(24) APR: Steve's 24th dialogue with Richard Fobes
[EM] (24) APR: Steve's 24rd dialogue
with Richard Fobes
[….]>
- Re: (23) APR: Steve's 23rd dialogue with Richard Fobes
Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 11:04:53
-0800
From: VoteFair ElectionMethods@VoteFair.org
Cc: steve bosworth stevebosworth@hotmail.com
Subject: Re: [EM] (23) APR: Steve's 23rd dialogue with Richard Fobes
Message-ID: 5669CCD5.4080703@VoteFair.org
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1254; format=flowed
On 12/2/2015 5:05 PM, steve bosworth wrote:
S:> > ... my criticism remains that, in contrast to APR,
[VoteFair ranking] limits both
the number of parties on the ballot, and the degree to which each of
these parties will be represented in the assembly more than is
necessary. Remember that you seem quite happy with your system not
allowing any representation to one of your parties that had received
support from 10% of the electorate in the electoral district.
R: > You are referring to an example that demonstrates a situation in which
a
10% minority of voters have a first preference for a third political
party, yet many of those voters have expressed a [lower] preference for
the
candidates in the most-popular political party.
To better understand the situation, keep in mind that when a voter is
allowed to express preferences for both candidates and political
parties, both preferences from each voter cannot be accommodated in all
cases. This is especially true when a voter prefers a political party,
but does not prefer the candidates in that party.
S: I understand that a voter who favors
a particular party may not favor all of its candidates but I do not see how she
would not favor any of its candidates.
Please explain.
R: > Your APR method has a similar issue. Consider a voter who expresses
their preference for a specific "association" (political party),
yet
that voter chooses to give his or her weighted vote to an elected
official who is in a different "association."
S: Yes, during APR’s primary each
citizen would probably choose to vote through the “association” (e.g. party)
during the following general election whose published values seemed closest to
her own. However, if she discovered that
none of the candidates seeking to represent that party during the general
election were such that they could be trusted effectively to work for those
values, rationally she would then only rank other candidates who she judged
more likely to work for those values. It
makes no sense to me to separate a party from all its candidates in the
electoral process as you seem to be suggesting.
R:> Of course, for both VoteFair ranking and your APR method, if every voter
prefers the candidates in their own political party as the best
candidates, then the situation expressed in that book's example does not
arise.
S:
Please explain more. Your book clearly says that the “White party” that
is most favored by 10% of the voters will receive no representation in the
assembly. Do you deny this? How do you justify it?
[….]
R:> Remember that both APR and
VoteFair ranking do two kinds of
measurements. One measurement asks for party affiliations, and the
other measurement asks for candidate preferences.
S: Yes, in one sense, APR’s primary
also structurally separates parties (associations) from their future candidates. However, unlike VoteFair, APR’s general
election indivisibly combines each party with its representatives. The
collective weighted vote of each party in the assembly is simply composed of
all the weighted votes earned by each party’s elected candidate in the general
election.
R:> Also keep in mind that this particular example refers to 100 voters
electing 10 representatives, so even if the results are considered to be
"off" by one elected official, that does not yield a 10%
"error" in a
real-life situation.
S:
I need you to explain your terms and chain of reasoning here. From APR’s point of view, it is an “error” for
any percent of the voters to be unrepresented when all could be represented
exactly.
R: > Specifically, if VoteFair ranking were used to elect the 80
representatives in the "lower house" of the California
"assembly"
(legislature), and the analogous situation occurred, being "off"
by one
elected official is only a 1.25% "error," not the 10%
"error" in the
simplified example.
S: Again, APR shows us how those who
are elected need not be “off” even by one winner.
R:> Another way to keep this concept in perspective is to consider that when
a political party offers better candidates than the other political
parties, that party deserves to win extra seats, even if it means that a
minor political party does not get as many seats as they would otherwise
get -- if they had offered better (more representative) candidates.
S:
While VoteFair might provide this feature to some undetermined extent,
APR provides it completely and exactly.
Again recall that politics is multidimensional and that there are
frequently reasons for crossing party ("association") lines.
For example, suppose your APR method were used for electing the 80
members of the (lower house of the) California assembly, and suppose
that most female Latina voters indicate a preference for a
Latino-oriented association, yet all the candidates in that
Latino-oriented association were male. Many of those female voters
would give their candidate-based preference to female candidates in
other associations, based on shared political views regarding issues
that are most important to those female voters.
In this case your APR method would give the "correct" number of
seats to
the Latino-oriented association, but the representatives in those seats
would have less than the "correct" level of influence in terms
of
legislative voting power.
S:
Again I need you to explain your chain of reason here. As I see it, APR allows each female Latin
voter to do what you want her to be able to do, namely, guarantee that her vote
will be added to the weighted vote of elected candidate she sees as most likely
to represent all the “issues that are most important” to her, e.g. both women’s
rights and her “latino-orientation”. When this happens, why would say tha this
proportion of her “influence” is not “correct”?
