MO
Michael Ossipoff
Wed, Oct 12, 2016 1:42 AM
Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in which one of the
other candidates, not A, is the CWs.
What if B is CWs?
Then we have a truncation example, in which the C voters are truncating B.
For C to win would be a violation of truncation resistance. ...if B is CWs
& this is a truncation example.
But no problem: MMPO elects A instead of C.
Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD & Minimal Defense
(Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).
Maybe the truncation resistance failure of electing C is related to that
incompatibility.
Electing A avoids the problem.
When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected that it penalizes
truncation instead of electing the CWs. But that isn't really a problem:
If your truncation is principled, then you have no reason to object when
the CWs thai you don't like doesn't win.
..nor does anyone have a complaint.
If your truncation is careless, then just be more careful
If your truncation is hurried, then allow yourself more time.
So the election of A isn't a problem if B is CWs & it's a truncation
example.
Plurality Criterion? Of the candidates other than the most pairwise-opposed
one, A is the most favorite.
There's no important objection to electing A if B is CWs.
What if C is the CWs, & the A voters are burying C?
C would be a peculiar CWs, unsupported from both sides. No support other
than hir 1st choice voters.
There's surely no important objection if such an unsupported candidate
doesn't win.
So, no matter how you look at it, there's no objection to electing A in the
CD example.
I told of how someone didn't accept ICT because of its relatively wordy &
unfamiliar definition.
When offered list of methods, that person chose Approval as favorite.
Hearing the MMPO definition, she didn't consider it un-intuitive,
complicated, overly wordy or without obvious justification.
It elects someone least unpreferred to someone else.
What could be more simple, obvious & natural?
She didn't object to MMPO as she objected to ICS
Yes there are strongly-felt objections to MMPO. I've answered them.
Yes MMPO shares wv's possibility of perpetual burial fiasco, but it may
well never happen. It doesn't keep wv from being one of the most popular
methods.
FBC, Weak CD, wv strategy. A lot of important advantages.
Wv strategy means that the CWs is better & more easily protected than in
any other rank-methods.
Michael Ossipoff
Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in which one of the
other candidates, not A, is the CWs.
What if B is CWs?
Then we have a truncation example, in which the C voters are truncating B.
For C to win would be a violation of truncation resistance. ...if B is CWs
& this is a truncation example.
But no problem: MMPO elects A instead of C.
Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD & Minimal Defense
(Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).
Maybe the truncation resistance failure of electing C is related to that
incompatibility.
Electing A avoids the problem.
When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected that it penalizes
truncation instead of electing the CWs. But that isn't really a problem:
If your truncation is principled, then you have no reason to object when
the CWs thai you don't like doesn't win.
..nor does anyone have a complaint.
If your truncation is careless, then just be more careful
If your truncation is hurried, then allow yourself more time.
So the election of A isn't a problem if B is CWs & it's a truncation
example.
Plurality Criterion? Of the candidates other than the most pairwise-opposed
one, A is the most favorite.
There's no important objection to electing A if B is CWs.
What if C is the CWs, & the A voters are burying C?
C would be a peculiar CWs, unsupported from both sides. No support other
than hir 1st choice voters.
There's surely no important objection if such an unsupported candidate
doesn't win.
So, no matter how you look at it, there's no objection to electing A in the
CD example.
--------------------
I told of how someone didn't accept ICT because of its relatively wordy &
unfamiliar definition.
When offered list of methods, that person chose Approval as favorite.
Hearing the MMPO definition, she didn't consider it un-intuitive,
complicated, overly wordy or without obvious justification.
It elects someone least unpreferred to someone else.
What could be more simple, obvious & natural?
She didn't object to MMPO as she objected to ICS
Yes there are strongly-felt objections to MMPO. I've answered them.
Yes MMPO shares wv's possibility of perpetual burial fiasco, but it may
well never happen. It doesn't keep wv from being one of the most popular
methods.
FBC, Weak CD, wv strategy. A lot of important advantages.
Wv strategy means that the CWs is better & more easily protected than in
any other rank-methods.
Michael Ossipoff
C
C.Benham
Wed, Oct 12, 2016 5:55 AM
On 10/12/2016 12:12 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in which one of
the other candidates, not A, is the CWs.
33: A>B
32: B (sincere may be B>A)
34: C
Mike,
I don't recall doing that exactly. I like compliance with CD. The
example I posted recently:
Given that burial vulnerability is unavoidable in Condorcet methods, I
think that is more democratic if (in this respect) larger factions
have the advantage over smaller factions.
43: A
03: A>B
44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)
10: C
C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10.
Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three
factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.
Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval elects C.
The "WV strategy" enthusiast might chastise the 3 A>B voters for
allowing the B supporters' burial to succeed by not truncating but if
they'd
done that then WV would have elected their least-preferred candidate.
The tops-of-the-ballots oriented Benham and LV(erw)SME handle the
scenario by (effectively) laughing off C (and electing A in breach of
Minimal Defense), while the more bottoms-of-the-ballots oriented
Smith//Approval notes that C is the most "approved" (i.e. voted above
bottom) candidate and says to the 44 B>C voters "since you voted for C
you can have C".
Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD & Minimal
Defense (Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).
C: Certainly we can't have all three of Plurality, CD and Minimal Defense.
When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected that it penalizes
truncation instead of electing the CWs
C: MSA isn't one of my very favourite Condorcet methods, but I prefer it
to Winning Votes. In the example it elects C.
Chris Benham
Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in which one of
the other candidates, not A, is the CWs.
What if B is CWs?
Then we have a truncation example, in which the C voters are truncating B.
For C to win would be a violation of truncation resistance. ...if B is
CWs & this is a truncation example.
But no problem: MMPO elects A instead of C.
Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD & Minimal
Defense (Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).
Maybe the truncation resistance failure of electing C is related to
that incompatibility.
Electing A avoids the problem.
When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected that it penalizes
truncation instead of electing the CWs. But that isn't really a problem:
If your truncation is principled, then you have no reason to object
when the CWs thai you don't like doesn't win.
..nor does anyone have a complaint.
If your truncation is careless, then just be more careful
If your truncation is hurried, then allow yourself more time.
So the election of A isn't a problem if B is CWs & it's a truncation
example.
Plurality Criterion? Of the candidates other than the most
pairwise-opposed one, A is the most favorite.
There's no important objection to electing A if B is CWs.
What if C is the CWs, & the A voters are burying C?
C would be a peculiar CWs, unsupported from both sides. No support
other than hir 1st choice voters.
There's surely no important objection if such an unsupported candidate
doesn't win.
So, no matter how you look at it, there's no objection to electing A
in the CD example.
I told of how someone didn't accept ICT because of its relatively
wordy & unfamiliar definition.
When offered list of methods, that person chose Approval as favorite.
Hearing the MMPO definition, she didn't consider it un-intuitive,
complicated, overly wordy or without obvious justification.
It elects someone least unpreferred to someone else.
