Mostly exactly the same as for elections. Polls may however often be less competitive than elections. (Although some elections can be less competitive than some polls.) This means that you could emphasize performance with sincere votes more, and put less weight on performance against strategic voters.

No, FBC is not important. It is important not to be vulnerable to "betrayal strategies", but that doesn't necessarily mean FBC compliance. :-)

Often so.

Has somebody sometimes noticed a strategically generated top-cycle or any other cycle in any elections or polls?

When strategic intentions are gone, or low enough, one should focus on which candidate is best according to the needs of the society. I have no good idea on what MAM tries to achieve (= what kind of winner to elect) with sincere votes. In some polls Range could be the best (if you want the winner to have high average support), or maybe Approval (= elect the most approved candidate) or some Condorcet (= elect the one who is preferred over the others) method.

I guess you are talking about competitive polls here. I.e. EM members are expected not only to have strong opinions on the alternatives but also strong intentions to make their favourite win (by voting strategically).

Yes, sounds very competitive.

Among this group of people, I'm sure you couldn't be sure of anything :-) , and you should protect yourself against all possible strategies. Or at least against those strategies that EM people are likely to master. That is probably a smaller set than the largest set of all theoretically possible strategies. :-)

Ok, now you are talking about highly competitive polls. Why did you introduce Smith set here? Is that to safeguard against strategies? I'm not knowledgeable enough to tell what kind of strategic threats Smith set would eliminate. Maybe you introduced it to have good performance with sincere votes.

This is a sidetrack, but I must note that I'm not a believer in Smith set. My opinion is that it tries to force linearity to group opinions. You can expect that (linear opinions) from individual voters, but in groups there's no need to assume that all the Smith set members would be better than the other candidates (with sincere votes). You can as well think than losses to other candidates are a bad thing, irrespective of whether they occur in cycles or not. Losses within a cycle could be considered worse than losses outside of that cycle.

I'm not able to take position on how good that combination would be against strategies that might emerge among the EM list voters. The discussed environment is assumed to be very competitive, and I guess there's no difference any more on whether we had a poll or an election. Both would be competitive, and similar methods would be needed to make the system work.

Or actually I do believe that often we do not really need extreme defensive measures, and putting more emphasis on electing the best winner with sincere votes is possible. I mean for example that I have not seen any good general guidance (to regular voters with no exact knowledge on how other voters are going to vote) on how to vote strategically in some very basic Condorcet elections. My best guess is that even if EM list would vote on which single winner election method is the best, using Condorcet, I would not expect people to identify any good strategy that they could use to (effectively, intentionally) manipulate the results and change the winner from the sincere winner to some alternative that they like better.

For these reasons I tend to favour methods that are good with sincere votes, and that are designed to protect us only against some very basic and very obvious strategic voting opportunities. I'm somewhere at the level of "in most cases Condorcet is enough".

BR, Juho

Hi Juho--

It isn't that I can't stop, can't quit discussing voting-systems :^)  It's
just that this good idea occurred to me, because I'm polling on another
(non-political) subject at other websites, and I want the count to be as
strategy-proof as possible.

And so of course I wanted to mention the good idea (for poll
strategy-resistance) at EM.

I suggested Pairwise-Winner (MAM,  Smith//MMPO).

But, even though FBC isn't needed (because I want sincere rankings, and not
equal-top-ranking), it might still be undesirable if Smith//MMPO could do
things that the voter doesn't intend or like.  A ballot that gets X into
the Smith set (by eliminating one of her defeats by Smith-set members)
could allow hir strong pairwise opposition against Y (though Y pairbeats X)
to give the win to someone worse than both.

Maybe that's undesirable even if FBC isn't needed.

So maybe Pairwise-Winner (MAM,  Smith,MMPO)?

Even though Smith,MMPO could fail to elect a CWv, that's ok, because MAM
would elect hir, and s/he'd pairbeat the Smith,MMPO winner.

So, which would be better for polls:

Pairwise-Winner (MAM,  Smith//MMPO)

or

Pairwise-Winner (MAM,  Smith,MMPO)?

Forest?  Kevin?

Any suggestions? I want the best strategy-proofness for polls that might
need that, but without unnecessarily irrational, unintended and undesirable
results.

