election-methods@mailman.electorama.com

Technical discussion of election methods

View all threads

Continuing interrupted reply to Closed

MO
Michael Ossipoff
Sun, Mar 3, 2024 2:21 AM

My phone fell off its stand, resulting in premature sending of the reply.
So let me resume:

As I was saying, I DO object to STV’s negative response, because
Sainte-Lague & d’Hondt don’t have any negative response.  …& STV is a
humongously elaborate complex procedure, requiring new balloting equipment
& software…while list-PR requires no new balloting equipment & no software
modification. The allocations to parties & their candidates can be
determined at any kitchen table where there’s a hand-calculator.

To return to the matter of Hare single-winner:

It’s true that sometimes the CW is an unliked middle compromise, & it would
be better to have the winner-favoriteness that comes with Hare,  which
always chooses the favorite of the largest faction of the Mutual-Majority
when there is once.

But, to best & always & most reliably eliminated perceived lesser-evil
giveaway-need, it’s necessary to always elect the CW, however unfavorite.
So I propose RP(wv) when rank-balloting is insisted-on.

… but would support a Hare proposal if Hare  is honestly offered.  It
currently is not.

There might be other comments in that post that I’d like to reply to, if I
can find it.

My phone fell off its stand, resulting in premature sending of the reply. So let me resume: As I was saying, I DO object to STV’s negative response, because Sainte-Lague & d’Hondt don’t have any negative response. …& STV is a humongously elaborate complex procedure, requiring new balloting equipment & software…while list-PR requires no new balloting equipment & no software modification. The allocations to parties & their candidates can be determined at any kitchen table where there’s a hand-calculator. To return to the matter of Hare single-winner: It’s true that sometimes the CW is an unliked middle compromise, & it would be better to have the winner-favoriteness that comes with Hare, which always chooses the favorite of the largest faction of the Mutual-Majority when there is once. But, to best & always & most reliably eliminated perceived lesser-evil giveaway-need, it’s necessary to always elect the CW, however unfavorite. So I propose RP(wv) when rank-balloting is insisted-on. … but would support a Hare proposal if Hare is honestly offered. It currently is not. There might be other comments in that post that I’d like to reply to, if I can find it.
RL
Richard Lung
Sun, Mar 3, 2024 9:59 AM

“I DO object to STV’s negative response”

 It does not matter whether Mr Ossipoff, you or I, or anyone else
objects to an election method. As HG Wells said over a century ago (The
Elements of Reconstruction, 1916) voting method is not a matter of
opinion, but a matter of demonstration.

It is perfectly possible for STV to use equivalent proportional counts
to Webster/Sainte Lague and the d’Hondt rule divisor methods. Originally
STV used the Hare quota. The Droop quota is merely the minimum PR, as
the Hare quota is the maximum PR. I have recommended the average PR, a
Harmonic Mean quota, V/(S+1/2) which is equivalent for proportionality
to the Sainte Lague divisor rule. But I invented it for other reasons.
It just turned out to have that extra confirmation.

As a matter of fact, I hired the programming of (first order) Binomial
STV and supplied the list with some links, including to GitHub. The
other day I learned that GitHub suffered a mass malware attack in 2023,
from which they maybe did not completely recover. I have no technical
knowledge myself. So I welcome it being looked into by admin, but that
is why the list has not received the links.

First order Binomial STV is simpler in principle than conventional STV.
It is a one-truth election method, which makes it unique, not only to
STV but to all the worlds election methods, which are at least two-truth
methods. That is to say, they are “unscientific” or inconsistent,
because their rules differ as to how they elect or exclude candidates.
In principle, election and exclusion are the same, because one voters
election is another voters exclusion

Binomial STV (not only first order) uses the same method for electing as
excluding candidates. In other words, it is symmetrical as to election
and exclusion. First order STV involves two counts, an election count of
preferences and an exclusion count of reversed preferences. Both counts
use Meek method computer count of surplus transfer, in exactly the same
procedure, whether to elect candidates or exclude them (to an election
quota or an exclusion quota, otherwise the same quota). The exclusion
count is an iteration of the election count.

However, first order STV is simpler than Meek method, in that it
dispenses with its “last past the post” exclusion method, when election
surpluses run out. It also dispenses with the Meek method policy of
reducing the quota as voters abstain their preferences. On the contrary,
abstentions information is counted, thus satisfying the principle of the
conservation of (preferential) information, fundamental to science or
organised knowledge.

Regards,

Richard Lung.

On 03/03/2024 02:21, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

My phone fell off its stand, resulting in premature sending of the
reply. So let me resume:

As I was saying, I DO object to STV’s negative response, because
Sainte-Lague & d’Hondt don’t have any negative response.  …& STV is a
humongously elaborate complex procedure, requiring new balloting
equipment & software…while list-PR requires no new balloting equipment
& no software modification. The allocations to parties & their
candidates can be determined at any kitchen table where there’s a
hand-calculator.

To return to the matter of Hare single-winner:

It’s true that sometimes the CW is an unliked middle compromise, & it
would be better to have the winner-favoriteness that comes with Hare,
 which always chooses the favorite of the largest faction of the
Mutual-Majority when there is once.

But, to best & always & most reliably eliminated perceived lesser-evil
giveaway-need, it’s necessary to always elect the CW, however
unfavorite. So I propose RP(wv) when rank-balloting is insisted-on.

… but would support a Hare proposal if Hare  is honestly offered.  It
currently is not.

There might be other comments in that post that I’d like to reply to,
if I can find it.


Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em  for list info

“I DO object to STV’s negative response”  It does not matter whether Mr Ossipoff, you or I, or anyone else objects to an election method. As HG Wells said over a century ago (The Elements of Reconstruction, 1916) voting method is not a matter of opinion, but a matter of demonstration. It is perfectly possible for STV to use equivalent proportional counts to Webster/Sainte Lague and the d’Hondt rule divisor methods. Originally STV used the Hare quota. The Droop quota is merely the minimum PR, as the Hare quota is the maximum PR. I have recommended the average PR, a Harmonic Mean quota, V/(S+1/2) which is equivalent for proportionality to the Sainte Lague divisor rule. But I invented it for other reasons. It just turned out to have that extra confirmation. As a matter of fact, I hired the programming of (first order) Binomial STV and supplied the list with some links, including to GitHub. The other day I learned that GitHub suffered a mass malware attack in 2023, from which they maybe did not completely recover. I have no technical knowledge myself. So I welcome it being looked into by admin, but that is why the list has not received the links. First order Binomial STV is simpler in principle than conventional STV. It is a one-truth election method, which makes it unique, not only to STV but to all the worlds election methods, which are at least two-truth methods. That is to say, they are “unscientific” or inconsistent, because their rules differ as to how they elect or exclude candidates. In principle, election and exclusion are the same, because one voters election is another voters exclusion Binomial STV (not only first order) uses the same method for electing as excluding candidates. In other words, it is symmetrical as to election and exclusion. First order STV involves two counts, an election count of preferences and an exclusion count of reversed preferences. Both counts use Meek method computer count of surplus transfer, in exactly the same procedure, whether to elect candidates or exclude them (to an election quota or an exclusion quota, otherwise the same quota). The exclusion count is an iteration of the election count. However, first order STV is simpler than Meek method, in that it dispenses with its “last past the post” exclusion method, when election surpluses run out. It also dispenses with the Meek method policy of reducing the quota as voters abstain their preferences. On the contrary, abstentions information is counted, thus satisfying the principle of the conservation of (preferential) information, fundamental to science or organised knowledge. Regards, Richard Lung. On 03/03/2024 02:21, Michael Ossipoff wrote: > My phone fell off its stand, resulting in premature sending of the > reply. So let me resume: > > As I was saying, I DO object to STV’s negative response, because > Sainte-Lague & d’Hondt don’t have any negative response.  …& STV is a > humongously elaborate complex procedure, requiring new balloting > equipment & software…while list-PR requires no new balloting equipment > & no software modification. The allocations to parties & their > candidates can be determined at any kitchen table where there’s a > hand-calculator. > > To return to the matter of Hare single-winner: > > It’s true that sometimes the CW is an unliked middle compromise, & it > would be better to have the winner-favoriteness that comes with Hare, >  which always chooses the favorite of the largest faction of the > Mutual-Majority when there is once. > > But, to best & always & most reliably eliminated perceived lesser-evil > giveaway-need, it’s necessary to always elect the CW, however > unfavorite. So I propose RP(wv) when rank-balloting is insisted-on. > > … but would support a Hare proposal if Hare  is honestly offered.  It > currently is not. > > There might be other comments in that post that I’d like to reply to, > if I can find it. > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
FE
Filip Ejlak
Fri, Apr 5, 2024 3:26 PM

This is a question primarily to Richard Lung, as I am trying to understand
Binomial STV (and perhaps simulate it). If we want to do Binomial STV with
10 candidates and 4 seats, do we just do an STV contest for 4 winners with
a simultaneous "inversed" STV contest for 6 losers, with a candidate being
excluded in one sub-election iff they have won a seat in the other
sub-election? If that's right, isn't it unfortunately a very
clone-dependent solution? If that's not right, what's the actual algorithm?

Richard Lung voting@ukscientists.com wrote:

“I DO object to STV’s negative response”

It does not matter whether Mr Ossipoff, you or I, or anyone else objects
to an election method. As HG Wells said over a century ago (The Elements of
Reconstruction, 1916) voting method is not a matter of opinion, but a
matter of demonstration.

It is perfectly possible for STV to use equivalent proportional counts to
Webster/Sainte Lague and the d’Hondt rule divisor methods. Originally STV
used the Hare quota. The Droop quota is merely the minimum PR, as the Hare
quota is the maximum PR. I have recommended the average PR, a Harmonic Mean
quota, V/(S+1/2) which is equivalent for proportionality to the Sainte
Lague divisor rule. But I invented it for other reasons. It just turned out
to have that extra confirmation.

As a matter of fact, I hired the programming of (first order) Binomial STV
and supplied the list with some links, including to GitHub. The other day I
learned that GitHub suffered a mass malware attack in 2023, from which they
maybe did not completely recover. I have no technical knowledge myself. So
I welcome it being looked into by admin, but that is why the list has not
received the links.

First order Binomial STV is simpler in principle than conventional STV. It
is a one-truth election method, which makes it unique, not only to STV but
to all the worlds election methods, which are at least two-truth methods.
That is to say, they are “unscientific” or inconsistent, because their
rules differ as to how they elect or exclude candidates. In principle,
election and exclusion are the same, because one voters election is another
voters exclusion

Binomial STV (not only first order) uses the same method for electing as
excluding candidates. In other words, it is symmetrical as to election and
exclusion. First order STV involves two counts, an election count of
preferences and an exclusion count of reversed preferences. Both counts use
Meek method computer count of surplus transfer, in exactly the same
procedure, whether to elect candidates or exclude them (to an election
quota or an exclusion quota, otherwise the same quota). The exclusion count
is an iteration of the election count.