What could be more simple, obvious & natural?
She didn't object to MMPO as she objected to ICS
Yes there are strongly-felt objections to MMPO. I've answered them.
Yes MMPO shares wv's possibility of perpetual burial fiasco, but it
may well never happen. It doesn't keep wv from being one of the most
popular methods.
FBC, Weak CD, wv strategy. A lot of important advantages.
Wv strategy means that the CWs is better & more easily protected than
in any other rank-methods.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 10/12/2016 12:12 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in which one of
> the other candidates, not A, is the CWs.
33: A>B
32: B (sincere may be B>A)
34: C
Mike,
I don't recall doing that exactly. I like compliance with CD. The
example I posted recently:
> Given that burial vulnerability is unavoidable in Condorcet methods, I
> think that is more democratic if (in this respect) larger factions
> have the advantage over smaller factions.
>
> 43: A
> 03: A>B
> 44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)
> 10: C
>
> C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10.
>
> Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three
> factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.
>
> Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval elects C.
The "WV strategy" enthusiast might chastise the 3 A>B voters for
allowing the B supporters' burial to succeed by not truncating but if
they'd
done that then WV would have elected their least-preferred candidate.
The tops-of-the-ballots oriented Benham and LV(erw)SME handle the
scenario by (effectively) laughing off C (and electing A in breach of
Minimal Defense), while the more bottoms-of-the-ballots oriented
Smith//Approval notes that C is the most "approved" (i.e. voted above
bottom) candidate and says to the 44 B>C voters "since you voted for C
you can have C".
> Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD & Minimal
> Defense (Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).
C: Certainly we can't have all three of Plurality, CD and Minimal Defense.
> When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected that it penalizes
> truncation instead of electing the CWs
C: MSA isn't one of my very favourite Condorcet methods, but I prefer it
to Winning Votes. In the example it elects C.
Chris Benham
> Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in which one of
> the other candidates, not A, is the CWs.
>
> What if B is CWs?
>
> Then we have a truncation example, in which the C voters are truncating B.
>
> For C to win would be a violation of truncation resistance. ...if B is
> CWs & this is a truncation example.
>
> But no problem: MMPO elects A instead of C.
>
> Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD & Minimal
> Defense (Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).
>
> Maybe the truncation resistance failure of electing C is related to
> that incompatibility.
>
> Electing A avoids the problem.
>
> When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected that it penalizes
> truncation instead of electing the CWs. But that isn't really a problem:
>
> If your truncation is principled, then you have no reason to object
> when the CWs thai you don't like doesn't win.
>
> ..nor does anyone have a complaint.
>
> If your truncation is careless, then just be more careful
>
> If your truncation is hurried, then allow yourself more time.
>
> So the election of A isn't a problem if B is CWs & it's a truncation
> example.
>
> Plurality Criterion? Of the candidates other than the most
> pairwise-opposed one, A is the most favorite.
>
> There's no important objection to electing A if B is CWs.
>
> What if C is the CWs, & the A voters are burying C?
>
> C would be a peculiar CWs, unsupported from both sides. No support
> other than hir 1st choice voters.
>
> There's surely no important objection if such an unsupported candidate
> doesn't win.
>
> So, no matter how you look at it, there's no objection to electing A
> in the CD example.
> --------------------
> I told of how someone didn't accept ICT because of its relatively
> wordy & unfamiliar definition.
>
> When offered list of methods, that person chose Approval as favorite.
>
> Hearing the MMPO definition, she didn't consider it un-intuitive,
> complicated, overly wordy or without obvious justification.
>
> It elects someone least unpreferred to someone else.
>
> What could be more simple, obvious & natural?
>
> She didn't object to MMPO as she objected to ICS
>
> Yes there are strongly-felt objections to MMPO. I've answered them.
>
> Yes MMPO shares wv's possibility of perpetual burial fiasco, but it
> may well never happen. It doesn't keep wv from being one of the most
> popular methods.
>
> FBC, Weak CD, wv strategy. A lot of important advantages.
>
> Wv strategy means that the CWs is better & more easily protected than
> in any other rank-methods.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Thu, Oct 13, 2016 2:38 PM
Hi Chris--
(Replying farther down)
On Oct 11, 2016 10:55 PM, "C.Benham" cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
On 10/12/2016 12:12 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in which one of the
other candidates, not A, is the CWs.
33: A>B
32: B (sincere may be B>A)
34: C
Mike,
I don't recall doing that exactly. I like compliance with CD. The
example I posted recently:
Given that burial vulnerability is unavoidable in Condorcet methods, I
think that is more democratic if (in this respect) larger factions
have the advantage over smaller factions.
43: A
03: A>B
44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)
10: C
C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10.
Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three
factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.
Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval elects C.
The "WV strategy" enthusiast might chastise the 3 A>B voters for
allowing the B supporters' burial to succeed by not truncating...
(endquote)
Yes. If you believe your favorite is CWs, you can protect hir win by
defensive plumping. ...or at least not ranking someone whose voters might
bury.
You wrote:
but if they'd
done that then WV would have elected their least-preferred candidate.
(endquote)
Yes, if the B voters bury, then for the A voters, truncation will only
worsen their result.
But such non-risk-free punitive defensive strategies are common throughout
the animal kingdom, including in human affairs.
- Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as in your example.
So the B voters in your example dislike C more than the A voters do.
A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for the A voters.
So the A voters have a more credible threat.
- In such situations, the defender has a more credible threat.
The A voters could say to the B voters:
"Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury our candidate, and you
think we should show our gratitude by supporting your candidate in 2nd
place :^) ".
But, sure, there's at least the hypothetical possibility of the perpetual
burial fiasco, if A is in the B voters' bottom set.
But I've told why that fiasco's requirements are a bit mutually
contradictory.
Even if A is in the B voters' bottom-set, the B voters might not bother
to bury (even if it's theoretically optimal), if the chance of success is
sufficiently small.
I'm not saying that the majority are always right, but wv is popular.
Benham & Woodall don't reliability have wv strategy.
In Bucklin & Approval, the CWs's voters can protect hir by plumping.
Likewise methods with wv strategy.
Voters will do what it takes to protect a perceived CWs, because that's the
best they can get.
What happens when there's a CWs is more important than hkw a natural top
cycle is solved.
Michael Ossipoff
The tops-of-the-ballots oriented Benham and LV(erw)SME handle the
scenario by (effectively) laughing off C (and electing A in breach of
Minimal Defense), while the more bottoms-of-the-ballots oriented
Smith//Approval notes that C is the most "approved" (i.e. voted above
bottom) candidate and says to the 44 B>C voters "since you voted for C
Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD & Minimal Defense
(Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).
C: Certainly we can't have all three of Plurality, CD and Minimal
When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected that it penalizes
truncation instead of electing the CWs
C: MSA isn't one of my very favourite Condorcet methods, but I prefer it
to Winning Votes. In the example it elects C.
Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in which one of the
other candidates, not A, is the CWs.
What if B is CWs?
Then we have a truncation example, in which the C voters are truncating
For C to win would be a violation of truncation resistance. ...if B is
CWs & this is a truncation example.
But no problem: MMPO elects A instead of C.
Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD & Minimal Defense
(Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).
Maybe the truncation resistance failure of electing C is related to that
Electing A avoids the problem.
When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected that it penalizes
truncation instead of electing the CWs. But that isn't really a problem:
If your truncation is principled, then you have no reason to object when
the CWs thai you don't like doesn't win.
..nor does anyone have a complaint.
If your truncation is careless, then just be more careful
If your truncation is hurried, then allow yourself more time.
So the election of A isn't a problem if B is CWs & it's a truncation
Plurality Criterion? Of the candidates other than the most
pairwise-opposed one, A is the most favorite.
There's no important objection to electing A if B is CWs.
What if C is the CWs, & the A voters are burying C?
C would be a peculiar CWs, unsupported from both sides. No support other
than hir 1st choice voters.
There's surely no important objection if such an unsupported candidate
So, no matter how you look at it, there's no objection to electing A in
I told of how someone didn't accept ICT because of its relatively wordy
When offered list of methods, that person chose Approval as favorite.
Hearing the MMPO definition, she didn't consider it un-intuitive,
complicated, overly wordy or without obvious justification.
It elects someone least unpreferred to someone else.
What could be more simple, obvious & natural?
She didn't object to MMPO as she objected to ICS
Yes there are strongly-felt objections to MMPO. I've answered them.
Yes MMPO shares wv's possibility of perpetual burial fiasco, but it may
well never happen. It doesn't keep wv from being one of the most popular
methods.
FBC, Weak CD, wv strategy. A lot of important advantages.
Wv strategy means that the CWs is better & more easily protected than in
Hi Chris--
(Replying farther down)
On Oct 11, 2016 10:55 PM, "C.Benham" <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
>
> On 10/12/2016 12:12 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>> Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in which one of the
other candidates, not A, is the CWs.
>
>
> 33: A>B
> 32: B (sincere may be B>A)
> 34: C
>
>
> Mike,
>
> I don't recall doing that exactly. I like compliance with CD. The
example I posted recently:
>
>> Given that burial vulnerability is unavoidable in Condorcet methods, I
think that is more democratic if (in this respect) larger factions
>> have the advantage over smaller factions.
>>
>> 43: A
>> 03: A>B
>> 44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)
>> 10: C
>>
>> C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10.
>>
>> Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three
factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.
>>
>> Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval elects C.
>
>
> The "WV strategy" enthusiast might chastise the 3 A>B voters for
allowing the B supporters' burial to succeed by not truncating...
(endquote)
Yes. If you believe your favorite is CWs, you can protect hir win by
defensive plumping. ...or at least not ranking someone whose voters might
bury.
You wrote:
but if they'd
> done that then WV would have elected their least-preferred candidate.
(endquote)
Yes, if the B voters bury, then for the A voters, truncation will only
worsen their result.
But such non-risk-free punitive defensive strategies are common throughout
the animal kingdom, including in human affairs.
1. Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as in your example.
So the B voters in your example dislike C more than the A voters do.
A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for the A voters.
So the A voters have a more credible threat.
2. In such situations, the defender has a more credible threat.
The A voters could say to the B voters:
"Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury our candidate, and you
think we should show our gratitude by supporting your candidate in 2nd
place :^) ".
But, sure, there's at least the hypothetical possibility of the perpetual
burial fiasco, if A is in the B voters' bottom set.
But I've told why that fiasco's requirements are a bit mutually
contradictory.
Even if A is in the B voters' bottom-set, the B voters might not bother
to bury (even if it's theoretically optimal), if the chance of success is
sufficiently small.
I'm not saying that the majority are always right, but wv is popular.
Benham & Woodall don't reliability have wv strategy.
In Bucklin & Approval, the CWs's voters can protect hir by plumping.
Likewise methods with wv strategy.
Voters will do what it takes to protect a perceived CWs, because that's the
best they can get.
What happens when there's a CWs is more important than hkw a natural top
cycle is solved.
Michael Ossipoff
>
> The tops-of-the-ballots oriented Benham and LV(erw)SME handle the
scenario by (effectively) laughing off C (and electing A in breach of
> Minimal Defense), while the more bottoms-of-the-ballots oriented
Smith//Approval notes that C is the most "approved" (i.e. voted above
> bottom) candidate and says to the 44 B>C voters "since you voted for C
you can have C".
>
>
>> Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD & Minimal Defense
(Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).
>
>
> C: Certainly we can't have all three of Plurality, CD and Minimal
Defense.
>
>
>> When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected that it penalizes
truncation instead of electing the CWs
>
>
> C: MSA isn't one of my very favourite Condorcet methods, but I prefer it
to Winning Votes. In the example it elects C.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>> Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in which one of the
other candidates, not A, is the CWs.
>>
>> What if B is CWs?
>>
>> Then we have a truncation example, in which the C voters are truncating
B.
>>
>> For C to win would be a violation of truncation resistance. ...if B is
CWs & this is a truncation example.
>>
>> But no problem: MMPO elects A instead of C.
>>
>> Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD & Minimal Defense
(Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).
>>
>> Maybe the truncation resistance failure of electing C is related to that
incompatibility.
>>
>> Electing A avoids the problem.
>>
>> When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected that it penalizes
truncation instead of electing the CWs. But that isn't really a problem:
>>
>> If your truncation is principled, then you have no reason to object when
the CWs thai you don't like doesn't win.
>>
>> ..nor does anyone have a complaint.
>>
>> If your truncation is careless, then just be more careful
>>
>> If your truncation is hurried, then allow yourself more time.
>>
>> So the election of A isn't a problem if B is CWs & it's a truncation
example.
>>
>> Plurality Criterion? Of the candidates other than the most
pairwise-opposed one, A is the most favorite.
>>
>> There's no important objection to electing A if B is CWs.
>>
>> What if C is the CWs, & the A voters are burying C?
>>
>> C would be a peculiar CWs, unsupported from both sides. No support other
than hir 1st choice voters.
>>
>> There's surely no important objection if such an unsupported candidate
doesn't win.
>>
>> So, no matter how you look at it, there's no objection to electing A in
the CD example.
>> --------------------
>> I told of how someone didn't accept ICT because of its relatively wordy
& unfamiliar definition.
>>
>> When offered list of methods, that person chose Approval as favorite.
>>
>> Hearing the MMPO definition, she didn't consider it un-intuitive,
complicated, overly wordy or without obvious justification.
>>
>> It elects someone least unpreferred to someone else.
>>
>> What could be more simple, obvious & natural?
>>
>> She didn't object to MMPO as she objected to ICS
>>
>> Yes there are strongly-felt objections to MMPO. I've answered them.