S:> > ... 1) how do you guarantee that the citizens whose votes are
wasted by
VoteFair will be represented at all in the assembly?
...
... in contrast to APR, VoteFair needlessly wastes some votes both
qualitatively and quantitatively.
R: > As partially explained above, when VoteFair ranking is used, very few
votes are "wasted."
S: Why “waste” any citizen’s vote?
[….]
R:> Your APR method would nearly
always elect some representatives who carry
relatively little weight during legislative voting because very few
voters chose them as "their" representative.
S:
Yes quite possibly. Why should a
representative who is supported by few citizens have the same mathematical weight
in the assembly as a rep who is support by many?
R: >The result is that power
is concentrated in the hands of fewer representatives. In my opinion,
that is a recipe for more corruption compared to what can occur when all
the elected representatives have the same voting power.
Before you disagree, consider that
"unpopular" representatives would not
get chosen to be on important committees. The important committees
would consist of representatives who have higher levels of voting power.
S:
Please, what is your evidence or reasoning for this claim. I our dialogue 23 you summarized my argulment
that the closer ideological fit between each APR rep and his electorate is more
likely to motive his electorate to study the speech and behavior of their rep
and thus be more efficient at holding him to account, e.g. more likely to
punish any “corruption” if it occurs.
S: Again, I am not claiming that APR guarantees “full”
representation. I
have only argued that it seems to provide more complete,
proportional,
and exact representation than any other system of which I am aware
(including VoteFair for multi-winner elections).
R:> I can argue that APR's "unpopular" representatives waste
representation
because fewer of the elected representatives -- in fact less than half
-- hold all the power in the legislature. When fewer people represent
the voters, fewer voters are fully represented.
So, if you want to argue about
wasted votes, I would argue that your APR
method "wastes some representative seats."
S:
Surely, “seats” are not important in themselves. They are only important as representing
citizens votes, each citizen with one vote.
You sound like you do not believe in the principle of “one person one
vote”. That is not the same ideal as ”one
legislator one vote”.
Again, please give me your evidence or
reasoning for your above claims. APR
enables every citizen to be equally (and proportionately) represented by the
one rep each sees as most likely to speak and act on her behalf. Why do you think that a very popular rep is
going to be less (rather than more) efficient at speaking and action on behalf
of his likeminded electorate, i.e. less than a collection of members of the
assembly who include some members who are seen by that same electorate as not
sharing their worldview?
Also, please recall APR’s rule that no
member will be allowed to keep more that 10% of the weighted votes in the
assembly. They must non-returnably
transfer any extra votes to their trusted fellow members. This means that no rep will be in a position
to dictate to the assembly.
R:> In contrast, VoteFair ranking does not waste votes. Rather it uses both
the candidate-specific measurements and the party-specific measurements
to fill the seats in a way that spreads power equally to all the elected
representatives, and in a way that maximizes representation according to
a balance of both kinds of measurements: candidate-specific and
party-specific.
S: This passage seems to signal our
current differences:
I say democracy, as such, must value an
equal vote for each citizen first. This
means that no citizen’s vote should be wastes if this can be at all
avoided. APR offers such a practical
method. This also means that to “spread
power equally [between] the elected representatives” would be justified only if
the equality of citizens’ votes required this.
It does not require this;
I deny, in the end, that a party in a
general election can be separated from all its candidates. APR sees these 2 realities as a unity. These are not 2 opposed realities that must
be “balanced”. You seem mistakenly to see them as separate for electoral
purposes.
What do you think?
S: Currently, I assume that we agree,
- that by ?oppression? we mean any state action that violates the
?human
rights? of any members of its population;
R:> There are different kinds of oppression. Also, there are countless
interpretations of the words "human rights."
[….]
S: Does this mean that you no longer wish
to use the “word” or “concept” of “oppression” because you cannot define it?
S: > > 2) that, unless it is
specially defined, a ?majority? is anything over
50%;
3 )that the very concept of a representative ?democracy? expects a
majority of citizens indirectly (i.e. through its elected reps) to
rule
the whole population against the will of the minority when this is
judged to be necessary by that majority; and
R: > You seem to imply that democracy is a yes-or-no categorization.
S: Yes, but a complex, informed, intelligent and consistent series of yes’s and
no’s.
[….]
R:> Regarding "majority
rule," yes it is a big improvement over
dictatorship. Yet majority rule can be regarded as a category that
encompasses the lower half of the "democracy" ladder. In the
upper area
of that ladder is "full representation." At the very top of the
ladder
are ways in which elected representatives and voters and a consideration
for future generations combine to arrive at wise decisions -- which are
much better than majority-based decisions.
[….]
Donald Trump [….]
