In my IRV Mono-Raise failure example:

When I said:

33: A
29: B
30: C

II meant:

33: A
29: B>C
30: C>A

Michael Ossipoff

On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 4:47 PM, Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:

On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 11:24 PM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au
mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:

 On 11/7/2016 6:07 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

 "Someone" could /say/ that, but it wouldn't make any sense.

But how so?

 Increasing the turnout is generally regarded as a good thing.  If
 the method used was one of the mono-raise failing methods I like
 (such as IRV and Benham), I would say:

 "Unfortunately it isn't possible for voting methods to have every
 desirable property (because some of those properties are mutually
 incompatible), and this method economises
 by not meeting mono-raise.

Exactly. The more properties, important desirable ones, a method
provides, the more of a cost there is, in terms of "embarrassment
criteria", "could-look-bad".

So it's a matter of what you're getting in terms of the
"could-look-bad", and whether that could-look-bad could be bad in a
practical way. As you suggested, MMPO's "Hitler-with-2-votes" would be
bad news, and, as you suggested, is more than a "look-bad".

But the Mono-Raise failure of Benham, Woodall & IRV is only a
could-look-bad. It never bothered me, and never stopped me from saying
good things about those methods.

Likewise the lesser look-bad of MDDTR, when it fails Mono-Add-Plump.

MDDTR meets FBC & CD, and it has wv-like strategy.

...the same advantages that MMPO has.

...at the cost of Mono-Add-Plump.

You like IRV, Benham & Woodall. Lots of people here love IRV. I don't
reject those methods, though they aren't my main proposals, because of
FBC, and the fact that there's nothing the CWs's voters can do to
protects hir from losing, and the fact that Benham & Woodall are
pairwise-count methods very vulnerable to pairwise-count offensive
strategy, and innocent, nonstrategic truncation.

If you aren't majority-favored, the elimination of the CWs is
disadvantages for you. But, in Bucklin, sometimes it might not be
known who the CWs is, and s/he might not defenseiveliy plump, and so
s/he (& you too) lose anyway, even though it isn't IRV. I don't know
that the Bucklin failure that I just described will be rarer than the
IRV failure that I just described. And IRV brings some big advantages
for people who are majority-favored...MMC, CD, LNHa, LNHe.

If your candidate is big enough to eliminate the CW, then s/he's big
enough that s/he's fairly well-known, and that CW's voters would know
something about hir, and would be unlikely to reject hir & transfer
the other way when s/he's close enough to what you want that you'd
prefer to elect hir.

So I don't reject IRV--I just don't emphasize it as a proposal.

Anyway, as I said, lots of people here love IRV, and its Mono-Raise
failure doesn't seem to hurt its popularity. You like IRV, and its
Mono-Raise failure doesn't put you off from it. I agree with you on that.

And, for the same reason, we needn't & shouldn't be put off by MDDTR's
Mono-Add-Plump failure.

 But generally speaking people care most about their favourites

True.

 , and IRV meets not only mono-add-plump but also mono-add-top.
 It's true that after the election
 some of losing candidate X's supporters could complain "If we
 hadn't top-ranked X, then X would have won" but that is unlikely
 to be noticed and of course isn't
 true of all (or anything like all) of X's supporters. So the X
 supporters as a whole could complain "If we had been well informed
 and coordinated we could have
 used a mixed strategy (with not all of us voting the same way) and
 elected X."

 But if voters accept the method as fair and legitimate then that
 "complaint" won't be taken seriously or get much sympathy.

...as with MDDTR.

 Just as no quasi-intelligent device should be so "stupid" as to be
 confused by the very simple and spectacular MMPO failure example,
 neither should it be
 confused by the very very simple mono-add-plump scenario.

...or the fact that in IRV you can make someone lose by ranking them
higher?

 What (arguably) desirable properties (or criterion compliances) 
 are incompatible with meeting Mono-add-Plump?

FBC, CD, & wv-like strategy are evidently require failing
Mono-Add-Plump, or having MMPO's Hitler-with-2-votes problem.

