RL
Richard Lung
Sun, Feb 19, 2023 8:14 AM
Vote-splitting might be the main motive for voting reform in the USA, but not elsewhere. Europe and its diaspora was mainly motivated by the need to represent minorities, proportionately. On the continent, this took the form of partisan spoils sharing: party lists. This is also favored by safe seat careerists, in Britain.
The "lesser vehicule" is the Andrae and Hare traditions. Scandinavia still calls it the Andrae system, where it is nearly defunct. When Iceland resorted to STV for a special popular assembly they brought in James Gilmour, a Scotsman intellectually descended from the Hare system, supported by John Stuart Mill.
However, Carl Andrae was a member the Proportional Representation Society, set up in 1884, following its rejection in the Third Reform Bill. The independent-minded socialist, H G Wells was on the board in 1908. Nowadays, it is a Labour dominated body, that refers to STV as the gold standard. But the point about the gold standard is that the world had to come off it. (Before it has even come onto the unitive necessity of transferable voting.)
When members of the public commented on a then forthcoming Ontario Citizens Assembly, most of the complaints were directed at lack of proportion in FPTP, and importantly but secondarly against vote splitting.
Regards,
Richard Lung.
On 17 Feb 2023, at 10:19 pm, Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com wrote:
The candidate left unranked on the fewest ballots may be a better choice of default, because plurality is subject to vote splitting ... the main motivation for voting reform in the first place.
On 02/17/2023 1:13 PM EST KenB kdbearman@gmail.com wrote:
On 2/17/2023 10:48 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
(d)(1) Additional tabulation. Upon tabulation of the ballots, if no candidate receives a majority of first-ranked preferences, the ballots shall be tabulated again by paired comparison and examining every possible paired comparison. In each paired comparison, the presiding officer shall note the winning candidate in each paired comparison or if there is instead a tie.
(2) Condorcet winner. If a candidate is the winning candidate in every
paired comparison, the candidate shall be declared the winner of the election.
(3) No Condorcet winner. If there is no candidate that is the winning candidate in every paired comparison, then the candidate having the plurality of first-ranking preferences is declared the winner.
= = = = =
[KB] Do I understand paragraph (3) correctly: If there's no Condorcet winner, then you default to a First Past the Post winner?
Yes, given current usage data in the U.S., this is what happens about 0.2% of the RCV elections. Out of over 500 RCV elections in the U.S., only once did the election demonstrate a cycle. And that was Minneapolis Ward 2 in 2021. (And BTW, Nicolaus Tideman analyzed this and thinks that this evidence of a cycle is inconclusive because they had only 3 ranking levels and 5 or 6 candidates. But, as the ballots were marked and assuming none of the voters would have ranked anyone below 3rd-choice if there was more ranking levels, then it was a cycle.)
Now, in my opinion, the problem here becomes a political problem that might eclipse the technical problem. The technical problem is about how to keep any cycle from being gamed or incentivizing tactical/strategic voting in future elections. This is a quite esoteric technical problem and I would invite Markus or Nic or anyone else with their Condorcet-consistent method to explain it to a bunch of legislators, let alone the public.
We explain Condorcet this way: If a simple majority of voters mark their ballots preferring Candidate A over Candidate B, then Candidate B is not elected.
Why should Candidate B be elected? The IRV people twist themselves into pretzels trying to answer that. (Their answer is either "we've been doing it this way for several decade and IRV is well tested" or, when challenged that the "well tested" has shown failure in 3 out of 500 cases, then they trot out the old "Candidate Milquetoast" argument, saying, essentially that IRV saved us from getting Montroll in 2009 or Begich in 2022 because they are both milquetoast and "kiss the baby" candidates. A real horseshit argument.)
So, in the less than 0.2% of the cases where it is impossible to satisfy the simple ethical principle of the Condorcet criterion, then we have to explain to the public how and why the candidate who was elected was chosen. What is it about this winning candidate that makes him/her a more appropriate choice for election to office than any other candidate in the Smith set? What, that the public can see and discern, indicates electoral support? How would we answer that question?
That California bill (from a previous session, I believe it's a dead bill now) used the Hare IRV winner as the contingency winner if no Condorcet winner. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220AB2161 I think that, for less than 0.2%, defending this choice over plurality is difficult.
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
Vote-splitting might be the main motive for voting reform in the USA, but not elsewhere. Europe and its diaspora was mainly motivated by the need to represent minorities, proportionately. On the continent, this took the form of partisan spoils sharing: party lists. This is also favored by safe seat careerists, in Britain.
The "lesser vehicule" is the Andrae and Hare traditions. Scandinavia still calls it the Andrae system, where it is nearly defunct. When Iceland resorted to STV for a special popular assembly they brought in James Gilmour, a Scotsman intellectually descended from the Hare system, supported by John Stuart Mill.
However, Carl Andrae was a member the Proportional Representation Society, set up in 1884, following its rejection in the Third Reform Bill. The independent-minded socialist, H G Wells was on the board in 1908. Nowadays, it is a Labour dominated body, that refers to STV as the gold standard. But the point about the gold standard is that the world had to come off it. (Before it has even come onto the unitive necessity of transferable voting.)
When members of the public commented on a then forthcoming Ontario Citizens Assembly, most of the complaints were directed at lack of proportion in FPTP, and importantly but secondarly against vote splitting.
Regards,
Richard Lung.
On 17 Feb 2023, at 10:19 pm, Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> wrote:
The candidate left unranked on the fewest ballots may be a better choice of default, because plurality is subject to vote splitting ... the main motivation for voting reform in the first place.
> On Fri, Feb 17, 2023, 11:47 AM robert bristow-johnson <rbj@audioimagination.com> wrote:
>
>
> > On 02/17/2023 1:13 PM EST KenB <kdbearman@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 2/17/2023 10:48 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> >
> > > > https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qnSE5wPa1y7kY_zblLRwxc2Ol1QmrUs/view
> > > >
> > > ______________________________
> > >
> > > (d)(1) Additional tabulation. Upon tabulation of the ballots, if no candidate receives a majority of first-ranked preferences, the ballots shall be tabulated again by paired comparison and examining every possible paired comparison. In each paired comparison, the presiding officer shall note the winning candidate in each paired comparison or if there is instead a tie.
> > > (2) Condorcet winner. If a candidate is the winning candidate in every
> > > paired comparison, the candidate shall be declared the winner of the election.
> > > (3) No Condorcet winner. If there is no candidate that is the winning candidate in every paired comparison, then the candidate having the plurality of first-ranking preferences is declared the winner.
> > > ______________________________
> > = = = = =
> > [KB] Do I understand paragraph (3) correctly: If there's no Condorcet winner, then you default to a First Past the Post winner?
> >
>
> Yes, given current usage data in the U.S., this is what happens about 0.2% of the RCV elections. Out of over 500 RCV elections in the U.S., *only* *once* did the election demonstrate a cycle. And that was Minneapolis Ward 2 in 2021. (And BTW, Nicolaus Tideman analyzed this and thinks that this evidence of a cycle is inconclusive because they had only 3 ranking levels and 5 or 6 candidates. But, as the ballots were marked and assuming none of the voters would have ranked anyone below 3rd-choice if there was more ranking levels, then it was a cycle.)
>
> Now, in my opinion, the problem here becomes a political problem that might eclipse the technical problem. The technical problem is about how to keep any cycle from being gamed or incentivizing tactical/strategic voting in future elections. This is a quite esoteric technical problem and I would invite Markus or Nic or anyone else with their Condorcet-consistent method to explain it to a bunch of legislators, let alone the public.
>
> We explain Condorcet this way: If a simple majority of voters mark their ballots preferring Candidate A over Candidate B, then Candidate B is not elected.
>
> Why *should* Candidate B be elected? The IRV people twist themselves into pretzels trying to answer that. (Their answer is either "we've been doing it this way for several decade and IRV is well tested" or, when challenged that the "well tested" has shown failure in 3 out of 500 cases, then they trot out the old "Candidate Milquetoast" argument, saying, essentially that IRV saved us from getting Montroll in 2009 or Begich in 2022 because they are both milquetoast and "kiss the baby" candidates. A real horseshit argument.)
>
> So, in the less than 0.2% of the cases where it is impossible to satisfy the simple ethical principle of the Condorcet criterion, then we have to explain to the public how and why the candidate who was elected was chosen. What is it about this winning candidate that makes him/her a more appropriate choice for election to office than any other candidate in the Smith set? What, that the public can see and discern, indicates electoral support? How would we answer that question?
>
> That California bill (from a previous session, I believe it's a dead bill now) used the Hare IRV winner as the contingency winner if no Condorcet winner. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220AB2161 I think that, for less than 0.2%, defending this choice over plurality is difficult.
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
CC
Colin Champion
Sun, Feb 19, 2023 10:26 AM
Another correction I'm afraid...
I mentioned evaluation results for Condorcet+random (which are quite
good). They can't possibly be right. Anyone who attempts tactical voting
needs to make decisions from imperfect knowledge, since he can't know
for sure how people will vote. Studies of tactical voting tend to factor
this difficulty out, assuming onmiscience on the part of the manipulator
and therefore making tactical voting seem more effective than it really
is. My evaluation does this... but the omniscience must stretch to
knowing in advance the result of the random coin toss.
