RL
Richard Lung
Fri, May 24, 2019 1:37 PM
On 24/05/2019 12:59, Richard Lung wrote:
In theory, FAB STV is an RCV system that is based on keep values, as
operated by Meek Method STV. The difference is that the former system
gives keep values for unelected, as well as elected, candidates.
Elected candidates have keep values of one or less. So, candidates
with no votes or preferences whatsoever would have keep values of
infinity.
This is not so bad as it sounds. In fact it makes no difference to the
counting procedure. If you wanted to avoid the infinities, then
candidates would be allowed to vote for themselves, ensuring a minimum
one vote. This would give the candidate a keep value that is the same
as the value of the quota (being the quota divided by one vote).
from
Richard Lung.
On 24/05/2019 00:30, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
I think all unranked candidates are tied for last place, no? Are
there any variants of RCV that this is different?
Whether equally-ranked candidates are counted as votes for both
candidates or for neither candidates cannot make a difference for
Margins. But it seems to me that it makes a difference if Winning
Votes is the measure of defeat strength.
regrads,
r b-j
---------------------------- Original Message
All criterias (Winning Votes, Margins, Relative Margins) have
advantages and are acceptable. The fine choice depends on the
interpretation you told voters that would be made of blank ballots.
If a blank rank means "all bad", WV is perfect. If it means "all the
same" Margin is good, and if it means "I don't know but I trust other
voters to express a valid opinion about this option", then RM is
perfect. Just tell voters the chosen interpretation of blank tanks in
advance so they can fill a sincere ballot...
Le 22 mai 2019 à 20:18, robert bristow-johnson
i'm posting this to the list. i hope it's okay.
i had been asked:
This "plausible example" you can think of, why don't you show it
i'm not as good as you guys in dreaming up the number of ballots
ex. A>B>C>D
but could you have a defeat matrix where
A>B>C
but C>A by a smaller defeat strength than A>B or B>C. But D>A by
an even smaller defeat strength, however D<B and D>C?
i dunno how to dream up ballot combinations to do that.
Without it all I can say that is that the River winner may or
a "better choice" than the
RP winner.
River's main practical point is that it easier than Schulze and
i think it's more complicated than RP. it's RP with an additional
i have to say i am still not convinced of WV. probably
Schulze-Margins is still the best, but RP-Margins good enough and
possibly easier to sell to policy makers and the public.
i like Margins in principle: The percentage Margin is
(WV-LV)/(WV+LV) and is a measure of the decisiveness of defeat,
without respect to the size of the election. So 5% defeat is a more
decisive defeat than a 4% defeat.
But if you consider every Condorcet pair as it's own little
election, then the salience of the election would be the number of
voters that weigh in on it, which is WV+LV.
So if the net defeat strength (the index to rank the pairs) is the
product of how important the election is with the decisiveness of
defeat you get:
(WV+LV) x (WV-LV)/(WV+LV) = WV - LV
it just seems to me that Margins is better than WV.
but say, WV, is a good idea for defeat strength. is LV a better idea?
hmmmm.
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
--
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
On 24/05/2019 12:59, Richard Lung wrote:
> In theory, FAB STV is an RCV system that is based on keep values, as
> operated by Meek Method STV. The difference is that the former system
> gives keep values for unelected, as well as elected, candidates.
> Elected candidates have keep values of one or less. So, candidates
> with no votes or preferences whatsoever would have keep values of
> infinity.
> This is not so bad as it sounds. In fact it makes no difference to the
> counting procedure. If you wanted to avoid the infinities, then
> candidates would be allowed to vote for themselves, ensuring a minimum
> one vote. This would give the candidate a keep value that is the same
> as the value of the quota (being the quota divided by one vote).
>
> from
> Richard Lung.
>
> On 24/05/2019 00:30, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>>
>> I think all unranked candidates are tied for last place, no? Are
>> there any variants of RCV that this is different?
>>
>> Whether equally-ranked candidates are counted as votes for *both*
>> candidates or for *neither* candidates cannot make a difference for
>> Margins. But it seems to me that it makes a difference if Winning
>> Votes is the measure of defeat strength.
>>
>> regrads,
>>
>> r b-j
>>
>>
>>
>> ---------------------------- Original Message
>> ----------------------------
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Defeat strength, Winning Votes vs. Margins, what to
>> do with equal-ranks on the ballot?
>> From: Stéphane Rouillon <stephane.rouillon@sympatico.ca>
>> Date: Thu, May 23, 2019 4:24 pm
>> To: rbj@audioimagination.com
>> Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> > All criterias (Winning Votes, Margins, Relative Margins) have
>> advantages and are acceptable. The fine choice depends on the
>> interpretation you told voters that would be made of blank ballots.
>> If a blank rank means "all bad", WV is perfect. If it means "all the
>> same" Margin is good, and if it means "I don't know but I trust other
>> voters to express a valid opinion about this option", then RM is
>> perfect. Just tell voters the chosen interpretation of blank tanks in
>> advance so they can fill a sincere ballot...
>> >
>> > Envoyé de mon iPhone
>> >
>> >> Le 22 mai 2019 à 20:18, robert bristow-johnson
>> <rbj@audioimagination.com> a écrit :
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> i'm posting this to the list. i hope it's okay.
>> >>
>> >> i had been asked:
>> >>
>> >> > This "plausible example" you can think of, why don't you show it
>> to us?
>> >>
>> >> i'm not as good as you guys in dreaming up the number of ballots
>> ranked however:
>> >>
>> >> ex. A>B>C>D
>> >>
>> >> but could you have a defeat matrix where
>> >>
>> >> A>B>C
>> >>
>> >> but C>A by a smaller defeat strength than A>B or B>C. But D>A by
>> an even smaller defeat strength, however D<B and D>C?
>> >>
>> >> i dunno how to dream up ballot combinations to do that.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> > Without it all I can say that is that the River winner may or
>> may not be
>> >> > a "better choice" than the
>> >> > RP winner.
>> >> >
>> >> > River's main practical point is that it easier than Schulze and
>> RP to use.
>> >>
>> >> i think it's more complicated than RP. it's RP with an additional
>> exception.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> i have to say i am still not convinced of WV. probably
>> Schulze-Margins is still the best, but RP-Margins good enough and
>> possibly easier to sell to policy makers and the public.
>> >>
>> >> i like Margins in principle: The percentage Margin is
>> (WV-LV)/(WV+LV) and is a measure of the decisiveness of defeat,
>> without respect to the size of the election. So 5% defeat is a more
>> decisive defeat than a 4% defeat.
>> >>
>> >> But if you consider every Condorcet pair as it's own little
>> election, then the salience of the election would be the number of
>> voters that weigh in on it, which is WV+LV.
>> >>
>> >> So if the net defeat strength (the index to rank the pairs) is the
>> product of how important the election is with the decisiveness of
>> defeat you get:
>> >>
>> >> (WV+LV) x (WV-LV)/(WV+LV) = WV - LV
>> >>
>> >> it just seems to me that Margins is better than WV.
>> >>
>> >> but say, WV, is a good idea for defeat strength. is LV a better idea?
>> >>
>> >> hmmmm.
>> >>
>> >> --
>> >>
>> >> r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
>> >>
>> >> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> ----
>> >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>> list info
>> >
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>> r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com
>>
>> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>>
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>