On the subject of strategic nomination, I think that adding turkey raising as a category to JGA's two self-interested categories could be useful. We could also make the tests more general by considering sets of candidates instead of just individual candidates. So the categories would be: - If one or more candidates of the initial set drop out, and the winner changes in a way that the candidates who dropped out all prefer to the original winner, then the method has a strategic exit incentive in that election. - If one or more candidates of the reserve set enter the election, and the winner changes to someone they all prefer, then the method has a strategic entry incentive in that election. - Consider a candidate A in the initial candidate set, as well as a subset T of the set of reserve candidates (who can join but haven't yet). If, when these candidates T are introduced, the winner changes in a way that A prefers, then the method has a turkey raising incentive by A in that election. - The method has a turkey raising incentive in an election if there exists such an initial candidate A and turkey set T. This would be a kind of candidate analog of nonmonotonicity, because the presence of A in the initial candidate set should (if the method is "monotone") push the outcome towards A precisely to the extent that voters support A. Thus the introduction of someone who A doesn't like shouldn't draw the outcome *closer* to A. -km