(23) APR: Steve's 23rd dialogue with Richard Fobes
[EM]
(23) APR: Steve's 23rd dialogue with Richard Fobes
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2015 09:54:43 -0800
From: VoteFair ElectionMethods@VoteFair.org
Cc: steve bosworth stevebosworth@hotmail.com
Subject: Re: [EM] (22) APR: Steve's 22th dialogue with Richard Fobes
Message-ID: 5650AFE3.9090503@VoteFair.org
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R:> Steve, you don't seem to be carefully reading what I write. As an
example, I wrote:
R: > VoteFair ranking is intentionally designed to limit the
number of
political parties who actually get their candidates elected. But
it
does this in a way that lists a greater number of minor political
parties on the ballot.
Your reply was:
S: Limiting the number of political parties arbitrarily is not a
virtue
when this prevents some citizens from being represented most
faithfully. APR only limits the number of ?associations? (e.g
parties) to the number that have received sufficient support during APR?s
primary
election.
VoteFair ranking does not "arbitrarily" limit the number of
parties.
Please re-read the chapter titled "It's Party Time!: Voting For
Parties
And Keeping Ballots Short" (in "Ending The Hidden Unfairness In
U.S.
Elections"). It explains how VoteFair party ranking carefully(!)
identifies which political parties deserve to have candidates on the
ballot. (And it explains how the method prevents large parties from
having "shadow" parties whose purpose would be to reduce the
number of
candidates from small parties.)
S: Yes, I do accept that your VoteFair ranking
is “intentionally designed to limit the number of political parties [….] in a
way that lists a greater number of minor political parties on the ballot” than
the existing system. Also, it was an
exaggeration for me to call this design “arbitrary” since you do outline the
method by which this “limit” is to be determined.
However,
my criticism remains that, in contrast to APR, it limits both the number of
parties on the ballot, and the degree to which each of these parties will be represented
in the assembly more than is necessary.
Remember that you seem quite happy with your system not allowing any
representation to one of your parties that had received support from 10% of the
electorate in the electoral district.
This
contrasts with APR, which in theory, would allow citizens in its primary to
require candidates to run to represent up to 435 parties (“associations”) to
appear on the country wide USA general election ballots for congresspersons. Also, any such party whose candidates
collectively received 10% of citizens’ votes in the country would command 10%
of the weighted votes in the House of Representatives. Also, on average, each elected APR
congressperson would have received between 0.2% and 0.3% of the votes from the
American electorate.
Thus,
in contrast to APR, VoteFair needlessly wastes some votes both qualitatively
and quantitatively.
R:> Steve, another pattern in your messages is that you repeatedly claim
advantages for your APR method as if they apply to a comparison with
VoteFair ranking, even though they are really just advantages over
current voting methods. (By current methods I mean the ones commonly
used in the U.S. and Europe.)
Specifically, your following claims for APR also apply to VoteFair
ranking (if the word "association" is replaced by
"party")
[….]
R: > All of these claimed advantages also apply to VoteFair ranking.
Yes, these claims are valid advantages for your APR method compared to
existing voting methods. But you have been stating that you want to
compare your APR method to VoteFair ranking, so please do not imply that
these advantages are relevant in comparing your APR method with VoteFair
ranking.
S: Yes, I do accept that the advantages of APR
repeated below also apply to VoteFair, but only to a smaller degree. This follows both from the above fact that
you say VoteFair,
would allow some parties who have
received even 10% support from the electorate not to be representation in the
assembly, and
VoteFair is designed to allow fewer
parties (associations) and fewer candidates than APR allows, from which each
citizen can select the one who seems most accurately to represent her own hopes
and fears:
R:> > S: .... a foundation for the growth of this qualitative
advantage would have been provided earlier by the way [the method]
recruits its
candidates.
.... [the] primary election discovers the ... organizations in
the country that are Smost trusted by its citizens.
... should
stimulate more attractive candidates ...
... [the] election of the
most favored of these better candidates would seem also to combine to
raise the average quality of representation in the assembly ....
... closer bonds between citizens and their
representatives ...
... It asks citizens to start to
familiarize themselves with the existing members, officials, and
other
potential candidates of their preferred organizations months before
each
voter has to finalize her ranking of candidates during the general
election.
... [time] would allow each association, its candidates and
its registered voters to coordinate their thinking and planning about
how best to run their common campaign in the coming general election.
... This closer bond between each rep and his electorate would also
seem to
make each congressperson’s work in the assembly more focused and
known
to be backed by his association and his electors.
... more likely to produce, on average, a
closer ideological fit between each citizen and her congressperson
...
... more likely to help solve the real problems facing the
country. They are more likely to do this because of the greater
expectation on the part of their different electorates that progress
must actually be made with respect to the goals of each of the
ideological different electorates who elected them.
.... this ideological bond between each citizen
and her rep would seem more likely to provide the kind of
congresspersons to engage in the kind of productive debates and
negotiations in the House to [...] help solve the
real problems facing the country.
... Consequently, an assembly composed of such able,
different, well informed, clashing, and focused reps would seem to
provide an optimal debating and negotiating chamber for the
production
of creative and evidence based solutions to common problems. The
wisdom
of any decisions resulting from this deliberative process is also likely
to be aided by the simple fact that it would take place in an
assembly
whose composition most accurately reflects the real variety and
intensity of the concerns of all citizens.
