I just would like to applaud the response below (by Richard?) to those who still support IRV, STV,.. and any other method that tends to eliminate the candidate supported by the most voters in the first round, like it did in Burlington (because IRV, STV, etc. do not treat all voters' votes equally, counting only the 2nd and lower choices of some voters before that candidate is eliminated but not others), and to ask a question: Does approval voting (where each voter may vote for up to n-1 candidates when n candidates are running for an office) adhere to the Condorcet criteria? Thank you. Kathy Dopp "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere." - Martin Luther King, Jr. SSRN: http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 Science is my passion, politics my duty (Thomas Jefferson, paraphrased) On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 12:35 PM <election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote: > > ---------------------------- Original Message ---------------------------- > > Subject: Re: [EM] re Burlington > > From: "Richard Lung" <voting@ukscientists.com> > > Date: Mon, May 20, 2019 11:52 am > > > > election-methods@electorama.com > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > ... > > but the Condorcet criterion simply proposes that if more voters mark > > their ballots preferring Candidate A to Candidate B than the number of > > voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not > > elected. > > > > i like to compare it to a mathematical proof by contradiction: If a > > Condorcet Winner exists and your election method does not elect the > > CW, then who did you elect??? You elected someone when more voters > > explicitly marked their ballots that they preferred some other > > **specific** candidate.?? How can that be an expression of the will of > > the electorate??? That's the problem with IRV or Borda or Bucklin (or > > some other RCV that someone cooks up).?? Most of the time it may elect > > the CW.?? Then great! No one is complaining.?? But when it doesn't, how > > possibly can the winner claim to have the democratic support of the > > electorate (even though we don't demand a majority of first-choice > > votes, since that demand is unrealistic in a 3-way or 4-way race) when > > the voters explicitly say "Give us this other candidate that we like > > better!" ?? > > ... > > > > L8r, > > > > r b-j

Hi Kathy, Le mercredi 22 mai 2019 à 16:41:18 UTC−5, Kathy Dopp <kathy.dopp@gmail.com> a écrit : >Does approval voting (where each voter may vote for up to n-1 >candidates when n candidates are running for an office) adhere to the >Condorcet criteria? Methods that claim some form of Condorcet compliance usually have ballots that admit at least some preferences to be marked on the ballot such that some candidate A is preferred to B, who is in turn preferred to a third candidate C. For "full" compliance a ballot should admit a full ranking. Approval does satisfy Condorcet as far as can be discerned from the cast ballots, although this is also true for first-past-the-post. In other words the cast ballots aren't capable of showing a Condorcet failure. So this may or may not be good enough for you. Kevin

There's two Richards, one described as Richard F. That makes me Richard L. Not only have we divergent views (He can speak for himself) but to make matters more confusing, I acknowledge the criticism of IRV, STV (which Cathy may have picked-up on) but have devised a new version of STV (FAB STV) which avoids "premature exclusion" of candidates (as well as complying with "later no harm"). from Richard Lung. On 22/05/2019 22:40, Kathy Dopp wrote: > I just would like to applaud the response below (by Richard?) to those > who still support IRV, STV,.. and any other method that tends to > eliminate the candidate supported by the most voters in the first > round, like it did in Burlington (because IRV, STV, etc. do not treat > all voters' votes equally, counting only the 2nd and lower choices of > some voters before that candidate is eliminated but not others), and > to ask a question: > > Does approval voting (where each voter may vote for up to n-1 > candidates when n candidates are running for an office) adhere to the > Condorcet criteria? > > Thank you. > > Kathy Dopp > "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere." - Martin > Luther King, Jr. > > SSRN:http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 > > Science is my passion, politics my duty (Thomas Jefferson, paraphrased) > > On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 12:35 PM > <election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com> wrote: > >>> ---------------------------- Original Message ---------------------------- >>> Subject: Re: [EM] re Burlington >>> From: "Richard Lung"<voting@ukscientists.com> >>> Date: Mon, May 20, 2019 11:52 am >>> >>> election-methods@electorama.com >>> >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> > ... >>> but the Condorcet criterion simply proposes that if more voters mark >>> their ballots preferring Candidate A to Candidate B than the number of >>> voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not >>> elected. >>> >>> i like to compare it to a mathematical proof by