Could the Implicit Approval winner ever be a Condorcet loser?

Highly unlikely, especially in the context of too many candidates, etc. But
if so, every other candidate would have a short beatpath to it ... so no
narrowing of the field would occur.

So it would be better to use the IRV winner or the MaxMax Pairwise Support
winner as the short beatpath target ... the winner of the simplest method
that satisfies the Condorcet Loser Criterion.

On Wed, Aug 30, 2023, 11:30 PM Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com
wrote:

Say the finalists are the IRV winner together with any and all of its
"enemies" (defined as those candidates that defeat it pairwise).

If the IRV winner has no enemies, no need for any further runoff beyond the
Instant Runoff that just popped out the IRV winner.

If the IRV winner has precisely one enemy, then the two-candidate final
runoff will be a no stress sincere choice for the voters.

Otherwise, you have a potentially interesting runoff with "around 3 to 5
candidates" to put the Condorcet Meetng through its paces.

fws

On Thu, Aug 31, 2023, 11:51 AM Forest Simmons forest.simmons21@gmail.com
wrote:

Forest,

I think we are imagining different real world scenarios here as well as
having different philosophical attitudes.

I have in mind say a country's presidential election with the primary
being held well before the final, with very many candidates (say in the
tens)
and with most of the voters knowing nothing or next to nothing about
most of the candidates.

The purpose of the primary then is just to weed out candidates with
insignificant core support to reduce the field to a "manageable" size and to
reduce the amount of research serious voters need to do to give an
adequately informed vote.

Candidates who do very poorly in this primary scenario have the
potential to win a strong following in the course of the relatively long
campaign
period between the primary and the final election.

So I'm not happy with complicated Condorcet-ish rules for the primary
that are too similar to the method used for the final election. I see no
reason
why the primary "Condorcet loser" shouldn't be on the finals ballot if
he/she is serious and has some low threshold of core supporters.

Also I don't like the idea of possibly strategic and/or bigoted voters
having a say about the finals ballot-access of candidates they hate
without any
possible cost or risk to candidates they support.

One of the things I like about my IRV last N idea is that the ballot
rules are very similar to what I think should be used for the final
election (maybe not
quite identical because for the primary I'm not in favour of allowing
above-bottom equal-ranking or an explicit approval cutoff).

Chris Benham

On 1/09/2023 4:21 am, Forest Simmons wrote:

Forest,

I gather you envisage a high-turnout primary election with the final
being held as soon as practicable afterwards.

On the issue of whether or not we sometimes dispense with the final
because one candidate was so dominant in the primary,
we could have a rule about the winners final-two IRV count (or maybe
some alternative, like minimum pairwise support) as a proportion
of the total number of eligible voters.

If that is too low, then maybe we can have a final anyway, say between
the IRV winner and the candidate  with the most pairwise opposition
to the IRV winner  (and maybe if that isn't the IRV last-2 runner-up
that candidate also if that pairwise result was "sufficiently", according to
some rule we make up, close).

There should be no simple rule that says we always have a final if the
turnout for the primary is below X%, because that could sometimes cause
some faction of voters to have a strategic incentive to abstain from the
primary.

Chris B.

On 1/09/2023 6:37 am, Forest Simmons wrote:

It seems to me that the position is this. Condorcet voting works well
under certain assumptions, which include voters sincerely ranking all
candidates in order of preference. Strategic voting turns out to be less
of a problem than one might fear, but drastic truncation is fatal.
   The merits of Condorcet voting lie partly in its not penalising
minor parties, so you'd expect it to lead to an explosion in the number
of candidates.
   So you're organising a presidential election, hoping to take
advantage of the merits of Condorcet voting, and you expect 500
candidates to put themselves forward. What do you do?
   One no-brain solution is to run a Condorcet election with 500
candidates. Another is to rely on administrative procedures, eg. only
the 5 candidates with most supporting signatures get onto the ballot.
This isn't a bad idea; something like it is widely practised. I think
the Virginia meeting is intentionally allowing it as an option. Can we
do better?

