Fwd: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 234, Issue 13
---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
Date: Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 16:31
Subject: Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 234, Issue 13
To: Sass sass@equal.vote
Yes, but opponents only meaningful criticism of Condorcet is about their
vulnerability to offensive strategy.
Yes, sincere top-cycles are vanishingly-rare, but a faction could make a
top-cycle by burial.
For CW,IA & MinMax(wv), & Schulze, the defensive strategy against burial is
to refuse to rank anyone whom you don’t want to be able to beat the CW by
burial.
That deters burial by making it backfire.
The beauty of the autodeterent methods is that, if it’s known that they
successfully deter offensive-strategy, then no defensive strategy is
needed, & voters have no need to not sincerely rank as many candidates as
they want to.
On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:30 Sass sass@equal.vote wrote:
All Condorcet methods have strong strategy resistance in practice for
public elections because public elections will almost always have a
Condorcet Winner, and it will be difficult to predict when they won't. By
far the most reliable strategy in practice for a public election with any
Condorcet method is honesty.
On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 10:45 AM <
election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote:
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Today's Topics:
1. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff)
2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Andrew Myers)
3. Autodeterrence introduction & definitions (Michael Ossipoff)
Message: 1
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 09:03:29 -0800
From: Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
To: "Bob Richard [lists]" lists001@robertjrichard.com
Cc: election-methods@electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?
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Nanson has precedent, but it doesn?t have the simplicity of some of the
other Condorcet-compliant methods.
?& how does Nanson do by freedom from need for defensive-strategy (against
offensive-strategy)?
Achieving the best strategy-free-ness is the goal of Condorcet.
On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 12:08 Bob Richard [lists] <
lists001@robertjrichard.com> wrote:
A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of
Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to learn
why
it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing mention
of
this episode, so this research would probably involve traveling to
Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives, county election
records and the public library. On the other hand, this part of
Michigan is
a beautiful place to visit. Any takers?
--Bob Richard
------ Original Message ------
From "Michael Ossipoff" email9648742@gmail.com
To "EM list" election-methods@electorama.com
Date 1/10/2024 11:34:57 AM
Subject [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?
That question was recently asked.
Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter.
So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an
organization.
Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few candidates,
in the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its
particularly great unfamiliarity.
Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure
our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t
too-vote an
evil.
How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in
various nonpolitical votes.
Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a
voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV.
?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened
for RCV.
But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online,
in
the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for
the
pursuit of an initiative.
Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such
as:
MinMax(wv)
CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA).
Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles.
Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the
defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & don?t
wish
to beat the CW via burial.
That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to
find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of
initiative-enactment.
Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that
focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to
approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative.
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