>>
>> Yes MMPO shares wv's possibility of perpetual burial fiasco, but it may
well never happen. It doesn't keep wv from being one of the most popular
methods.
>>
>> FBC, Weak CD, wv strategy. A lot of important advantages.
>>
>> Wv strategy means that the CWs is better & more easily protected than in
any other rank-methods.
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>>
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info
>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
C
C.Benham
Fri, Oct 14, 2016 4:02 AM
43: A
03: A>B
44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)
10: C
C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10.
Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three
factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.
Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval (equivalent
here to Max Covered Approval) and Approval Sorted Margins elect C.
On 10/14/2016 1:08 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
- Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as in your example.
C: (By "CWs" Mike means 'sincere CW'). No, in my example A could be a
wing candidate. Say A is Centre-Left, B is Centre-Right and C is
(to use a Kevin Venzke expression) a "Martian" candidate, perhaps Far
Right. C should be irrelevant and would be without the B supporters'
burying.
So the B voters in your example dislike C more than the A voters do.
A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for the A voters.
So the A voters have a more credible threat.
The A voters could say to the B voters:
"Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury our candidate, and
you think we should show our gratitude by supporting your candidate in
2nd place ".
C: This assumes that the B faction gave notice of their intention to
bury A (and didn't all just blindly copy their candidates' "how-to-vote
card" that they saw
for the first time just before they voted.)
Also it assumes that for all (or nearly all) the A voters the B
faction's voting strategy is the most important issue in the election.
But in any case in the example
only 6% of the A voters failed to truncate, and that was sufficient to
allow the B factions' burial to succeed under Winning Votes (and MMPO).
What happens when there's a CWs is more important than how a natural
top cycle is solved.
C: In the 3-candidate (and so 3 factions) scenario, I think we can
meaningfully distinguish between a "sincere CW" that in order to be the
actual voted
CW has to rely on rival factions not merely truncating, and one that
only needs rival factions to not actively bury (order-reverse or vote an
insincere preference).
I don't much care about the former (weaker) type, and in any case I
think they are hopeless cause. Resolving a "natural top cycle" properly
is more important
than trying to save them (or to "deter" big bad "offensive truncators").
On the other hand the largest-of-three factions definitely shouldn't be
vulnerable to burial because only 94% of them truncated!
Chris Benham
On 10/12/2016 12:12 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in which one of
the other candidates, not A, is the CWs.
33: A>B
32: B (sincere may be B>A)
34: C
Mike,
I don't recall doing that exactly. I like compliance with CD.
The example I posted recently:
Given that burial vulnerability is unavoidable in Condorcet
methods, I think that is more democratic if (in this respect) larger
factions
have the advantage over smaller factions.
43: A
03: A>B
44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)
10: C
C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10.
Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three
factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.
Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval elects C.
The "WV strategy" enthusiast might chastise the 3 A>B voters for
allowing the B supporters' burial to succeed by not truncating...
(endquote)
Yes. If you believe your favorite is CWs, you can protect hir win by
defensive plumping. ...or at least not ranking someone whose voters
might bury.
You wrote:
but if they'd
done that then WV would have elected their least-preferred candidate.
(endquote)
Yes, if the B voters bury, then for the A voters, truncation will
only worsen their result.
But such non-risk-free punitive defensive strategies are common
throughout the animal kingdom, including in human affairs.
- Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as in your example.
So the B voters in your example dislike C more than the A voters do.
A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for the A voters.
So the A voters have a more credible threat.
- In such situations, the defender has a more credible threat.
The A voters could say to the B voters:
"Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury our candidate, and
you think we should show our gratitude by supporting your candidate in
2nd place :^) ".
But, sure, there's at least the hypothetical possibility of the
perpetual burial fiasco, if A is in the B voters' bottom set.
But I've told why that fiasco's requirements are a bit mutually
contradictory.
Even if A is in the B voters' bottom-set, the B voters might not
bother to bury (even if it's theoretically optimal), if the chance of
success is sufficiently small.
I'm not saying that the majority are always right, but wv is popular.
Benham & Woodall don't reliability have wv strategy.
In Bucklin & Approval, the CWs's voters can protect hir by plumping.
Likewise methods with wv strategy.
Voters will do what it takes to protect a perceived CWs, because
that's the best they can get.
What happens when there's a CWs is more important than hkw a natural
top cycle is solved.
Michael Ossipoff
The tops-of-the-ballots oriented Benham and LV(erw)SME handle the
scenario by (effectively) laughing off C (and electing A in breach of
Minimal Defense), while the more bottoms-of-the-ballots oriented
Smith//Approval notes that C is the most "approved" (i.e. voted above
bottom) candidate and says to the 44 B>C voters "since you voted for
Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD & Minimal
Defense (Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).
C: Certainly we can't have all three of Plurality, CD and Minimal
When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected that it
penalizes truncation instead of electing the CWs
C: MSA isn't one of my very favourite Condorcet methods, but I
prefer it to Winning Votes. In the example it elects C.
43: A
03: A>B
44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)
10: C
C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10.
Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three
factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.
Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval (equivalent
here to Max Covered Approval) and Approval Sorted Margins elect C.
On 10/14/2016 1:08 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> 1. Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as in your example.
C: (By "CWs" Mike means 'sincere CW'). No, in my example A could be a
wing candidate. Say A is Centre-Left, B is Centre-Right and C is
(to use a Kevin Venzke expression) a "Martian" candidate, perhaps Far
Right. C should be irrelevant and would be without the B supporters'
burying.
> So the B voters in your example dislike C more than the A voters do.
>
> A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for the A voters.
>
> So the A voters have a more credible threat.
>
C: No.
> The A voters could say to the B voters:
>
> "Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury our candidate, and
> you think we should show our gratitude by supporting your candidate in
> 2nd place ".
>
C: This assumes that the B faction gave notice of their intention to
bury A (and didn't all just blindly copy their candidates' "how-to-vote
card" that they saw
for the first time just before they voted.)
Also it assumes that for all (or nearly all) the A voters the B
faction's voting strategy is the most important issue in the election.
But in any case in the example
only 6% of the A voters failed to truncate, and that was sufficient to
allow the B factions' burial to succeed under Winning Votes (and MMPO).
> What happens when there's a CWs is more important than how a natural
> top cycle is solved.
C: In the 3-candidate (and so 3 factions) scenario, I think we can
meaningfully distinguish between a "sincere CW" that in order to be the
actual voted
CW has to rely on rival factions not merely truncating, and one that
only needs rival factions to not actively bury (order-reverse or vote an
insincere preference).
I don't much care about the former (weaker) type, and in any case I
think they are hopeless cause. Resolving a "natural top cycle" properly
is more important
than trying to save them (or to "deter" big bad "offensive truncators").
On the other hand the largest-of-three factions definitely shouldn't be
vulnerable to burial because only 94% of them truncated!