contradiction: If a >>> Condorcet Winner exists and your election method does not elect the >>> CW, then who did you elect??? You elected someone when more voters >>> explicitly marked their ballots that they preferred some other >>> **specific** candidate.?? How can that be an expression of the will of >>> the electorate??? That's the problem with IRV or Borda or Bucklin (or >>> some other RCV that someone cooks up).?? Most of the time it may elect >>> the CW.?? Then great! No one is complaining.?? But when it doesn't, how >>> possibly can the winner claim to have the democratic support of the >>> electorate (even though we don't demand a majority of first-choice >>> votes, since that demand is unrealistic in a 3-way or 4-way race) when >>> the voters explicitly say "Give us this other candidate that we like >>> better!" ?? >>> > ... >>> L8r, >>> >>> r b-j > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info >

Richard L, Why keep the details of your "new version of STV" a secret? Perhaps we can have a link. Do you recommend it for single-winner elections? Do you mean that "FAB STV" complies with Later-no-Harm, or that it avoids complying with it? Chris Benham On 24/05/2019 8:21 am, Richard Lung wrote: > There's two Richards, one described as Richard F. > That makes me Richard L. > Not only have we divergent views (He can speak for himself) but to > make matters more confusing, I acknowledge the criticism of IRV, STV > (which Cathy may have picked-up on) but have devised a new version of > STV (FAB STV) which avoids "premature exclusion" of candidates (as > well as complying with "later no harm"). > > from > Richard Lung. > > > On 22/05/2019 22:40, Kathy Dopp wrote: >> I just would like to applaud the response below (by Richard?) to those >> who still support IRV, STV,.. and any other method that tends to >> eliminate the candidate supported by the most voters in the first >> round, like it did in Burlington (because IRV, STV, etc. do not treat >> all voters' votes equally, counting only the 2nd and lower choices of >> some voters before that candidate is eliminated but not others), and >> to ask a question: >> >> Does approval voting (where each voter may vote for up to n-1 >> candidates when n candidates are running for an office) adhere to the >> Condorcet criteria? >> >> Thank you. >> >> Kathy Dopp >> "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere." - Martin >> Luther King, Jr. >> >> SSRN:http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 >> >> Science is my passion, politics my duty (Thomas Jefferson, paraphrased) >> >> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 12:35 PM >> <election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com>?? wrote: >> >>>> ---------------------------- Original Message >>>> ---------------------------- >>>> Subject: Re: [EM] re Burlington >>>> From: "Richard Lung"<voting@ukscientists.com> >>>> Date: Mon, May 20, 2019 11:52 am >>>> >>>> election-methods@electorama.com >>>> >>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> >>>> >> ... >>>> but the Condorcet criterion simply proposes that if more voters mark >>>> their ballots preferring Candidate A to Candidate B than the number of >>>> voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not >>>> elected. >>>> >>>> i like to compare it to a mathematical proof by contradiction: If a >>>> Condorcet Winner exists and your election method does not elect the >>>> CW, then who did you elect??? You elected someone when more voters >>>> explicitly marked their ballots that they preferred some other >>>> **specific** candidate.?? How can that be an expression of the will of >>>> the electorate??? That's the problem with IRV or Borda or Bucklin (or >>>> some other RCV that someone cooks up).?? Most of the time it may elect >>>> the CW.?? Then great! No one is complaining.?? But when it doesn't, >>>> how >>>> possibly can the winner claim to have the democratic support of the >>>> electorate (even though we don't demand a majority of first-choice >>>> votes, since that demand is unrealistic in a 3-way or 4-way race) when >>>> the voters explicitly say "Give us this other candidate that we like >>>> better!" ?? >>>> >> ... >>>> L8r, >>>> >>>> r b-j >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info --- This email has been checked for viruses by AVG. https://www.avg.com

Thanks for your interest. The link for FAB STV: Four Averages Binomial Single Transferable Vote is: https://www.smashwords.com/books/view/806030 It can also be obtained from the various national outlets of Amazon, subject to their minimum price policy of a dollar. (Smashwords is free.) The first part is for the general reader (mainly). In part two, for those familiar with Meek method, there is a chapter that follows on from that system. And there are starter explanations elsewhere. But most of the second part is a detailed step by step explanation of a system that grows exponentially more complicated with higher orders of this binomial extension of STV (according to a non-commutative expansion of the binomial theorem). First order (binomial, or both election and exclusion counted) STV is probably considerably simpler than Meek method: it consists "only" of a rational election count averaged with