Re: [EM] Poll, preliminary ballots
That obviously isn't the view of FairVote. They are not friendly but the
issue is too important for me to mind that. It gives me an opportunity
to comment on what one of your colleagues and my opponents himself
admitted to be the lists bubble (or "parallel universe.") How many
people are even aware of all these systems, promoted by the list, he
wanted to know?
In my opinion IRV may well be turned against, but not in favor of the
obscure single winner alternatives, the list appears to back, but
because it is not proportional. It may be seen, eventually, that IRV
makes very little difference to the result. Then the baby of a necessary
preference vote may be thrown out with the bathwater of eliminative
counts. And America turn to the obvious (but "toxic") alternative of
European party list systems, which deny individual freedom of
representation, and are really party referendums, that don't properly
"elect" or "choose-out" representation of the people.
Condorcet pairing is treated as if it were a definitive election system
but this is not so. Two cenutries ago, Laplace refuted it, for treating
orders of choice as having the same weight.
Regards,
Richard Lung.
On 23/04/2024 02:08, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:
I suspect that FairVote has so deeply poisoned the voting reform well
that, soon enough, IRV systems will be seen as politically toxic.
(Just a matter of time until a Democrat is the Condorcet winner but
still gets eliminated.)
Related to that, any system working off of ranked ballots has a good
chance of being discredited soon enough, as being a kind of "RCV".
Luckily, that still leaves some top-shelf methods like Score,
Smith//Score, ICA, or cardinal-pairwise; or even just running an
ordinal system off cardinal ballots. Anything involving runoffs will
probably be seen with mistrust, though.
On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 8:42 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy
electionmethods@votefair.org wrote:
On 4/21/2024 4:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> What do you think of BTR-IRV in that respect? Or Borda-elimination?
> Neither explicitly checks for a Condorcet winner.
Regarding BTR-IRV, yes it's simpler and fully Condorcet compliant.
However, some voters will distrust the idea that the Condorcet
winner is
being protected from elimination in spite of possibly repeatedly
getting
the fewest transferred votes.
I suspect that BTR-IRV inherits some odd characteristics from IRV,
such
as the ones that show up in a Yee diagram and what Star fans refer
to as
the center-squeeze effect.
Adding another layer on top of a flawed method doesn't make it better.
I think of RCIPE as being like a pyramid where the foundation
layer is
solid because pairwise losing candidates deserve to be eliminated
(because they must not be allowed to win). On top of that is the IRV
layer, which is not as strong, but it's only invoked when a counting
cycle does not include a pairwise losing candidate.
Regarding Borda-elimination, I distrust any method that's based on
Borda
counting because that method is vulnerable to strategic voting
and, for
fair results, requires only one mark in each row and only one mark in
each column (on a paper ballot of the kind used here in the US).
As an alternative to Borda counting I prefer the counting method in
Instant Pairwise Elimination:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Instant_Pairwise_Elimination
"... If an elimination round has no pairwise-losing candidate,
then the
method eliminates the candidate with the largest pairwise opposition
count, which is determined by counting on each ballot the number of
not-yet-eliminated candidates who are ranked above that candidate,
and
adding those numbers across all the ballots. ..."
Specifically, using IPE, when a voter buries a disliked candidate,
the
counting is not affected by how deep that candidate is buried.
KM, thanks for your wise questions.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/21/2024 4:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 2024-04-22 01:11, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hello,
From a marketability standpoint I kind of like RCIPE. If your
audience
understands IRV then they probably can understand the concept of a
candidacy
that has become futile during the count, who can be foretold to
be a
loser
well in advance of the end.
To me it is not that the pairwise losing candidate "deserves to be
eliminated" but that within the logic of IRV it's intuitive
that that
candidate shouldn't need to play a role, affecting things, if
they're
doomed
to lose. (Or perhaps it's just me who thinks that's intuitive.)
In contrast the "beats all" winner concept would be a bridge
too far,
because while there might be a candidate who can win every
final pairing,
IRV imposes additional requirements to get to that point, so
nothing is
assured about that status.