There are no particular constraints or objectives on a first round -
what matters is how well the system as a whole performs.
   It may be that Forest is trying to get only centrist candidates
through to the second round. I think this is a bad idea. The second
round cannot elect a bad candidate in his scheme, but non-centrist
voters are likely to feel they have nothing to play for and stay at
home. The result of the second round will therefore be skewed and
delegitimised.
   The problem lies in the questionable performance of ranked voting
with large fields. It seems to me that both Chris and Forest are trying
so hard to get the optimum set of survivors to the second round that
instead of solving the problem they end up shifting it to the first round.
   CJC

On 01/09/2023 00:39, C.Benham wrote:

I think I'm more or less done with this subject, as I don't feel like
I'm getting anywhere much. But I will reply to this:

On 9/1/23 17:47, Colin Champion wrote:

I guess that with numbers around 500, nothing will really work well, and
that we would bump against the, for lack of a better term, "aristocratic
nature" of elections. That is, if we don't do anything to counteract it,
such a field will naturally thin itself out by who's got the best
marketing; by what candidates are able to amplify their voice and get
their message out the most, and that undoing this bias will require a
more thorough redesign than changing the way votes are tallied.

If that's right, then it would seem the only option is to augment the
electoral procedure itself. Do something like asset voting or have a
representative sample dig deep into the candidates policies and pick the
finalist set. For 500 candidates, the voters would otherwise face a
burden just getting to know what they're about, no matter the voting
system, and the 100:1 "compression ratio" down to a finalist set of 5 is
so high that it's very difficult to get the right set if they skip on
that burden. Any consistent bias will greatly shrink that 500-candidate
set with time.

If we suppose that all of the 500 have a chance to get into the finalist
set, there has to be a considerable period before the general happens,
so that finalist set can inform the electorate of their positions.

The more we consider the possibility that anybody could be a good
winner, the more elections, as a mechanism, is at a disadvantage from
the start. My intuitive feeling is that at a 100:1 ratio, if you only
choose centrists, then the non-centrists are disincentivized as you say.
If you don't only choose centrists, then there's not enough room for the
full variety of the 500 to be represented in a set of size 5 anyway. So
something has to give.

Even if I'm wrong, the contention about clone dependence suggests to me
that we don't really know how to make a voting system that does what's
asked of such a primary. In a sense, it's not just that we don't know
how to solve the puzzle, but we're uncertain what kind of puzzle it is
(what the desiderata and dynamics are). But you said in another post that

This in turn suggests that you could at least determine if a particular
suggestion would be good by simulating the two-stage process:

• Lots of candidates present themselves
• Voters vote in the primary according to the method to be tested
  (possibly with some noise)
• Then the voters' hypothetical correct no-truncated ranking (of 500
  candidates!) is used as a basis for the general method, but after
  everybody but the finalist set is eliminated.
• Now determine the VSE, strategic resistance, or other figure of
  interest wrt the winner of the general.

Maybe by tinkering with this, it would be possible to get some idea of
what works and what doesn't. But note that it doesn't incorporate the
idea that getting acquainted with candidate positions is very expensive
when there are 500 of them, unless the primary deliberately takes that
into account.

-km

If we're talking about a field as large as 500, different voters could be randomly given different ballot papers for the primary with not all the candidates on. It could be, say, 10, on a ballot paper but there wouldn't be just 50 types because you'd want the candidates to be against different candidates on different ballots to make it fairer (so there'd be more than 50). These ballots would be randomly distributed to the voters (each candidate would appear on the same number of ballots). If you made it approval voting, you could probably just combine all the ballots together and use a proportional approval method to determine the candidates that make the final election.
Toby
On Saturday, 2 September 2023 at 00:21:17 BST, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet@t-online.de wrote:

I think I'm more or less done with this subject, as I don't feel like
I'm getting anywhere much. But I will reply to this:

On 9/1/23 17:47, Colin Champion wrote:

I guess that with numbers around 500, nothing will really work well, and
that we would bump against the, for lack of a better term, "aristocratic
nature" of elections. That is, if we don't do anything to counteract it,
such a field will naturally thin itself out by who's got the best
marketing; by what candidates are able to amplify their voice and get
their message out the most, and that undoing this bias will require a
more thorough redesign than changing the way votes are tallied.

