interested parties will aim to avoid
the issue through their nomination choices or voting advice.
For example FPP always elects the CW on those ballots. Spoiled FPP elections aren't that
common. But we would probably say that's because they tried not to have 3+ candidates on
the ballot, not because FPP is so Condorcet-efficient.
I specifically offer the example of FPP's nomination disincentive that you seem to
acknowledge is a thing in your last post. To the first paragraph you replied "I doubt it"
and to the second you said this:
"They" are who? Each party only nominates a number of candidates equal to the winning
seats. Independents (and those signing their petition to get on the ballot) choose
independently if they're gonna run or not.
I took this as a rhetorical question. Was it? To me it reads like you deny that FPP creates
any incentives that could affect how many candidates run. Sure, there can always be third
parties and write-ins, but that's clearly not what candidates I would mean in an FPP
context.
For example FPP always elects the CW on those ballots.
Oh, that seems to me to be a little disingenuous. There's only one ranking level other than
unranked. You don't know who the CW is if voters were allowed to be more specific about
their preferences. It's like the Approval folks insisting that their better at electing the
CW than IRV.
So what do you think would happen if FPP was actually conducted with rank ballots?
Oh, c'mon, Kevin... If the voters were issued ranked ballots and told that only their
first-choice vote will count and the candidate with most first-choice votes in the
one-and-only round will be elected, what I think would happen is massive voter confusion.
I dare
speculate that most FPP elections are won with a full majority,
I agree. In fact, most FPTP elections have only one or two candidates on the ballot.
so the use of rank ballots
would probably not dent FPP's observable Condorcet efficiency by much.
So what? FPTP will also elect the Hare winner or the Borda winner or the Bucklin winner or
even the Approval winner if all you have is one ranking level other than the implicit
unranked level.
The point was that the aspect of the analogy you called disingenuous, isn't likely to make
much difference. If FPP elects a majority favorite 95% of the time then its observable
Condorcet efficiency is going to be at least 95% no matter how many ranks you add to the
ballots, because a voted majority favorite is always the voted CW, and adding ranks doesn't
change the strategy.
And the point of all that, is that voted Condorcet efficiency from real elections doesn't
seem like a very reliable indicator of method quality. Most methods will look very good,
because parties and voters have ways to compensate for any mediocrity.
The only difference in voting strategy (I would call these voting tactics, my semantic is
that "compromising" is a tactic and less a "strategy") I would attribute to Hare vs.
Condorcet is, if it's Hare and the election is perceived as a close 3-way race, there may
be voters on either the Left or Right wing (the wing that is perceived as weaker) that may
choose to compromise and vote for the centrist so that the spoiled election that happened
n Burlington 2009 or in Alaska in August 2022 will not happen to them. That's the only
effect on different voting tactic I would predict between RCV decided by Hare vs. Condorcet.
Ok, noted.
Kevin
votingmethods.net
On 01/24/2023 9:21 AM EST Kevin Venzke stepjak@yahoo.fr wrote:
Hi Robert,
Thanks for clarifying. I think we have some miscommunication somehow.
We do. But I am not satisfied with the apparent meaning you construe to what I have written.
This is what I wrote:
To the extent a method deals badly with spoilers, the interested parties will aim to avoid
the issue through their nomination choices or voting advice.
For example FPP always elects the CW on those ballots. Spoiled FPP elections aren't that
common. But we would probably say that's because they tried not to have 3+ candidates on
the ballot, not because FPP is so Condorcet-efficient.
I specifically offer the example of FPP's nomination disincentive that you seem to
acknowledge is a thing in your last post.
WTF?? What was it that I "seem to acknowledge"?
To the first paragraph you replied "I doubt it"
There is no convincing evidence provided that parties will nominate different candidates based on the method used in the general election. Of course the method used in the primary election might affect who gets nominated.
and to the second you said this:
"They" are who? Each party only nominates a number of candidates equal to the winning
seats. Independents (and those signing their petition to get on the ballot) choose
independently if they're gonna run or not.
I took this as a rhetorical question. Was it? To me it reads like you deny that FPP creates
any incentives that could affect how many candidates run.