... [an elected representative] would seem to be both more able and
more likely to
negotiate solutions to common problems together with fellow but
ideologically different congresspersons. This is because each
[representative]
would probably enjoy more trust from his electorate.
[….]
R:> Now let's look at some other advantages you claim for APR.
Your latest message (copied below) also claims some advantages that I
did not include above. That's because they involve your words
"largely
homogeneous electorate" and "coalition," which suggest a
possible
misunderstanding.
S: Because an APR
congressperson would be more clearly expected to work and
vote to promote the scale of values he shares with his largely
homogeneous electorate, ....
R: > A "largely homogeneous electorate" is exactly the opposite of
the
concept that politics is multi-dimensional. I explained this concept in
my last message, but I don't think you fully understand what I'm
writing, so, let's consider an example.
Expanding on the California example from last time, consider a female
latina voter who votes for a female latina representative even though
that representative has the opposite preference for whether to build a
wall between California and Mexico. In your APR claims you imply that
this won't happen. I do not make such a claim about VoteFair ranking.
S:
No, I only say that it is less likely to happen with APR because it provides
her with more candidates from which to choose, i.e. to find the ones that more
completely possess the appropriate combination of all the “multi-dimensional”
concerns she cares about. In any case,
each citizen must have the freedom to these judgments for themselves.
R:> You said you agree that politics in the U.S. and Europe is
multi-dimensional. So how can you claim that a representative who is
elected using your APR method can possibly fully -- in all dimensions --
represent the tens of thousands of voters who elected that representative?
S:
I do not claim that APR guarantees that all the dimensions cared about by each
citizen will be “fully” represented by the congressperson to whom her vote is
added. I only see APR as structurally
making it more likely both that, on average, each will be represented in this
way as closely as possible, and that more of the competing value systems (each
containing many dimensions and held by the whole electorate) will be
proportionately represented in the assembly.
R:> Now let's consider your use of the words "coalition" and
"working majority."
R:> >S: The extra ability with which APR reps would seem to be able to
negotiate
compromises, would also seem to make it more likely that APR
congresspersons would respond to the imperative to form a working
majority in the assembly. Without such a majority coalition, any wise
legislative solutions to problems that such rational deliberations
might
have discovered could not be passed into law. Each APR rep is more
likely to see that if he is not a part of the majority that will shape the
assembly’s binding decisions, his own agenda, and that of his
electorate, will not be advanced.
R:> The basis of this forum is to focus on claims that are backed up by
mathematics, so let's get mathematical.
S: I assume this forum also wants to consider
any claims supported by non-mathematical “reasoning”.
R: > A coalition or working majority usually constitutes 51 percent to about
65 percent, and that coalition can pass laws without compromising with
the other 49 percent to 35 percent of the representatives.
S:
At the same time, any legislation is likely to have resulted from many compromises
that were made between the members who formed the relevant legislating
majority.
R:> Yet you say about APR:
S: ... [the elected representative] would seem to be both more able
and
likely to
negotiate solutions to common problems together with fellow but
ideologically different congresspersons.
R:> If your APR method were used in California, the
"conservatives" and
"liberals" would compete, and whichever side has the majority of
elected
representatives would pass laws without regard for the other side. That
is not true negotiation.
S:
This is a possible result for a majority elected by any method, including
VoteFair. However, since APR allows more
accurate multi-dimensional representation to take place, this may, in effect,
remove the dominance of the simplistic categories of “conservatives” vs.
“liberals”.
R: > In order to get true negotiation between the majority and the minority
(of legislators), the legislature would have to adopt fairer voting
methods within the legislature.
My interactive website at www.NegotiationTool.com demonstrates how that
S:
Thank you for directing me to this tool much earlier during our discussion.
After studying it, my response was to agree with you that that tool would help
any assembly to arrive at decisions that would be most agreeable to the
assembly, including an APR assembly. Still,
I see that any specific legislation that might be tentatively proposed as a
result of using this too, should need finally to be confirmed only by a straight
forward majority of the APR assembly’s “weighted votes”. This would be needed to make it clear to all which
reps are responsible for the new law
However,
the usefulness of this tool is irrelevant to the question of whether a VoteFair
assembly or an APR assembly would be more representative of a country’s
citizens. I believe that the above
arguments have already shown that APR is more like to produce the most
representative assembly.
R:> Electing representative who better represent the voters is only the
first step toward the kind of problem-solving, compromise-seeking
negotiations that voters want. Using better voting methods within a
legislature is the next step.
S:
I agree.
R:> Your APR method involves the first step of improving -- over current
methods -- the election process. However, your APR method would not
necessarily lead to the problem-solving, compromise-seeking negotiations
that you idealize.
S:
I did not claim that APR would “necessarily lead to the problem-solving, etc.”,
only that its more exact representativeness would make such “problem-solving”
more likely.
R:> Yes, getting better elected officials -- who represent the voters
instead of the biggest campaign contributors -- would improve
negotiations within a legislature, but VoteFair ranking would also
provide the same benefit.