However, first order STV is simpler than Meek method, in that it dispenses
with its “last past the post” exclusion method, when election surpluses run
out. It also dispenses with the Meek method policy of reducing the quota as
voters abstain their preferences. On the contrary, abstentions information
is counted, thus satisfying the principle of the conservation of
(preferential) information, fundamental to science or organised knowledge.

Regards,

Richard Lung.

On 03/03/2024 02:21, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

My phone fell off its stand, resulting in premature sending of the reply.
So let me resume:

As I was saying, I DO object to STV’s negative response, because
Sainte-Lague & d’Hondt don’t have any negative response.  …& STV is a
humongously elaborate complex procedure, requiring new balloting equipment
& software…while list-PR requires no new balloting equipment & no software
modification. The allocations to parties & their candidates can be
determined at any kitchen table where there’s a hand-calculator.

To return to the matter of Hare single-winner:

It’s true that sometimes the CW is an unliked middle compromise, & it
would be better to have the winner-favoriteness that comes with Hare,
which always chooses the favorite of the largest faction of the
Mutual-Majority when there is once.

But, to best & always & most reliably eliminated perceived lesser-evil
giveaway-need, it’s necessary to always elect the CW, however unfavorite.
So I propose RP(wv) when rank-balloting is insisted-on.

… but would support a Hare proposal if Hare  is honestly offered.  It
currently is not.

There might be other comments in that post that I’d like to reply to, if I
can find it.


Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info


Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
info

This is a question primarily to Richard Lung, as I am trying to understand Binomial STV (and perhaps simulate it). If we want to do Binomial STV with 10 candidates and 4 seats, do we just do an STV contest for 4 winners with a simultaneous "inversed" STV contest for 6 losers, with a candidate being excluded in one sub-election iff they have won a seat in the other sub-election? If that's right, isn't it unfortunately a very clone-dependent solution? If that's not right, what's the actual algorithm? Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com> wrote: > > “I DO object to STV’s negative response” > > It does not matter whether Mr Ossipoff, you or I, or anyone else objects > to an election method. As HG Wells said over a century ago (The Elements of > Reconstruction, 1916) voting method is not a matter of opinion, but a > matter of demonstration. > > It is perfectly possible for STV to use equivalent proportional counts to > Webster/Sainte Lague and the d’Hondt rule divisor methods. Originally STV > used the Hare quota. The Droop quota is merely the minimum PR, as the Hare > quota is the maximum PR. I have recommended the average PR, a Harmonic Mean > quota, V/(S+1/2) which is equivalent for proportionality to the Sainte > Lague divisor rule. But I invented it for other reasons. It just turned out > to have that extra confirmation. > > As a matter of fact, I hired the programming of (first order) Binomial STV > and supplied the list with some links, including to GitHub. The other day I > learned that GitHub suffered a mass malware attack in 2023, from which they > maybe did not completely recover. I have no technical knowledge myself. So > I welcome it being looked into by admin, but that is why the list has not > received the links. > > First order Binomial STV is simpler in principle than conventional STV. It > is a one-truth election method, which makes it unique, not only to STV but > to all the worlds election methods, which are at least two-truth methods. > That is to say, they are “unscientific” or inconsistent, because their > rules differ as to how they elect or exclude candidates. In principle, > election and exclusion are the same, because one voters election is another > voters exclusion > > Binomial STV (not only first order) uses the same method for electing as > excluding candidates. In other words, it is symmetrical as to election and > exclusion. First order STV involves two counts, an election count of > preferences and an exclusion count of reversed preferences. Both counts use > Meek method computer count of surplus transfer, in exactly the same > procedure, whether to elect candidates or exclude them (to an election > quota or an exclusion quota, otherwise the same quota). The exclusion count > is an iteration of the election count. > > However, first order STV is simpler than Meek method, in that it dispenses > with its “last past the post” exclusion method, when election surpluses run > out. It also dispenses with the Meek method policy of reducing the quota as > voters abstain their preferences. On the contrary, abstentions information > is counted, thus satisfying the principle of the conservation of > (preferential) information, fundamental to science or organised knowledge. > > Regards, > > Richard Lung. > > > > On 03/03/2024 02:21, Michael Ossipoff wrote: > > My phone fell off its stand, resulting in premature sending of the reply. > So let me resume: > > As I was saying, I DO object to STV’s negative response, because > Sainte-Lague & d’Hondt don’t have any negative response. …& STV is a > humongously elaborate complex procedure, requiring new balloting equipment > & software…while list-PR requires no new balloting equipment & no software > modification. The allocations to parties & their candidates can be > determined at any kitchen table where there’s a hand-calculator. > > To return to the matter of Hare single-winner: > > It’s true that sometimes the CW is an unliked middle compromise, & it > would be better to have the winner-favoriteness that comes with Hare, > which always chooses the favorite of the largest faction of the > Mutual-Majority when there is once. > > But, to best & always & most reliably eliminated perceived lesser-evil > giveaway-need, it’s necessary to always elect the CW, however unfavorite. > So I propose RP(wv) when rank-balloting is insisted-on. > > … but would support a Hare proposal if Hare is honestly offered. It > currently is not. > > There might be other comments in that post that I’d like to reply to, if I > can find it. > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >
RL
Richard Lung
Fri, Apr 5, 2024 7:37 PM

Thank you, Filip,

The first order Binomial STV is one election count and one exclusion
count, exactly like it (being symmetrical; an iteration). For the
election count I use Meek method of surplus transfers. The distinction,
of that computer count, over the traditional hand counts, is that
preferences, for an already elected candidate, with a quota, are still
recorded. Meek did that by updating the candidate keep value (the quota
divided by a candidates total transferable vote).