A concession (or clarification), now that you first bring this issue up: FPTP may very well affect whether a party proffers a candidate at all to run for an office. In fact, not since 2012 has the Republican party in Burlington Vermont (essentially the "third party" in our city) run a candidate for mayor. They know that all they will do is split votes with the Democrats and that will help elect the Prog, whom they least want elected. Perhaps, RCV will encourage them to run a candidate, but after the experience the GOP in Burlington had with Hare RCV (that their candidate became the spoiler anyway and the candidate they hated was elected anyway and unnecessarily), they might still distrust the system to the point of not wasting money and running a GOP candidate.
I didn't consider "no candidate" to be one of the nominating choices. Indeed, I still think that if a party is nominating actual people to run for an office, which person that is nominated will not be affected by the method used in the general election.
Sure, there can always be third
parties and write-ins, but that's clearly not what candidates I would mean in an FPP
context.
What did you mean? Did you mean that the two major parties will make calculated adjustments to whom is nominated (that is not the same as if someone is nominated) based on the method used in the general election? It is to that, that I have consistently said "I doubt it".
For example FPP always elects the CW on those ballots.
Oh, that seems to me to be a little disingenuous. There's only one ranking level other than
unranked. You don't know who the CW is if voters were allowed to be more specific about
their preferences. It's like the Approval folks insisting that they're better at electing the
CW than IRV.
So what do you think would happen if FPP was actually conducted with rank ballots?
Oh, c'mon, Kevin... If the voters were issued ranked ballots and told that only their
first-choice vote will count and the candidate with most first-choice votes in the
one-and-only round will be elected, what I think would happen is massive voter confusion.
I dare
speculate that most FPP elections are won with a full majority,
I agree. In fact, most FPTP elections have only one or two candidates on the ballot.
so the use of rank ballots
would probably not dent FPP's observable Condorcet efficiency by much.
So what? FPTP will also elect the Hare winner or the Borda winner or the Bucklin winner or
even the Approval winner if all you have is one ranking level other than the implicit
unranked level.
The point was that the aspect of the analogy you called disingenuous, isn't likely to make
much difference. If FPP elects a majority favorite 95% of the time then its observable
Condorcet efficiency is going to be at least 95% no matter how many ranks you add to the
ballots,
oh, no, no. That's false. If you add more ranking levels (than just one), the apparent CW may very well be a different candidate. That is because voters will rank some candidates at different levels whereas in FPTP they were all at one level, specifically unranked.
because a voted majority favorite is always the voted CW, and adding ranks doesn't
change the strategy.
And the point of all that, is that voted Condorcet efficiency from real elections doesn't
seem like a very reliable indicator of method quality. Most methods will look very good,
because parties and voters have ways to compensate for any mediocrity.
The only difference in voting strategy (I would call these voting tactics, my semantic is
that "compromising" is a tactic and less a "strategy") I would attribute to Hare vs.
Condorcet is, if it's Hare and the election is perceived as a close 3-way race, there may
be voters on either the Left or Right wing (the wing that is perceived as weaker) that may
choose to compromise and vote for the centrist so that the spoiled election that happened
in Burlington 2009 or in Alaska in August 2022 will not happen to them. That's the only
effect on different voting tactic I would predict between RCV decided by Hare vs. Condorcet.
Ok, noted.
really???
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
Hi:
With regard to Condorcet this technical paper may have some interest.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2203.13713.pdf
Regards,
Joe
—————————————-
Joseph Malkevitch
Email:
Webpage:
From: Election-Methods election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com on behalf of robert bristow-johnson rbj@audioimagination.com
Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2023 5:10 PM
To: EM list election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Suppose, for a moment, there were never any cycles...
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On 01/24/2023 9:21 AM EST Kevin Venzke stepjak@yahoo.fr wrote:
Hi Robert,
Thanks for clarifying. I think we have some miscommunication somehow.
We do. But I am not satisfied with the apparent meaning you construe to what I have written.
This is what I wrote:
To the extent a method deals badly with spoilers, the interested parties will aim to avoid
the issue through their nomination choices or voting advice.
For example FPP always elects the CW on those ballots. Spoiled FPP elections aren't that
common. But we would probably say that's because they tried not to have 3+ candidates on
the ballot, not because FPP is so Condorcet-efficient.
I specifically offer the example of FPP's nomination disincentive that you seem to
acknowledge is a thing in your last post.
WTF?? What was it that I "seem to acknowledge"?