If that's right, then it would seem the only option is to augment the
electoral procedure itself. Do something like asset voting or have a
representative sample dig deep into the candidates policies and pick the
finalist set. For 500 candidates, the voters would otherwise face a
burden just getting to know what they're about, no matter the voting
system, and the 100:1 "compression ratio" down to a finalist set of 5 is
so high that it's very difficult to get the right set if they skip on
that burden. Any consistent bias will greatly shrink that 500-candidate
set with time.

If we suppose that all of the 500 have a chance to get into the finalist
set, there has to be a considerable period before the general happens,
so that finalist set can inform the electorate of their positions.

The more we consider the possibility that anybody could be a good
winner, the more elections, as a mechanism, is at a disadvantage from
the start. My intuitive feeling is that at a 100:1 ratio, if you only
choose centrists, then the non-centrists are disincentivized as you say.
If you don't only choose centrists, then there's not enough room for the
full variety of the 500 to be represented in a set of size 5 anyway. So
something has to give.

Even if I'm wrong, the contention about clone dependence suggests to me
that we don't really know how to make a voting system that does what's
asked of such a primary. In a sense, it's not just that we don't know
how to solve the puzzle, but we're uncertain what kind of puzzle it is
(what the desiderata and dynamics are). But you said in another post that

This in turn suggests that you could at least determine if a particular
suggestion would be good by simulating the two-stage process:

• Lots of candidates present themselves
• Voters vote in the primary according to the method to be tested
  (possibly with some noise)
• Then the voters' hypothetical correct no-truncated ranking (of 500
  candidates!) is used as a basis for the general method, but after
  everybody but the finalist set is eliminated.
• Now determine the VSE, strategic resistance, or other figure of
  interest wrt the winner of the general.

Maybe by tinkering with this, it would be possible to get some idea of
what works and what doesn't. But note that it doesn't incorporate the
idea that getting acquainted with candidate positions is very expensive
when there are 500 of them, unless the primary deliberately takes that
into account.

-km

Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info

The sort of solution I had in mind was: reduce the 500 candidates to 36
by administrative means; reduce the 36 to 6 by a primary; hold a
Condorcet election with 6 andidates. The same answer applies if you
replace 500 by 5 million; the problem is to devise an electoral system
which doesn't start from a favourable assumption on the number of
candidates.
   If you sufficiently dislike administrative means, then you will need
an ingenious scheme like Toby's; I view them as a necessary evil.
      CJC

On 02/09/2023 08:48, Toby Pereira wrote:

In principle, the Hare system, as advocated by mathematicians, Clarence
Hoag and George Hallett in "Proportional Representation. The key to
democracy" does not need primaries. The point about "Proportional
Representation with a single transferable vote in large constituencies"
to quote HG Wells, in turn quoted by Hoag and Hallett, is that STV is a
general election, primaries and plebiscites combined into one, as
pointed out by Joe Rogaly in "Parliament for the People." Joe Rogaly
coined the term "the super-vote" for STV, which is a sometimes unpopular
term, even while people liked the system.

Hoag and Hallett explicitly said STV did not need separate primary
elections, when discussing the prospective New York city STV elections.

Even when there are more candidates than the voters can be familiar
with, separate primaries may not be needed. This is because all voters
can home in on the issues most important to them, and the specific
candidates, who state their concerns with them.

The volume of candidates is determined by the level or area of
government. Hence local elections; the candidates entry arena of
politics, may have thousands of candidates, but they will tend to focus
on the areas they come from, and know about, and are known in.

Regards,

Richard Lung.