The conclusion would seem to be that tactical voting is harder than I
allow for in randomised voting methods, and randomisation better, not
worse, than my figures suggest. I think I need a sad face emoji here.
CJC
Another correction I'm afraid...
I mentioned evaluation results for Condorcet+random (which are quite
good). They can't possibly be right. Anyone who attempts tactical voting
needs to make decisions from imperfect knowledge, since he can't know
for sure how people will vote. Studies of tactical voting tend to factor
this difficulty out, assuming onmiscience on the part of the manipulator
and therefore making tactical voting seem more effective than it really
is. My evaluation does this... but the omniscience must stretch to
knowing in advance the result of the random coin toss.
The conclusion would seem to be that tactical voting is harder than I
allow for in randomised voting methods, and randomisation better, not
worse, than my figures suggest. I think I need a sad face emoji here.
CJC
CC
Colin Champion
Sun, Feb 19, 2023 3:36 PM
"Politicians and the voting public would not accept anything more
complicated than X" is my own favourite line of argument - but I
substitute my own value for X(minimax). I know that my judgement is
coloured by my preferences. There's a surprising degree of dissent over
which methods are simpler than which, and where the boundary should be
drawn. People who deal directly with politicians and the voting public
can no doubt get closer to the truth than people whose interest is
predominantly theoretical, but I wish there was an authoritative and
objective source of information. If only some behavioural psychologist
was funded to investigate the question...
To be finicky, the issue isn't exactly one of simplicity but rather one
of psychological acceptability, which includes the notions of whether a
method "makes sense" to the average onlooker, and whether it is seen as
conferring legitimacy on its winner rather than being an unmotivated
piece of jiggery pokery.
Notwithstanding all this... you and Robert may well be right.
CJC
On 18/02/2023 17:53, Bob Richard (lists) wrote:
Colin makes one argument for learning to live with the plurality
winner when there is no Condorcet winner. But it is only part of the
reason. Even if the social choice theorists could agree among
themselves on one best (or good enough) solution to the riddle of
cycles, politicians and the voting public would still not accept
anything more complicated than Robert's draft bill, or -- possibly --
"choose the IRV winner when there is no Condorcet winner." (The latter
only because IRV is already a somewhat familiar procedure.) The fact
that the theorists cancel each other out is only part of this situation.
Robert said earlier that there is a "political problem that might
eclipse the technical problem" (emphasis added). I would say instead
that the political problem absolutely eclipses the technical problem.
--Bob Richard
------ Original Message ------
From "Colin Champion" <colin.champion@routemaster.app
mailto:colin.champion@routemaster.app>
To election-methods@lists.electorama.com
mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Date 2/18/2023 1:42:36 AM
Subject Re: [EM] Hay guys, look at this...
I think Robert was wise to propse Condorcet+FPTP. It's the Judgement
of Solomon, allowing him to step aside from endless debates about
which Condorcet method is best.
I don't agree with his reasoning "If a simple majority of voters
mark their ballots preferring Candidate A over Candidate B... Why
should B be elected?" This is the argument of the Condorcet Loser
Criterion, which implicitly assumes that a decision can be determined
purely by the signums of the margins, ignoring their amplitudes.
Minimax violates Condorcet Loser and I'm not the only person to
support it.
But then I don't favour Kristofer's proposal either. My evaluation
suggests that burial is a particular threat for Condorcet methods,
and that in its presence their accuracies are: minimax 64%,
condorcet+fptp 59%, copeland,fptp 48%. [Usual disclaimers apply.]
[I would say a word in favour of SPE with an FPTP preranking. This is
a symmetrisation of the method of Llull's De Arte Eleccionis of 1299,
so it's essentially the oldest Condorcet method in existence which
isn't vitiated by indecisiveness. Its virtue lies in its linear-time
countability, which is only a factor if counting is manual and there
is a risk of a sizeable number of candidates standing. SPE is about
as resistant to burial as is minimax.]
Wiser judgements than Solomon's are imaginable. If there was a an
expert consensus that among those methods simple enough to gain the
approval of voters and legislators, XYZ was best, then Robert would
probably listen; but the onus is on experts to build a consensus, not
on advocates to take sides.
CJC
On 18/02/2023 06:05, Forest Simmons wrote:
Let me rephrase the question ... suppose that there were only three
candidates and you already knew that they were in a rock paper
scissors pairwise preference cycle.
How would you decide which one to vote for if you could only vote
for one?
That's the one you should make your first choice on an RCV ballot if
the cycle breaker is FPTP as you have been suggesting.
That decision is at least as difficult as the approval decision
would be, because under approval strategy you should approve that
candidate X (the one you would vote for if you had only one vote)
AND also approve your favorite if X was not already your favorite.
These are the same candidates that you would naturally rank on an
RCV ballot ... leaving the 3rd choice unranked ... the one that is
neither your favorite nor your compromise.
If you mis-triangulate the compromise in an FPTP election ... too
bad: you wasted your vote. But the approval ballot also counts
towards everybody you like better than your compromise, including
your favorite.
That's why Approval is often proposed as a Condorcet completion
method in the absence of a runoff.
Implicit approval takes advantage of the natural strategy of
truncating the candidates you don't like, while ranking your
preferred of the two front runners AND anybody you liked better ...
including your favorite ... whether or not it was a frontrunner.
Yes, the cycle is already there ... but it cannot split the votes
unless the method allows vote splitting by not having any contingent
backup vote. Approval has the simplest backup vote capability ...
any other method requires some kind of runoff/elimination step to
ameliorate the potential vote split.
Example ballot profile:
40 A>B (Sincere is A>C)
35 B>C
25 C>A
Under Plurality A wins.
The Implicit Approval (fewest truncations) winner is B with only 25
truncations, compared with 35 A truncations and 40 C truncations.
This is a typical kind of ballot profile resulting from the burial
by the largest faction ... of the sincere Condorcet Winner (C in
this example).
If the C supporters wanted to protect C, they could have truncated A:
25 C instead of 25 C>A.
This would not change the Plurality winner, but reinforces the
Implicit Approval winner, which gives the sincere CW a defense
against burial by punishing the burying faction ... electing their
sincere last choice instead of their sincere second choice.
With this defensive truncation B still has the fewest truncations
25, but now the burial perpetrator A has way more truncations (60)
than either of the others ... no chance of success in their burial
gambit.
Electing the Plurality choice (lacking a ballot CW) rewards the
burial perpetrator in this example .... so it encourages candidates
with large first place support to bury the sincere CW.
This example is typical in this respect ... the insincere burial
(of sincere CW) gambit is most tempting to the faction with the
greatest first place support.
On the other hand it is not tempting to bury the CW when lacking a
CW the implicit approval candidate is elected ... because this
burial gambit will almost certainly fail if not outright backfire.
It seems to me that anybody who understands why Approval is superior
to FPTP Plurality as an election method ... such a person should be
able to see how Approval is a better fall back alternative than
Plurality (absent a CW) .... an appreciable positive difference at
no extra cost.
The little Dutch boy was right to put his finger in the dike ... a
stitch in time is in deed worth nine.
On Fri, Feb 17, 2023, 7:07 PM robert bristow-johnson <
rbj@audioimagination.com mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com> wrote:
On 02/17/2023 9:44 PM EST Forest Simmons
<forest.simmons21@gmail.com <mailto:forest.simmons21@gmail.com>>
wrote:
Suppose the whole election was to choose one of the three
candidates ... no noncycle members were in the election at all.
Would you recommend FPTP Plurality over Approval?
I dunno. I would recommend Condorcet RCV and, only in the
super-rare case of a cycle, I would recommend plurality of
first-choice votes because it's no worse than we already have
now with FPTP and it's simple to explain to voters why that one
candidate (the one with more first-choice votes than anyone
else) is, in some sense, uniquely more preferred by the
electorate over any other candidate.
In a competitive 3-way race, I dunno if Approval would be better
than FPTP. I *do* know, if it were Approval, that I would have
a tactical decision to make regarding my second-favorite candidate.
But with RCV, I would have no tactical decision to make. I
would know immediately what I would do with my second-fav.
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
<mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com>
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
Election-Methods mailing list - see
https://electorama.com/em for list info
"Politicians and the voting public would not accept anything more
complicated than X" is my own favourite line of argument - but I
substitute my own value for X(minimax). I know that my judgement is
coloured by my preferences. There's a surprising degree of dissent over
which methods are simpler than which, and where the boundary should be
drawn. People who deal directly with politicians and the voting public
can no doubt get closer to the truth than people whose interest is
predominantly theoretical, but I wish there was an authoritative and
objective source of information. If only some behavioural psychologist
was funded to investigate the question...
To be finicky, the issue isn't exactly one of simplicity but rather one
of psychological acceptability, which includes the notions of whether a
method "makes sense" to the average onlooker, and whether it is seen as
conferring legitimacy on its winner rather than being an unmotivated
piece of jiggery pokery.
Notwithstanding all this... you and Robert may well be right.
CJC
On 18/02/2023 17:53, Bob Richard (lists) wrote:
> Colin makes one argument for learning to live with the plurality
> winner when there is no Condorcet winner. But it is only part of the
> reason. Even if the social choice theorists could agree among
> themselves on one best (or good enough) solution to the riddle of
> cycles, politicians and the voting public would still not accept
> anything more complicated than Robert's draft bill, or -- possibly --
> "choose the IRV winner when there is no Condorcet winner." (The latter
> only because IRV is already a somewhat familiar procedure.) The fact
> that the theorists cancel each other out is only part of this situation.