But if the audience doesn't know IRV then it would be harder
for me to
find
an argument for RCIPE.
What do you think of BTR-IRV in that respect? Or Borda-elimination?
Neither explicitly checks for a Condorcet winner.
-km
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Hi Kristofer,
Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de a écrit :
What do you think of BTR-IRV in that respect? Or Borda-elimination?
Neither explicitly checks for a Condorcet winner.
I don't think these are similar. The RCIPE advocate only asks for a rule change that
seems modest and logical within the context of IRV: If the candidate was destined to
lose in IRV anyway, then eliminate him sooner. In exchange, RCIPE achieves quite a
lot.
With BTR-IRV I don't think any IRV fan will be persuaded, as it can't be explained
why the bottom two candidates should challenge each other in a way that normally
only occurs in IRV's final two. And if I put my Condorcet hat back on, I don't get
it either, why it would make sense to arrive at Condorcet that way.
Trying not to spam, but I also forgot to say: Copeland-elimination
should be Condorcet and it works like RCIPE in the absence of any lower
cycles. (Break the tie by first preference count when there is a cycle.)
Sure. I think there is a world where RCIPE is the right thing to advocate, and
that's the cleverness I see there. But this could also be true for Copeland
elimination.
Kevin
votingmethods.net
On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 18:09 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com> wrote:
Anything involving runoffs will probably be seen with mistrust, though.
..,then at least something good would come from it. :-)
On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 8:42 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods@votefair.org> wrote:
On 4/21/2024 4:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
What do you think of BTR-IRV in that respect? Or Borda-elimination?
Neither explicitly checks for a Condorcet winner.
Regarding BTR-IRV, yes it's simpler and fully Condorcet compliant.
However, some voters will distrust the idea that the Condorcet winner is
being protected from elimination in spite of possibly repeatedly getting
the fewest transferred votes.
I suspect that BTR-IRV inherits some odd characteristics from IRV, such
as the ones that show up in a Yee diagram and what Star fans refer to as
the center-squeeze effect.
Adding another layer on top of a flawed method doesn't make it better.
I think of RCIPE as being like a pyramid where the foundation layer is
solid because pairwise losing candidates deserve to be eliminated
(because they must not be allowed to win). On top of that is the IRV
layer, which is not as strong, but it's only invoked when a counting
cycle does not include a pairwise losing candidate.
Regarding Borda-elimination, I distrust any method that's based on Borda
counting because that method is vulnerable to strategic voting and, for
fair results, requires only one mark in each row and only one mark in
each column (on a paper ballot of the kind used here in the US).
As an alternative to Borda counting I prefer the counting method in
Instant Pairwise Elimination:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Instant_Pairwise_Elimination
"... If an elimination round has no pairwise-losing candidate, then the
method eliminates the candidate with the largest pairwise opposition
count, which is determined by counting on each ballot the number of
not-yet-eliminated candidates who are ranked above that candidate, and
adding those numbers across all the ballots. ..."
Specifically, using IPE, when a voter buries a disliked candidate, the
counting is not affected by how deep that candidate is buried.
KM, thanks for your wise questions.
Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy
On 4/21/2024 4:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 2024-04-22 01:11, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hello,
From a marketability standpoint I kind of like RCIPE. If your audience
understands IRV then they probably can understand the concept of a
candidacy
that has become futile during the count, who can be foretold to be a
loser
well in advance of the end.
To me it is not that the pairwise losing candidate "deserves to be
eliminated" but that within the logic of IRV it's intuitive that that
candidate shouldn't need to play a role, affecting things, if they're
doomed
to lose. (Or perhaps it's just me who thinks that's intuitive.)
In contrast the "beats all" winner concept would be a bridge too far,
because while there might be a candidate who can win every final
pairing,
IRV imposes additional requirements to get to that point, so nothing is
assured about that status.
But if the audience doesn't know IRV then it would be harder for me to
find
an argument for RCIPE.
What do you think of BTR-IRV in that respect? Or Borda-elimination?
Neither explicitly checks for a Condorcet winner.
-km
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info