S:
No, given that VoteFair wastes some votes and its representativeness is less
exact than APR’s, it is less likely to provide this “benefit” as fully.
R:> Remember that in your APR method it is easy for only 51 percent of the
voters to be represented when a law is passed. That easily leads to
oppression of the minority of voters -- namely the
"associations" that
comprise the other 49 percent.
S:
Currently, I assume that we agree,
that by “oppression” we mean any state
action that violates the “human rights” of any members of its population;
that, unless it is specially defined, a
“majority” is anything over 50%;
that the very concept of a
representative “democracy” expects a majority of citizens indirectly (i.e.
through its elected reps) to rule the whole population against the will of the
minority when this is judged to be necessary by that majority; and
that both VoteFair and APR are attempts
better to serve “democracy” by electing more representative members of the
assembly.
In
this context, it is worth noting that one obligation imposed upon by a
universal respect for “human rights” is for us to give each person equal
consideration. I see this moral
obligation as specifically requiring that each adult’s vote be treated
equally. If so, no citizen’s vote should
needlessly be given more weight than another, e.g. none should be wasted as
VoteFair wasted the above 10%.
Also,
I accept that a “majority” in states that call themselves democracies may still
sometimes “oppress” sections of their populations. This possibility would not be necessarily
excluded even if their assemblies were elected by APR or VoteFair. In any case, I see no reason to assume such
oppression always is “easy”. Still, a ruling minority is even more likely to
“oppress” larger sections of its population.
This is why, other things being equal, we prefer “democracy”.
At
the same time, I see an APR majority as less likely than a VoteFair majority to
oppress sections of its population. This
is because an APR majority is structurally more likely to be composed of
congresspersons both who represent a unity of a greater number of dimensions
and who are supported by a larger percent of its population. In contrast to
APR, VoteFair both wastes some votes and elects each rep with a scale of values,
which on average, will be less clearly aligned with the hopes and fears of his
or her electorate.
R: > The moment you refer to one elected politician as representing tens of
thousands of citizens, you are overlooking that the similarity of those
citizens ?- as measured as members of one of your associations -? have
to be one-dimensional.
S: Please explain the thinking process by which
you have arrived at this conclusion. As
yet, I see no reason to expect that the worldviews of individual APR reps of
“associations” would probably be any less multi-dimensional, on average, than
those elected by VoteFair. In fact, it
seems to me that APR structurally makes it more likely that the range of
concerns that would be included in any majority formed by APR reps rather than
VoteFair by reps would be wider and more accurately reflect the range and
intensity of concerns held by the whole electorate. Again remember that the perspectives present
in the votes that VoteFair would waste would be represented in the assembly
only by chance, if at all.
[….]
R:> This topic leads to the issue of
understanding the difference between
"proportional" and "representative."
The concept of proportionality is one-dimensional, and is based on some
kind of measurement. And that measurement is just a single number.
Remember that single numbers are what your APR method uses.
S:
Yes, the weighted vote that each APR representative would have in the assembly
would be single number. This single
number tells us exactly how many citizens support that congressperson’s
combination and hierarchy of dimensions (concerns) more than those held by any
one of the other 434 reps. Thus, each
single number is a comparative measure of the degree to which citizens
currently support each of the competing multi-dimensional agendas currently
being offered by the members of the assembly.
I
accept that these “dimensions” will probably include many issues and question
including those related to the following ones you mentioned, e.g. “political
party affiliation, … females versus males, … religious affiliation, … financial
net worth, … or "association" ...
[…]
R:> Getting back to the general topic of VoteFair versus APR, you wrote:
S:I hope the following last addition to this post will help to
explain
why I see APR as most likely to help elect a legislative assembly
that would
- be less corrupted by private money;
- be composed of reps who could be more easily held to account by
their respective electorates,
- be composed of reps more skilled at explaining the merits of their
own
agendas to their fellow reps, and more determined to form the
alliances
and to make the compromises necessary so as to be an essential part
of a
majority that can legislate at least part of their own respective
agendas; and thus
- an assembly that would be more likely to make rational and
evidence
based laws.
VoteFair ranking would also produce these same advantages.
S:
Yes, but I think to a lesser extent for the reason given above.
S: I assume we agree that when a citizen sees a member of the
assembly as speaking and acting in the ways entirely approved by that
citizen, then we would say that that member represents that citizen
as
completely as possible. As you know, APR allows each citizen to
guarantee this by adding her vote to the ?weighted vote? of the
member
she most trusts to speak and act in this way. VoteFair does not do
this
as efficiently.
R:> I disagree.
You have worded the above paragraph in a convoluted way, so I have to
clarify:
- I do agree that "when a citizen sees a member of the [legislature]
as
speaking and acting in the ways entirely approved by that citizen, then
we would say that that member represents that citizen as completely as
possible."
- My statement "I disagree" regards the word "this" in
"VoteFair does
not do this as efficiently" as referring to the first sentence about
representation.
S:
Do you still believe that VoteFair does this as “efficiently” in the light of
my contributions to this post? If so,
please explain why.
R:> * I am not commenting on your second sentence, which refers to an
APR-specific feature. This feature is a characteristic of the APR
method, but it does not imply full representation.