>
> Robert said earlier that there is a "political problem that *_might_*
> eclipse the technical problem" (emphasis added). I would say instead
> that the political problem absolutely eclipses the technical problem.
>
> --Bob Richard
>
> ------ Original Message ------
> From "Colin Champion" <colin.champion@routemaster.app
> <mailto:colin.champion@routemaster.app>>
> To election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> <mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com>
> Date 2/18/2023 1:42:36 AM
> Subject Re: [EM] Hay guys, look at this...
>
>> I think Robert was wise to propse Condorcet+FPTP. It's the Judgement
>> of Solomon, allowing him to step aside from endless debates about
>> which Condorcet method is best.
>> I don't agree with his reasoning "If a simple majority of voters
>> mark their ballots preferring Candidate A over Candidate B... Why
>> should B be elected?" This is the argument of the Condorcet Loser
>> Criterion, which implicitly assumes that a decision can be determined
>> purely by the signums of the margins, ignoring their amplitudes.
>> Minimax violates Condorcet Loser and I'm not the only person to
>> support it.
>> But then I don't favour Kristofer's proposal either. My evaluation
>> suggests that burial is a particular threat for Condorcet methods,
>> and that in its presence their accuracies are: minimax 64%,
>> condorcet+fptp 59%, copeland,fptp 48%. [Usual disclaimers apply.]
>>
>> [I would say a word in favour of SPE with an FPTP preranking. This is
>> a symmetrisation of the method of Llull's De Arte Eleccionis of 1299,
>> so it's essentially the oldest Condorcet method in existence which
>> isn't vitiated by indecisiveness. Its virtue lies in its linear-time
>> countability, which is only a factor if counting is manual and there
>> is a risk of a sizeable number of candidates standing. SPE is about
>> as resistant to burial as is minimax.]
>>
>> Wiser judgements than Solomon's are imaginable. If there was a an
>> expert consensus that among those methods simple enough to gain the
>> approval of voters and legislators, XYZ was best, then Robert would
>> probably listen; but the onus is on experts to build a consensus, not
>> on advocates to take sides.
>>
>> CJC
>>
>>
>> On 18/02/2023 06:05, Forest Simmons wrote:
>>> Let me rephrase the question ... suppose that there were only three
>>> candidates and you already knew that they were in a rock paper
>>> scissors pairwise preference cycle.
>>>
>>> How would you decide which one to vote for if you could only vote
>>> for one?
>>>
>>> That's the one you should make your first choice on an RCV ballot if
>>> the cycle breaker is FPTP as you have been suggesting.
>>>
>>> That decision is at least as difficult as the approval decision
>>> would be, because under approval strategy you should approve that
>>> candidate X (the one you would vote for if you had only one vote)
>>> AND also approve your favorite if X was not already your favorite.
>>>
>>> These are the same candidates that you would naturally rank on an
>>> RCV ballot ... leaving the 3rd choice unranked ... the one that is
>>> neither your favorite nor your compromise.
>>>
>>> If you mis-triangulate the compromise in an FPTP election ... too
>>> bad: you wasted your vote. But the approval ballot also counts
>>> towards everybody you like better than your compromise, including
>>> your favorite.
>>>
>>> That's why Approval is often proposed as a Condorcet completion
>>> method in the absence of a runoff.
>>>
>>> Implicit approval takes advantage of the natural strategy of
>>> truncating the candidates you don't like, while ranking your
>>> preferred of the two front runners AND anybody you liked better ...
>>> including your favorite ... whether or not it was a frontrunner.
>>>
>>> Yes, the cycle is already there ... but it cannot split the votes
>>> unless the method allows vote splitting by not having any contingent
>>> backup vote. Approval has the simplest backup vote capability ...
>>> any other method requires some kind of runoff/elimination step to
>>> ameliorate the potential vote split.
>>>
>>> Example ballot profile:
>>>
>>> 40 A>B (Sincere is A>C)
>>> 35 B>C
>>> 25 C>A
>>>
>>> Under Plurality A wins.
>>>
>>> The Implicit Approval (fewest truncations) winner is B with only 25
>>> truncations, compared with 35 A truncations and 40 C truncations.
>>>
>>> This is a typical kind of ballot profile resulting from the burial
>>> by the largest faction ... of the sincere Condorcet Winner (C in
>>> this example).
>>>
>>> If the C supporters wanted to protect C, they could have truncated A:
>>>
>>> 25 C instead of 25 C>A.
>>>
>>> This would not change the Plurality winner, but reinforces the
>>> Implicit Approval winner, which gives the sincere CW a defense
>>> against burial by punishing the burying faction ... electing their
>>> sincere last choice instead of their sincere second choice.
>>>
>>> With this defensive truncation B still has the fewest truncations
>>> 25, but now the burial perpetrator A has way more truncations (60)
>>> than either of the others ... no chance of success in their burial
>>> gambit.
>>>
>>> Electing the Plurality choice (lacking a ballot CW) rewards the
>>> burial perpetrator in this example .... so it encourages candidates
>>> with large first place support to bury the sincere CW.
>>>
>>> This example is typical in this respect ... the insincere burial
>>> (of sincere CW) gambit is most tempting to the faction with the
>>> greatest first place support.
>>>
>>> On the other hand it is not tempting to bury the CW when lacking a
>>> CW the implicit approval candidate is elected ... because this
>>> burial gambit will almost certainly fail if not outright backfire.
>>>
>>> It seems to me that anybody who understands why Approval is superior
>>> to FPTP Plurality as an election method ... such a person should be
>>> able to see how Approval is a better fall back alternative than
>>> Plurality (absent a CW) .... an appreciable positive difference at
>>> no extra cost.
>>>
>>> The little Dutch boy was right to put his finger in the dike ... a
>>> stitch in time is in deed worth nine.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Feb 17, 2023, 7:07 PM robert bristow-johnson <
>>> rbj@audioimagination.com <mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> > On 02/17/2023 9:44 PM EST Forest Simmons
>>> <forest.simmons21@gmail.com <mailto:forest.simmons21@gmail.com>>
>>> wrote:
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > Suppose the whole election was to choose one of the three
>>> candidates ... no noncycle members were in the election at all.
>>> >
>>> > Would you recommend FPTP Plurality over Approval?
>>> >
>>> >
>>>
>>> I dunno. I would recommend Condorcet RCV and, only in the
>>> super-rare case of a cycle, I would recommend plurality of
>>> first-choice votes because it's no worse than we already have
>>> now with FPTP and it's simple to explain to voters why that one
>>> candidate (the one with more first-choice votes than anyone
>>> else) is, in some sense, uniquely more preferred by the
>>> electorate over any other candidate.
>>>
>>> In a competitive 3-way race, I dunno if Approval would be better
>>> than FPTP. I *do* know, if it were Approval, that I would have
>>> a tactical decision to make regarding my second-favorite candidate.
>>>
>>> But with RCV, I would have no tactical decision to make. I
>>> would know immediately what I would do with my second-fav.
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj@audioimagination.com
>>> <mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com>
>>>
>>> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>>>
>>> .
>>> .
>>> .
>>>
>>>
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see
>>> https://electorama.com/em for list info
>>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
KM
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Sun, Feb 19, 2023 5:31 PM
On 2/19/23 16:36, Colin Champion wrote:
"Politicians and the voting public would not accept anything more
complicated than X" is my own favourite line of argument - but I
substitute my own value for X(minimax). I know that my judgement is
coloured by my preferences. There's a surprising degree of dissent over
which methods are simpler than which, and where the boundary should be
drawn. People who deal directly with politicians and the voting public
can no doubt get closer to the truth than people whose interest is
predominantly theoretical, but I wish there was an authoritative and
objective source of information. If only some behavioural psychologist
was funded to investigate the question...
To be finicky, the issue isn't exactly one of simplicity but rather one
of psychological acceptability, which includes the notions of whether a
method "makes sense" to the average onlooker, and whether it is seen as
conferring legitimacy on its winner rather than being an unmotivated
piece of jiggery pokery.
Notwithstanding all this... you and Robert may well be right.
FWIW, I suspect the complexity people are willing to accept depends on
their trust in the political process in general. For instance, some
local New Zealand elections use Meek's method, which is complex however
you put it.[1] And I wouldn't be prepared to explain the pretty messy
greedy algorithm used to allocate party list top-up seats here (in
Norway), but people seem to accept it.[2]
I don't think Robert could use minmax because the criterion he's using
is "if more people prefer X to Y than vice versa, then Y is not
elected". That seems to imply at least Condorcet loser. I'm not sure,
though -- if you're particularly critical, you could even say it implies
Smith, but I don't think Robert had that in mind.
-km
[1] I wonder what the legal language for that is... it's basically
impossible to do by hand.
[2] IMHO, biproportional apportionment is much simpler. I suspect
what's keeping it from being changed is mostl inertia.