Unlike Meek method, I do keep values for every candidate, losers as well
as winners. Candidates in deficit of a quota have keep values of more
than unity, signifying they are excluded. The exclusion count is run
exactly like the election count but with the preferences reversed, so a
quota now becomes an exclusion quota. The rule is simple: an election
count elects candidates reaching the quota. An exclusion count excludes
candidates reaching a quota. One voters preferences is another voters
unpreferences. There is no difference in principle between them.

Binomial STV (symbolised as STV^; first order Binomial STV would be
STV^1. Any order bimomial STV would be STV^n. Preceding forms of STV,
including Meek method, are STV^0. The ballot paper looks just like any
Ranked Choice Vote. But the instructions are different. Every voting
method has voters instructions.

The instructions are, in the case of your example: There are four seats
available and ten candidates to choose from. Your first four preferences
would more or less help to elect candidates. Your next 6 preferences (if
you choose to make them) would less or more help to exclude those
candidates. So, a tenth preference counts as much against a candidate,
as your first preference would count for a candidate. But you don't have
to give any order of preference. A carte blanche is equivalent to NOTA.
If a quota of abstentions is reached, one of the seats is left empty.
This election also gives voters the rational power to exclude candidates.

Some candidates may be both popular and unpopular enough to gain both
election and exclusion quotas. They are both "alive" and "dead" to the
electorate. (A case of "Schrodingers candidate" according to Forest
Simmons.) Whether they are elected or excluded is determined by a
Quotient of the exclusion quota divided by the election quota. If the
ratio is one or less, they are elected; if not, excluded. (The Quotient
is the square of a geometric mean.)

When inverted, the exclusion count is like a second-opinion election.
The geometric means of the candidates election keep values and inverse
exclusion keep value establish the over-all order of popularity of the
candidates (from lowest to highest over-all keep values.

All the voters abstentions have to be counted, to establish whether they
care more to elect or exclude candidates. This also means there is no
reduction of the quota with abstentions, as in Meek method. Counting
abstentions observes the conservation of (preferential) information.

I hired a programmer for first order Binomial STV, which, unlike the
higher orders, should be much simpler than Meek method, and simpler in
conception than the hand counts. However I have always supported them
all my adult life, and am now an old man.

Kristofer found the GitHub link to the programmers coding, which he sent me:

https://github.com/Esrot-Clients/STV_CSV/tree/master

The programmer also sent me a "frontend" for the use of voters:

https://votingstv.cloud/

And he sent me two manuals, which I attach, in case useful to a
technical person, unlike myself.

Regards,

Richard Lung.

On 05/04/2024 16:26, Filip Ejlak wrote:

This is a question primarily to Richard Lung, as I am trying to
understand Binomial STV (and perhaps simulate it). If we want to do
Binomial STV with 10 candidates and 4 seats, do we just do an STV
contest for 4 winners with a simultaneous "inversed" STV contest for 6
losers, with a candidate being excluded in one sub-election iff they
have won a seat in the other sub-election? If that's right, isn't it
unfortunately a very clone-dependent solution? If that's not right,
what's the actual algorithm?

Richard Lung voting@ukscientists.com wrote:

 “I DO object to STV’s negative response”

  It does not matter whether Mr Ossipoff, you or I, or anyone else
 objects to an election method. As HG Wells said over a century ago
 (The Elements of Reconstruction, 1916) voting method is not a
 matter of opinion, but a matter of demonstration.

 It is perfectly possible for STV to use equivalent proportional
 counts to Webster/Sainte Lague and the d’Hondt rule divisor
 methods. Originally STV used the Hare quota. The Droop quota is
 merely the minimum PR, as the Hare quota is the maximum PR. I have
 recommended the average PR, a Harmonic Mean quota, V/(S+1/2) which
 is equivalent for proportionality to the Sainte Lague divisor
 rule. But I invented it for other reasons. It just turned out to
 have that extra confirmation.

 As a matter of fact, I hired the programming of (first order)
 Binomial STV and supplied the list with some links, including to
 GitHub. The other day I learned that GitHub suffered a mass
 malware attack in 2023, from which they maybe did not completely
 recover. I have no technical knowledge myself. So I welcome it
 being looked into by admin, but that is why the list has not
 received the links.

 First order Binomial STV is simpler in principle than conventional
 STV. It is a one-truth election method, which makes it unique, not
 only to STV but to all the worlds election methods, which are at
 least two-truth methods. That is to say, they are “unscientific”
 or inconsistent, because their rules differ as to how they elect
 or exclude candidates. In principle, election and exclusion are
 the same, because one voters election is another voters exclusion

 Binomial STV (not only first order) uses the same method for
 electing as excluding candidates. In other words, it is
 symmetrical as to election and exclusion. First order STV involves
 two counts, an election count of preferences and an exclusion
 count of reversed preferences. Both counts use Meek method
 computer count of surplus transfer, in exactly the same procedure,
 whether to elect candidates or exclude them (to an election quota
 or an exclusion quota, otherwise the same quota). The exclusion
 count is an iteration of the election count.

 However, first order STV is simpler than Meek method, in that it
 dispenses with its “last past the post” exclusion method, when
 election surpluses run out. It also dispenses with the Meek method
 policy of reducing the quota as voters abstain their preferences.
 On the contrary, abstentions information is counted, thus
 satisfying the principle of the conservation of (preferential)
 information, fundamental to science or organised knowledge.

 Regards,

 Richard Lung.



 On 03/03/2024 02:21, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
 My phone fell off its stand, resulting in premature sending of
 the reply. So let me resume:

 As I was saying, I DO object to STV’s negative response, because
 Sainte-Lague & d’Hondt don’t have any negative response.  …& STV
 is a humongously elaborate complex procedure, requiring new
 balloting equipment & software…while list-PR requires no new
 balloting equipment & no software modification. The allocations
 to parties & their candidates can be determined at any kitchen
 table where there’s a hand-calculator.