S: Again, I am not claiming that APR guarantees
“full” representation. I have only
argued that it seems to provide more complete, proportional, and exact
representation than any other system of which I am aware (including VoteFair
for multi-winner elections).
R:> To be clear, you have not yet provided evidence, either mathematical or
otherwise, that supports your claim that your APR method would produce
better representation than what VoteFair ranking would produce.
S: In that case,
how do you guarantee that the citizens
whose votes are wasted by VoteFair will be represented at all in the assembly?
Given that APR allows each citizen to
give their vote to the congressperson of the 435 she judges will best reflect
her own hopes and concerns, how can you maintain that a VoteFair voter, on
average, will have an equally exact quality of representation when she only has
the opportunity of ranking a relatively small number of local candidates?
R:> Please continue to ask questions because I'm assuming that our
discussion is helping readers of this forum better understand subtle yet
important aspects of voting.
S: Thank you for your responses and I
look forward to the continuation of our dialogue.
Richard Fobes
Steve
Bosworth
On 12/2/2015 5:05 PM, steve bosworth wrote:
... my criticism remains that, in contrast to APR,
[VoteFair ranking] limits both
the number of parties on the ballot, and the degree to which each of
these parties will be represented in the assembly more than is
necessary. Remember that you seem quite happy with your system not
allowing any representation to one of your parties that had received
support from 10% of the electorate in the electoral district.
You are referring to an example that demonstrates a situation in which a
10% minority of voters have a first preference for a third political
party, yet many of those voters have expressed a preference for the
candidates in the most-popular political party.
To better understand the situation, keep in mind that when a voter is
allowed to express preferences for both candidates and political
parties, both preferences from each voter cannot be accommodated in all
cases. This is especially true when a voter prefers a political party,
but does not prefer the candidates in that party.
Your APR method has a similar issue. Consider a voter who expresses
their preference for a specific "association" (political party), yet
that voter chooses to give his or her weighted vote to an elected
official who is in a different "association."
Of course, for both VoteFair ranking and your APR method, if every voter
prefers the candidates in their own political party as the best
candidates, then the situation expressed in that book's example does not
arise.
Also keep in mind that this particular example refers to 100 voters
electing 10 representatives, so even if the results are considered to be
"off" by one elected official, that does not yield a 10% "error" in a
real-life situation.
Specifically, if VoteFair ranking were used to elect the 80
representatives in the "lower house" of the California "assembly"
(legislature), and the analogous situation occurred, being "off" by one
elected official is only a 1.25% "error," not the 10% "error" in the
simplified example.
Another way to keep this concept in perspective is to consider that when
a political party offers better candidates than the other political
parties, that party deserves to win extra seats, even if it means that a
minor political party does not get as many seats as they would otherwise
get -- if they had offered better (more representative) candidates.
Again recall that politics is multidimensional and that there are
frequently reasons for crossing party ("association") lines.
For example, suppose your APR method were used for electing the 80
members of the (lower house of the) California assembly, and suppose
that most female Latina voters indicate a preference for a
Latino-oriented association, yet all the candidates in that
Latino-oriented association were male. Many of those female voters
would give their candidate-based preference to female candidates in
other associations, based on shared political views regarding issues
that are most important to those female voters.
In this case your APR method would give the "correct" number of seats to
the Latino-oriented association, but the representatives in those seats
would have less than the "correct" level of influence in terms of
legislative voting power.
... 1)how do you guarantee that the citizens whose votes are wasted by
VoteFair will be represented at all in the assembly?
...
... in contrast to APR, VoteFair needlessly wastes some votes both
qualitatively and quantitatively.
As partially explained above, when VoteFair ranking is used, very few
votes are "wasted."
Remember that both APR and VoteFair ranking do two kinds of
measurements. One measurement asks for party affiliations, and the
other measurement asks for candidate preferences.
Your APR method would nearly always elect some representatives who carry
relatively little weight during legislative voting because very few
voters chose them as "their" representative. The result is that power
is concentrated in the hands of fewer representatives. In my opinion,
that is a recipe for more corruption compared to what can occur when all
the elected representatives have the same voting power.
Before you disagree, consider that "unpopular" representatives would not
get chosen to be on important committees. The important committees
would consist of representatives who have higher levels of voting power.
S:Again, I am not claiming that APR guarantees “full” representation.I
have only argued that it seems to provide more complete, proportional,
and exact representation than any other system of which I am aware
(including VoteFair for multi-winner elections).
I can argue that APR's "unpopular" representatives waste representation
because fewer of the elected representatives -- in fact less than half
-- hold all the power in the legislature. When fewer people represent
the voters, fewer voters are fully represented.
So, if you want to argue about wasted votes, I would argue that your APR
method "wastes some representative seats."
In contrast, VoteFair ranking does not waste votes. Rather it uses both
the candidate-specific measurements and the party-specific measurements
to fill the seats in a way that spreads power equally to all the elected
representatives, and in a way that maximizes representation according to
a balance of both kinds of measurements: candidate-specific and
party-specific.
S: Currently, I assume that we agree,
1)that by “oppression” we mean any state action that violates the “human
rights” of any members of its population;
There are different kinds of oppression. Also, there are countless
interpretations of the words "human rights." As a result, a definition
of oppression that uses the term "human rights" is simply shifting
ambiguity (multiple meanings) onto another term.