On 2/19/23 16:36, Colin Champion wrote:
> "Politicians and the voting public would not accept anything more
> complicated than X" is my own favourite line of argument - but I
> substitute my own value for X(minimax). I know that my judgement is
> coloured by my preferences. There's a surprising degree of dissent over
> which methods are simpler than which, and where the boundary should be
> drawn. People who deal directly with politicians and the voting public
> can no doubt get closer to the truth than people whose interest is
> predominantly theoretical, but I wish there was an authoritative and
> objective source of information. If only some behavioural psychologist
> was funded to investigate the question...
>
> To be finicky, the issue isn't exactly one of simplicity but rather one
> of psychological acceptability, which includes the notions of whether a
> method "makes sense" to the average onlooker, and whether it is seen as
> conferring legitimacy on its winner rather than being an unmotivated
> piece of jiggery pokery.
>
> Notwithstanding all this... you and Robert may well be right.
FWIW, I suspect the complexity people are willing to accept depends on
their trust in the political process in general. For instance, some
local New Zealand elections use Meek's method, which is complex however
you put it.[1] And I wouldn't be prepared to explain the pretty messy
greedy algorithm used to allocate party list top-up seats here (in
Norway), but people seem to accept it.[2]
I don't think Robert could use minmax because the criterion he's using
is "if more people prefer X to Y than vice versa, then Y is not
elected". That seems to imply at least Condorcet loser. I'm not sure,
though -- if you're particularly critical, you could even say it implies
Smith, but I don't think Robert had that in mind.
-km
[1] I wonder what the legal language for *that* is... it's basically
impossible to do by hand.
[2] IMHO, biproportional apportionment is *much* simpler. I suspect
what's keeping it from being changed is mostl inertia.
CC
Colin Champion
Sun, Feb 19, 2023 6:46 PM
I asked Kristofer whether Condorcet+FPTP complied with the Condorcet
Loser criterion. He replied "probably not" with a sketch proof, and then
gave the following example.
<quote>
[preliminary election]
40: L>C>R
42: R>C>L
10: C>L>R
R is the Condorcet loser and Plurality winner. (L is the IRV winner.)
Now clone C, the CW:
40: L>Ca>Cb>Cc>R
42: R>Cb>Cc>Ca>L
10: Cc>Ca>Cb>L>R
There's no CW, so Plurality elects R, the Condorcet loser.
(Incidentally, R ties for first in minmax.)
Seems OK. Verified with
https://web.archive.org/web/20220403135047/http://www.cs.angelo.edu/~rlegrand/rbvote/calc.html.
</quote>
I'd wondered whether Robert didn't have any intellectual commitent to
the criterion, but had used it in argument against IRV and therefore
found his options limited.
CJC
On 19/02/2023 17:31, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 2/19/23 16:36, Colin Champion wrote:
"Politicians and the voting public would not accept anything more
complicated than X" is my own favourite line of argument - but I
substitute my own value for X(minimax). I know that my judgement is
coloured by my preferences. There's a surprising degree of dissent
over which methods are simpler than which, and where the boundary
should be drawn. People who deal directly with politicians and the
voting public can no doubt get closer to the truth than people whose
interest is predominantly theoretical, but I wish there was an
authoritative and objective source of information. If only some
behavioural psychologist was funded to investigate the question...
To be finicky, the issue isn't exactly one of simplicity but rather
one of psychological acceptability, which includes the notions of
whether a method "makes sense" to the average onlooker, and whether
it is seen as conferring legitimacy on its winner rather than being
an unmotivated piece of jiggery pokery.
Notwithstanding all this... you and Robert may well be right.
FWIW, I suspect the complexity people are willing to accept depends on
their trust in the political process in general. For instance, some
local New Zealand elections use Meek's method, which is complex
however you put it.[1] And I wouldn't be prepared to explain the
pretty messy greedy algorithm used to allocate party list top-up seats
here (in Norway), but people seem to accept it.[2]
I don't think Robert could use minmax because the criterion he's using
is "if more people prefer X to Y than vice versa, then Y is not
elected". That seems to imply at least Condorcet loser. I'm not sure,
though -- if you're particularly critical, you could even say it
implies Smith, but I don't think Robert had that in mind.
-km
[1] I wonder what the legal language for that is... it's basically
impossible to do by hand.
[2] IMHO, biproportional apportionment is much simpler. I suspect
what's keeping it from being changed is mostl inertia.
I asked Kristofer whether Condorcet+FPTP complied with the Condorcet
Loser criterion. He replied "probably not" with a sketch proof, and then
gave the following example.
<quote>
[preliminary election]
40: L>C>R
42: R>C>L
10: C>L>R
R is the Condorcet loser and Plurality winner. (L is the IRV winner.)
Now clone C, the CW:
40: L>Ca>Cb>Cc>R
42: R>Cb>Cc>Ca>L
10: Cc>Ca>Cb>L>R
There's no CW, so Plurality elects R, the Condorcet loser.
(Incidentally, R ties for first in minmax.)
Seems OK. Verified with
https://web.archive.org/web/20220403135047/http://www.cs.angelo.edu/~rlegrand/rbvote/calc.html.
</quote>
I'd wondered whether Robert didn't have any intellectual commitent to
the criterion, but had used it in argument against IRV and therefore
found his options limited.
CJC
On 19/02/2023 17:31, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> On 2/19/23 16:36, Colin Champion wrote:
>> "Politicians and the voting public would not accept anything more
>> complicated than X" is my own favourite line of argument - but I
>> substitute my own value for X(minimax). I know that my judgement is
>> coloured by my preferences. There's a surprising degree of dissent
>> over which methods are simpler than which, and where the boundary
>> should be drawn. People who deal directly with politicians and the
>> voting public can no doubt get closer to the truth than people whose
>> interest is predominantly theoretical, but I wish there was an
>> authoritative and objective source of information. If only some
>> behavioural psychologist was funded to investigate the question...
>>
>> To be finicky, the issue isn't exactly one of simplicity but rather
>> one of psychological acceptability, which includes the notions of
>> whether a method "makes sense" to the average onlooker, and whether
>> it is seen as conferring legitimacy on its winner rather than being
>> an unmotivated piece of jiggery pokery.
>>
>> Notwithstanding all this... you and Robert may well be right.
>
> FWIW, I suspect the complexity people are willing to accept depends on
> their trust in the political process in general. For instance, some
> local New Zealand elections use Meek's method, which is complex
> however you put it.[1] And I wouldn't be prepared to explain the
> pretty messy greedy algorithm used to allocate party list top-up seats
> here (in Norway), but people seem to accept it.[2]
>
> I don't think Robert could use minmax because the criterion he's using
> is "if more people prefer X to Y than vice versa, then Y is not
> elected". That seems to imply at least Condorcet loser. I'm not sure,
> though -- if you're particularly critical, you could even say it
> implies Smith, but I don't think Robert had that in mind.
>
> -km
>
> [1] I wonder what the legal language for *that* is... it's basically
> impossible to do by hand.
> [2] IMHO, biproportional apportionment is *much* simpler. I suspect
> what's keeping it from being changed is mostl inertia.
KV
Kevin Venzke
Mon, Feb 20, 2023 12:21 AM
Le dimanche 19 février 2023 à 12:47:49 UTC−6, Colin Champion colin.champion@routemaster.app a écrit :
I asked Kristofer whether Condorcet+FPTP complied with the Condorcet Loser criterion. He
replied "probably not" with a sketch proof, and then gave the following example.
Also the standard MinMax "bad example" is also a C+FPP Condorcet Loser bad example:
14:D>A>B>C
13:D>B>C>A
13:D>C>A>B
20:A>B>C>D
20:B>C>A>D
20:C>A>B>D
It's too bad Rob's calculator must be accessed by archive. I have recently made a
calculator at
votingmethods.net/cond
This is a WV calculator, but if one only uses full rankings then it doesn't matter. It
solves MinMax, Schulze, RP, and River, and attempts to detail the step-by-step resolution
of the latter three (for Schulze, using the Schwartz sequential dropping approach).
I'd wondered whether Robert didn't have any intellectual commitent to the criterion, but
had used it in argument against IRV and therefore found his options limited.
I don't quite follow that since IRV satisfies Condorcet Loser.
Kevin
votingmethods.net
Hi Colin,
> Le dimanche 19 février 2023 à 12:47:49 UTC−6, Colin Champion <colin.champion@routemaster.app> a écrit :
> I asked Kristofer whether Condorcet+FPTP complied with the Condorcet Loser criterion. He
> replied "probably not" with a sketch proof, and then gave the following example.
Also the standard MinMax "bad example" is also a C+FPP Condorcet Loser bad example:
14:D>A>B>C
13:D>B>C>A
13:D>C>A>B
20:A>B>C>D
20:B>C>A>D
20:C>A>B>D
It's too bad Rob's calculator must be accessed by archive. I have recently made a
calculator at
votingmethods.net/cond
This is a WV calculator, but if one only uses full rankings then it doesn't matter. It
solves MinMax, Schulze, RP, and River, and attempts to detail the step-by-step resolution
of the latter three (for Schulze, using the Schwartz sequential dropping approach).
> I'd wondered whether Robert didn't have any intellectual commitent to the criterion, but
> had used it in argument against IRV and therefore found his options limited.
I don't quite follow that since IRV satisfies Condorcet Loser.
Kevin
votingmethods.net
FS
Forest Simmons
Mon, Feb 20, 2023 1:27 AM
I have learned a lot from the "hay guys" thread that spontaneously upgraded
into this "hey guys" thread.