Left to myself on this, I'll probably go with

Pairwiise-Winner (MAM,  Smith,MMPO)

But what are some opinions on this?

Replying farther down:

On Sun, Dec 18, 2016 at 6:09 AM, Juho Laatu juho.laatu@gmail.com wrote:

Yes, in some polling electorates, like CIVS. But in rank-balloting polls,
you want to find the CWs, and so you don't want equal-top-ranking. You
might even not allow equal-ranking. So FBC isn't needed.

Well, for elections, with all kinds of voters, especially under current
conditions, I'd want for even the worst overcompromisers to not have any
incentive to vote someone over their favorite.  Besides, as an Approvalist,
I want the opportunity to vote fully-effective equal-top-ranking.

[Replying farther down] :

No, but in one EM poll, the other co-conductor of the poll told me that
someone had requested permission to vote anonymously, suggesting an
intention to use burial strategy.

At CIVS (Condorcet Internet Voting-Service) I've never noticed a top-cycle
for 1st place. But for lower-place, later-finishers, there are often
cycles, when there are lots of candidates, probably because of short
rankings, or people guessing about their lower choices.

Yes, certainly, for elections. But when I use a rank-method for polling,
it's because I want to find out the CWs. That's my goal with a
rank-balloting poll.

[Replying farther down] :

Yes, that would be the concern.

Invulnerability to truncation & chicken-dilemma defection, and resistance
to (& penalizing of) burial would be good enough. That's what I'm trying
for with
Pairwise-Winner (MAM,  Smith,MMPO).

Yes, partly.

When offensive strategy is used against the CWs, s/he'll be in the voted
Smith-set. That's a good reason to elect from the voted Smith-set, so that
the CWs can maybe be rescued.

[Replying farther down] :

rank-balloting poll.

For elections, for a ranking-method, I like MMDA & MMDAsc.

That seems so at CIVS. I always use MAM there.

Well, the feeling to want to do burial might be natural. Likewise
truncation, which might not even be strategically-intended. Llikewise
chicken-dilemma defection. People at EM would be the most familiar with
those strategies, but anyone could feel the incentive for them.

Most especially if you're polling, on some topic, a group of people who
have strongly-preferred  favorites among the alternatives

Certainly at CIVS. When there are strong preferences, when people might be
strongly committed to favorites, I'd like a little more in polls.

Pairwise-Winner (MAM,  Smith,MMPO)

or

Pairwise-Winner (MAM,  Smith//MMPO)

would be an effort to achieve that.

Any opinions regarding which of those two would be better?

Michael Ossipoff

On Sun, Dec 18, 2016 at 12:46 PM, Toby Pereira tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk wrote:

Yes. This isn't a political poll at all. It's an online poll on a
non-political question, to find out what the CWs is, and which alternatives
have majority approval.

Yes, when the result won't be implemented, then there's no reason why it's
necessary to name the count-method in advance, because the results by
various methods could be given. If there's participation in that poll, I'll
report results by MAM, Approval, &  probably Pairwise-Winner (MAM,
Smith,MMPO).

Most likely there won't be strategy, and the CWs will win as CWv.

But sometimes, when there are only a few voters, other methods can be
needed for tiebreaking.

I recently did a poll on voting-systems, and MAM returned a tie between
Approval & Score.

The alternatives were:

Approval
Score
Bucklin
MDDA
MDDAsc
IRV
Benham

But I noticed that Approval did better than Score in its pairwise
comparisons.

1. Approval pairbeat more alternatives than Score did.

2. The sum of Approval's pairwise votes against the other alternatives was
   greater than that of Score.

#1 means that Approval beats Score by Copeland.

#2 means that Approval beats Score by a version of Borda.

But #1 & #2 seem to compellingly indicate that Approval beats Score.

Of course there are good reasons to not announce Copeland or Borda as the
count-rule. But, when there's a tie, they point to a winner in a meaningful
way.

Somewhere else, at PoliticalForums, I'm conducting a presidential poll
between Hillary, Jill, Donald, & Gary.

I don't know the winner so far, because someone additional has just voted,
and i haven't yet updated the count.

Though PoliticalForums' Opinion-Polls forum supports Approval, with
balloting, count, & count-display fully automated (voting is by
click-bubble), I instead invited rankings.

Because I wanted people to vote, and because IRV is so popular and
relatively well-known, I designated IRV as the count-rule.