In general I avoid carefully defining words because most words have
multiple definitions. You can assume that if you propose a definition,
I am not going to agree with that definition. Instead, let's stick to
talking about concepts, not words.
2)that, unless it is specially defined, a “majority” is anything over
50%;
3)that the very concept of a representative “democracy” expects a
majority of citizens indirectly (i.e. through its elected reps) to rule
the whole population against the will of the minority when this is
judged to be necessary by that majority; and
You seem to imply that democracy is a yes-or-no categorization.
I regard democracy as being like a ladder, and currently we are near the
bottom of that ladder because we use primitive single-mark ballots.
Our proposals -- my VoteFair ranking and your APR method -- make
improvements in collecting preferences and calculating results, but
there are yet higher levels of democracy, as pointed to by my
www.NegotiationTool.com website (thank you for expressing appreciation
for it) and the idea of "direct democracy."
Regarding "majority rule," yes it is a big improvement over
dictatorship. Yet majority rule can be regarded as a category that
encompasses the lower half of the "democracy" ladder. In the upper area
of that ladder is "full representation." At the very top of the ladder
are ways in which elected representatives and voters and a consideration
for future generations combine to arrive at wise decisions -- which are
much better than majority-based decisions.
We have a long way to go to get to the top of the "democracy" ladder,
yet the result will be widespread economic prosperity beyond what most
of us can imagine. That's a natural consequence of cooperation instead
of conflict.
The current U.S. Presidential election is providing an example of a
celebrity politician advocating a very unwise (downright stupid!)
"solution." Specifically Donald Trump recommends that Muslims be
blocked from entering the United States (until U.S. Congress can figure
out what's going on, which is like saying "until hell freezes over,"
which means forever). Surprisingly there are many voters (although a
small minority) who think this is a good "solution."
This example reveals what I have said about the "celebrity" problem with
the APR method. Lots of people will say "I want my vote in the
legislature to be controlled by so-and-so," who is a celebrity
politician, without realizing that the representative is not capable of
making wise decisions.
The election process can and should involve discussing how to solve
problems, and this discussion process helps to steer political parties
away from unpopular "solutions" and converge on wise solutions. But if
those discussions are then subverted by lots of impressionable voters
voting for celebrities with crazy ideas, bad laws are likely to get passed.
2)Given that APR allows each citizen to give their vote to the
congressperson of the 435 she judges will best reflect her own hopes and
concerns, ...
You have wandered back into talking about the possibility of using your
APR method for electing members of U.S. Congress. Apparently you do not
yet fully understand what I have tried to convey in earlier messages, so
I'll try again, from a different perspective.
The United States is basically 50 separate nations. We share one
military, and we share a single currency. (And there are some other
federal control issues, such as our interstate highway system being
built and maintained for military purposes, and civilians get to use
those highways except at times when the military needs them.) Otherwise,
each of the 50 states operates like a nation in the sense that European
nations have developed, although without the language and religious
differences. In particular, each state/nation is economically dominated
by one or two or sometimes three big "cities" or "metropolitan areas."
With this in mind, imagine your APR method being adopted to elect the
members of the European Parliament. Hopefully you recognize that APR
would not work well for that purpose. For those same reasons, the APR
method would not work for electing members to U.S. Congress.
In particular, corruption would result because less-prosperous nations
would have their citizens' votes shifted to the representatives of
stronger nations through the use of economic incentives given to those
voters (in various forms of legal and illegal bribery).
Keep in mind that Europe is still in the early stages of "union," the
honeymoon phase, so you must allow for the corruption that will creep
into the European Parliament. What goes on in Washington DC
demonstrates the corruption that arises after the biggest campaign
contributors have had time to learn how to take advantage of weaknesses
in the chosen voting methods.
So please stick with our agreement to consider whether the APR method
would work for electing the 80 members of the "lower house" of the
California legislature or the 40 members of its "upper house" -- or some
other case where voting does not cross national/state borders.
That's all I have time for now. I appreciate your questions, and your
desire to understand.
Richard Fobes
On 12/2/2015 5:05 PM, steve bosworth wrote:
[EM] (23) APR: Steve's 23^rd dialogue with Richard Fobes
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2015 09:54:43 -0800
From: VoteFair ElectionMethods@VoteFair.org
To: "election-methods@lists.electorama.com"
election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Cc: steve bosworth stevebosworth@hotmail.com
Subject: Re: [EM] (22) APR: Steve's 22th dialogue with Richard Fobes
Message-ID: 5650AFE3.9090503@VoteFair.org
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1254; format=flowed
R:> Steve, you don't seem to be carefully reading what I write. As an
example, I wrote:
R: > VoteFair ranking is intentionally designed to limit the
number of
political parties who actually get their candidates elected. But it
does this in a way that lists a greater number of minor political
parties on the ballot.
Your reply was:
S: Limiting the number of political parties arbitrarily is not a
virtue
when this prevents some citizens from being represented most
faithfully. APR only limits the number of ?associations? (e.g
parties) to the number that have received sufficient support during
APR?s primary
election.