Colin Champion made some very helpful points and pointers about the
psychology of what we are involved in. Many similar practical
considerations contributed by all participants.
Several suggestions have been made about how to complete this sentence:
"Lacking a candidate that defeats every other candidate in pairwise
head-to-head comparisons, elect the candidate that ..."
I can live with most of those suggestions ... which is neither here nor
there in the grand scheme of things ... but I hope haven't offended anybody
or discouraged anybody's contributions to these explorations.
Several people have said, "Why not just ...?"
And I thought, "Why didn't I think of that?"
The most promising idea I am currently thinking along these lines goes like
this:
Elect the pairwise undefeated champion ... or lacking such a champion,
elect the winner of the strongest pairwise defeat ... meaning the pairwise
contest with the greatest sum of winner approval and loser disapproval ...
winner approval measured by winning votes ... the number of ballots on
which the winner outranks the loser... loser disapproval measured by loser
abstentions ... the number of ballots on which the pairwise loser is
unranked.
So winning votes plus loser abstentions is my proposal for defeat strength
... not to be used in Rsnked Pairs ... but just in the first and strongest
step of RP ... and then only in the absence of a Condorcet Winner.
For now it's just an idea needing an experimental shake down beyond my
meager manual tests.
But who knows?
-Forest
On Sun, Feb 19, 2023, 10:47 AM Colin Champion <
colin.champion@routemaster.app> wrote:
I asked Kristofer whether Condorcet+FPTP complied with the Condorcet Loser
criterion. He replied "probably not" with a sketch proof, and then gave the
following example.
<quote>
[preliminary election]
40: L>C>R
42: R>C>L
10: C>L>R
R is the Condorcet loser and Plurality winner. (L is the IRV winner.)
Now clone C, the CW:
40: L>Ca>Cb>Cc>R
42: R>Cb>Cc>Ca>L
10: Cc>Ca>Cb>L>R
There's no CW, so Plurality elects R, the Condorcet loser. (Incidentally,
R ties for first in minmax.)
Seems OK. Verified with
https://web.archive.org/web/20220403135047/http://www.cs.angelo.edu/~rlegrand/rbvote/calc.html.
</quote>
I'd wondered whether Robert didn't have any intellectual commitent to the
criterion, but had used it in argument against IRV and therefore found his
options limited.
CJC
On 19/02/2023 17:31, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 2/19/23 16:36, Colin Champion wrote:
"Politicians and the voting public would not accept anything more
complicated than X" is my own favourite line of argument - but I substitute
my own value for X(minimax). I know that my judgement is coloured by my
preferences. There's a surprising degree of dissent over which methods are
simpler than which, and where the boundary should be drawn. People who deal
directly with politicians and the voting public can no doubt get closer to
the truth than people whose interest is predominantly theoretical, but I
wish there was an authoritative and objective source of information. If
only some behavioural psychologist was funded to investigate the
question...
To be finicky, the issue isn't exactly one of simplicity but rather one of
psychological acceptability, which includes the notions of whether a method
"makes sense" to the average onlooker, and whether it is seen as conferring
legitimacy on its winner rather than being an unmotivated piece of jiggery
pokery.
Notwithstanding all this... you and Robert may well be right.
FWIW, I suspect the complexity people are willing to accept depends on
their trust in the political process in general. For instance, some local
New Zealand elections use Meek's method, which is complex however you put
it.[1] And I wouldn't be prepared to explain the pretty messy greedy
algorithm used to allocate party list top-up seats here (in Norway), but
people seem to accept it.[2]
I don't think Robert could use minmax because the criterion he's using is
"if more people prefer X to Y than vice versa, then Y is not elected". That
seems to imply at least Condorcet loser. I'm not sure, though -- if you're
particularly critical, you could even say it implies Smith, but I don't
think Robert had that in mind.
-km
[1] I wonder what the legal language for that is... it's basically
impossible to do by hand.
[2] IMHO, biproportional apportionment is much simpler. I suspect what's
keeping it from being changed is mostl inertia.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
I have learned a lot from the "hay guys" thread that spontaneously upgraded
into this "hey guys" thread.
Colin Champion made some very helpful points and pointers about the
psychology of what we are involved in. Many similar practical
considerations contributed by all participants.
Several suggestions have been made about how to complete this sentence:
"Lacking a candidate that defeats every other candidate in pairwise
head-to-head comparisons, elect the candidate that ..."
I can live with most of those suggestions ... which is neither here nor
there in the grand scheme of things ... but I hope haven't offended anybody
or discouraged anybody's contributions to these explorations.
Several people have said, "Why not just ...?"
And I thought, "Why didn't I think of that?"
The most promising idea I am currently thinking along these lines goes like
this:
Elect the pairwise undefeated champion ... or lacking such a champion,
elect the winner of the strongest pairwise defeat ... meaning the pairwise
contest with the greatest sum of winner approval and loser disapproval ...
winner approval measured by winning votes ... the number of ballots on
which the winner outranks the loser... loser disapproval measured by loser
abstentions ... the number of ballots on which the pairwise loser is
unranked.
So winning votes plus loser abstentions is my proposal for defeat strength
... not to be used in Rsnked Pairs ... but just in the first and strongest
step of RP ... and then only in the absence of a Condorcet Winner.
For now it's just an idea needing an experimental shake down beyond my
meager manual tests.
But who knows?
-Forest
On Sun, Feb 19, 2023, 10:47 AM Colin Champion <
colin.champion@routemaster.app> wrote:
> I asked Kristofer whether Condorcet+FPTP complied with the Condorcet Loser
> criterion. He replied "probably not" with a sketch proof, and then gave the
> following example.
>
> <quote>
> [preliminary election]
>
> 40: L>C>R
> 42: R>C>L
> 10: C>L>R
>
> R is the Condorcet loser and Plurality winner. (L is the IRV winner.)
>
> Now clone C, the CW:
>
> 40: L>Ca>Cb>Cc>R
> 42: R>Cb>Cc>Ca>L
> 10: Cc>Ca>Cb>L>R
>
> There's no CW, so Plurality elects R, the Condorcet loser. (Incidentally,
> R ties for first in minmax.)
>
> Seems OK. Verified with
> https://web.archive.org/web/20220403135047/http://www.cs.angelo.edu/~rlegrand/rbvote/calc.html.
>
> </quote>
>
> I'd wondered whether Robert didn't have any intellectual commitent to the
> criterion, but had used it in argument against IRV and therefore found his
> options limited.
>
> CJC
>
> On 19/02/2023 17:31, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>
> On 2/19/23 16:36, Colin Champion wrote:
>
> "Politicians and the voting public would not accept anything more
> complicated than X" is my own favourite line of argument - but I substitute
> my own value for X(minimax). I know that my judgement is coloured by my
> preferences. There's a surprising degree of dissent over which methods are
> simpler than which, and where the boundary should be drawn. People who deal
> directly with politicians and the voting public can no doubt get closer to
> the truth than people whose interest is predominantly theoretical, but I
> wish there was an authoritative and objective source of information. If
> only some behavioural psychologist was funded to investigate the
> question...
>
> To be finicky, the issue isn't exactly one of simplicity but rather one of
> psychological acceptability, which includes the notions of whether a method
> "makes sense" to the average onlooker, and whether it is seen as conferring
> legitimacy on its winner rather than being an unmotivated piece of jiggery
> pokery.
>
> Notwithstanding all this... you and Robert may well be right.
>
>
> FWIW, I suspect the complexity people are willing to accept depends on
> their trust in the political process in general. For instance, some local
> New Zealand elections use Meek's method, which is complex however you put
> it.[1] And I wouldn't be prepared to explain the pretty messy greedy
> algorithm used to allocate party list top-up seats here (in Norway), but
> people seem to accept it.[2]
>
> I don't think Robert could use minmax because the criterion he's using is
> "if more people prefer X to Y than vice versa, then Y is not elected". That
> seems to imply at least Condorcet loser. I'm not sure, though -- if you're
> particularly critical, you could even say it implies Smith, but I don't
> think Robert had that in mind.
>
> -km
>
> [1] I wonder what the legal language for *that* is... it's basically
> impossible to do by hand.
> [2] IMHO, biproportional apportionment is *much* simpler. I suspect what's
> keeping it from being changed is mostl inertia.
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
FS
Forest Simmons
Mon, Feb 20, 2023 5:05 AM
One tweak to the strongest defeat version I am currently excited about:
Lacking an undefeated candidate elect the candidate with the strongest
defeat OVER A SMITH CANDIDATE.
Or to avoid the scary word "Smith" ...
Lacking an undefeated candidate elect the candidate with the strongest
defeat OVER A TOP CONTENDER..
With this explanation ... by "top contender" we mean a candidate that has a
beatpath to every other candidate.
Remember... in this context the strength of a defeat is the sum of the
winning votes and the losing abstentions.
This tweak makes the method Independent from Smith Dominated Alternatives,
and still requires only one pass through the ballots... assuming the
"unranked" count doesn't change for the candidates that remain after
disqualifying the Smith candidates.
-Forest
On Sun, Feb 19, 2023, 5:27 PM Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com
wrote:
I have learned a lot from the "hay guys" thread that spontaneously
upgraded into this "hey guys" thread.
Colin Champion made some very helpful points and pointers about the
psychology of what we are involved in. Many similar practical
considerations contributed by all participants.