 To return to the matter of Hare single-winner:

 It’s true that sometimes the CW is an unliked middle compromise,
 & it would be better to have the winner-favoriteness that comes
 with Hare,  which always chooses the favorite of the largest
 faction of the Mutual-Majority when there is once.

 But, to best & always & most reliably eliminated perceived
 lesser-evil giveaway-need, it’s necessary to always elect the CW,
 however unfavorite. So I propose RP(wv) when rank-balloting is
 insisted-on.

 … but would support a Hare proposal if Hare  is honestly
 offered.  It currently is not.

 There might be other comments in that post that I’d like to reply
 to, if I can find it.



 ----
 Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em  for list info
 ----
 Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
 list info
Thank you, Filip, The first order Binomial STV is one election count and one exclusion count, exactly like it (being symmetrical; an iteration). For the election count I use Meek method of surplus transfers. The distinction, of that computer count, over the traditional hand counts, is that preferences, for an already elected candidate, with a quota, are still recorded. Meek did that by updating the candidate keep value (the quota divided by a candidates total transferable vote). Unlike Meek method, I do keep values for every candidate, losers as well as winners. Candidates in deficit of a quota have keep values of more than unity, signifying they are excluded. The exclusion count is run exactly like the election count but with the preferences reversed, so a quota now becomes an exclusion quota. The rule is simple: an election count elects candidates reaching the quota. An exclusion count excludes candidates reaching a quota. One voters preferences is another voters unpreferences. There is no difference in principle between them. Binomial STV (symbolised as STV^; first order Binomial STV would be STV^1. Any order bimomial STV would be STV^n. Preceding forms of STV, including Meek method, are STV^0. The ballot paper looks just like any Ranked Choice Vote. But the instructions are different. Every voting method has voters instructions. The instructions are, in the case of your example: There are four seats available and ten candidates to choose from. Your first four preferences would more or less help to elect candidates. Your next 6 preferences (if you choose to make them) would less or more help to exclude those candidates. So, a tenth preference counts as much against a candidate, as your first preference would count for a candidate. But you don't have to give any order of preference. A carte blanche is equivalent to NOTA. If a quota of abstentions is reached, one of the seats is left empty. This election also gives voters the rational power to exclude candidates. Some candidates may be both popular and unpopular enough to gain both election and exclusion quotas. They are both "alive" and "dead" to the electorate. (A case of "Schrodingers candidate" according to Forest Simmons.) Whether they are elected or excluded is determined by a Quotient of the exclusion quota divided by the election quota. If the ratio is one or less, they are elected; if not, excluded. (The Quotient is the square of a geometric mean.) When inverted, the exclusion count is like a second-opinion election. The geometric means of the candidates election keep values and inverse exclusion keep value establish the over-all order of popularity of the candidates (from lowest to highest over-all keep values. All the voters abstentions have to be counted, to establish whether they care more to elect or exclude candidates. This also means there is no reduction of the quota with abstentions, as in Meek method. Counting abstentions observes the conservation of (preferential) information. I hired a programmer for first order Binomial STV, which, unlike the higher orders, should be much simpler than Meek method, and simpler in conception than the hand counts. However I have always supported them all my adult life, and am now an old man. Kristofer found the GitHub link to the programmers coding, which he sent me: https://github.com/Esrot-Clients/STV_CSV/tree/master The programmer also sent me a "frontend" for the use of voters: https://votingstv.cloud/ And he sent me two manuals, which I attach, in case useful to a technical person, unlike myself. Regards, Richard Lung. On 05/04/2024 16:26, Filip Ejlak wrote: > This is a question primarily to Richard Lung, as I am trying to > understand Binomial STV (and perhaps simulate it). If we want to do > Binomial STV with 10 candidates and 4 seats, do we just do an STV > contest for 4 winners with a simultaneous "inversed" STV contest for 6 > losers, with a candidate being excluded in one sub-election iff they > have won a seat in the other sub-election? If that's right, isn't it > unfortunately a very clone-dependent solution? If that's not right, > what's the actual algorithm? > > > > Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com> wrote: > > > “I DO object to STV’s negative response” > >  It does not matter whether Mr Ossipoff, you or I, or anyone else > objects to an election method. As HG Wells said over a century ago > (The Elements of Reconstruction, 1916) voting method is not a > matter of opinion, but a matter of demonstration. > > It is perfectly possible for STV to use equivalent proportional > counts to Webster/Sainte Lague and the d’Hondt rule divisor > methods. Originally STV used the Hare quota. The Droop quota is > merely the minimum PR, as the Hare quota is the maximum PR. I have > recommended the average PR, a Harmonic Mean quota, V/(S+1/2) which > is equivalent for proportionality to the Sainte Lague divisor > rule. But I invented it for other reasons. It just turned out to > have that extra confirmation. > > As a matter of fact, I hired the programming of (first order) > Binomial STV and supplied the list with some links, including to > GitHub. The other day I learned that GitHub suffered a mass > malware attack in 2023, from which they maybe did not completely > recover. I have no technical knowledge myself. So I welcome it > being looked into by admin, but that is why the list has not > received the links. > > First order Binomial STV is simpler in principle than conventional > STV. It is a one-truth election method, which makes it unique, not > only to STV but to all the worlds election methods, which are at > least two-truth methods. That is to say, they are “unscientific” > or inconsistent, because their rules differ as to how they elect > or exclude candidates. In principle, election and exclusion are > the same, because one voters election is another voters exclusion > > Binomial STV (not only first order) uses the same method for > electing as excluding candidates. In other words, it is > symmetrical as to election and exclusion. First order STV involves > two counts, an election count of preferences and an exclusion > count of reversed preferences. Both counts use Meek method > computer count of surplus transfer, in exactly the same procedure, > whether to elect candidates or exclude them (to an election quota > or an exclusion quota, otherwise the same quota). The exclusion > count is an iteration of the election count. > > However, first order STV is simpler than Meek method, in that it > dispenses with its “last past the post” exclusion method, when > election surpluses run out. It also dispenses with the Meek method > policy of reducing the quota as voters abstain their preferences. > On the contrary, abstentions information is counted, thus > satisfying the principle of the conservation of (preferential) > information, fundamental to science or organised knowledge. > > Regards, > > Richard Lung. > > > > On 03/03/2024 02:21, Michael Ossipoff wrote: >> My phone fell off its stand, resulting in premature sending of >> the reply. So let me resume: >> >> As I was saying, I DO object to STV’s negative response, because >> Sainte-Lague & d’Hondt don’t have any negative response.  …& STV >> is a humongously elaborate complex procedure, requiring new >> balloting equipment & software…while list-PR requires no new >> balloting equipment & no software modification. The allocations >> to parties & their candidates can be determined at any kitchen >> table where there’s a hand-calculator. >> >> To return to the matter of Hare single-winner: >> >> It’s true that sometimes the CW is an unliked middle compromise, >> & it would be better to have the winner-favoriteness that comes >> with Hare,  which always chooses the favorite of the largest >> faction of the Mutual-Majority when there is once. >> >> But, to best & always & most reliably eliminated perceived >> lesser-evil giveaway-need, it’s necessary to always elect the CW, >> however unfavorite. So I propose RP(wv) when rank-balloting is >> insisted-on. >> >> … but would support a Hare proposal if Hare  is honestly >> offered.  It currently is not. >> >> There might be other comments in that post that I’d like to reply >> to, if I can find it. >> >> >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for > list info >
RL
Richard Lung
Mon, Apr 15, 2024 7:08 AM