To the first paragraph you replied "I doubt it"
There is no convincing evidence provided that parties will nominate different candidates based on the method used in the general election. Of course the method used in the primary election might affect who gets nominated.
and to the second you said this:
"They" are who? Each party only nominates a number of candidates equal to the winning
seats. Independents (and those signing their petition to get on the ballot) choose
independently if they're gonna run or not.
I took this as a rhetorical question. Was it? To me it reads like you deny that FPP creates
any incentives that could affect how many candidates run.
A concession (or clarification), now that you first bring this issue up: FPTP may very well affect whether a party proffers a candidate at all to run for an office. In fact, not since 2012 has the Republican party in Burlington Vermont (essentially the "third party" in our city) run a candidate for mayor. They know that all they will do is split votes with the Democrats and that will help elect the Prog, whom they least want elected. Perhaps, RCV will encourage them to run a candidate, but after the experience the GOP in Burlington had with Hare RCV (that their candidate became the spoiler anyway and the candidate they hated was elected anyway and unnecessarily), they might still distrust the system to the point of not wasting money and running a GOP candidate.
I didn't consider "no candidate" to be one of the nominating choices. Indeed, I still think that if a party is nominating actual people to run for an office, which person that is nominated will not be affected by the method used in the general election.
Sure, there can always be third
parties and write-ins, but that's clearly not what candidates I would mean in an FPP
context.
What did you mean? Did you mean that the two major parties will make calculated adjustments to whom is nominated (that is not the same as if someone is nominated) based on the method used in the general election? It is to that, that I have consistently said "I doubt it".
For example FPP always elects the CW on those ballots.
Oh, that seems to me to be a little disingenuous. There's only one ranking level other than
unranked. You don't know who the CW is if voters were allowed to be more specific about
their preferences. It's like the Approval folks insisting that they're better at electing the
CW than IRV.
So what do you think would happen if FPP was actually conducted with rank ballots?
Oh, c'mon, Kevin... If the voters were issued ranked ballots and told that only their
first-choice vote will count and the candidate with most first-choice votes in the
one-and-only round will be elected, what I think would happen is massive voter confusion.
I dare
speculate that most FPP elections are won with a full majority,
I agree. In fact, most FPTP elections have only one or two candidates on the ballot.
so the use of rank ballots
would probably not dent FPP's observable Condorcet efficiency by much.
So what? FPTP will also elect the Hare winner or the Borda winner or the Bucklin winner or
even the Approval winner if all you have is one ranking level other than the implicit
unranked level.
The point was that the aspect of the analogy you called disingenuous, isn't likely to make
much difference. If FPP elects a majority favorite 95% of the time then its observable
Condorcet efficiency is going to be at least 95% no matter how many ranks you add to the
ballots,
oh, no, no. That's false. If you add more ranking levels (than just one), the apparent CW may very well be a different candidate. That is because voters will rank some candidates at different levels whereas in FPTP they were all at one level, specifically unranked.
because a voted majority favorite is always the voted CW, and adding ranks doesn't
change the strategy.
And the point of all that, is that voted Condorcet efficiency from real elections doesn't
seem like a very reliable indicator of method quality. Most methods will look very good,
because parties and voters have ways to compensate for any mediocrity.
The only difference in voting strategy (I would call these voting tactics, my semantic is
that "compromising" is a tactic and less a "strategy") I would attribute to Hare vs.
Condorcet is, if it's Hare and the election is perceived as a close 3-way race, there may
be voters on either the Left or Right wing (the wing that is perceived as weaker) that may
choose to compromise and vote for the centrist so that the spoiled election that happened
in Burlington 2009 or in Alaska in August 2022 will not happen to them. That's the only
effect on different voting tactic I would predict between RCV decided by Hare vs. Condorcet.
Ok, noted.
really???
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__electorama.com_em&d=DwIGaQ&c=yJ4UutiJRKf_XEsHUtOboHQQfLtKBfRC_OV2xJVGo18&r=o6VR-FODT1-zVZUm3DVE5oJTH7a2nI2uoeyzQiAOt44&m=Z1JZLbJ613QMMWoKIjQmUsjCEi_OHhVwgZulQetCq4jc7i3GdGf20Ky5P1udjq1n&s=_QMA1VQQUMMS8896zl-9a6jrEmAeBYTj8z7tYekMbbU&e= for list info
Hi Robert,
On 01/24/2023 9:21 AM EST Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:
Hi Robert,
Thanks for clarifying. I think we have some miscommunication somehow.
We do. But I am not satisfied with the apparent meaning you construe to what I have written.