This example reveals what I have said about the "celebrity"
problem with
the APR method. Lots of people will say "I want my vote in the
legislature to be controlled by so-and-so," who is a celebrity
politician, without realizing that the representative is not capable of
making wise decisions.
The election process can and should involve discussing how to solve
problems, and this discussion process helps to steer political parties
away from unpopular "solutions" and converge on wise solutions.
But if
those discussions are then subverted by lots of impressionable voters
voting for celebrities with crazy ideas, bad laws are likely to get
passed.
S:
Both of us have some worries about a simple democracy not yet being an
intelligent democracy and I see both of our proposals as attempting to
facilitate the growth of such political wisdom.
Nevertheless, we still seem to disagree
that APR is more vulnerable to “celebrity”.
Perhaps I will understand why you believe this if you could addressed my
more detailed reasons (sent to you earlier and summarized at the end of this
post) for expecting that APR,
would do more to limit the power of “celebrity”
and “wealth” in the political process, and
would better foster rational and
evidence decisions to be made by the
legislature.
- Given that APR allows each citizen to give their vote to the
congressperson of the 435 she judges will best reflect her own hopes
and
concerns, ...
R: > You have wandered back into talking about the possibility of using your
APR method for electing members of U.S. Congress. Apparently you do not
yet fully understand what I have tried to convey in earlier messages, so
I'll try again, from a different perspective.
[….]
S: I do understand that for all the reason you
have repeated in this post, that the establishment of APR in the USA or in the
whole of the European union would be extremely difficult from a practical point
of view. However, I am currently only
attempting to make the case for see APR as an essential part of a long term political
ideal.
Still,
for our purposes, I am happy only to refer to “legislators” or “member of
California’s Assembly”.
[….]
That's all I have time for now. I appreciate your questions, and your
desire to understand.
Richard Fobes
S: Thank you using the time avail to you in this
way. You did not have time to respond to
my claim in the follow copy of part of our dialogue 23 that these “advantages
of APR … also apply to VoteFair, but only to a smaller degree”. Perhaps you will be able to address this
claim later:
R:> >
S: Yes, I do accept that the advantages of APR [that you] repeated below
also apply to VoteFair, but only to a smaller degree[:]
[….. APR]
... should stimulate more attractive candidates ....
... [the] election of the
most favored of these better candidates would seem also to
combine to
raise the average quality of representation in the assembly
....
... closer bonds between citizens and their
representatives ...
... It asks citizens to start to
familiarize themselves with the existing members, officials,
and
other
potential candidates of their preferred organizations months
before each
voter has to finalize her ranking of candidates during the
general
election.
... [time] would allow each association, its candidates and
its registered voters to coordinate their thinking and
planning about
how best to run their common campaign in the coming general
election.
... This closer bond between each rep and his electorate
would also
seem to
make each [member of California’s legislative assembly] work
in the assembly more focused and
known
to be backed by his association and his electors.
... more likely to produce, on average, a
closer ideological fit between each citizen and her
congressperson ...
... more likely to help solve the real problems facing [California].
They are more likely to do this because of the greater
expectation on the part of their different electorates that
progress
must actually be made with respect to the goals of each of
the
ideological different electorates who elected them.
.... this ideological bond between each citizen
and her rep would seem more likely to provide the kind of
[elected members] to engage in the kind of productive debates and
negotiations in the [assembly] to [...] help solve the
real problems facing the [California].
... Consequently, an assembly composed of such able,[[
different, well informed, clashing, and focused reps would
seem to
provide an optimal debating and negotiating chamber for the
production
of creative and evidence based solutions to common problems.
The
wisdom
of any decisions resulting from this deliberative process is
also
likely
to be aided by the simple fact that it would take place in
an
assembly
whose composition most accurately reflects the real variety
and
intensity of the concerns of all citizens.
... [an APR elected representative] would seem to be both
more able and
more likely to
negotiate solutions to common problems together with fellow
but
ideologically different congresspersons. This is because
each
[representative]
would probably enjoy more trust from his electorate.
[?.]
S: I do not claim that APR guarantees that all the dimensions cared
about by each citizen will be ?fully? represented by the [elected
member]
to whom her vote is added.I only see APR as structurally making it
more
likely both that, on average, each will be represented in this way as
closely as possible, and that more of the competing value systems
(each
containing many dimensions and held by the whole electorate) will be
proportionately represented in the assembly.
[….]
S:
The extra ability with which APR reps would seem to be able to
negotiate
compromises, would also seem to make it more likely that APR
congresspersons would respond to the imperative to form a
working
majority in the assembly. Without such a majority coalition,
any wise
legislative solutions to problems that such rational
deliberations might
have discovered could not be passed into law. Each APR rep
is more
likely to see that if he is not a part of the majority that will
shape the
assembly?s binding decisions, his own agenda, and that of
his
electorate, will not be advanced.
S: I look forward to your next post.
Steve