Chris Benham
>
> Hi Chris--
>
> (Replying farther down)
>
> On Oct 11, 2016 10:55 PM, "C.Benham" <cbenham@adam.com.au
> <mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au>> wrote:
> >
> > On 10/12/2016 12:12 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> >
> >> Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in which one of
> the other candidates, not A, is the CWs.
> >
> >
> > 33: A>B
> > 32: B (sincere may be B>A)
> > 34: C
> >
> >
> > Mike,
> >
> > I don't recall doing that exactly. I like compliance with CD.
> The example I posted recently:
> >
> >> Given that burial vulnerability is unavoidable in Condorcet
> methods, I think that is more democratic if (in this respect) larger
> factions
> >> have the advantage over smaller factions.
> >>
> >> 43: A
> >> 03: A>B
> >> 44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)
> >> 10: C
> >>
> >> C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10.
> >>
> >> Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three
> factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.
> >>
> >> Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval elects C.
> >
> >
> > The "WV strategy" enthusiast might chastise the 3 A>B voters for
> allowing the B supporters' burial to succeed by not truncating...
>
> (endquote)
>
> Yes. If you believe your favorite is CWs, you can protect hir win by
> defensive plumping. ...or at least not ranking someone whose voters
> might bury.
>
> You wrote:
>
> but if they'd
> > done that then WV would have elected their least-preferred candidate.
>
> (endquote)
>
> Yes, if the B voters bury, then for the A voters, truncation will
> only worsen their result.
>
> But such non-risk-free punitive defensive strategies are common
> throughout the animal kingdom, including in human affairs.
>
> 1. Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as in your example.
>
> So the B voters in your example dislike C more than the A voters do.
>
> A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for the A voters.
>
> So the A voters have a more credible threat.
>
> 2. In such situations, the defender has a more credible threat.
>
> The A voters could say to the B voters:
>
> "Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury our candidate, and
> you think we should show our gratitude by supporting your candidate in
> 2nd place :^) ".
>
> But, sure, there's at least the hypothetical possibility of the
> perpetual burial fiasco, if A is in the B voters' bottom set.
>
> But I've told why that fiasco's requirements are a bit mutually
> contradictory.
>
> Even if A is in the B voters' bottom-set, the B voters might not
> bother to bury (even if it's theoretically optimal), if the chance of
> success is sufficiently small.
>
> I'm not saying that the majority are always right, but wv is popular.
>
> Benham & Woodall don't reliability have wv strategy.
>
> In Bucklin & Approval, the CWs's voters can protect hir by plumping.
> Likewise methods with wv strategy.
>
> Voters will do what it takes to protect a perceived CWs, because
> that's the best they can get.
>
> What happens when there's a CWs is more important than hkw a natural
> top cycle is solved.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
> >
> > The tops-of-the-ballots oriented Benham and LV(erw)SME handle the
> scenario by (effectively) laughing off C (and electing A in breach of
> > Minimal Defense), while the more bottoms-of-the-ballots oriented
> Smith//Approval notes that C is the most "approved" (i.e. voted above
> > bottom) candidate and says to the 44 B>C voters "since you voted for
> C you can have C".
> >
> >
> >> Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD & Minimal
> Defense (Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).
> >
> >
> > C: Certainly we can't have all three of Plurality, CD and Minimal
> Defense.
> >
> >
> >> When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected that it
> penalizes truncation instead of electing the CWs
> >
> >
> > C: MSA isn't one of my very favourite Condorcet methods, but I
> prefer it to Winning Votes. In the example it elects C.
> >
> > Chris Benham
> >
> >
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Fri, Oct 14, 2016 7:09 PM
43: A
03: A>B
44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)
10: C
C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10.
Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three
factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.
Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval (equivalent
here to Max Covered Approval) and Approval Sorted Margins elect C.
On 10/14/2016 1:08 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
- Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as in your example.
C: (By "CWs" Mike means 'sincere CW'). No, in my example A could be a
wing candidate.
(endquote)
You said that sincere for the B voters is B>A or B. If it's B>A, then B is
middle CWs.
But yes, not if B voters' sincere preference is just B.
But by the assumption of a 1- dimensional political spectrum, a CWs will
usually be middle.
The rarity of top cycles in CIVS polls suggests that the 1D assumption is
at least fairly good.
(Replying farther down)
Say A is Centre-Left, B is Centre-Right and C is
(to use a Kevin Venzke expression) a "Martian" candidate, perhaps Far
Right. C should be irrelevant and would be without the B supporters'
So the B voters in your example dislike C more than the A voters do.
A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for the A voters.
So the A voters have a more credible threat.
...unless there's a 1D spectrum, as suggested by poll results.
The A voters could say to the B voters:
"Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury our candidate, and
you think we should show our gratitude by supporting your candidate in 2nd
place ".
C: This assumes that the B faction gave notice of their intention to bury
A
Punitive strategy achieves nothing if not announced.
(Replying farther down)
(and didn't all just blindly copy their candidates' "how-to-vote card" that
they saw
for the first time just before they voted.)
Also it assumes that for all (or nearly all) the A voters the B faction's
voting strategy is the most important issue in the election.
(endquote)
Not really.
But, if burial is at all likely, CWs preferrers should plump as a matter of
course.
Yes, the CWs can't always be reliablly predicted. The advantage of wv &
MMPO over Bucklin is that, if burial is deterred, then failure to plump is
harmless.
(You wrote):
But in any case in the example
only 6% of the A voters failed to truncate, and that was sufficient to
allow the B factions' burial to succeed under Winning Votes (and MMPO).
...and, with the methods you prefer, there's no way the CWs's voters can
protect hir (other than by an elaborate Probabilistic voting strategy).
(I'd said):
What happens when there's a CWs is more important than how a natural top
C: In the 3-candidate (and so 3 factions) scenario, I think we can
meaningfully distinguish between a "sincere CW" that in order to be the
actual voted
CW has to rely on rival factions not merely truncating, and one that only
needs rival factions to not actively bury (order-reverse or vote an
insincere preference).
(endquote)
Exactly. Truncation of a CWs won't take away hir win in WV & MMPO. ...but
it will in the methods you prefer.
I don't much care about the former (weaker) type, and in any case I think
they are hopeless cause. Resolving a "natural top cycle" properly is more
important
than trying to save them (or to "deter" big bad "offensive truncators")
Unless you care about what it takes to protect a CWs, as voters try to do.
Unless you care how drastic their defensive voting must be.
And big bad truncation needn't be strategic. It could be big bad
principled, hurried, careless, etc.
...but in your methods it easily takes away a CWs win. Your choice.
On the other hand the largest-of-three factions definitely shouldn't be
vulnerable to burial because only 94% of them truncated!
In your methods, S/he's vulnerable to burial with nothing the CWs's voters
can do about it. ...and vulnerable even to big bad truncation.
Michael Ossipoff
Hi Chris--
(Replying farther down)
On Oct 11, 2016 10:55 PM, "C.Benham" cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
On 10/12/2016 12:12 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in which one of
the other candidates, not A, is the CWs.