With MDDTR, the price of FBC, CD & wv-like strategy is Mono-Add-Plump.
That's a very small price, arguably less than IRV's Mono-Raise failure
(though I note that you mentioned that Mono-Add-Plump is about a
favorite).

Michael Ossipoff

 Chris Benham

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I should re-state the definition of MDDTR, because we haven't
discussed it for a while.

Ii don't know who introuced MDDTR. Who introduced it?

MDDTR stands for Majority Defeat Disqualification, Top Ratings.

MDDTR:

Voters can rank as many or as few candidates as they want to.

Equal rankings allowed.

1. Disqualify any candidate who has a majority pairwise defeat, unless
   everyone has one.

2. The winner is the un-disqualified candidate top-ranked by the most
   voters.

[end of definition]

MDDTR meets FBC & CD, an has wv-like stratgy.

The cost for that is that MDDTR fails Mono-Add-Plump. I've discussed
what that is no worse than IRV's failure of Mono-Raise. If IRV can be
popular in spite of Mono-Raise failure, and its favorite-burial need,
then MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump failure shouldn't have its importance &
badness exaggerated.

IRV is popular here. Then there's no reason why MDDTR couldn't or
shouldn't be at least as popular.

Michael Ossipoff

On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff
<email9648742@gmail.com mailto:email9648742@gmail.com> wrote:

 Chris--

 You suggested that Mono-Add-Plump failure is worse than Mono-Raise
 failure because people care more about their favorites, and
 because Mono-Raise failure is simpler.

 1. Caring about favorites:

 a) So you're saying that Mono-Raise failure can't happen when
 someone sincerely moves their favorite to top?:

 IRV:

 31: A
 2: B>A (sincere is A)
 29: B>C
 30: C>A

 1st round totals:

 A = 31
 B = 29 + 2 = 31
 C = 30

 C is eliminated & transferss to A

 Now A has a 61 majority and wins.

 But then the 2 B>A voters decide to sincerely raise A to top:

 33: A
 29: B
 30: C

 B gets eliminated, and transfers to C.

 Now C has a 59 majority and wins.

 b) You care about favorite? What about when you need to rank
 Comprmise over favorite to keep worst from winning? We're all
 familiar with that. In Burlington, the Republicans didn't do that,
 and their failure to favorite-bury elected their last choice.

 Yes, this isn't a monotonicity failure, but you used caring about
 Favorite as an advantage of IRV's Mono-Raise failure over MDDTR's
 Mono-Add-Plump failure. But obviously IRV has a bigger problem for
 Favorite. ...the reason why IRV was repealed in Burlington.

 So please, let's not use caring about Favorite as a reason to
 prefer IRV with its Mono-Raise failure
 & its favorite-burial need, to MDDTR's Mono-Add Plump failure.

 2. Simplicity:

 What could be simpler than your need, in IRV, to bury your
 favorite to help Compromise beat Worst:

 Sincere:

 40: C
 25: B>C
 35: A>B

 A voters vote sincerely, and B, the CWv, gets eliminated &
 transfers to C. C wins because the A voters didn't favorite-bury.

 Strategic:

 40: C
 25: B>C
 35: B>A (sincere is A>B)

 Now B wins.

 That's as simple as it gets. Let's not say that MDDTR's look-bad
 criterion-failurle is simpler than IRV's serious favorite-burial need.

 Yes, I'm talking about a problem that isn't a monotonicity
 problem. But its at least as simple as MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump
 problem, and is worse because it's a practical strategy problem
 that makes people need to favorite-bury.

 Michael Ossipoff


 By sincerely raising A to top, you made A lose.








 On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 2:48 AM, Michael Ossipoff
 <email9648742@gmail.com <mailto:email9648742@gmail.com>> wrote:



     On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 11:24 PM, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au
     <mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au>> wrote:

         On 11/7/2016 6:07 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

         "Someone" could /say/ that, but it wouldn't make any sense.


     But how so?

         Increasing the turnout is generally regarded as a good
         thing.  If the method used was one of the mono-raise
         failing methods I like (such as IRV and Benham), I would say:

         "Unfortunately it isn't possible for voting methods to
         have every desirable property (because some of those
         properties are mutually incompatible), and this method
         economises
         by not meeting mono-raise.


