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Manipulability stats for more poll methods (fixed footnotes)

MO
Michael Ossipoff
Mon, May 6, 2024 12:25 AM

On Sun, May 5, 2024 at 04:17 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de
wrote:

On 2024-05-05 00:25, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

On Sat, May 4, 2024 at 14:45 Kristofer Munsterhjelm
<km_elmet@t-online.de mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote:

Let min be the minimum utility (the utility of your worst candidate),
and max be the utility of your favorite. Then the normalized ratings
from 0 to k inclusive are given by

r_i = round( (x_i - min)/(max-min) * k), where x_i is the utility of the
ith candidate, and r_i is the rating of that candidate.

I thought this was the natural way to create Range ballots from
utilities.

Of course. That’s surely the only way to portray  sincere  Score-voting in
a spatial-simulation.

What threw me was when in a reply to Chris, demonstrated it on
Approval—which made it look as if you’d used it to model Approval voting.

Misunderstood resolved.

Necessary for simulations, but I didn’t vote like that in the Score
elections I’ve voted in.

(We always used to have ranked, Approval & Score balloting in the EM polls,
& I voted in a Score poll a month or two ago…& we’re always being asked to
rate things Cardinal my.)

Surveys ask for absolute Cardinal-ratings, from excellent to awful.

That’s how I’ve always voted in political Score polls to.

Yes, EVC says to give max to best & min to worst in STAR…as optimal
immediate instrumental strategy requires. …& requires in Approval too.

But c’mon now! In an election with only Joe & Donald are you going to
approve Joe or vote for him in Plurality? Hell no!

…boycott the election? Maybe, but it would be a lot more expressive to
turn/on a ballot disapproving both.

What if Jill & Cornell are the only candidates. Their policies differ a
little. Maybe you prefer one’s platform to the other’s. Do you disapprove
one inApproval? No way !!

To my knowledge, there's no obvious way to generalize

above-mean utility thresholding to say, a 0-10 scale.

I'm aware that "normalize" as I've defined it above is different from
above-mean thresholding, and that the latter is more common in
treatments of approval voting in particular. For that reason, I use mean
utility cutoffs for the approval hybrids, and range-based normalization
for the Range hybrids. My point was just that one shouldn't confuse the
two and think I used the same approach for approval and Range.

-km

On Sun, May 5, 2024 at 04:17 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de> wrote: > On 2024-05-05 00:25, Michael Ossipoff wrote: > > > > > > On Sat, May 4, 2024 at 14:45 Kristofer Munsterhjelm > > <km_elmet@t-online.de <mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de>> wrote: > > > > > Let min be the minimum utility (the utility of your worst candidate), > and max be the utility of your favorite. Then the normalized ratings > from 0 to k inclusive are given by > > r_i = round( (x_i - min)/(max-min) * k), where x_i is the utility of the > ith candidate, and r_i is the rating of that candidate. > > I thought this was the natural way to create Range ballots from > utilities. Of course. That’s surely the only way to portray sincere Score-voting in a spatial-simulation. What threw me was when in a reply to Chris, demonstrated it on Approval—which made it look as if you’d used it to model Approval voting. Misunderstood resolved. Necessary for simulations, but I didn’t vote like that in the Score elections I’ve voted in. (We always used to have ranked, Approval & Score balloting in the EM polls, & I voted in a Score poll a month or two ago…& we’re always being asked to rate things Cardinal my.) Surveys ask for *absolute* Cardinal-ratings, from excellent to awful. That’s how I’ve always voted in political Score polls to. Yes, EVC says to give max to best & min to worst in STAR…as optimal immediate instrumental strategy requires. …& requires in Approval too. But c’mon now! In an election with only Joe & Donald are you going to approve Joe or vote for him in Plurality? Hell no! …boycott the election? Maybe, but it would be a lot more expressive to turn/on a ballot disapproving both. What if Jill & Cornell are the only candidates. Their policies differ a little. Maybe you prefer one’s platform to the other’s. Do you disapprove one inApproval? No way !! To my knowledge, there's no obvious way to generalize > above-mean utility thresholding to say, a 0-10 scale. > > I'm aware that "normalize" as I've defined it above is different from > above-mean thresholding, and that the latter is more common in > treatments of approval voting in particular. For that reason, I use mean > utility cutoffs for the approval hybrids, and range-based normalization > for the Range hybrids. My point was just that one shouldn't confuse the > two and think I used the same approach for approval and Range. > > -km >