33: A>B
32: B (sincere may be B>A)
34: C
Mike,
I don't recall doing that exactly. I like compliance with CD. The
example I posted recently:
Given that burial vulnerability is unavoidable in Condorcet methods,
I think that is more democratic if (in this respect) larger factions
have the advantage over smaller factions.
43: A
03: A>B
44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)
10: C
C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10.
Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three
factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.
Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval elects C.
The "WV strategy" enthusiast might chastise the 3 A>B voters for
allowing the B supporters' burial to succeed by not truncating...
(endquote)
Yes. If you believe your favorite is CWs, you can protect hir win by
defensive plumping. ...or at least not ranking someone whose voters might
bury.
done that then WV would have elected their least-preferred candidate.
(endquote)
Yes, if the B voters bury, then for the A voters, truncation will only
But such non-risk-free punitive defensive strategies are common
throughout the animal kingdom, including in human affairs.
- Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as in your example.
So the B voters in your example dislike C more than the A voters do.
A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for the A voters.
So the A voters have a more credible threat.
- In such situations, the defender has a more credible threat.
The A voters could say to the B voters:
"Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury our candidate, and
you think we should show our gratitude by supporting your candidate in 2nd
place :^) ".
But, sure, there's at least the hypothetical possibility of the
perpetual burial fiasco, if A is in the B voters' bottom set.
But I've told why that fiasco's requirements are a bit mutually
Even if A is in the B voters' bottom-set, the B voters might not bother
to bury (even if it's theoretically optimal), if the chance of success is
sufficiently small.
I'm not saying that the majority are always right, but wv is popular.
Benham & Woodall don't reliability have wv strategy.
In Bucklin & Approval, the CWs's voters can protect hir by plumping.
Likewise methods with wv strategy.
Voters will do what it takes to protect a perceived CWs, because that's
What happens when there's a CWs is more important than hkw a natural top
The tops-of-the-ballots oriented Benham and LV(erw)SME handle the
scenario by (effectively) laughing off C (and electing A in breach of
Minimal Defense), while the more bottoms-of-the-ballots oriented
Smith//Approval notes that C is the most "approved" (i.e. voted above
bottom) candidate and says to the 44 B>C voters "since you voted for C
Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD & Minimal
Defense (Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).
C: Certainly we can't have all three of Plurality, CD and Minimal
When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected that it penalizes
truncation instead of electing the CWs
C: MSA isn't one of my very favourite Condorcet methods, but I prefer
it to Winning Votes. In the example it elects C.
(Replying farther down)
On Oct 13, 2016 9:03 PM, "C.Benham" <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
>
>
> 43: A
> 03: A>B
> 44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)
> 10: C
>
> C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10.
>
> Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three
factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.
>
> Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval (equivalent
here to Max Covered Approval) and Approval Sorted Margins elect C.
>
>
>
> On 10/14/2016 1:08 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>> 1. Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as in your example.
>
(You wrote):
> C: (By "CWs" Mike means 'sincere CW'). No, in my example A could be a
wing candidate.
(endquote)
You said that sincere for the B voters is B>A or B. If it's B>A, then B is
middle CWs.
But yes, not if B voters' sincere preference is just B.
But by the assumption of a 1- dimensional political spectrum, a CWs will
usually be middle.
The rarity of top cycles in CIVS polls suggests that the 1D assumption is
at least fairly good.
(Replying farther down)
Say A is Centre-Left, B is Centre-Right and C is
> (to use a Kevin Venzke expression) a "Martian" candidate, perhaps Far
Right. C should be irrelevant and would be without the B supporters'
> burying.
>
>
>> So the B voters in your example dislike C more than the A voters do.
>>
>> A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for the A voters.
>>
>> So the A voters have a more credible threat.
>
> C: No.
...unless there's a 1D spectrum, as suggested by poll results.
>
>> The A voters could say to the B voters:
>>
>> "Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury our candidate, and
you think we should show our gratitude by supporting your candidate in 2nd
place ".
>
>
> C: This assumes that the B faction gave notice of their intention to bury
A
Punitive strategy achieves nothing if not announced.
(Replying farther down)
(and didn't all just blindly copy their candidates' "how-to-vote card" that
they saw
> for the first time just before they voted.)
>
> Also it assumes that for all (or nearly all) the A voters the B faction's
voting strategy is the most important issue in the election.
(endquote)
Not really.
But, if burial is at all likely, CWs preferrers should plump as a matter of
course.
Yes, the CWs can't always be reliablly predicted. The advantage of wv &
MMPO over Bucklin is that, if burial is deterred, then failure to plump is
harmless.
(You wrote):
But in any case in the example
> only 6% of the A voters failed to truncate, and that was sufficient to
allow the B factions' burial to succeed under Winning Votes (and MMPO).
...and, with the methods you prefer, there's no way the CWs's voters can
protect hir (other than by an elaborate Probabilistic voting strategy).
(I'd said):
>
>> What happens when there's a CWs is more important than how a natural top
cycle is solved.
>
>
> C: In the 3-candidate (and so 3 factions) scenario, I think we can
meaningfully distinguish between a "sincere CW" that in order to be the
actual voted
> CW has to rely on rival factions not merely truncating, and one that only
needs rival factions to not actively bury (order-reverse or vote an
insincere preference).
(endquote)
Exactly. Truncation of a CWs won't take away hir win in WV & MMPO. ...but
it will in the methods you prefer.
> I don't much care about the former (weaker) type, and in any case I think
they are hopeless cause. Resolving a "natural top cycle" properly is more
important
> than trying to save them (or to "deter" big bad "offensive truncators")
Unless you care about what it takes to protect a CWs, as voters try to do.
Unless you care how drastic their defensive voting must be.
And big bad truncation needn't be strategic. It could be big bad
principled, hurried, careless, etc.
...but in your methods it easily takes away a CWs win. Your choice.
>
> On the other hand the largest-of-three factions definitely shouldn't be
vulnerable to burial because only 94% of them truncated!
In your methods, S/he's vulnerable to burial with nothing the CWs's voters
can do about it. ...and vulnerable even to big bad truncation.
Michael Ossipoff
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>>
>> Hi Chris--
>>
>> (Replying farther down)
>>
>> On Oct 11, 2016 10:55 PM, "C.Benham" <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
>> >
>> > On 10/12/2016 12:12 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>> >
>> >> Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in which one of
the other candidates, not A, is the CWs.
>> >
>> >
>> > 33: A>B
>> > 32: B (sincere may be B>A)
>> > 34: C
>> >
>> >
>> > Mike,
>> >
>> > I don't recall doing that exactly. I like compliance with CD. The
example I posted recently:
>> >
>> >> Given that burial vulnerability is unavoidable in Condorcet methods,
I think that is more democratic if (in this respect) larger factions
>> >> have the advantage over smaller factions.