     Exactly. The more properties, important desirable ones, a
     method provides, the more of a cost there is, in terms of
     "embarrassment criteria", "could-look-bad".

     So it's a matter of what you're getting in terms of the
     "could-look-bad", and whether that could-look-bad could be bad
     in a practical way. As you suggested, MMPO's
     "Hitler-with-2-votes" would be bad news, and, as you
     suggested, is more than a "look-bad".

     But the Mono-Raise failure of Benham, Woodall & IRV is only a
     could-look-bad. It never bothered me, and never stopped me
     from saying good thins about those methods.

     Likewise the lesser look-bad of MDDTR, when it fails
     Mono-Add-Plump.

     MDDTR meets FBC & CD, and it has wv-like strategy.

     ...the same advantages that MMPO has.

     ...at the cost of Mono-Add-Plump.

     You like IRV, Benham & Woodall. Lots of people here love IRV.
     I don't reject those methods, though they aren't my main
     proposals, because of FBC, and the fact that there's nothing
     the CWs's voters can do to protects hir from losing, and the
     fact that Benham & Woodall are pairwise-count methods very
     vulnerable to pairwise-count offensive strategy, and innocent,
     nonstrategic truncation.

     If you aren't majority-favored, the elimination of the CWs is
     disadvantages for you. But, in Bucklin, sometimes it might not
     be known who the CWs is, and s/he might not defenseiveliy
     plump, and so s/he (& you too) lose anyway, even though it
     isn't IRV. I don't know that the Bucklin failure that I just
     described will be rarer than the IRV failure that I just
     described. And IRV brings some big advantages for people who
     are majority-favored...MMC, CD, LNHa, LNHe.

     If your candidate is big enough to eliminate the CW, then
     s/he's big enough that s/he's fairly well-known, and that CW's
     voters would know something about hir, and would be unlikely
     to reject hir & transfer the other way when s/he's close
     enough to what you want that you'd prefer to elect hir.

     So I don't reject IRV--I just don't emphasize it as a proposal.

     Anyway, as I said, lots of people here love IRV, and its
     Mono-Raise failure doesn't seem to hurt its popularity. You
     like IRV, and its Mono-Raise failure doesn't put you off from
     it. I agree with you on that.

     And, for the same reason, we needn't & shouldn't be put off by
     MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump failure.



         But generally speaking people care most about their favourites


     True.

         , and IRV meets not only mono-add-plump but also
         mono-add-top. It's true that after the election
         some of losing candidate X's supporters could complain "If
         we hadn't top-ranked X, then X would have won" but that is
         unlikely to be noticed and of course isn't
         true of all (or anything like all) of X's supporters.  So
         the X supporters as a whole could complain "If we had been
         well informed and coordinated we could have
         used a mixed strategy (with not all of us voting the same
         way) and elected X."

         But if voters accept the method as fair and legitimate
         then that "complaint" won't be taken seriously or get much
         sympathy.


     ...as with MDDTR.


         Just as no quasi-intelligent device should be so "stupid"
         as to be confused by the very simple and spectacular MMPO
         failure example, neither should it be
         confused by the very very simple mono-add-plump scenario.


     ...or the fact that in IRV you can make someone lose by
     ranking them higher?


         What (arguably) desirable properties (or criterion
         compliances)  are incompatible with meeting Mono-add-Plump?


     FBC, CD, & wv-like strategy are evidently require failing
     Mono-Add-Plump, or having MMPO's Hitler-with-2-votes problem.

     With MDDTR, the price of FBC, CD & wv-like strategy is
     Mono-Add-Plump. That's a very small price, arguably less than
     IRV's Mono-Raise failure (though I note that you mentioned
     that Mono-Add-Plump is about a favorite).

     Michael Ossipoff


         Chris Benham

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Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com
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Participation belongs to the broad general class of monotonicity criteria,
in which your ballot causes a result opposite to what it says.

You show up & cast a ballot that votes X over Y, and that changes the
winner from X to Y. That's an instance of nonmonotonicity.