On 02/09/2023 07:48, Toby Pereira wrote:

but there wouldn't be just 50 types because you'd want the candidates >
to be against different candidates on different ballots to make it >
fairer (so there'd be more than 50). These ballots would be randomly >
distributed to the voters (each candidate would appear on the same >
number of ballots). If you made it approval voting, you could > probably
just combine all the ballots together and use a proportional > approval
method to determine the candidates that make the final > election. > >
Toby > > On Saturday, 2 September 2023 at 00:21:17 BST, Kristofer
Munsterhjelm > km_elmet@t-online.de wrote: > > > I think I'm more or
less done with this subject, as I don't feel > like I'm getting anywhere
much. But I will reply to this: > > On 9/1/23 17:47, Colin Champion
wrote: >> It seems to me that the position is this. Condorcet voting
works >> well under certain assumptions, which include voters sincerely

turns out to be less of a problem than one might fear, but drastic >>
truncation is fatal. The merits of Condorcet voting lie partly in >> its
not penalising minor parties, so you'd expect it to lead to an >>
explosion in the number of candidates. So you're organising a >>
presidential election, hoping to take advantage of the merits of >>
Condorcet voting, and you expect 500 candidates to put themselves >>
forward. What do you do? One no-brain solution is to run a >> Condorcet
election with 500 candidates. Another is to rely on >> administrative
procedures, eg. only the 5 candidates with most >> supporting signatures
get onto the ballot. This isn't a bad idea; >> something like it is
widely practised. I think the Virginia meeting >> is intentionally
allowing it as an option. Can we do better? > > I guess that with
numbers around 500, nothing will really work well, > and that we would
bump against the, for lack of a better term, > "aristocratic nature" of
elections. That is, if we don't do anything > to counteract it, such a
field will naturally thin itself out by > who's got the best marketing;
by what candidates are able to amplify > their voice and get their
message out the most, and that undoing this > bias will require a more
thorough redesign than changing the way > votes are tallied. > > If
that's right, then it would seem the only option is to augment > the
electoral procedure itself. Do something like asset voting or > have a
representative sample dig deep into the candidates policies > and pick
the finalist set. For 500 candidates, the voters would > otherwise face
a burden just getting to know what they're about, no > matter the voting
system, and the 100:1 "compression ratio" down to a > finalist set of 5
is so high that it's very difficult to get the > right set if they skip
on that burden. Any consistent bias will > greatly shrink that
500-candidate set with time. > > If we suppose that all of the 500 have
a chance to get into the > finalist set, there has to be a considerable
period before the > general happens, so that finalist set can inform the
electorate of > their positions. > > The more we consider the
possibility that anybody could be a good > winner, the more elections,
as a mechanism, is at a disadvantage > from the start. My intuitive
feeling is that at a 100:1 ratio, if you > only choose centrists, then
the non-centrists are disincentivized as > you say. If you don't only
choose centrists, then there's not enough > room for the full variety of
the 500 to be represented in a set of > size 5 anyway. So something has
to give. > > Even if I'm wrong, the contention about clone dependence
suggests to > me that we don't really know how to make a voting system
that does > what's asked of such a primary. In a sense, it's not just
that we > don't know how to solve the puzzle, but we're uncertain what
kind of > puzzle it is (what the desiderata and dynamics are). But you
said in > another post that > >> I posted some figures a while ago
indicating that as the level of >> truncation increased, some strange
reversals set in just after the >> half-way mark: the Borda count
briefly gained in accuracy while >> Condorcet methods started a headlong
fall. > > This in turn suggests that you could at least determine if a >
particular suggestion would be good by simulating the two-stage >
process: > > - Lots of candidates present themselves - Voters vote in
the primary > according to the method to be tested (possibly with some
noise) - > Then the voters' hypothetical correct no-truncated ranking
(of 500 > candidates!) is used as a basis for the general method, but
after > everybody but the finalist set is eliminated. - Now determine
the > VSE, strategic resistance, or other figure of interest wrt the
winner > of the general. > > Maybe by tinkering with this, it would be
possible to get some idea > of what works and what doesn't. But note
that it doesn't incorporate > the idea that getting acquainted with
candidate positions is very > expensive when there are 500 of them,
unless the primary deliberately > takes that into account. > > -km > >
---- Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em >
https://electorama.com/em for list info > > ---- Election-Methods
mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em > for list
infoepresentation with a single transferable vote in large
constituencies" to quote HG Wells, in turn quoted by Hoag and Hallett