>> >>
>> >> 43: A
>> >> 03: A>B
>> >> 44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)
>> >> 10: C
>> >>
>> >> C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10.
>> >>
>> >> Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three
factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.
>> >>
>> >> Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval elects C.
>> >
>> >
>> > The "WV strategy" enthusiast might chastise the 3 A>B voters for
allowing the B supporters' burial to succeed by not truncating...
>>
>> (endquote)
>>
>> Yes. If you believe your favorite is CWs, you can protect hir win by
defensive plumping. ...or at least not ranking someone whose voters might
bury.
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> but if they'd
>> > done that then WV would have elected their least-preferred candidate.
>>
>> (endquote)
>>
>> Yes, if the B voters bury, then for the A voters, truncation will only
worsen their result.
>>
>> But such non-risk-free punitive defensive strategies are common
throughout the animal kingdom, including in human affairs.
>>
>> 1. Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as in your example.
>>
>> So the B voters in your example dislike C more than the A voters do.
>>
>> A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for the A voters.
>>
>> So the A voters have a more credible threat.
>>
>> 2. In such situations, the defender has a more credible threat.
>>
>> The A voters could say to the B voters:
>>
>> "Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury our candidate, and
you think we should show our gratitude by supporting your candidate in 2nd
place :^) ".
>>
>> But, sure, there's at least the hypothetical possibility of the
perpetual burial fiasco, if A is in the B voters' bottom set.
>>
>> But I've told why that fiasco's requirements are a bit mutually
contradictory.
>>
>> Even if A is in the B voters' bottom-set, the B voters might not bother
to bury (even if it's theoretically optimal), if the chance of success is
sufficiently small.
>>
>> I'm not saying that the majority are always right, but wv is popular.
>>
>> Benham & Woodall don't reliability have wv strategy.
>>
>> In Bucklin & Approval, the CWs's voters can protect hir by plumping.
Likewise methods with wv strategy.
>>
>> Voters will do what it takes to protect a perceived CWs, because that's
the best they can get.
>>
>> What happens when there's a CWs is more important than hkw a natural top
cycle is solved.
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>> >
>> > The tops-of-the-ballots oriented Benham and LV(erw)SME handle the
scenario by (effectively) laughing off C (and electing A in breach of
>> > Minimal Defense), while the more bottoms-of-the-ballots oriented
Smith//Approval notes that C is the most "approved" (i.e. voted above
>> > bottom) candidate and says to the 44 B>C voters "since you voted for C
you can have C".
>> >
>> >
>> >> Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD & Minimal
Defense (Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).
>> >
>> >
>> > C: Certainly we can't have all three of Plurality, CD and Minimal
Defense.
>> >
>> >
>> >> When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected that it penalizes
truncation instead of electing the CWs
>> >
>> >
>> > C: MSA isn't one of my very favourite Condorcet methods, but I prefer
it to Winning Votes. In the example it elects C.
>> >
>> > Chris Benham
>> >
>> >
>
>
MO
Michael Ossipoff
Fri, Oct 14, 2016 7:32 PM
I misinterpreted something you said:
You said that I assumed that the buriers announce their intention to bury.
Not really.
If the strategjc ambience is such that burial is at all likely, the CWs's
voters don't need official notification. They should defensively plump as a
matter of course.
Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 13, 2016 9:03 PM, "C.Benham" cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
43: A
03: A>B
44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)
10: C
C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10.
Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three
factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.
Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval (equivalent
here to Max Covered Approval) and Approval Sorted Margins elect C.
On 10/14/2016 1:08 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
- Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as in your example.
C: (By "CWs" Mike means 'sincere CW'). No, in my example A could be a
wing candidate. Say A is Centre-Left, B is Centre-Right and C is
(to use a Kevin Venzke expression) a "Martian" candidate, perhaps Far
Right. C should be irrelevant and would be without the B supporters'
burying.
So the B voters in your example dislike C more than the A voters do.
A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for the A voters.
So the A voters have a more credible threat.
C: No.
The A voters could say to the B voters:
"Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury our candidate, and you
think we should show our gratitude by supporting your candidate in 2nd
place ".
C: This assumes that the B faction gave notice of their intention to bury
A (and didn't all just blindly copy their candidates' "how-to-vote card"
that they saw
for the first time just before they voted.)
Also it assumes that for all (or nearly all) the A voters the B faction's
voting strategy is the most important issue in the election. But in any
case in the example
only 6% of the A voters failed to truncate, and that was sufficient to
allow the B factions' burial to succeed under Winning Votes (and MMPO).
What happens when there's a CWs is more important than how a natural top
cycle is solved.
C: In the 3-candidate (and so 3 factions) scenario, I think we can
meaningfully distinguish between a "sincere CW" that in order to be the
actual voted
CW has to rely on rival factions not merely truncating, and one that only
needs rival factions to not actively bury (order-reverse or vote an
insincere preference).
I don't much care about the former (weaker) type, and in any case I think
they are hopeless cause. Resolving a "natural top cycle" properly is more
important
than trying to save them (or to "deter" big bad "offensive truncators").
On the other hand the largest-of-three factions definitely shouldn't be
vulnerable to burial because only 94% of them truncated!
Chris Benham
Hi Chris--
(Replying farther down)
On Oct 11, 2016 10:55 PM, "C.Benham" cbenham@adam.com.au wrote:
On 10/12/2016 12:12 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in which one of the
other candidates, not A, is the CWs.
33: A>B
32: B (sincere may be B>A)
34: C
Mike,
I don't recall doing that exactly. I like compliance with CD. The
example I posted recently:
Given that burial vulnerability is unavoidable in Condorcet methods, I
think that is more democratic if (in this respect) larger factions
have the advantage over smaller factions.
43: A
03: A>B
44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)
10: C
C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10.
Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three
factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.
Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval elects C.
The "WV strategy" enthusiast might chastise the 3 A>B voters for
allowing the B supporters' burial to succeed by not truncating...
(endquote)
Yes. If you believe your favorite is CWs, you can protect hir win by
defensive plumping. ...or at least not ranking someone whose voters might
bury.
You wrote:
but if they'd
done that then WV would have elected their least-preferred candidate.
(endquote)
Yes, if the B voters bury, then for the A voters, truncation will only
worsen their result.
But such non-risk-free punitive defensive strategies are common throughout
the animal kingdom, including in human affairs.
- Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as in your example.
So the B voters in your example dislike C more than the A voters do.
A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for the A voters.
So the A voters have a more credible threat.
- In such situations, the defender has a more credible threat.
The A voters could say to the B voters:
"Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury our candidate, and you
think we should show our gratitude by supporting your candidate in 2nd
place :^) ".
But, sure, there's at least the hypothetical possibility of the perpetual
burial fiasco, if A is in the B voters' bottom set.
But I've told why that fiasco's requirements are a bit mutually
contradictory.
Even if A is in the B voters' bottom-set, the B voters might not bother
to bury (even if it's theoretically optimal), if the chance of success is
sufficiently small.