Mono-Add-Raise was first named "Monotonicity", but Woodall named a more
generfal large class of monotonicity criteria.

A useful distinction among monotonicity criteria is, it seems to me:

Some monotonicity criteria say:

1. "My ballot made X lose even though it votes X over whoever else won,
   and is a change in the ballot-set that should make X more likely to win.
   (but it made X lose because of something else that the ballot does)."

Others say:

2. "My ballot made X lose for no other reason than because of a change
   that should make X more likely to win.

Failure of a #2 monotonicity criterion seems more ridiculous, more without
an explanation or justification.

Mono-Raise is a #2, and Mono-Add-Plump is a #1. That's why I say that
Mono-Add-Plump failure isn't as bad as Mono-Raise failure.

When MDDTR makes the candidate you plump lose, s/he loses because of the
addition of a ballot, which spoils a majority, not specifically because
your ballot favors that candidate.

Mono-Raise makes the candidate you raised lose for no other reason than
because you changed your ballot in a way that should be favorable to hir.

Maybe Mono-Raise is the only #2--I don't know.

Michael Ossipoff

On Tue, Nov 8, 2016 at 8:35 AM, Toby Pereira tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk wrote:

Chris Benham

I should re-state the definition of MDDTR, because we haven't discussed it
for a while.

Ii don't know who introuced MDDTR. Who introduced it?

MDDTR stands for Majority Defeat Disqualification, Top Ratings.

MDDTR:

Voters can rank as many or as few candidates as they want to.

Equal rankings allowed.

1. Disqualify any candidate who has a majority pairwise defeat, unless
   everyone has one.

2. The winner is the un-disqualified candidate top-ranked by the most
   voters.

[end of definition]

MDDTR meets FBC & CD, an has wv-like stratgy.

The cost for that is that MDDTR fails Mono-Add-Plump. I've discussed what
that is no worse than IRV's failure of Mono-Raise. If IRV can be popular in
spite of Mono-Raise failure, and its favorite-burial need, then MDDTR's
Mono-Add-Plump failure shouldn't have its importance & badness exaggerated.

IRV is popular here. Then there's no reason why MDDTR couldn't or
shouldn't be at least as popular.

Michael Ossipoff

On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:

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Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2016.0.7859 / Virus Database: 4664/13366 - Release Date: 11/07/16

On 11/7/2016 6:18 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

C: Failing mono-add-plump is as stupid as a quasi-"intelligent" device

C: There are methods that meet  FBC and CD and mono-add-plump. So your

Chris Benham

On 11/8/2016 8:14 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

I should re-state the definition of MDDTR, because we haven't discussed it
for a while.

Ii don't know who introuced MDDTR. Who introduced it?

I think you did.  There was a  3-slot MDDA:

http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Majority_Defeat_Disqualification_Approval

MDDTR:

Voters can rank as many or as few candidates as they want to.

I surprised you aren't proposing that it use 3-slot rating ballots.

The method obviously has a horrible strong random-fill incentive.

Chris Benham

I should re-state the definition of MDDTR, because we haven't discussed it
for a while.

Ii don't know who introuced MDDTR. Who introduced it?

MDDTR stands for Majority Defeat Disqualification, Top Ratings.

MDDTR:

Voters can rank as many or as few candidates as they want to.

Equal rankings allowed.

1. Disqualify any candidate who has a majority pairwise defeat, unless
   everyone has one.

2. The winner is the un-disqualified candidate top-ranked by the most
   voters.

[end of definition]

MDDTR meets FBC & CD, an has wv-like stratgy.

The cost for that is that MDDTR fails Mono-Add-Plump. I've discussed what
that is no worse than IRV's failure of Mono-Raise. If IRV can be popular in
spite of Mono-Raise failure, and its favorite-burial need, then MDDTR's
Mono-Add-Plump failure shouldn't have its importance & badness exaggerated.

IRV is popular here. Then there's no reason why MDDTR couldn't or
shouldn't be at least as popular.

Michael Ossipoff

On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
wrote:

No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2016.0.7859 / Virus Database: 4664/13366 - Release Date: 11/07/16