I may have already mentioned that Steven Brams suggested that, instead of starting with a pairwise-count, and using Approval only for tiebreaking, it would be better to always elect a majority-approved candidate if there is one. But one reason to use rank-balloting is because many people might need it for the reassurance that they'd need in order to overcompromise, or refuse to support a rival at all. So it seems to me that methods that look first at pairwise-count--methods such as MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, & IC,MMPO better satisfy that need for a rank-count method. But there could maybe some future electorate that doesn't have that need, and maybe, then, there'd be a good case for ensuring that a majority-approved candidate is elected if there is one. With such a hypothetical electorate of the future, the only real purpose of rankings would be to provide an easy, convenient & reliable way to avoid chicken-dilemma. I'd like to suggest two such methods, which meet FBC, provide an easy way to avoid chicken-dilemma, and elect a majority-approved candidate if there is one. 1. Majority-Approval Pairwise (MAPW): Rankings. Default is, all ranked candidates are approved, but you can un-approve any particular candidates that you want to. If no one is majority-approved, then use MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, or IC,MMPO. Otherwise, just elect the Approval winner. *2. *Majority-Approval Pairwise2 (MAPW2): Rankings. Default is all ranked candidates are approved, but you can un-approve any particular candidates that you want to. If no one is majority-approved, then use MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, or IC,MMPO. If 1 candidate is majority-approved, s/he wins. If 2 or more candidates are majority-approved, then choose among them by MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, or IC,MMPO. ------------------------- MAPW is simpler, and has more approval & less pairwise-count. MAPW & MAPW2 are for a time when the only reason for using rankings is to easily avoid chicken-dilemma, and it's desired to use a method that's as much Approval as possible. Michael Ossipoff

I forgot to add: When MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, or IC,MMPO is used to choose between 2 or more candidates who are majority-approved, then majority-defeats & pairwise-opposition by the not-majority-approved candidates count in the MDDA or MMPO count. ...not just majority-defeats & pairwise-opposition by majority-approved candidates. Michael Ossipoff On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 8:28 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com> wrote: > I may have already mentioned that Steven Brams suggested that, instead of > starting with a pairwise-count, and using Approval only for tiebreaking, it > would be better to always elect a majority-approved candidate if there is > one. > > But one reason to use rank-balloting is because many people might need it > for the reassurance that they'd need in order to overcompromise, or refuse > to support a rival at all. > > So it seems to me that methods that look first at pairwise-count--methods > such as MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, & IC,MMPO better satisfy that need for a > rank-count method. > > But there could maybe some future electorate that doesn't have that need, > and maybe, then, there'd be a good case for ensuring that a > majority-approved candidate is elected if there is one. > > With such a hypothetical electorate of the future, the only real purpose > of rankings would be to provide an easy, convenient & reliable way to avoid > chicken-dilemma. > > I'd like to suggest two such methods, which meet FBC, provide an easy way > to avoid chicken-dilemma, and elect a majority-approved candidate if there > is one. > > 1. Majority-Approval Pairwise (MAPW): > > Rankings. Default is, all ranked candidates are approved, but you can > un-approve any particular candidates that you want to. > > If no one is majority-approved, then use MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, or IC,MMPO. > > Otherwise, just elect the Approval winner. > > *2. *Majority-Approval Pairwise2 (MAPW2): > > Rankings. Default is all ranked candidates are approved, but you can > un-approve any particular candidates that you want to. > > If no one is majority-approved, then use MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, or IC,MMPO. > > If 1 candidate is majority-approved, s/he wins. > > If 2 or more candidates are majority-approved, then choose among them by > MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, or IC,MMPO. > > ------------------------- > > MAPW is simpler, and has more approval & less pairwise-count. > > MAPW & MAPW2 are for a time when the only reason for using rankings is to > easily avoid chicken-dilemma, and it's desired to use a method that's as > much Approval as possible. > > Michael Ossipoff > > > > > > >