I'm not saying that the majority are always right, but wv is popular.
Benham & Woodall don't reliability have wv strategy.
In Bucklin & Approval, the CWs's voters can protect hir by plumping.
Likewise methods with wv strategy.
Voters will do what it takes to protect a perceived CWs, because that's
the best they can get.
What happens when there's a CWs is more important than hkw a natural top
cycle is solved.
Michael Ossipoff
The tops-of-the-ballots oriented Benham and LV(erw)SME handle the
scenario by (effectively) laughing off C (and electing A in breach of
Minimal Defense), while the more bottoms-of-the-ballots oriented
Smith//Approval notes that C is the most "approved" (i.e. voted above
bottom) candidate and says to the 44 B>C voters "since you voted for C
Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD & Minimal
Defense (Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).
C: Certainly we can't have all three of Plurality, CD and Minimal
When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected that it penalizes
truncation instead of electing the CWs
C: MSA isn't one of my very favourite Condorcet methods, but I prefer it
to Winning Votes. In the example it elects C.
I misinterpreted something you said:
You said that I assumed that the buriers announce their intention to bury.
Not really.
If the strategjc ambience is such that burial is at all likely, the CWs's
voters don't need official notification. They should defensively plump as a
matter of course.
Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 13, 2016 9:03 PM, "C.Benham" <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
>
> 43: A
> 03: A>B
> 44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)
> 10: C
>
> C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10.
>
> Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three
> factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.
>
> Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval (equivalent
> here to Max Covered Approval) and Approval Sorted Margins elect C.
>
>
> On 10/14/2016 1:08 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> 1. Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as in your example.
>
>
> C: (By "CWs" Mike means 'sincere CW'). No, in my example A could be a
> wing candidate. Say A is Centre-Left, B is Centre-Right and C is
> (to use a Kevin Venzke expression) a "Martian" candidate, perhaps Far
> Right. C should be irrelevant and would be without the B supporters'
> burying.
>
> So the B voters in your example dislike C more than the A voters do.
>
> A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for the A voters.
>
> So the A voters have a more credible threat.
>
> C: No.
>
> The A voters could say to the B voters:
>
> "Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury our candidate, and you
> think we should show our gratitude by supporting your candidate in 2nd
> place ".
>
>
> C: This assumes that the B faction gave notice of their intention to bury
> A (and didn't all just blindly copy their candidates' "how-to-vote card"
> that they saw
> for the first time just before they voted.)
>
> Also it assumes that for all (or nearly all) the A voters the B faction's
> voting strategy is the most important issue in the election. But in any
> case in the example
> only 6% of the A voters failed to truncate, and that was sufficient to
> allow the B factions' burial to succeed under Winning Votes (and MMPO).
>
> What happens when there's a CWs is more important than how a natural top
> cycle is solved.
>
>
> C: In the 3-candidate (and so 3 factions) scenario, I think we can
> meaningfully distinguish between a "sincere CW" that in order to be the
> actual voted
> CW has to rely on rival factions not merely truncating, and one that only
> needs rival factions to not actively bury (order-reverse or vote an
> insincere preference).
>
> I don't much care about the former (weaker) type, and in any case I think
> they are hopeless cause. Resolving a "natural top cycle" properly is more
> important
> than trying to save them (or to "deter" big bad "offensive truncators").
>
> On the other hand the largest-of-three factions definitely shouldn't be
> vulnerable to burial because only 94% of them truncated!
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
> Hi Chris--
>
> (Replying farther down)
>
> On Oct 11, 2016 10:55 PM, "C.Benham" <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
> >
> > On 10/12/2016 12:12 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> >
> >> Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in which one of the
> other candidates, not A, is the CWs.
> >
> >
> > 33: A>B
> > 32: B (sincere may be B>A)
> > 34: C
> >
> >
> > Mike,
> >
> > I don't recall doing that exactly. I like compliance with CD. The
> example I posted recently:
> >
> >> Given that burial vulnerability is unavoidable in Condorcet methods, I
> think that is more democratic if (in this respect) larger factions
> >> have the advantage over smaller factions.
> >>
> >> 43: A
> >> 03: A>B
> >> 44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)
> >> 10: C
> >>
> >> C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10.
> >>
> >> Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three
> factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.
> >>
> >> Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval elects C.
> >
> >
> > The "WV strategy" enthusiast might chastise the 3 A>B voters for
> allowing the B supporters' burial to succeed by not truncating...
>
> (endquote)
>
> Yes. If you believe your favorite is CWs, you can protect hir win by
> defensive plumping. ...or at least not ranking someone whose voters might
> bury.
>
> You wrote:
>
> but if they'd
> > done that then WV would have elected their least-preferred candidate.
>
> (endquote)
>
> Yes, if the B voters bury, then for the A voters, truncation will only
> worsen their result.
>
> But such non-risk-free punitive defensive strategies are common throughout
> the animal kingdom, including in human affairs.
>
> 1. Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as in your example.
>
> So the B voters in your example dislike C more than the A voters do.
>
> A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for the A voters.
>
> So the A voters have a more credible threat.
>
> 2. In such situations, the defender has a more credible threat.
>
> The A voters could say to the B voters:
>
> "Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury our candidate, and you
> think we should show our gratitude by supporting your candidate in 2nd
> place :^) ".
>
> But, sure, there's at least the hypothetical possibility of the perpetual
> burial fiasco, if A is in the B voters' bottom set.
>
> But I've told why that fiasco's requirements are a bit mutually
> contradictory.
>
> Even if A is in the B voters' bottom-set, the B voters might not bother
> to bury (even if it's theoretically optimal), if the chance of success is
> sufficiently small.
>
> I'm not saying that the majority are always right, but wv is popular.
>
> Benham & Woodall don't reliability have wv strategy.
>
> In Bucklin & Approval, the CWs's voters can protect hir by plumping.
> Likewise methods with wv strategy.
>
> Voters will do what it takes to protect a perceived CWs, because that's
> the best they can get.
>
> What happens when there's a CWs is more important than hkw a natural top
> cycle is solved.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
> >
> > The tops-of-the-ballots oriented Benham and LV(erw)SME handle the
> scenario by (effectively) laughing off C (and electing A in breach of
> > Minimal Defense), while the more bottoms-of-the-ballots oriented
> Smith//Approval notes that C is the most "approved" (i.e. voted above
> > bottom) candidate and says to the 44 B>C voters "since you voted for C
> you can have C".
> >
> >
> >> Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD & Minimal
> Defense (Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).
> >
> >
> > C: Certainly we can't have all three of Plurality, CD and Minimal
> Defense.
> >
> >
> >> When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected that it penalizes
> truncation instead of electing the CWs
> >
> >
> > C: MSA isn't one of my very favourite Condorcet methods, but I prefer it
> to Winning Votes. In the example it elects C.
> >
> > Chris Benham
> >
> >
>
>
>