Several suggestions have been made about how to complete this sentence:
"Lacking a candidate that defeats every other candidate in pairwise
head-to-head comparisons, elect the candidate that ..."
I can live with most of those suggestions ... which is neither here nor
there in the grand scheme of things ... but I hope haven't offended anybody
or discouraged anybody's contributions to these explorations.
Several people have said, "Why not just ...?"
And I thought, "Why didn't I think of that?"
The most promising idea I am currently thinking along these lines goes
like this:
Elect the pairwise undefeated champion ... or lacking such a champion,
elect the winner of the strongest pairwise defeat ... meaning the pairwise
contest with the greatest sum of winner approval and loser disapproval ...
winner approval measured by winning votes ... the number of ballots on
which the winner outranks the loser... loser disapproval measured by loser
abstentions ... the number of ballots on which the pairwise loser is
unranked.
So winning votes plus loser abstentions is my proposal for defeat strength
... not to be used in Rsnked Pairs ... but just in the first and strongest
step of RP ... and then only in the absence of a Condorcet Winner.
For now it's just an idea needing an experimental shake down beyond my
meager manual tests.
But who knows?
-Forest
On Sun, Feb 19, 2023, 10:47 AM Colin Champion <
colin.champion@routemaster.app> wrote:
I asked Kristofer whether Condorcet+FPTP complied with the Condorcet
Loser criterion. He replied "probably not" with a sketch proof, and then
gave the following example.
<quote>
[preliminary election]
40: L>C>R
42: R>C>L
10: C>L>R
R is the Condorcet loser and Plurality winner. (L is the IRV winner.)
Now clone C, the CW:
40: L>Ca>Cb>Cc>R
42: R>Cb>Cc>Ca>L
10: Cc>Ca>Cb>L>R
There's no CW, so Plurality elects R, the Condorcet loser. (Incidentally,
R ties for first in minmax.)
Seems OK. Verified with
https://web.archive.org/web/20220403135047/http://www.cs.angelo.edu/~rlegrand/rbvote/calc.html.
</quote>
I'd wondered whether Robert didn't have any intellectual commitent to the
criterion, but had used it in argument against IRV and therefore found his
options limited.
CJC
On 19/02/2023 17:31, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 2/19/23 16:36, Colin Champion wrote:
"Politicians and the voting public would not accept anything more
complicated than X" is my own favourite line of argument - but I substitute
my own value for X(minimax). I know that my judgement is coloured by my
preferences. There's a surprising degree of dissent over which methods are
simpler than which, and where the boundary should be drawn. People who deal
directly with politicians and the voting public can no doubt get closer to
the truth than people whose interest is predominantly theoretical, but I
wish there was an authoritative and objective source of information. If
only some behavioural psychologist was funded to investigate the
question...
To be finicky, the issue isn't exactly one of simplicity but rather one
of psychological acceptability, which includes the notions of whether a
method "makes sense" to the average onlooker, and whether it is seen as
conferring legitimacy on its winner rather than being an unmotivated piece
of jiggery pokery.
Notwithstanding all this... you and Robert may well be right.
FWIW, I suspect the complexity people are willing to accept depends on
their trust in the political process in general. For instance, some local
New Zealand elections use Meek's method, which is complex however you put
it.[1] And I wouldn't be prepared to explain the pretty messy greedy
algorithm used to allocate party list top-up seats here (in Norway), but
people seem to accept it.[2]
I don't think Robert could use minmax because the criterion he's using is
"if more people prefer X to Y than vice versa, then Y is not elected". That
seems to imply at least Condorcet loser. I'm not sure, though -- if you're
particularly critical, you could even say it implies Smith, but I don't
think Robert had that in mind.
-km
[1] I wonder what the legal language for that is... it's basically
impossible to do by hand.
[2] IMHO, biproportional apportionment is much simpler. I suspect
what's keeping it from being changed is mostl inertia.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
One tweak to the strongest defeat version I am currently excited about:
Lacking an undefeated candidate elect the candidate with the strongest
defeat OVER A SMITH CANDIDATE.
Or to avoid the scary word "Smith" ...
Lacking an undefeated candidate elect the candidate with the strongest
defeat OVER A TOP CONTENDER..
With this explanation ... by "top contender" we mean a candidate that has a
beatpath to every other candidate.
Remember... in this context the strength of a defeat is the sum of the
winning votes and the losing abstentions.
This tweak makes the method Independent from Smith Dominated Alternatives,
and still requires only one pass through the ballots... assuming the
"unranked" count doesn't change for the candidates that remain after
disqualifying the Smith candidates.
-Forest
On Sun, Feb 19, 2023, 5:27 PM Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com>
wrote:
> I have learned a lot from the "hay guys" thread that spontaneously
> upgraded into this "hey guys" thread.
>
> Colin Champion made some very helpful points and pointers about the
> psychology of what we are involved in. Many similar practical
> considerations contributed by all participants.
>
> Several suggestions have been made about how to complete this sentence:
>
> "Lacking a candidate that defeats every other candidate in pairwise
> head-to-head comparisons, elect the candidate that ..."
>
> I can live with most of those suggestions ... which is neither here nor
> there in the grand scheme of things ... but I hope haven't offended anybody
> or discouraged anybody's contributions to these explorations.
>
> Several people have said, "Why not just ...?"
>
> And I thought, "Why didn't I think of that?"
>
> The most promising idea I am currently thinking along these lines goes
> like this:
>
> Elect the pairwise undefeated champion ... or lacking such a champion,
> elect the winner of the strongest pairwise defeat ... meaning the pairwise
> contest with the greatest sum of winner approval and loser disapproval ...
> winner approval measured by winning votes ... the number of ballots on
> which the winner outranks the loser... loser disapproval measured by loser
> abstentions ... the number of ballots on which the pairwise loser is
> unranked.
>
> So winning votes plus loser abstentions is my proposal for defeat strength
> ... not to be used in Rsnked Pairs ... but just in the first and strongest
> step of RP ... and then only in the absence of a Condorcet Winner.
>
> For now it's just an idea needing an experimental shake down beyond my
> meager manual tests.
>
> But who knows?
>
> -Forest
>
> On Sun, Feb 19, 2023, 10:47 AM Colin Champion <
> colin.champion@routemaster.app> wrote:
>
>> I asked Kristofer whether Condorcet+FPTP complied with the Condorcet
>> Loser criterion. He replied "probably not" with a sketch proof, and then
>> gave the following example.
>>
>> <quote>
>> [preliminary election]
>>
>> 40: L>C>R
>> 42: R>C>L
>> 10: C>L>R
>>
>> R is the Condorcet loser and Plurality winner. (L is the IRV winner.)
>>
>> Now clone C, the CW:
>>
>> 40: L>Ca>Cb>Cc>R
>> 42: R>Cb>Cc>Ca>L
>> 10: Cc>Ca>Cb>L>R
>>
>> There's no CW, so Plurality elects R, the Condorcet loser. (Incidentally,
>> R ties for first in minmax.)
>>
>> Seems OK. Verified with
>> https://web.archive.org/web/20220403135047/http://www.cs.angelo.edu/~rlegrand/rbvote/calc.html.
>>
>> </quote>
>>
>> I'd wondered whether Robert didn't have any intellectual commitent to the
>> criterion, but had used it in argument against IRV and therefore found his
>> options limited.
>>
>> CJC
>>
>> On 19/02/2023 17:31, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>>
>> On 2/19/23 16:36, Colin Champion wrote:
>>
>> "Politicians and the voting public would not accept anything more
>> complicated than X" is my own favourite line of argument - but I substitute
>> my own value for X(minimax). I know that my judgement is coloured by my
>> preferences. There's a surprising degree of dissent over which methods are
>> simpler than which, and where the boundary should be drawn. People who deal
>> directly with politicians and the voting public can no doubt get closer to
>> the truth than people whose interest is predominantly theoretical, but I
>> wish there was an authoritative and objective source of information. If
>> only some behavioural psychologist was funded to investigate the
>> question...
>>
>> To be finicky, the issue isn't exactly one of simplicity but rather one
>> of psychological acceptability, which includes the notions of whether a
>> method "makes sense" to the average onlooker, and whether it is seen as
>> conferring legitimacy on its winner rather than being an unmotivated piece
>> of jiggery pokery.
>>
>> Notwithstanding all this... you and Robert may well be right.
>>
>>
>> FWIW, I suspect the complexity people are willing to accept depends on
>> their trust in the political process in general. For instance, some local
>> New Zealand elections use Meek's method, which is complex however you put
>> it.[1] And I wouldn't be prepared to explain the pretty messy greedy
>> algorithm used to allocate party list top-up seats here (in Norway), but
>> people seem to accept it.[2]
>>
>> I don't think Robert could use minmax because the criterion he's using is
>> "if more people prefer X to Y than vice versa, then Y is not elected". That
>> seems to imply at least Condorcet loser. I'm not sure, though -- if you're
>> particularly critical, you could even say it implies Smith, but I don't
>> think Robert had that in mind.
>>
>> -km
>>
>> [1] I wonder what the legal language for *that* is... it's basically
>> impossible to do by hand.
>> [2] IMHO, biproportional apportionment is *much* simpler. I suspect
>> what's keeping it from being changed is mostl inertia.
