Freedom and determinism An election system assumes freedom of choice, from the voters. There is no right or wrong result to be determined. Which indeed has never been proved. But that is what social choice theory, led by theorem Arrow, illogically assumed. What it assumed as reasonable considerations are its own improvised incomplete electoral system (tagged onto maiorocracy, the tyranny of the majority), not worthy of calling democratic, without benefit, as it is, of the historical development of election method.  If any election method has no determinate result, then there is no criterion by which it can be refuted. For instance, the Burlingtonresult, at odds with a Condorcet winner does not necessarily discredit it. It is only a consideration, and a dubious one, at that. Laplacesaid, over two centuries ago, that Condorcet pairing is illegitimate, for not taking into account the relative importance of orders of preference. But the fixation on a “Condorcet winner” bolsters the (minimally democratic) single member system.  Preference voting or ranked choice voting is itself undeniably the essential condition for reforming the vote. Undeniably, because orders of preference do exist, as the so-called “wasted vote” and strategic or tactical voting prove beyond doubt. But a given number of orders of preference imply a given number of seats per constituency, otherwise there would be no point in stating them, the point being that stating the candidates chosen in order is to elect several prefered candidates before others. To meet this implication leads to the requirement of quota counting (freedom of the vote with equality of the count), and so forth. Contrarily, abandoning higher preferences for lower preferences, in a single-member system,is the height of inefficiency, for granting voters wishes. That is, beyond the great work of replacing, with a ranked choice vote, the illiterate x-vote, which is a one-preference stub vote (producing disproportionate results even in a two-party system). Regards, Richard Lung.