Kristofer, > It also seems to define the criterion a bit differently: > >>> If a majority prefers one particular candidate to another, then they >>> should have a way of voting that will ensure that the other cannot win, >>> without any member of that majority reversing a preference for one >>> candidate over another. > > which would indicate that the majority can bar a particular candidate > from winning by voting in some given way that does not involve order > reversal, only truncation. "Truncation" or equal-ranking.  Steve Eppley a while back had a "Non-Drastic Defense" criterion that says that if more than half the voters vote A over B and A no lower than equal-top then B can't win. You'd think everything would meet that, but Margins doesn't. Of course Double Defeat (met by ASM and Smith//Approval and Double Defeat,Hare of the methods nominated in our current poll) implies easy compliance with the criterion you quote. If A has a pairwise win over B, then the A>B preferring voters (whether they are a "majority" or not) can ensure that B doesn't win by approving A and not approving B. The Double Defeat feature is both a common-sense way of tending to make for a higher social utility winner and an easy common-sense "defensive strategy" device. Chris B. On 15/05/2024 4:06 am, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > On 2024-05-14 19:55, Michael Ossipoff wrote: >> It seems to me that the Weak Defensive Strategy Criterion was a >> generalization of FBC: >> >> One should never get a worse result because they didn’t vote >> something they like less over something they like more. >> >> Strictly-speaking, Condorcet methods fail, but wv Condorcet doesn’t >> fail importantly. Most other Condorcet methods fail badly, because >> they fail FBC badly. >> >> I don’t expect Benham to either, though wv is all that I’ve tested. > > https://electowiki.org/wiki/Weak_Defensive_Strategy_criterion says > that Schulze passes. > > So does > http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2000-April/102004.html > > It also seems to define the criterion a bit differently: > >>> If a majority prefers one particular candidate to another, then they >>> should have a way of voting that will ensure that the other cannot win, >>> without any member of that majority reversing a preference for one >>> candidate over another. > > which would indicate that the majority can bar a particular candidate > from winning by voting in some given way that does not involve order > reversal, only truncation. > > If there's a sincere CW, then it's the same as your criterion, but if > not, then there may be one majority who prefers A to B and another > that prefers A to C, but no majority preferring A to both B and C. > Then the majority preferring A to B should have a way to stop B from > winning... > > I think? It's not my criterion. > > -km > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info

On Mon, May 13, 2024 at 11:18 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > Margins-Sorted Approval, Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes, and Max > Strength Transitive Beatpath are also Condorcet methods. Are you ranking > them third as well? > It wasn't clear to me how they worked, so I left them off, but if they're Condorcet, I suppose I will rank them third as well.