The only reply was in the subject box "Trying to understand BSTV".

If there is anything you want to know, you only have to ask.

To have an answer, there has to be a question.

Regards,

 Richard Lung.

On 05/04/2024 20:37, Richard Lung wrote:

Thank you, Filip,

The first order Binomial STV is one election count and one exclusion
count, exactly like it (being symmetrical; an iteration). For the
election count I use Meek method of surplus transfers. The
distinction, of that computer count, over the traditional hand counts,
is that preferences, for an already elected candidate, with a quota,
are still recorded. Meek did that by updating the candidate keep value
(the quota divided by a candidates total transferable vote).

Unlike Meek method, I do keep values for every candidate, losers as
well as winners. Candidates in deficit of a quota have keep values of
more than unity, signifying they are excluded. The exclusion count is
run exactly like the election count but with the preferences reversed,
so a quota now becomes an exclusion quota. The rule is simple: an
election count elects candidates reaching the quota. An exclusion
count excludes candidates reaching a quota. One voters preferences is
another voters unpreferences. There is no difference in principle
between them.

Binomial STV (symbolised as STV^; first order Binomial STV would be
STV^1. Any order bimomial STV would be STV^n. Preceding forms of STV,
including Meek method, are STV^0. The ballot paper looks just like any
Ranked Choice Vote. But the instructions are different. Every voting
method has voters instructions.

The instructions are, in the case of your example: There are four
seats available and ten candidates to choose from. Your first four
preferences would more or less help to elect candidates. Your next 6
preferences (if you choose to make them) would less or more help to
exclude those candidates. So, a tenth preference counts as much
against a candidate, as your first preference would count for a
candidate. But you don't have to give any order of preference. A carte
blanche is equivalent to NOTA. If a quota of abstentions is reached,
one of the seats is left empty. This election also gives voters the
rational power to exclude candidates.

Some candidates may be both popular and unpopular enough to gain both
election and exclusion quotas. They are both "alive" and "dead" to the
electorate. (A case of "Schrodingers candidate" according to Forest
Simmons.) Whether they are elected or excluded is determined by a
Quotient of the exclusion quota divided by the election quota. If the
ratio is one or less, they are elected; if not, excluded. (The
Quotient is the square of a geometric mean.)

When inverted, the exclusion count is like a second-opinion election.
The geometric means of the candidates election keep values and inverse
exclusion keep value establish the over-all order of popularity of the
candidates (from lowest to highest over-all keep values.

All the voters abstentions have to be counted, to establish whether
they care more to elect or exclude candidates. This also means there
is no reduction of the quota with abstentions, as in Meek method.
Counting abstentions observes the conservation of (preferential)
information.

I hired a programmer for first order Binomial STV, which, unlike the
higher orders, should be much simpler than Meek method, and simpler in
conception than the hand counts. However I have always supported them
all my adult life, and am now an old man.

Kristofer found the GitHub link to the programmers coding, which he
sent me:

https://github.com/Esrot-Clients/STV_CSV/tree/master

The programmer also sent me a "frontend" for the use of voters:

https://votingstv.cloud/

And he sent me two manuals, which I attach, in case useful to a
technical person, unlike myself.

Regards,

Richard Lung.

On 05/04/2024 16:26, Filip Ejlak wrote:

This is a question primarily to Richard Lung, as I am trying to
understand Binomial STV (and perhaps simulate it). If we want to do
Binomial STV with 10 candidates and 4 seats, do we just do an STV
contest for 4 winners with a simultaneous "inversed" STV contest for
6 losers, with a candidate being excluded in one sub-election iff
they have won a seat in the other sub-election? If that's right,
isn't it unfortunately a very clone-dependent solution? If that's not
right, what's the actual algorithm?