>>
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
TP
Toby Pereira
Mon, Feb 20, 2023 10:17 AM
One problem with using the winner of the single biggest defeat is that it could just be a candidate dominating a clone, saying little about their performance overall. And if you're not confining it to e.g. the Smith Set, it could possibly even be the second weakest candidate of many.
Toby
On Monday, 20 February 2023 at 01:28:18 GMT, Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com wrote:
I have learned a lot from the "hay guys" thread that spontaneously upgraded into this "hey guys" thread.
Colin Champion made some very helpful points and pointers about the psychology of what we are involved in. Many similar practical considerations contributed by all participants.
Several suggestions have been made about how to complete this sentence:
"Lacking a candidate that defeats every other candidate in pairwise head-to-head comparisons, elect the candidate that ..."
I can live with most of those suggestions ... which is neither here nor there in the grand scheme of things ... but I hope haven't offended anybody or discouraged anybody's contributions to these explorations.
Several people have said, "Why not just ...?"
And I thought, "Why didn't I think of that?"
The most promising idea I am currently thinking along these lines goes like this:
Elect the pairwise undefeated champion ... or lacking such a champion, elect the winner of the strongest pairwise defeat ... meaning the pairwise contest with the greatest sum of winner approval and loser disapproval ... winner approval measured by winning votes ... the number of ballots on which the winner outranks the loser... loser disapproval measured by loser abstentions ... the number of ballots on which the pairwise loser is unranked.
So winning votes plus loser abstentions is my proposal for defeat strength ... not to be used in Rsnked Pairs ... but just in the first and strongest step of RP ... and then only in the absence of a Condorcet Winner.
For now it's just an idea needing an experimental shake down beyond my meager manual tests.
But who knows?
-Forest
On Sun, Feb 19, 2023, 10:47 AM Colin Champion colin.champion@routemaster.app wrote:
I asked Kristofer whether Condorcet+FPTP complied with the Condorcet Loser criterion. He replied "probably not" with a sketch proof, and then gave the following example.
<quote>
[preliminary election]
40: L>C>R
42: R>C>L
10: C>L>R
R is the Condorcet loser and Plurality winner. (L is the IRV winner.)
Now clone C, the CW:
40: L>Ca>Cb>Cc>R
42: R>Cb>Cc>Ca>L
10: Cc>Ca>Cb>L>R
There's no CW, so Plurality elects R, the Condorcet loser. (Incidentally, R ties for first in minmax.)
Seems OK. Verified with https://web.archive.org/web/20220403135047/http://www.cs.angelo.edu/~rlegrand/rbvote/calc.html.
</quote>
I'd wondered whether Robert didn't have any intellectual commitent to the criterion, but had used it in argument against IRV and therefore found his options limited.
CJC
On 19/02/2023 17:31, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 2/19/23 16:36, Colin Champion wrote:
"Politicians and the voting public would not accept anything more complicated than X" is my own favourite line of argument - but I substitute my own value for X(minimax). I know that my judgement is coloured by my preferences. There's a surprising degree of dissent over which methods are simpler than which, and where the boundary should be drawn. People who deal directly with politicians and the voting public can no doubt get closer to the truth than people whose interest is predominantly theoretical, but I wish there was an authoritative and objective source of information. If only some behavioural psychologist was funded to investigate the question...
To be finicky, the issue isn't exactly one of simplicity but rather one of psychological acceptability, which includes the notions of whether a method "makes sense" to the average onlooker, and whether it is seen as conferring legitimacy on its winner rather than being an unmotivated piece of jiggery pokery.
Notwithstanding all this... you and Robert may well be right.
FWIW, I suspect the complexity people are willing to accept depends on their trust in the political process in general. For instance, some local New Zealand elections use Meek's method, which is complex however you put it.[1] And I wouldn't be prepared to explain the pretty messy greedy algorithm used to allocate party list top-up seats here (in Norway), but people seem to accept it.[2]
I don't think Robert could use minmax because the criterion he's using is "if more people prefer X to Y than vice versa, then Y is not elected". That seems to imply at least Condorcet loser. I'm not sure, though -- if you're particularly critical, you could even say it implies Smith, but I don't think Robert had that in mind.
-km
[1] I wonder what the legal language for that is... it's basically impossible to do by hand.
[2] IMHO, biproportional apportionment is much simpler. I suspect what's keeping it from being changed is mostl inertia.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
One problem with using the winner of the single biggest defeat is that it could just be a candidate dominating a clone, saying little about their performance overall. And if you're not confining it to e.g. the Smith Set, it could possibly even be the second weakest candidate of many.
Toby
On Monday, 20 February 2023 at 01:28:18 GMT, Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> wrote:
I have learned a lot from the "hay guys" thread that spontaneously upgraded into this "hey guys" thread.
Colin Champion made some very helpful points and pointers about the psychology of what we are involved in. Many similar practical considerations contributed by all participants.
Several suggestions have been made about how to complete this sentence:
"Lacking a candidate that defeats every other candidate in pairwise head-to-head comparisons, elect the candidate that ..."
I can live with most of those suggestions ... which is neither here nor there in the grand scheme of things ... but I hope haven't offended anybody or discouraged anybody's contributions to these explorations.
Several people have said, "Why not just ...?"
And I thought, "Why didn't I think of that?"
The most promising idea I am currently thinking along these lines goes like this:
Elect the pairwise undefeated champion ... or lacking such a champion, elect the winner of the strongest pairwise defeat ... meaning the pairwise contest with the greatest sum of winner approval and loser disapproval ... winner approval measured by winning votes ... the number of ballots on which the winner outranks the loser... loser disapproval measured by loser abstentions ... the number of ballots on which the pairwise loser is unranked.
So winning votes plus loser abstentions is my proposal for defeat strength ... not to be used in Rsnked Pairs ... but just in the first and strongest step of RP ... and then only in the absence of a Condorcet Winner.
For now it's just an idea needing an experimental shake down beyond my meager manual tests.
But who knows?
-Forest
On Sun, Feb 19, 2023, 10:47 AM Colin Champion <colin.champion@routemaster.app> wrote:
I asked Kristofer whether Condorcet+FPTP complied with the Condorcet Loser criterion. He replied "probably not" with a sketch proof, and then gave the following example.
<quote>
[preliminary election]
40: L>C>R
42: R>C>L
10: C>L>R
R is the Condorcet loser and Plurality winner. (L is the IRV winner.)
Now clone C, the CW:
40: L>Ca>Cb>Cc>R
42: R>Cb>Cc>Ca>L
10: Cc>Ca>Cb>L>R
There's no CW, so Plurality elects R, the Condorcet loser. (Incidentally, R ties for first in minmax.)
Seems OK. Verified with https://web.archive.org/web/20220403135047/http://www.cs.angelo.edu/~rlegrand/rbvote/calc.html.
</quote>
I'd wondered whether Robert didn't have any intellectual commitent to the criterion, but had used it in argument against IRV and therefore found his options limited.
CJC
On 19/02/2023 17:31, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 2/19/23 16:36, Colin Champion wrote:
"Politicians and the voting public would not accept anything more complicated than X" is my own favourite line of argument - but I substitute my own value for X(minimax). I know that my judgement is coloured by my preferences. There's a surprising degree of dissent over which methods are simpler than which, and where the boundary should be drawn. People who deal directly with politicians and the voting public can no doubt get closer to the truth than people whose interest is predominantly theoretical, but I wish there was an authoritative and objective source of information. If only some behavioural psychologist was funded to investigate the question...
To be finicky, the issue isn't exactly one of simplicity but rather one of psychological acceptability, which includes the notions of whether a method "makes sense" to the average onlooker, and whether it is seen as conferring legitimacy on its winner rather than being an unmotivated piece of jiggery pokery.
Notwithstanding all this... you and Robert may well be right.
FWIW, I suspect the complexity people are willing to accept depends on their trust in the political process in general. For instance, some local New Zealand elections use Meek's method, which is complex however you put it.[1] And I wouldn't be prepared to explain the pretty messy greedy algorithm used to allocate party list top-up seats here (in Norway), but people seem to accept it.[2]
I don't think Robert could use minmax because the criterion he's using is "if more people prefer X to Y than vice versa, then Y is not elected". That seems to imply at least Condorcet loser. I'm not sure, though -- if you're particularly critical, you could even say it implies Smith, but I don't think Robert had that in mind.
-km
[1] I wonder what the legal language for *that* is... it's basically impossible to do by hand.
[2] IMHO, biproportional apportionment is *much* simpler. I suspect what's keeping it from being changed is mostl inertia.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
TP
Toby Pereira
Mon, Feb 20, 2023 10:26 AM
OK, so this version mentions the Smith Set but it still fails independence of clones and at this point I don't really see it as easier to understand than (or as good as) something like Ranked Pairs. Does it have advantages e.g. concerning burial incentives?
Toby
On Monday, 20 February 2023 at 05:05:59 GMT, Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com wrote:
One tweak to the strongest defeat version I am currently excited about:
Lacking an undefeated candidate elect the candidate with the strongest defeat OVER A SMITH CANDIDATE.
Or to avoid the scary word "Smith" ...
Lacking an undefeated candidate elect the candidate with the strongest defeat OVER A TOP CONTENDER..
With this explanation ... by "top contender" we mean a candidate that has a beatpath to every other candidate.