Well, I think we are getting closer now.
This is what I wrote:
To the extent a method deals badly with spoilers, the interested parties will aim to avoid
the issue through their nomination choices or voting advice.
For example FPP always elects the CW on those ballots. Spoiled FPP elections aren't that
common. But we would probably say that's because they tried not to have 3+ candidates on
the ballot, not because FPP is so Condorcet-efficient.
I specifically offer the example of FPP's nomination disincentive that you seem to
acknowledge is a thing in your last post.
WTF?? What was it that I "seem to acknowledge"?
Essentially it's the concession/clarification you wrote below. When you agreed that Begich's
situation would probably be different under FPP, I'm not sure to what else you might attribute
this other than incentives stemming from FPP.
(You also stated that most FPP elections have only 1-2 candidates on the ballot, which led
me to suspect you might see FPP itself as a cause of this. But I admit that you didn't
actually say that.)
To the first paragraph you replied "I doubt it"
There is no convincing evidence provided that parties will nominate different candidates
based on the method used in the general election. Of course the method used in the
primary election might affect who gets nominated.
Interesting distinction. I'm not sure what to think of that.
and to the second you said this:
"They" are who? Each party only nominates a number of candidates equal to the winning
seats. Independents (and those signing their petition to get on the ballot) choose
independently if they're gonna run or not.
I took this as a rhetorical question. Was it? To me it reads like you deny that FPP creates
any incentives that could affect how many candidates run.
A concession (or clarification), now that you first bring this issue up: FPTP may very
well affect whether a party proffers a candidate at all to run for an office. In fact, not
since 2012 has the Republican party in Burlington Vermont (essentially the "third party" in
our city) run a candidate for mayor. They know that all they will do is split votes with
the Democrats and that will help elect the Prog, whom they least want elected. Perhaps,
RCV will encourage them to run a candidate, but after the experience the GOP in Burlington
had with Hare RCV (that their candidate became the spoiler anyway and the candidate they
hated was elected anyway and unnecessarily), they might still distrust the system to the
point of not wasting money and running a GOP candidate.
I didn't consider "no candidate" to be one of the nominating choices. Indeed, I still
think that if a party is nominating actual people to run for an office, which person
that is nominated will not be affected by the method used in the general election.
Ok.
Sure, there can always be third
parties and write-ins, but that's clearly not what candidates I would mean in an FPP
context.
What did you mean? Did you mean that the two major parties will make calculated
adjustments to whom is nominated (that is not the same as if someone is nominated) based
on the method used in the general election?
No, in an FPP context I much more mean if someone is nominated.
Though I do think it's likely that some candidates viable under a Condorcet method might
very well choose not to run in an IRV contest. Maybe there are unchangeable realities of
the world we live in which cause this to be untrue. That would be disappointing, though.
It is to that, that I have consistently said "I doubt it".
Yes, and I have not missed that. I think I took your statements as broader than you meant.
The point was that the aspect of the analogy you called disingenuous, isn't likely to make
much difference. If FPP elects a majority favorite 95% of the time then its observable
Condorcet efficiency is going to be at least 95% no matter how many ranks you add to the
ballots,
(adding back the rest of the quote)
because a voted majority favorite is always the voted CW, and adding ranks doesn't
change the strategy.
oh, no, no. That's false. If you add more ranking levels (than just one), the apparent CW
may very well be a different candidate. That is because voters will rank some candidates
at different levels whereas in FPTP they were all at one level, specifically unranked.
When there's a majority favorite, I don't agree with you (I can't see a reason for the
voters' inclination to vote strategically to change simply because ranks are added), but in
any case it's probably more valuable to understand why I'm using this argument than for you
to necessarily accept it.
In some ways it's unfortunate to have to seek an analogy in FPP, due to its ballot format.
But FPP does provide us with a striking demonstration of how a seemingly very poor method
can still manage to avoid presenting one disaster after another.
And the point of all that, is that voted Condorcet efficiency from real elections doesn't
seem like a very reliable indicator of method quality. Most methods will look very good,
because parties and voters have ways to compensate for any mediocrity.
The only difference in voting strategy (I would call these voting tactics, my semantic is
that "compromising" is a tactic and less a "strategy") I would attribute to Hare vs.