Richard Lung voting@ukscientists.com wrote:

 “I DO object to STV’s negative response”

  It does not matter whether Mr Ossipoff, you or I, or anyone else
 objects to an election method. As HG Wells said over a century
 ago (The Elements of Reconstruction, 1916) voting method is not a
 matter of opinion, but a matter of demonstration.

 It is perfectly possible for STV to use equivalent proportional
 counts to Webster/Sainte Lague and the d’Hondt rule divisor
 methods. Originally STV used the Hare quota. The Droop quota is
 merely the minimum PR, as the Hare quota is the maximum PR. I
 have recommended the average PR, a Harmonic Mean quota, V/(S+1/2)
 which is equivalent for proportionality to the Sainte Lague
 divisor rule. But I invented it for other reasons. It just turned
 out to have that extra confirmation.

 As a matter of fact, I hired the programming of (first order)
 Binomial STV and supplied the list with some links, including to
 GitHub. The other day I learned that GitHub suffered a mass
 malware attack in 2023, from which they maybe did not completely
 recover. I have no technical knowledge myself. So I welcome it
 being looked into by admin, but that is why the list has not
 received the links.

 First order Binomial STV is simpler in principle than
 conventional STV. It is a one-truth election method, which makes
 it unique, not only to STV but to all the worlds election
 methods, which are at least two-truth methods. That is to say,
 they are “unscientific” or inconsistent, because their rules
 differ as to how they elect or exclude candidates. In principle,
 election and exclusion are the same, because one voters election
 is another voters exclusion

 Binomial STV (not only first order) uses the same method for
 electing as excluding candidates. In other words, it is
 symmetrical as to election and exclusion. First order STV
 involves two counts, an election count of preferences and an
 exclusion count of reversed preferences. Both counts use Meek
 method computer count of surplus transfer, in exactly the same
 procedure, whether to elect candidates or exclude them (to an
 election quota or an exclusion quota, otherwise the same quota).
 The exclusion count is an iteration of the election count.

 However, first order STV is simpler than Meek method, in that it
 dispenses with its “last past the post” exclusion method, when
 election surpluses run out. It also dispenses with the Meek
 method policy of reducing the quota as voters abstain their
 preferences. On the contrary, abstentions information is counted,
 thus satisfying the principle of the conservation of
 (preferential) information, fundamental to science or organised
 knowledge.

 Regards,

 Richard Lung.



 On 03/03/2024 02:21, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
 My phone fell off its stand, resulting in premature sending of
 the reply. So let me resume:

 As I was saying, I DO object to STV’s negative response, because
 Sainte-Lague & d’Hondt don’t have any negative response.  …& STV
 is a humongously elaborate complex procedure, requiring new
 balloting equipment & software…while list-PR requires no new
 balloting equipment & no software modification. The allocations
 to parties & their candidates can be determined at any kitchen
 table where there’s a hand-calculator.

 To return to the matter of Hare single-winner:

 It’s true that sometimes the CW is an unliked middle compromise,
 & it would be better to have the winner-favoriteness that comes
 with Hare,  which always chooses the favorite of the largest
 faction of the Mutual-Majority when there is once.

 But, to best & always & most reliably eliminated perceived
 lesser-evil giveaway-need, it’s necessary to always elect the
 CW, however unfavorite. So I propose RP(wv) when rank-balloting
 is insisted-on.

 … but would support a Hare proposal if Hare  is honestly
 offered.  It currently is not.

 There might be other comments in that post that I’d like to
 reply to, if I can find it.



 ----
 Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em  for list info
 ----
 Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
 list info

Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em  for list info

The only reply was in the subject box "Trying to understand BSTV". If there is anything you want to know, you only have to ask. To have an answer, there has to be a question. Regards,  Richard Lung. On 05/04/2024 20:37, Richard Lung wrote: > > > Thank you, Filip, > > The first order Binomial STV is one election count and one exclusion > count, exactly like it (being symmetrical; an iteration). For the > election count I use Meek method of surplus transfers. The > distinction, of that computer count, over the traditional hand counts, > is that preferences, for an already elected candidate, with a quota, > are still recorded. Meek did that by updating the candidate keep value > (the quota divided by a candidates total transferable vote). > > Unlike Meek method, I do keep values for every candidate, losers as > well as winners. Candidates in deficit of a quota have keep values of > more than unity, signifying they are excluded. The exclusion count is > run exactly like the election count but with the preferences reversed, > so a quota now becomes an exclusion quota. The rule is simple: an > election count elects candidates reaching the quota. An exclusion > count excludes candidates reaching a quota. One voters preferences is > another voters unpreferences. There is no difference in principle > between them. > > Binomial STV (symbolised as STV^; first order Binomial STV would be > STV^1. Any order bimomial STV would be STV^n. Preceding forms of STV, > including Meek method, are STV^0. The ballot paper looks just like any > Ranked Choice Vote. But the instructions are different. Every voting > method has voters instructions. > > The instructions are, in the case of your example: There are four > seats available and ten candidates to choose from. Your first four > preferences would more or less help to elect candidates. Your next 6 > preferences (if you choose to make them) would less or more help to > exclude those candidates. So, a tenth preference counts as much > against a candidate, as your first preference would count for a > candidate. But you don't have to give any order of preference. A carte > blanche is equivalent to NOTA. If a quota of abstentions is reached, > one of the seats is left empty. This election also gives voters the > rational power to exclude candidates. > > Some candidates may be both popular and unpopular enough to gain both > election and exclusion quotas. They are both "alive" and "dead" to the > electorate. (A case of "Schrodingers candidate" according to Forest > Simmons.) Whether they are elected or excluded is determined by a > Quotient of the exclusion quota divided by the election quota. If the > ratio is one or less, they are elected; if not, excluded. (The > Quotient is the square of a geometric mean.) > > When inverted, the exclusion count is like a second-opinion election. > The geometric means of the candidates election keep values and inverse > exclusion keep value establish the over-all order of popularity of the > candidates (from lowest to highest over-all keep values. > > All the voters abstentions have to be counted, to establish whether > they care more to elect or exclude candidates. This also means there > is no reduction of the quota with abstentions, as in Meek method. > Counting abstentions observes the conservation of (preferential) > information. > > I hired a programmer for first order Binomial STV, which, unlike the > higher orders, should be much simpler than Meek method, and simpler in > conception than the hand counts. However I have always supported them > all my adult life, and am now an old man. > > Kristofer found the GitHub link to the programmers coding, which he > sent me: > > https://github.com/Esrot-Clients/STV_CSV/tree/master > > The programmer also sent me a "frontend" for the use of voters: > > https://votingstv.cloud/ > > And he sent me two manuals, which I attach, in case useful to a > technical person, unlike myself. > > Regards, > > Richard Lung. > > > > > On 05/04/2024 16:26, Filip Ejlak wrote: >> This is a question primarily to Richard Lung, as I am trying to >> understand Binomial STV (and perhaps simulate it). If we want to do >> Binomial STV with 10 candidates and 4 seats, do we just do an STV >> contest for 4 winners with a simultaneous "inversed" STV contest for >> 6 losers, with a candidate being excluded in one sub-election iff >> they have won a seat in the other sub-election? If that's right, >> isn't it unfortunately a very clone-dependent solution? If that's not >> right, what's the actual algorithm? >> >> >> >> Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com> wrote: >> >> >> “I DO object to STV’s negative response” >> >>  It does not matter whether Mr Ossipoff, you or I, or anyone else >> objects to an election method. As HG Wells said over a century >> ago (The Elements of Reconstruction, 1916) voting method is not a >> matter of opinion, but a matter of demonstration. >> >> It is perfectly possible for STV to use equivalent proportional >> counts to Webster/Sainte Lague and the d’Hondt rule divisor >> methods. Originally STV used the Hare quota. The Droop quota is >> merely the minimum PR, as the Hare quota is the maximum PR. I >> have recommended the average PR, a Harmonic Mean quota, V/(S+1/2) >> which is equivalent for proportionality to the Sainte Lague >> divisor rule. But I invented it for other reasons. It just turned >> out to have that extra confirmation. >> >> As a matter of fact, I hired the programming of (first order) >> Binomial STV and supplied the list with some links, including to >> GitHub. The other day I learned that GitHub suffered a mass >> malware attack in 2023, from which they maybe did not completely >> recover. I have no technical knowledge myself. So I welcome it >> being looked into by admin, but that is why the list has not >> received the links. >> >> First order Binomial STV is simpler in principle than >> conventional STV. It is a one-truth election method, which makes >> it unique, not only to STV but to all the worlds election >> methods, which are at least two-truth methods. That is to say, >> they are “unscientific” or inconsistent, because their rules >> differ as to how they elect or exclude candidates. In principle, >> election and exclusion are the same, because one voters election >> is another voters exclusion >> >> Binomial STV (not only first order) uses the same method for >> electing as excluding candidates. In other words, it is >> symmetrical as to election and exclusion. First order STV >> involves two counts, an election count of preferences and an >> exclusion count of reversed preferences. Both counts use Meek >> method computer count of surplus transfer, in exactly the same >> procedure, whether to elect candidates or exclude them (to an >> election quota or an exclusion quota, otherwise the same quota). >> The exclusion count is an iteration of the election count. >> >> However, first order STV is simpler than Meek method, in that it >> dispenses with its “last past the post” exclusion method, when >> election surpluses run out. It also dispenses with the Meek >> method policy of reducing the quota as voters abstain their >> preferences. On the contrary, abstentions information is counted, >> thus satisfying the principle of the conservation of >> (preferential) information, fundamental to science or organised >> knowledge. >> >> Regards, >> >> Richard Lung. >> >> >> >> On 03/03/2024 02:21, Michael Ossipoff wrote: >>> My phone fell off its stand, resulting in premature sending of >>> the reply. So let me resume: >>> >>> As I was saying, I DO object to STV’s negative response, because >>> Sainte-Lague & d’Hondt don’t have any negative response.  …& STV >>> is a humongously elaborate complex procedure, requiring new >>> balloting equipment & software…while list-PR requires no new >>> balloting equipment & no software modification. The allocations >>> to parties & their candidates can be determined at any kitchen >>> table where there’s a hand-calculator. >>> >>> To return to the matter of Hare single-winner: >>> >>> It’s true that sometimes the CW is an unliked middle compromise, >>> & it would be better to have the winner-favoriteness that comes >>> with Hare,  which always chooses the favorite of the largest >>> faction of the Mutual-Majority when there is once. >>> >>> But, to best & always & most reliably eliminated perceived >>> lesser-evil giveaway-need, it’s necessary to always elect the >>> CW, however unfavorite. So I propose RP(wv) when rank-balloting >>> is insisted-on. >>> >>> … but would support a Hare proposal if Hare  is honestly >>> offered.  It currently is not. >>> >>> There might be other comments in that post that I’d like to >>> reply to, if I can find it. >>> >>> >>> >>> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for >> list info >> > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info