But I'll announce the winner by Approval,  Benham & by
Pairwise-Winner (MAM, Smith,MMPO) too.

(I told people to rank only the candidates they approve of.)

I conducted a voting-systems poll there too, and Approval is the winner
there as well.

I'm conducting two voting-system polls: One at PoliticalForums,and one at
CIVS (Condorcet Internet Voting Service).

I emphasize that those two polls, at PoliticalForums & at CIVS, are to find
out how the general public feels about voting-systems. Obviously the
people here at EM, who are not representative of the general public on that
subject, shouldn't vote in those general-public-opinion polls.

But of course feel free to check out the results.

As I said, Approval is the consistent winner, at both polls. Score is
2nd-best at CIVS. It seems to me that, at PoliticalForums, Score is tied
with Plurality. No one but me approved MDDA.

.

Yes, I've got several online polls going, on presidential candidates,
voting-systems, & nonpolitical reform questions.

In the CIVS presidential poll, with 72 votes in, Jill Stein is the CWv
(with Bernie removed from the count).

I invite people at EM to vote in the PoliticalForums presidential poll, if
they want to. Go to PoliticalForums (You can find a link to it via google),
and then go to its Opinion Polls forum. Among the polls there is my
presidential poll.

As I said, of course the voting-system polls are only for the general
public, not for people who are familiar with voting-systems.

Yes, that would be a good reliable way to find the CWs. It could be
feasible in a meeting-room, but, for most online polls, it isn't feasible.
For one thing, it's difficult enough to get people to vote once.

Rankings is usually a good way to find out the CWs, and MAM always works
fine at CIVS. But, at a forum where the people are very familiar with the
matter being voted on, and highly committed to some alternative(s), I feel
that it might be better to add Smith,MMPO's defection-proofness, via

Pairwise-Winner (MAM,  Smith,MMPO)

or

Pairwise-Winner (MAM,  Smith//MMPO)

Any opinions on which would be better?

Mike

From: Michael Ossipoff email9648742@gmail.com
To: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Sunday, 18 December 2016, 6:05
Subject: [EM] Voting-System Choice for Polls (Just one more thing I want
to say)

Before quitting EM & retiring from voting-systems, there's one more thing
I'd like to say:

What's the best voting-system for polls?

Though FBC is important for official political elections, I don't think it
serves a purpose in polls, where the purpose is to get sincere rankings,
and hope that people vote sincere rankings. In polls, the compulsion to
favorite-bury is much less likely.

As I've said, I haven't noticed any sign (top-cycles for 1st place) of
strategy in polls.

I suggest that, for sincere electorates, MAM is the ideal best. That means
it's best for polls at the Condorcet Internet Voting Service, where there's
been no sign of strategy.

But what if you're doing a poll among people who are highly involved in the
subject that you're polling about, and have strong committment to some
alternatives? Like, for example, suppose you're pollng at EM about
voting-systems?

Maybe some members of the electorate will resort to strategy. Especially if
the electorate are a voting-system mailing-lislt.

So you can't really be sure that there'll be no chicken-dilemma defection.

So maybe, instead of MAM, Smith//MMPO should be used.

It is automatically resistant to chicken-dilemma defection.

But, for burial, it isn't as good as MAM. With MAM, a candidate that you, &
sufficiently-many others, don't rank can't beat the CWs by burial.

...but it can in MMPO, though there's a lot of uncertainty & risk in trying
burial in MMPO.

Maybe Smith//MMPO's reliable automatic chicken-dilemma protection is more
important, because defection is easier & less drastic a strategy than
burial.

But maybe MAM's better burial protection is more important, because burial
temptation & opportunity is a lot more common than a chicken-dilemma
situation.

My suggestion: Use both.

Do the count by Smith//MMPO, & by MAM. Of the winners by those 2 methods,
the final winner is the one that pairwise-beats the other.

That's a solid good solution, because:

In the chicken-dilemma example, and also in a burial example, the intended
victim of the offensive strategy pairbeats the perps' candidate.

So, declaring, as winner, the one of those 2 winners that pairbeats the
other is definitely the best solution, if MAM & Smith//MMPO are the best
choices, each of which offers better protection in different ways.