Condorcet is, if it's Hare and the election is perceived as a close 3-way race, there may
be voters on either the Left or Right wing (the wing that is perceived as weaker) that may
choose to compromise and vote for the centrist so that the spoiled election that happened
in Burlington 2009 or in Alaska in August 2022 will not happen to them. That's the only
effect on different voting tactic I would predict between RCV decided by Hare vs. Condorcet.
Ok, noted.
really???
I thought it better to leave it in and acknowledge reading it than delete it and make you
wonder if I saw it or not. "Strategy under Condorcet" seems too broad for me to want to try
commenting directly. The difference you suggest is reasonable.
Kevin
votingmethods.net
On 01/26/2023 7:30 PM EST Kevin Venzke stepjak@yahoo.fr wrote:
...
The point was that the aspect of the analogy you called disingenuous, isn't likely to make
much difference. If FPP elects a majority favorite 95% of the time then its observable
Condorcet efficiency is going to be at least 95% no matter how many ranks you add to the
ballots,
(adding back the rest of the quote)
because a voted majority favorite is always the voted CW, and adding ranks doesn't
change the strategy.
oh, no, no. That's false. If you add more ranking levels (than just one), the apparent CW
may very well be a different candidate. That is because voters will rank some candidates
at different levels whereas in FPTP they were all at one level, specifically unranked.
When there's a majority favorite, I don't agree with you (I can't see a reason for the
voters' inclination to vote strategically to change simply because ranks are added), but in
any case it's probably more valuable to understand why I'm using this argument than for you
to necessarily accept it.
In some ways it's unfortunate to have to seek an analogy in FPP, due to its ballot format.
But FPP does provide us with a striking demonstration of how a seemingly very poor method
can still manage to avoid presenting one disaster after another.
To be clear (still not sure I am understanding you on everything) I don't want to equate First-Past-The-Post with using a ranked-ballot and counting only the vote for the highest-ranked candidate. Now, when you have FPTP and only one ranking level other than unranked, the plurality winner of that election is also the CW from what information in the ballot data we know. But that does not mean that this CW would be the same CW if the number of ranking levels were increased to, say, the number of candidates on the ballot.
When the number of ranking levels is much less than the number of candidates, we know that there are ballots that get exhausted early that would not be if the number of ranking levels was increased. FPTP is the ranked-ballot with extreme ballot truncation. FPTP is "everybody gotta bullet-vote".
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
Hi Robert,
On 01/26/2023 7:30 PM EST Kevin Venzke stepjak@yahoo.fr wrote:
...
The point was that the aspect of the analogy you called disingenuous, isn't likely to make
much difference. If FPP elects a majority favorite 95% of the time then its observable
Condorcet efficiency is going to be at least 95% no matter how many ranks you add to the
ballots,
(adding back the rest of the quote)
because a voted majority favorite is always the voted CW, and adding ranks doesn't
change the strategy.
oh, no, no. That's false. If you add more ranking levels (than just one), the apparent CW
may very well be a different candidate. That is because voters will rank some candidates
at different levels whereas in FPTP they were all at one level, specifically unranked.
When there's a majority favorite, I don't agree with you (I can't see a reason for the
voters' inclination to vote strategically to change simply because ranks are added), but in
any case it's probably more valuable to understand why I'm using this argument than for you
to necessarily accept it.
In some ways it's unfortunate to have to seek an analogy in FPP, due to its ballot format.
But FPP does provide us with a striking demonstration of how a seemingly very poor method
can still manage to avoid presenting one disaster after another.
To be clear (still not sure I am understanding you on everything) I don't want to equate
First-Past-The-Post with using a ranked-ballot and counting only the vote for the
highest-ranked candidate. Now, when you have FPTP and only one ranking level other than
unranked, the plurality winner of that election is also the CW from what information in the
ballot data we know. But that does not mean that this CW would be the same CW if the
number of ranking levels were increased to, say, the number of candidates on the ballot.
When the number of ranking levels is much less than the number of candidates, we know that
there are ballots that get exhausted early that would not be if the number of ranking
levels was increased. FPTP is the ranked-ballot with extreme ballot truncation. FPTP is
"everybody gotta bullet-vote".
I get you, I'm not sure I disagree with any of that. What I want to note is that if the FPP
elections always had a majority favorite, additional ranks shouldn't be able to change the
apparent CW. You would have to hypothesize that adding more ranks could make voters less
strategic, or something, to explain why the previous majority favorite might lose their
status.
Kevin
votingmethods.net