It's quite difficult to make a method that's not either consistently ordinal or cardinal. Lottery information somehow is between these, and hard to make use of without reverting to either ordinal or cardinal. My generalized STAR method is vulnerable to cloning. It determines the potential winner set as the smallest set of candidates so that in every three-candidate cardinal election (cumulative voting, Range, etc.), two candidates drawn from that set always beat the third; and then uses a Condorcet method to rank the candidates in that set. However, if there is an ordinal CW and this CW is cloned twice, then the elections (A1, A2, X) where A is the CW and X is someone else, is always won by one of the clones, assuming the rated convention of a clone. So the potential winner set collapses to A1 and A2, and then one of them wins by conventional Condorcet. Cloning A forces what's essentially two-candidate comparisons into the three-way comparison logic. The whole point of the three-way comparison being to have the least number of candidates required to do a cardinal comparison (so that fewer candidates obscure each other and lead to a Burr dilemma). The problem can be solved by not normalizing the inferred Range ballots - but then the whole method just turns into Range due to the latter's IIA compliance. So the method can either align along the ordinal grain and become Condorcet, or the cardinal and become whatever the base method is (as long as this method passes IIA). The cardinal Condorcet lottery idea suggests that comparisons of more than three candidates also have their place, since lotteries can have any number of candidates with nonzero chance of winning. So another "natural" way to imagine a cardinal-ordinal method would be one that somehow uses k-candidate comparisons for all k > 1: from pairwise (Condorcet) to full data. But how? The obvious way is IRNR (instant runoff with cardinal normalization instead of Plurality counting). But that method inherits IRV's various undesirable features like nonmonotonicity. (Though IRNR wih lp-normalized cardinal ballots might not be quite as center-squeezy as plain IRV.) It's harder than one would think. -km