Of course, it's been pointed out that methods that elect the pair-winner,
among the winners by 2 different methods, tend to fail FBC.

But FBC isn't needed in polls, where you want sincere ranking, not
equal-top-ranking.

Michael Ossipoff

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Ok, no sincere top cycles, nor strategic ones. Only the possibility that someone might have sometimes voted strategically (without achieving anything). What are we worried about? See also comment on irrational strategic voting below (maybe no major fears there either).

In theory that might save the CWs in some very rare cases. Note that electing outside the Smith set may sometimes also help us, e.g. by making strategic plans void by not electing the (possibly strongly top-looped) favourite of the strategists.

If you accept the claim that the best winner (when there is no CWs) can sometimes be found outside the Smith set, then use of Smith set means that sometimes one does not elect the best winner with sincere votes. That is also not very common, but it would be nice to always elect the best candidate. One should aim at that, unless there is a strong need to modify the system (= make it worse from sincere votes point of view) in order to defend the system against strategic voting (that is expected to lead to even worse consequences than not electing the best candidate with sincere votes).

Now we are talking about irrational strategies and uneducated voters. The best defence against that might be trustworthy neutral experts that tell people that their interests are best served by voting sincerely, or at least not by using any clearly irrational strategies. I'm sure there will always be some irrational behaviour, but that might be just general noise, and would not influence the election. If some large grouping will use some irrational strategy, and as a result will make the outcome of the election worse from their point of view, maybe they will learn and will vote rationally (sincerely or strategically) in the next election.

One more observation on how I would approach the problem of finding a Condorcet method that is sufficiently strategy proof. I would pick first the Condorcet method that produces best possible results with sincere votes. Then I'd let EM members watch one episode of some soap opera, and then vote on who was the best actor. That would be the first poll. Then they would watch another episode, and vote again in the second poll. Then they would watch one more episode, and cast their final vote. People would be allowed to discuss about their preferences, so that similar minded people would find each others, and they could plan strategies for the final election (and why not also for the polls). People would also be encouraged to publish strategic advice to others. People could also attach information on how they voted strategically in their ballot (note, not after the election but only in the ballot when voting). This whole process would be repeated few times. If there would be some clear symptoms of the used method failing under pressure of strategic voting, one could test some modified method using the same process (hoping to get rid of the identified strategy problems). If no strategic failures are obvious, I'd keep the original method. I have great trust on the skills of people on this mailing list, but so far I have not seen any good strategic guidance for voters or parties in real life Condorcet elections. Maybe there are reasons for that. Maybe people don't have any good advices to give :-). Maybe already basic Condorcet methods are strategy proof enough for typical large scale competitive elections and polls. Note that my approach is very practical. When talking about real life elections, I don't try to identify exact criteria to meet, but methods that are sufficiently tolerant (not necessarily 100% tolerant) to all the relevant threat scenarios.

BR, Juho

For polls I suggest either  Smith//Approval (explicit)  or Margins
Sorted Approval (explicit).

And with that ballot information the winners  using other methods could
be announced.

Michael Ossipoff wrote:

That is a bit odd, since IRV meets Later-no-Harm and so there's never
any strategic point in truncating.

And Mono-raise. It usually causes vulnerability (or greater
vulnerability) to Push-over strategy.

Chris Benham

On 12/19/2016 6:49 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

Sure, that was a mis-statement: It was for the  MDDA poll that I said to
rank only the candidates the voter approves of. ...not for the IRV poll.

In the IRV poll, I and some others voted a complete ranking.

For the PoliticalForums poll on voting-systems, the alternatives were:

Plurality
Approval
Score
MDDA

I wanted to include a ranking-method. But I only wanted to include 1
ranking-method, because I didn't want to ask participants to read about
more than 1 unfamiliar method or rank-count rule.

I chose MDDA because it (along with MDDAsc) is the best for elections, and
is very briefly-defined--something that can make all the difference in
poll-participation.

And, rather than define a different rank-count for the poll's designated
count-rule, it seemed simpler to just designate MDDA (even though what's
best for elections isn't necessarily best for a poll).

For polls where offensive strategy seems more likely, I'll use:

Pairwise-Winner (MAM,  Smith,MMPO)

With the Smith set limiting what can be considered for winning, I don't
think there's any need to let it otherwise change the MMPO count, by
affecting the alternatives' maximum pairwise opposition..