VoteFair ranking does not "arbitrarily" limit the number of parties.
Please re-read the chapter titled "It's Party Time!: Voting For Parties
And Keeping Ballots Short" (in "Ending The Hidden Unfairness In U.S.
Elections"). It explains how VoteFair party ranking carefully(!)
identifies which political parties deserve to have candidates on the
ballot. (And it explains how the method prevents large parties from
having "shadow" parties whose purpose would be to reduce the number of
candidates from small parties.)
S:Yes, I do accept that your VoteFair ranking is “intentionally designed
to limit the number of political parties [….] in a way that lists a
greater number of minor political parties on the ballot” than the
existing system.Also, it was an exaggeration for me to call this design
“arbitrary” since you do outline the method by which this “limit” is to
be determined.
However, my criticism remains that, in contrast to APR, it limits both
the number of parties on the ballot, and the degree to which each of
these parties will be represented in the assembly more than is
necessary.Remember that you seem quite happy with your system not
allowing any representation to one of your parties that had received
support from 10% of the electorate in the electoral district.
This contrasts with APR, which in theory, would allow citizens in its
primary to require candidates to run to represent up to 435 parties
(“associations”) to appear on the country wide USA general election
ballots for congresspersons.Also, any such party whose candidates
collectively received 10% of citizens’ votes in the country would
command 10% of the weighted votes in the House of Representatives.Also,
on average, each elected APR congressperson would have received between
0.2% and 0.3% of the votes from the American electorate.
Thus, in contrast to APR, VoteFair needlessly wastes some votes both
qualitatively and quantitatively.
R:> Steve, another pattern in your messages is that you repeatedly claim
advantages for your APR method as if they apply to a comparison with
VoteFair ranking, even though they are really just advantages over
current voting methods. (By current methods I mean the ones commonly
used in the U.S. and Europe.)
Specifically, your following claims for APR also apply to VoteFair
ranking (if the word "association" is replaced by "party")
[….]
R: > All of these claimed advantages also apply to VoteFair ranking.
Yes, these claims are valid advantages for your APR method compared to
existing voting methods. But you have been stating that you want to
compare your APR method to VoteFair ranking, so please do not imply
that
these advantages are relevant in comparing your APR method with
VoteFair
ranking.
S:Yes, I do accept that the advantages of APR repeated below also apply
to VoteFair, but only to a smaller degree.This follows both from the
above fact that you say VoteFair,
1)would allow some parties who have received even 10% support from the
electorate not to be representation in the assembly, and
2)VoteFair is designed to allow fewer parties (associations) and fewer
candidates than APR allows, from which each citizen can select the one
who seems most accurately to represent her own hopes and fears:
R:> > S: .... a foundation for the growth of this qualitative
advantage would have been provided earlier by the way [the method]
recruits its
candidates.
.... [the] primary election discovers the ... organizations in
the country that are Smost trusted by its citizens.
... should
stimulate more attractive candidates ...
... [the] election of the
most favored of these better candidates would seem also to combine to
raise the average quality of representation in the assembly ....
... closer bonds between citizens and their
representatives ...
... It asks citizens to start to
familiarize themselves with the existing members, officials, and
other
potential candidates of their preferred organizations months
before each
voter has to finalize her ranking of candidates during the general
election.
... [time] would allow each association, its candidates and
its registered voters to coordinate their thinking and planning about
how best to run their common campaign in the coming general election.
... This closer bond between each rep and his electorate would also
seem to
make each congressperson’s work in the assembly more focused and
known
to be backed by his association and his electors.
... more likely to produce, on average, a
closer ideological fit between each citizen and her
congressperson ...
... more likely to help solve the real problems facing the
country. They are more likely to do this because of the greater
expectation on the part of their different electorates that progress
must actually be made with respect to the goals of each of the
ideological different electorates who elected them.
.... this ideological bond between each citizen
and her rep would seem more likely to provide the kind of
congresspersons to engage in the kind of productive debates and
negotiations in the House to [...] help solve the
real problems facing the country.
... Consequently, an assembly composed of such able,
different, well informed, clashing, and focused reps would seem to
provide an optimal debating and negotiating chamber for the
production
of creative and evidence based solutions to common problems. The
wisdom
of any decisions resulting from this deliberative process is also
likely
to be aided by the simple fact that it would take place in an
assembly
whose composition most accurately reflects the real variety and
intensity of the concerns of all citizens.
... [an elected representative] would seem to be both more able and
more likely to
negotiate solutions to common problems together with fellow but
ideologically different congresspersons. This is because each
[representative]
would probably enjoy more trust from his electorate.
[….]
R:> Now let's look at some other advantages you claim for APR.
Your latest message (copied below) also claims some advantages that I
did not include above. That's because they involve your words "largely
homogeneous electorate" and "coalition," which suggest a possible
misunderstanding.
S: Because an APR congressperson would be more clearly expected to
work and
vote to promote the scale of values he shares with his largely
homogeneous electorate, ....
R: > A "largely homogeneous electorate" is exactly the opposite of the
concept that politics is multi-dimensional. I explained this concept in
my last message, but I don't think you fully understand what I'm
writing, so, let's consider an example.