Remember... in this context the strength of a defeat is the sum of the winning votes and the losing abstentions.
This tweak makes the method Independent from Smith Dominated Alternatives, and still requires only one pass through the ballots... assuming the "unranked" count doesn't change for the candidates that remain after disqualifying the Smith candidates.
-Forest
On Sun, Feb 19, 2023, 5:27 PM Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com wrote:
I have learned a lot from the "hay guys" thread that spontaneously upgraded into this "hey guys" thread.
Colin Champion made some very helpful points and pointers about the psychology of what we are involved in. Many similar practical considerations contributed by all participants.
Several suggestions have been made about how to complete this sentence:
"Lacking a candidate that defeats every other candidate in pairwise head-to-head comparisons, elect the candidate that ..."
I can live with most of those suggestions ... which is neither here nor there in the grand scheme of things ... but I hope haven't offended anybody or discouraged anybody's contributions to these explorations.
Several people have said, "Why not just ...?"
And I thought, "Why didn't I think of that?"
The most promising idea I am currently thinking along these lines goes like this:
Elect the pairwise undefeated champion ... or lacking such a champion, elect the winner of the strongest pairwise defeat ... meaning the pairwise contest with the greatest sum of winner approval and loser disapproval ... winner approval measured by winning votes ... the number of ballots on which the winner outranks the loser... loser disapproval measured by loser abstentions ... the number of ballots on which the pairwise loser is unranked.
So winning votes plus loser abstentions is my proposal for defeat strength ... not to be used in Rsnked Pairs ... but just in the first and strongest step of RP ... and then only in the absence of a Condorcet Winner.
For now it's just an idea needing an experimental shake down beyond my meager manual tests.
But who knows?
-Forest
On Sun, Feb 19, 2023, 10:47 AM Colin Champion colin.champion@routemaster.app wrote:
I asked Kristofer whether Condorcet+FPTP complied with the Condorcet Loser criterion. He replied "probably not" with a sketch proof, and then gave the following example.
<quote>
[preliminary election]
40: L>C>R
42: R>C>L
10: C>L>R
R is the Condorcet loser and Plurality winner. (L is the IRV winner.)
Now clone C, the CW:
40: L>Ca>Cb>Cc>R
42: R>Cb>Cc>Ca>L
10: Cc>Ca>Cb>L>R
There's no CW, so Plurality elects R, the Condorcet loser. (Incidentally, R ties for first in minmax.)
Seems OK. Verified with https://web.archive.org/web/20220403135047/http://www.cs.angelo.edu/~rlegrand/rbvote/calc.html.
</quote>
I'd wondered whether Robert didn't have any intellectual commitent to the criterion, but had used it in argument against IRV and therefore found his options limited.
CJC
On 19/02/2023 17:31, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 2/19/23 16:36, Colin Champion wrote:
"Politicians and the voting public would not accept anything more complicated than X" is my own favourite line of argument - but I substitute my own value for X(minimax). I know that my judgement is coloured by my preferences. There's a surprising degree of dissent over which methods are simpler than which, and where the boundary should be drawn. People who deal directly with politicians and the voting public can no doubt get closer to the truth than people whose interest is predominantly theoretical, but I wish there was an authoritative and objective source of information. If only some behavioural psychologist was funded to investigate the question...
To be finicky, the issue isn't exactly one of simplicity but rather one of psychological acceptability, which includes the notions of whether a method "makes sense" to the average onlooker, and whether it is seen as conferring legitimacy on its winner rather than being an unmotivated piece of jiggery pokery.
Notwithstanding all this... you and Robert may well be right.
FWIW, I suspect the complexity people are willing to accept depends on their trust in the political process in general. For instance, some local New Zealand elections use Meek's method, which is complex however you put it.[1] And I wouldn't be prepared to explain the pretty messy greedy algorithm used to allocate party list top-up seats here (in Norway), but people seem to accept it.[2]
I don't think Robert could use minmax because the criterion he's using is "if more people prefer X to Y than vice versa, then Y is not elected". That seems to imply at least Condorcet loser. I'm not sure, though -- if you're particularly critical, you could even say it implies Smith, but I don't think Robert had that in mind.
-km
[1] I wonder what the legal language for that is... it's basically impossible to do by hand.
[2] IMHO, biproportional apportionment is much simpler. I suspect what's keeping it from being changed is mostl inertia.
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
OK, so this version mentions the Smith Set but it still fails independence of clones and at this point I don't really see it as easier to understand than (or as good as) something like Ranked Pairs. Does it have advantages e.g. concerning burial incentives?
Toby
On Monday, 20 February 2023 at 05:05:59 GMT, Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> wrote:
One tweak to the strongest defeat version I am currently excited about:
Lacking an undefeated candidate elect the candidate with the strongest defeat OVER A SMITH CANDIDATE.
Or to avoid the scary word "Smith" ...
Lacking an undefeated candidate elect the candidate with the strongest defeat OVER A TOP CONTENDER..
With this explanation ... by "top contender" we mean a candidate that has a beatpath to every other candidate.
Remember... in this context the strength of a defeat is the sum of the winning votes and the losing abstentions.
This tweak makes the method Independent from Smith Dominated Alternatives, and still requires only one pass through the ballots... assuming the "unranked" count doesn't change for the candidates that remain after disqualifying the Smith candidates.
-Forest
On Sun, Feb 19, 2023, 5:27 PM Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21@gmail.com> wrote:
I have learned a lot from the "hay guys" thread that spontaneously upgraded into this "hey guys" thread.
Colin Champion made some very helpful points and pointers about the psychology of what we are involved in. Many similar practical considerations contributed by all participants.
Several suggestions have been made about how to complete this sentence:
"Lacking a candidate that defeats every other candidate in pairwise head-to-head comparisons, elect the candidate that ..."
I can live with most of those suggestions ... which is neither here nor there in the grand scheme of things ... but I hope haven't offended anybody or discouraged anybody's contributions to these explorations.
Several people have said, "Why not just ...?"
And I thought, "Why didn't I think of that?"
The most promising idea I am currently thinking along these lines goes like this:
Elect the pairwise undefeated champion ... or lacking such a champion, elect the winner of the strongest pairwise defeat ... meaning the pairwise contest with the greatest sum of winner approval and loser disapproval ... winner approval measured by winning votes ... the number of ballots on which the winner outranks the loser... loser disapproval measured by loser abstentions ... the number of ballots on which the pairwise loser is unranked.
So winning votes plus loser abstentions is my proposal for defeat strength ... not to be used in Rsnked Pairs ... but just in the first and strongest step of RP ... and then only in the absence of a Condorcet Winner.
For now it's just an idea needing an experimental shake down beyond my meager manual tests.
But who knows?
-Forest
On Sun, Feb 19, 2023, 10:47 AM Colin Champion <colin.champion@routemaster.app> wrote:
I asked Kristofer whether Condorcet+FPTP complied with the Condorcet Loser criterion. He replied "probably not" with a sketch proof, and then gave the following example.
<quote>
[preliminary election]
40: L>C>R
42: R>C>L
10: C>L>R
R is the Condorcet loser and Plurality winner. (L is the IRV winner.)
Now clone C, the CW:
40: L>Ca>Cb>Cc>R
42: R>Cb>Cc>Ca>L
10: Cc>Ca>Cb>L>R
There's no CW, so Plurality elects R, the Condorcet loser. (Incidentally, R ties for first in minmax.)
Seems OK. Verified with https://web.archive.org/web/20220403135047/http://www.cs.angelo.edu/~rlegrand/rbvote/calc.html.
</quote>
I'd wondered whether Robert didn't have any intellectual commitent to the criterion, but had used it in argument against IRV and therefore found his options limited.
CJC
On 19/02/2023 17:31, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 2/19/23 16:36, Colin Champion wrote:
"Politicians and the voting public would not accept anything more complicated than X" is my own favourite line of argument - but I substitute my own value for X(minimax). I know that my judgement is coloured by my preferences. There's a surprising degree of dissent over which methods are simpler than which, and where the boundary should be drawn. People who deal directly with politicians and the voting public can no doubt get closer to the truth than people whose interest is predominantly theoretical, but I wish there was an authoritative and objective source of information. If only some behavioural psychologist was funded to investigate the question...
To be finicky, the issue isn't exactly one of simplicity but rather one of psychological acceptability, which includes the notions of whether a method "makes sense" to the average onlooker, and whether it is seen as conferring legitimacy on its winner rather than being an unmotivated piece of jiggery pokery.
Notwithstanding all this... you and Robert may well be right.
FWIW, I suspect the complexity people are willing to accept depends on their trust in the political process in general. For instance, some local New Zealand elections use Meek's method, which is complex however you put it.[1] And I wouldn't be prepared to explain the pretty messy greedy algorithm used to allocate party list top-up seats here (in Norway), but people seem to accept it.[2]
I don't think Robert could use minmax because the criterion he's using is "if more people prefer X to Y than vice versa, then Y is not elected". That seems to imply at least Condorcet loser. I'm not sure, though -- if you're particularly critical, you could even say it implies Smith, but I don't think Robert had that in mind.
-km
[1] I wonder what the legal language for *that* is... it's basically impossible to do by hand.
[2] IMHO, biproportional apportionment is *much* simpler. I suspect what's keeping it from being changed is mostl inertia.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