...which could cause some unexpected, unintended results of one's ballot.

Maybe it would be more convenient to just call it:

P(MAM, Smith,MMPO)

By combining MAM's 1st-rate burial-deterrence with MMPO's automatic
reliable chicken-dilemma defection prevention, that seems the best choice
for counting rank-balloting polls, if the goal is to avoid successful
offensive strategy.

But any reasons otherwise are welcome. Because I might sometimes want to
use the best anti-strategy rank-count, I'm interested in any reasons why
P(MAM, Smith,MMPO) could be improved on.

Michael Ossipoff

On Sun, Dec 18, 2016 at 6:28 PM, Juho Laatu juho.laatu@gmail.com wrote:

We have no reason to worry about offensive strategy in CIVS polls.

And so MAM is the best choice for CIVS polls. MAM is one of the rank-counts
that CIVS supports.

But sometimes I poll a forum about the subject that the forum debates, and
about which the members have strong favorites. That's where
P(MAM,  Smith,MMPO) comes in.

I can't say why it's important to guarantee that the winner is in the voted
Smith-set, other than that it confers compliance with various criteria,
including Mutual-Majority.

But, because one member of the voted Smith set will be the CWs, if
truncation or burial is being attempted against it (neuter gender because
I'm talking about poll-alternatives) then that means that disqualifying
non-members of the voted Smith-set narrows the field in a way favorable to
the CWs.

But the important reason why Smith,MMPO needs the Smith set is to avoid
MMPO's Hitler-with-2-votes problem, without losing its full
truncation-proofness.

Maybe, but, by pairwise-count standards, electing from the Smith set keeps
the winner among the pairwise publicly-favored candidates.

Of course, in an election, when Approval elects the candidate approved,
considered satisfactory by the most people, is probably more important than
electing the CWs or from the sincere Smith-set.

...as long as people accept not electing the CWs, and we don't have an
angry majority. But Approval's emphasis on satisfactory-ness should help
that acceptance.

Sure, in elections, where the candidate satisfactory to the most people
isn't in the sincere Smith-set.

But, in polls, I'm just trying to find the CWs if there is one.

Sure, there's a trade-off between electing the best candidate under
sincere-voting, vs thwarting &/or deterring offensive strategy.

MAM, by itself would surely, it seems to me, be the best way to find the
CWs, for sincere voters. Smith,MMPO surely departs from MAM's ideal
best-ness in that regard.  The use of P(MAM,  Smith,MMPO) means a
conscious choice for adding good chicken-dilemma protection, at the cost of
ideal best-ness, when it's desired to find the CWs.

Well, the person starting the poll, when using a rank-count that thwarts &
sometimes penalizes offensive strategy, should advise voters that offensive
strategy probably won't work, and could backfire.

I'm sure there will always be some irrational behaviour, but that might be

If the CWs is  in your strong bottom-set, then burial, even when it risks
electing a worse member of your strong bottom-set, isn't irrational, if
there's any chance of successfully changing the winner to someone in your
strong top-set.

If we were using Condorcet, and if the expected CWs were a Repugnocrat, I'd
routinely use burial strategy, every time, in hopes of electing a
progressive. That's good strategy.

I'd also top-rank all the progressives.

[Replying farther down] :

But people would then be using counterstrategy agains the declared
offensive strategy, and that would make it unrealistic, because in real
elections, the voters might not be as adept at counterstrategy.

Why not just, instead, work out hypothetical results out on paper, instead
of using actual voting?

But, ever since EM started, I've always felt that poll are super useful &
valuable, as the only way to find out what it's like to use the various
voting-systems. You probably know that I started lots of polls at EM.
They've fallen out of fashion, and I consider that regrettable, because you
can't fully evaluate  & compare voting-systems without actually trying
them. Voting in polls, and counting polls.

So yes, I'm in favor of polls at EM. Regrettably no one else is.

Many-party presidential polls. Polls on voting-systems.

And, if there isn't agreement on what method or count-rule should be used,
then use "Voter's Choice", in which a voter can designate a rank-count such
that his Approval ballot will automatically approve down to the winner by
his designated voting-system. When we used Voter's Choice, there was a
"manual" option, by which the voter could opt for his Approval ballot to be
used, instead of that automatic approval-cutoff placement.