a (symmetrical) rational exclusion count, both based on keep value counting. In symbols, first order STV is the simplest binomial formula, (P + U) = (P + U)^1, where P stands for Preference election and U stands for Unpreference exclusion. Meek and traditional hand-counted STV classify as zero order STV or uninomial STV forms (in my system). FAB STV works the same way for single member elections. The candidates are ordered by the smallness of their keep values. The first of the Four Averages is (my invention of) the Harmonic Mean quota. This is the average of the Hare and Droop quotas, which are harmonic series, whose average is found by their harmonic mean: votes divided by (number of seats plus one half). The need for this complication is that the Droop quota, which historically supplanted the Hare quota, to make small constituency elections possible, is undemocratic, in that it allows the election of candidates to be governed by one with a statistically insignificant chance few votes more than another. Whichever quota is used, it should not alter the order of candidates election. All it does is adjust the over-all level of the keep values for the candidates, raising or lowering the general bar of election. To clarify on your last question, FAB STV complies with "Later no harm". There are no multiple votes to more or less count against each other. It is a single transferable vote strictly according to order of preference, always subject to rational keep-value counting. from Richard Lung. On 24/05/2019 07:40, Chris Benham wrote: > Richard L, > > Why keep the details of your "new version of STV" a secret? Perhaps we > can have a link. > > Do you recommend it for single-winner elections? > > Do you mean that "FAB STV" complies with Later-no-Harm, or that it > avoids complying with it? > > Chris Benham > > On 24/05/2019 8:21 am, Richard Lung wrote: >> There's two Richards, one described as Richard F. >> That makes me Richard L. >> Not only have we divergent views (He can speak for himself) but to >> make matters more confusing, I acknowledge the criticism of IRV, STV >> (which Cathy may have picked-up on) but have devised a new version of >> STV (FAB STV) which avoids "premature exclusion" of candidates (as >> well as complying with "later no harm"). >> >> from >> Richard Lung. >> >> >> On 22/05/2019 22:40, Kathy Dopp wrote: >>> I just would like to applaud the response below (by Richard?) to those >>> who still support IRV, STV,.. and any other method that tends to >>> eliminate the candidate supported by the most voters in the first >>> round, like it did in Burlington (because IRV, STV, etc. do not treat >>> all voters' votes equally, counting only the 2nd and lower choices of >>> some voters before that candidate is eliminated but not others), and >>> to ask a question: >>> >>> Does approval voting (where each voter may vote for up to n-1 >>> candidates when n candidates are running for an office) adhere to the >>> Condorcet criteria? >>> >>> Thank you. >>> >>> Kathy Dopp >>> "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere." - Martin >>> Luther King, Jr. >>> >>> SSRN:http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 >>> >>> Science is my passion, politics my duty (Thomas Jefferson, paraphrased) >>> >>> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 12:35 PM >>> <election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com>?? wrote: >>> >>>>> ---------------------------- Original Message >>>>> ---------------------------- >>>>> Subject: Re: [EM] re Burlington >>>>> From: "Richard Lung"<voting@ukscientists.com> >>>>> Date: Mon, May 20, 2019 11:52 am >>>>> >>>>> election-methods@electorama.com >>>>> >>>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> >>>>> >>> ... >>>>> but the Condorcet criterion simply proposes that if more voters mark >>>>> their ballots preferring Candidate A to Candidate B than the >>>>> number of >>>>> voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not >>>>> elected. >>>>> >>>>> i like to compare it to a mathematical proof by contradiction: If a >>>>> Condorcet Winner exists and your election method does not elect the >>>>> CW, then who did you elect??? You elected someone when more voters >>>>> explicitly marked their ballots that they preferred some other >>>>> **specific** candidate.?? How can that be an expression of the >>>>> will of >>>>> the electorate??? That's the problem with IRV or Borda or Bucklin (or >>>>> some other RCV that someone cooks up).?? Most of the time it may >>>>> elect >>>>> the CW.?? Then great! No one is complaining.?? But when it >>>>> doesn't, how >>>>> possibly can the winner claim to have the democratic support of the >>>>> electorate (even though we don't demand a majority of first-choice >>>>> votes, since that demand is unrealistic in a 3-way or 4-way race) >>>>> when >>>>> the voters explicitly say "Give us this other candidate that we like >>>>> better!" ?? >>>>> >>> ... >>>>> L8r, >>>>> >>>>> r b-j >>> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for >>> list info >>> >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for >> list info > > --- > This email has been checked for viruses by AVG. > https://www.avg.com > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info >