Expanding on the California example from last time, consider a female
latina voter who votes for a female latina representative even though
that representative has the opposite preference for whether to build a
wall between California and Mexico. In your APR claims you imply that
this won't happen. I do not make such a claim about VoteFair ranking.
S: No, I only say that it is less likely to happen with APR because it
provides her with more candidates from which to choose, i.e. to find the
ones that more completely possess the appropriate combination of all the
“multi-dimensional” concerns she cares about.In any case, each citizen
must have the freedom to these judgments for themselves.
R:> You said you agree that politics in the U.S. and Europe is
multi-dimensional. So how can you claim that a representative who is
elected using your APR method can possibly fully -- in all
dimensions --
represent the tens of thousands of voters who elected that
representative?
S: I do not claim that APR guarantees that all the dimensions cared
about by each citizen will be “fully” represented by the congressperson
to whom her vote is added.I only see APR as structurally making it more
likely both that, on average, each will be represented in this way as
closely as possible, and that more of the competing value systems (each
containing many dimensions and held by the whole electorate) will be
proportionately represented in the assembly.
R:> Now let's consider your use of the words "coalition" and "working
majority."
R:> >S: The extra ability with which APR reps would seem to be able to
negotiate
compromises, would also seem to make it more likely that APR
congresspersons would respond to the imperative to form a working
majority in the assembly. Without such a majority coalition, any wise
legislative solutions to problems that such rational
deliberations might
have discovered could not be passed into law. Each APR rep is more
likely to see that if he is not a part of the majority that will
shape the
assembly’s binding decisions, his own agenda, and that of his
electorate, will not be advanced.
R:> The basis of this forum is to focus on claims that are backed up by
mathematics, so let's get mathematical.
S:I assume this forum also wants to consider any claims supported by
non-mathematical “reasoning”.
R: > A coalition or working majority usually constitutes 51 percent to
about
65 percent, and that coalition can pass laws without compromising with
the other 49 percent to 35 percent of the representatives.
S: At the same time, any legislation is likely to have resulted from
many compromises that were made between the members who formed the
relevant legislating majority.
R:> Yet you say about APR:
S: ... [the elected representative] would seem to be both more
able and
likely to
negotiate solutions to common problems together with fellow but
ideologically different congresspersons.
R:> If your APR method were used in California, the "conservatives" and
"liberals" would compete, and whichever side has the majority of
elected
representatives would pass laws without regard for the other side. That
is not true negotiation.
S: This is a possible result for a majority elected by any method,
including VoteFair.However, since APR allows more accurate
multi-dimensional representation to take place, this may, in effect,
remove the dominance of the simplistic categories of “conservatives” vs.
“liberals”.
R: > In order to get true negotiation between the majority and the
minority
(of legislators), the legislature would have to adopt fairer voting
methods within the legislature.
My interactive website at www.NegotiationTool.com demonstrates how that
S: Thank you for directing me to this tool much earlier during our
discussion. After studying it, my response was to agree with you that
that tool would help any assembly to arrive at decisions that would be
most agreeable to the assembly, including an APR assembly.Still, I see
that any specific legislation that might be tentatively proposed as a
result of using this too, should need finally to be confirmed only by a
straight forward majority of the APR assembly’s “weighted votes”.This
would be needed to make it clear to all which reps are responsible for
the new law
However, the usefulness of this tool is irrelevant to the question of
whether a VoteFair assembly or an APR assembly would be more
representative of a country’s citizens.I believe that the above
arguments have already shown that APR is more like to produce the most
representative assembly.
R:> Electing representative who better represent the voters is only the
first step toward the kind of problem-solving, compromise-seeking
negotiations that voters want. Using better voting methods within a
legislature is the next step.
S: I agree.
R:> Your APR method involves the first step of improving -- over current
methods -- the election process. However, your APR method would not
necessarily lead to the problem-solving, compromise-seeking
negotiations
that you idealize.
S: I did not claim that APR would “necessarily lead to the
problem-solving, etc.”, only that its more exact representativeness
would make such “problem-solving” more likely.
R:> Yes, getting better elected officials -- who represent the voters
instead of the biggest campaign contributors -- would improve
negotiations within a legislature, but VoteFair ranking would also
provide the same benefit.
S: No, given that VoteFair wastes some votes and its representativeness
is less exact than APR’s, it is less likely to provide this “benefit” as
fully.
R:> Remember that in your APR method it is easy for only 51 percent
of the
voters to be represented when a law is passed. That easily leads to
oppression of the minority of voters -- namely the "associations" that
comprise the other 49 percent.
S: Currently, I assume that we agree,
1)that by “oppression” we mean any state action that violates the “human
rights” of any members of its population;
2)that, unless it is specially defined, a “majority” is anything over
50%;
3)that the very concept of a representative “democracy” expects a
majority of citizens indirectly (i.e. through its elected reps) to rule
the whole population against the will of the minority when this is
judged to be necessary by that majority; and
4)that both VoteFair and APR are attempts better to serve “democracy” by
electing more representative members of the assembly.
In this context, it is worth noting that one obligation imposed upon by
a universal respect for “human rights” is for us to give each person
equal consideration.I see this moral obligation as specifically
requiring that each adult’s vote be treated equally.If so, no citizen’s
vote should needlessly be given more weight than another, e.g. none
should be wasted as VoteFair wasted the above 10%.