Well, I mentioned, above, that I'd routinely use burial strategy when the
expected CWs is in my strong bottom-set, in an official Condorcet election.

As others have pointed out, that might be so. No one knows. Maybe no
problem. Maybe the perpetual burial fiasco.  ...if I'm typical  :^)

But, to clarify, I doubt that the expected CWs will be in my strong
bottom-set. I have more confidence in the public's judgment.

For example, in most Internet presidential polls, the CWv is a Green or
other progressive like Bernie or Nader.  Jill Stein is the CWv in my
23-candidate, 17-party 2016 Presidential poll.
.
Michael Ossipoff

Ok, MAM is a quite decent method. If strategic voting is minimal, I guess you pick the method that gives best results with sincere votes. I'm still lacking good understanding of why exactly MAM would produce best winners with sincere votes.

That's a good answer since there are situations where one can justify electing from a Smith set that consists of very similar minded clones. The top cycle can be sincere or strategic. The same matrix can however probably be also a result of sincere votes where the Smith set candidates are not clones but a much more competitive group. In such cases it could make sense to elect outside the Smith set. One key point here is that information in the matrix is limited, and it is impossible to say if there are clones, and which preferences are strong and which ones weak.

It is not possible to tell if there was a CWs. The top loop can be sincere as well (or a result of various good and bad strategies). And the best sincere winner might be also outside the Smith set.

I don't understand your definition of "pairwise publicly-favored candidates". Why can't candidates outside the Smith set be such candidates? I mean situations where the leading candidate outside the Smith set could lose by one vote to all the Smith set members. Losing only marginally to many candidates could be a better result than losing a lot to fewer candidates.

Also pairwise comparisons can sometimes lead to situations where best candidate (based on those pairwise comparisons) is found outside the Smith set. (see the marginal loss example above)

All Condorcet methods can find the CWs with sincere votes.

Ok, if your preferences are A >>>>> B > C, and your guess is that B is a CWs, then it would be quite risk free to try to create cycles. It is however quite possible that your vote will be part of the "general noise". Some C supporters could also compromise (= top rank B) if they believe that B's victory is not certain, and some B supporters could rank A lowest if they believe that many A supporters plan to bury B. Many A supporters would not like the idea of increasing the chances of C winning the election. Many voters would vote sincerely since that's what they believe is the right thing to do. There are so many parameters and uncertainty in polls that coherent strategic voting may not be common. It may not be easy to get sufficient number of strategic voters to follow the plan.

I have been asking for generic strategic guidance for Condorcet elections. I think you are close to proposing one rule here. Maybe something like "if you strongly dislike the expected winner, bury it under all such candidates that are not much worse than it". Maybe add "if some of your favourite candidates are expected to beat those candidates". Maybe you can improve my formulation of that possible strategic advice. Maybe simulations could tell if that strategy does more good than harm, or nothing at all (assuming some nice distribution of preference strengths among voters).

The strategy would be declared only if the strategists consider that useful. If they don't publish, other voters may not be able to follow the strategy. If they publish, other voters might react to that in many ways. Just like in real elections.

Of course we are talking about a very knowledgeable and possibly also strategic voter community here. In real life elections everything would be one step milder. If some method can survive this test, real life elections could be an easier case.

Yes, that works in theory. In real life I have seen too many times scenarios where the claimed vulnerabilities are based on having exact information on what the preferences will be at the election day, and ability to change the voting behaviour of all those voters (100%) that would have the strategic interest, and all other voters not changing their behaviour in any way, and not applying any other strategies. That's what I would call hypothetical and unrealistic :-). I created that testing method to reflect the uncertainties that are present in real elections. If you are disciplined enough to put all that information on paper, with all the uncertainties, that's ok too. But the normal line of discussion at EM is not disciplined enough to achieve that.

Yes, polls can be very helpful. And paper work sometimes too, if disciplined enough.

Yes. If you can, please upgrade my description above to something that you believe to be valid guidance to regular voters. (Alternatively you can give also strategic rules for parties, that may then give further guidance to their supporters).

Here's another one that may work e.g. against some minmax style Condorcet methods. "If some unwanted party/grouping has numerous equally disliked candidates, rank them in a loop in alphabetical order, starting from a random candidate".

BR, Juho