Also, I accept that a “majority” in states that call themselves
democracies may still sometimes “oppress” sections of their
populations.This possibility would not be necessarily excluded even if
their assemblies were elected by APR or VoteFair.In any case, I see no
reason to assume such oppression always is “easy”. Still, a ruling
minority is even more likely to “oppress” larger sections of its
population.This is why, other things being equal, we prefer “democracy”.
At the same time, I see an APR majority as less likely than a VoteFair
majority to oppress sections of its population.This is because an APR
majority is structurally more likely to be composed of congresspersons
both who represent a unity of a greater number of dimensions and who are
supported by a larger percent of its population. In contrast to APR,
VoteFair both wastes some votes and elects each rep with a scale of
values, which on average, will be less clearly aligned with the hopes
and fears of his or her electorate.
R: > The moment you refer to one elected politician as representing
tens of
thousands of citizens, you are overlooking that the similarity of those
citizens ?- as measured as members of one of your associations -? have
to be one-dimensional.
S:Please explain the thinking process by which you have arrived at this
conclusion.As yet, I see no reason to expect that the worldviews of
individual APR reps of “associations” would probably be any less
multi-dimensional, on average, than those elected by VoteFair.In fact,
it seems to me that APR structurally makes it more likely that the range
of concerns that would be included in any majority formed by APR reps
rather than VoteFair by reps would be wider and more accurately reflect
the range and intensity of concerns held by the whole electorate.Again
remember that the perspectives present in the votes that VoteFair would
waste would be represented in the assembly only by chance, if at all.
[….]
R:> This topic leads to the issue of understanding the difference between
"proportional" and "representative."
The concept of proportionality is one-dimensional, and is based on some
kind of measurement. And that measurement is just a single number.
Remember that single numbers are what your APR method uses.
S: Yes, the weighted vote that each APR representative would have in the
assembly would be single number.This single number tells us exactly how
many citizens support that congressperson’s combination and hierarchy of
dimensions (concerns) more than those held by any one of the other 434
reps.Thus, each single number is a comparative measure of the degree to
which citizens currently support each of the competing multi-dimensional
agendas currently being offered by the members of the assembly.
I accept that these “dimensions” will probably include many issues and
question including those related to the following ones you mentioned,
e.g. “political party affiliation, … females versus males, … religious
affiliation, … financial net worth, … or "association" ...
[…]
R:> Getting back to the general topic of VoteFair versus APR, you wrote:
S:I hope the following last addition to this post will help to
explain
why I see APR as most likely to help elect a legislative assembly
that would
-
be less corrupted by private money;
-
be composed of reps who could be more easily held to account by
their respective electorates,
- be composed of reps more skilled at explaining the merits of
their own
agendas to their fellow reps, and more determined to form the
alliances
and to make the compromises necessary so as to be an essential
part of a
majority that can legislate at least part of their own respective
agendas; and thus
- an assembly that would be more likely to make rational and
evidence
based laws.
VoteFair ranking would also produce these same advantages.
S: Yes, but I think to a lesser extent for the reason given above.
S: I assume we agree that when a citizen sees a member of the
assembly as speaking and acting in the ways entirely approved by that
citizen, then we would say that that member represents that
citizen as
completely as possible. As you know, APR allows each citizen to
guarantee this by adding her vote to the ?weighted vote? of the
member
she most trusts to speak and act in this way. VoteFair does not
do this
as efficiently.
R:> I disagree.
You have worded the above paragraph in a convoluted way, so I have to
clarify:
-
I do agree that "when a citizen sees a member of the [legislature] as
speaking and acting in the ways entirely approved by that citizen, then
we would say that that member represents that citizen as completely as
possible." -
My statement "I disagree" regards the word "this" in "VoteFair does
not do this as efficiently" as referring to the first sentence about
representation.
S: Do you still believe that VoteFair does this as “efficiently” in the
light of my contributions to this post?If so, please explain why.
R:> * I am not commenting on your second sentence, which refers to an
APR-specific feature. This feature is a characteristic of the APR
method, but it does not imply full representation.
S:Again, I am not claiming that APR guarantees “full” representation.I
have only argued that it seems to provide more complete, proportional,
and exact representation than any other system of which I am aware
(including VoteFair for multi-winner elections).
R:> To be clear, you have not yet provided evidence, either
mathematical or
otherwise, that supports your claim that your APR method would produce
better representation than what VoteFair ranking would produce.
S:In that case,
1)how do you guarantee that the citizens whose votes are wasted by
VoteFair will be represented at all in the assembly?
2)Given that APR allows each citizen to give their vote to the
congressperson of the 435 she judges will best reflect her own hopes and
concerns, how can you maintain that a VoteFair voter, on average, will
have an equally exact quality of representation when she only has the
opportunity of ranking a relatively small number of local candidates?
R:> Please continue to ask questions because I'm assuming that our
discussion is helping readers of this forum better understand
subtle yet
important aspects of voting.
S:Thank you for your responses and I look forward to the continuation of
our dialogue.
Richard Fobes
Steve Bosworth